In economic games the facial attributes of counterparts bias decisions to trust and decisions to enter play. We report research supporting hypotheses that trust and reciprocation decisions in trust games are biased by mechanisms of sexual selection. Hypotheses that trust game behaviour is modulated by inter-sexual competition were supported. 1) Attractive individuals elicit more cooperation. 2) Male participants display trust and reciprocation toward attractive female counterparts in excess of perceived trustworthiness (and this display is modulated by male self-reported physical dominance). 3) Female participants appear to respond to male trust as a signal of sexual interest and are therefore more likely to exploit the trust of attractive males. 4) In explicitly dating contexts females are more likely to prefer attractive males to pay for the meal. These results indicate that participants are biased by mate choice and mating display considerations while playing economic games in the lab. Hypotheses that trust game behaviour is modulated by intra-sexual competition for resources were also somewhat supported. 1) Male participants reporting an ability to win fights with same-sex peers are more exploitative of other males. 2) Cues to current circulating testosterone level in counterpart’s faces are less trusted but elicit more reciprocation. 3) The male sexually dimorphic trait facial width-to-height ratio (a trait which is related to both aggression and dominance) is related to an increased proportion of decisions to exploit others in the trust game while also being used by others as a cue to untrustworthiness. We conclude that trusting and trustworthy behaviour in both sexes is biased by mating market considerations predicted by intra- and inter-sexual selection.

Cross selling is the practice of selling additional products to an existing customer. It has the potential to boost revenues and can be beneficial for both the company and the customer. For many multi-divisional companies with product or service oriented organizational structures the attempt to realize the benefits of cross selling generates incentive problems. In this thesis, three problems spread over three business levels are identified. Firstly, management needs to (financially) motivate business units in fostering their cross selling efforts. Secondly, in order to make cross selling happen, business units need to cooperate and to exchange product-related information. Finally, in order to increase their short-term benefits business units might act opportunistically by selling products or services of other business units without paying attention to adding value for their customers. These incentive problems are theoretically examined by applying principal-agent theory and the theory of repeated games. Our findings suggest that an optimized incentive structure is required to make both the business units and the management better off. The thesis also analyses the circumstances and necessary prerequisites under which cross selling initiatives are beneficial for all involved parties. Apart from that cross selling sometimes may turn out to be non-beneficial. In addition to the elaborations above, risks and hazards of cross selling are presented in detail and applied for the extension of the underlying model. Bottom line, the work underlines that cross selling is to be realized holistically to ensure durable success. (author's abstract)

La tesi presenta alcuni dei risultati di un esperimento longitudinale condotto in due carceri statunitensi tra settembre 2015 e giugno 2016. L’obiettivo dell’analisi è testare lo studio delle preferenze sociali nella cornice dell’Economia Comportamentale e della teoria dei giochi (osservazione diretta del comportamento dei soggetti chiamati a compiere delle scelte in alcune situazioni selezionate), piuttosto che attraverso risposte a questionari auto valutativi. Infatti vengono messe in relazione i comportamenti osservati nei giochi e le spiegazioni che i soggetti intervistati danno di essi. Attraverso analisi statistica si può arrivare a dire che i comportamenti osservati nei giochi non sono sempre sufficienti per evidenziare le preferenze sociali dei soggetti, così come, del resto, non lo sono le risposte narrative. La conclusione che viene tratta dall’elaborato è che osservazione diretta dei comportamenti e analisi delle narrative personali dei soggetti sono due elementi ugualmente importanti per la comprensione delle preferenze sociali e che, lungi dall’escludersi a vicenda, si completano. / The thesis presents some of the results of a longitudinal experiment conducted in two U.S. prisons between September 2015 and June 2016. The objective of the analysis is to test the efficacy of studying social preferences in the framework of behavioral Economics and game theory (direct observation of the behaviour of the subjects asked to make choices in real situations), rather than through self-evaluative questionnaires and surveys. In fact, the analysis links the behaviors observed in the games and the explanations given by the subjects. In general it can be said that the behaviors observed in the games are not always sufficient to highlight the social preferences of the subjects, as well as, moreover, are not the narrative answers. The conclusion that comes from the elaborate is that direct observation of the behaviors and analysis of the personal narratives of the subjects are two equally important tools in the study social preferences and that, far from being mutually exclusive, they complement each other.