Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 66-67).

Thesis (M.A.)--Missouri State University, 2009. / "May 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaf 99). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Saint Louis University, 1932. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. [179]-181).

Thesis (M.A.)--George Mason University, 2009. / Vita: p. 108. Thesis director: John Barclay Burns. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Nov. 11, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 98-107). Also issued in print.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Talbot School of Theology, Biola University, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-127).

No description available.

No description available.

M.A. (Philosophy) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

The aim of this thesis is to examine what affect, if any, finding an argument both unanswerable yet unbelievable has on three purported first-person doxastic constraints. The three proposed constraints are the principle of truth, the principle of adequate reason and the principle of epistemic explanation. In Chapter 1, I lay out the claim of each of these constraints; differentiate them from one another, examine under what conditions they can be said to apply and provide what I take to be the strongest arguments for each of them. In Chapter 2, I explicate what I mean by finding an argument unanswerable yet unbelievable. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I detail how it is that finding an argument unanswerable yet unbelievable could constitute a threat to each of these constraints. I conclude that while the principle of adequate reason is undermined in the face of this threat, both the principle of truth and the principle of epistemic explanation fail to be undermined by this challenge.

No Abstract / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / (D. Lit. et Phil. (Philosophy))