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Essays on the Economics of Open-Source SoftwareOrman, Wafa Hakim January 2007 (has links)
This dissertation comprises three essays analyzing various economic questions relating to open-source software development. The common thread linking these essays is the long-term sustainability of the open-source software development model, which is largely built on unpaid contributions from individual developers scattered across the world. The first essay develops a theoretical analysis of the market for operating systems as two-sided platforms, modeling the effects of competition and compatibility between a proprietary platform developed by a profit-maximizing firm, and an open platform (a public good developed by volunteers). Looking at the impacts on the proprietary platform firm, and application developer firms and users of both platforms, I find that under certain circumstances, a proprietary platform can find it profitable to become compatible with the open platform. However, it is always optimal in terms of social welfare to have compatibility between platforms. The second essay uses a laboratory experiment to examine how these characteristics and levels of motivations that are heterogeneous across individuals interact to result in sustainable, non-zero levels of contribution to open source software. There is a pronounced “leadership effect,” with subjects playing in the first position invariably contributing more frequently than those in the second position, and so on. Heterogeneity preserves the leadership effect, but increases contributions across the board, and eliminates the pattern of declining individual and total group contributions over time frequently observed in public goods experiments. The third essay studies the micro-foundations of open-source software contributions and provides an empirical examination of developer motivations using survey data. If open-source contributions and education are both signals of ability, then their impact on income is likely to be linked. They may be complements if open source contributions reinforce the signal from education by showing that one stands out from the crowd, or they might be substitutes if open-source development replaces expensive education in honing programming skills by offering more immediate feedback. Using an instrumental variables framework to deal with the endogeneity of the education and contribution choices, I find that leading an open-source project and completing college are complementary practices, so that the signaling and reputation-building aspect dominates.
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Essays on spatial and behavioral analytics for platform designLee, Kyungmin (Brad) 17 July 2020 (has links)
The design and operation of a two-sided platform require a variety of decisions to facilitate a match between sellers (capacity) and buyers (demand). Many platforms deploy analytic capabilities to leverage rich information, on both demand and capacity, that is available in real-time. This dissertation research explores design decisions, such as price structure and quality controls, and allied analytic capabilities in order to document their impact on platform governance. These decisions are tested in the context of ride-sharing platform by positing three fundamental challenges that must be accounted for effective design: (1) spatial distribution of capacity and demand that allows for capacity spillovers, (2) buyer’s sentiment biases, and (3) seller’s relocation biases. These challenges are assessed in three separate but related essays.
The first essay investigates how the policies for setting surge prices should be designed under capacity spillovers. Using a data set from Uber’s operations, we estimate a spatial panel model to reveal its surge pricing structure that accounts for spatial dependency. Allied counterfactual analysis illustrates the limitations of a spot pricing policy (i.e., a policy that does not account for spillovers).
The second essay assesses the impact of buyer’s sentiment bias, ranging from optimism to pessimism, on the platform’s decision to control seller quality. Platforms face a trade-off between ensuring high-quality sellers and guaranteeing enough sellers such that wait-time is lowered. We formally characterize an optimal exclusion threshold on seller quality in the presence of sentiment bias.
We also examine strategies that a platform can access to benefit from buyer’s behavioral biases. Results document the impact of seller quality on a platform’s profitability and social welfare.
In the last essay, we focus on the seller’s relocation behavior. There is a debate in the literature on whether sellers’ willingness to relocate across demand zones in order to chase surging prices is rewarded in a ride-sharing platform setting. Using multiple machine learning algorithms, we classify rewarding behaviors with different pricing structures under a variety of circumstances. Results provide guidance on how to provide incentives while managing the dynamics of spatially distributed capacity.
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Essays on market structureRuan, Feng January 2012 (has links)
Some of the most important work in the development of economic theory is associated with the study of market structure. In essence, most markets are two-sided. For example, product markets connect tens of thousands of product brands to tens of millions of consumers; marriage markets couple the single men and women who would otherwise suffer from a lonely heart; and labour markets link the job candidates to their preferred employers and positions. Apart from the two-sidedness, we have explored another important common aspect of these market structures, i.e. interconnection/competition of the segments within one side of the market. Under this common thread, the three essays in this thesis are freshly formulated in a loosely related manner, covering topics in three different areas. Chapter 2 is motivated by strategic transitions of many marketplaces (e.g. Amazon.com). From the perspective of a platform owner, when it owns part of the business on one side of the market, there is no straightforward answer as to whether having the rest of business owned by others is advantageous or not. The argument is that, on the one hand, the platform welcomes more third-party business as it boosts revenue in terms of membership fees; on the other hand the business owned by the platform dislikes the incoming competitors whose participation drives down pro t margins. We propose a novel framework in this chapter to explore the trade-off between the two. Here, the intermediary can decide to be either a "merchant" or a "two-sided platform", or a hybrid one in between. Our analysis shows that in hybrid mode the platform extracts all the surplus from the producers of the merchandised brands, and the merchandised brands always charge a price premium compared to the directly retailed ones. We also show that as the platform absorbs an existing directly retailed brand into the self-brand portfolio, the equilibrium prices of both brand types are increased. We find that only the directly retailed brands dominate the market when the platform s capacity is relatively small; and both brand types coexist in the marketplace when the capacity is relatively large. Furthermore, we find a backward bending proportion plus a vertical proportion of the "contract curve" in comparative statics. That is, the self-brand portfolio always expands while the third-party-brand portfolio shrinks until it reaches a certain level, when the platform increases its capacity. It helps us to gain some ideas on the dynamics of brand portfolio management for the platform. Lastly, taking into account of indirect network effect which is the common feature in the two-sided market, it is shown that the platform is better o¤ when consumers have positive expected surplus. Chapter 3 is much motivated by the Chinese experience. China has witnessed the largest rural to urban labour ow (among which the majority are male) in the world s history over the last three decades. We propose an idea that the grand migration can also be attributed to the unbalanced sex ratio between rural and urban areas. This chapter develops a two-sided matching model of two linked marriage markets with homogeneous agents, non-transferable utility and search friction. We extend the one-market model of the previous literature into a two-market one, allowing the agents to migrate between the markets at a fixed cost. The analysis focuses on the unmatched as well as the migrating population, which is induced by the different sex ratios in the two geographically isolated marriage markets. We find that imperfections in the matching technology leads to the enlarged gap of sex ratio of the unmatched population compared to that of the unbalanced inflows. We are interested in the question of how the migrating costs affect the migration between rural and urban areas, and under what conditions a subsidy covering migrating costs might benefit a party in the marriage markets. We characterise the equilibrium set in the parameter space of migrating costs, and find that a full subsidy of migrating costs does not necessarily benefit those who receive it but always benefits the opposite sex, if they are the short sides of both markets. Chapter 4 explains the migration of labour force from a different angle. Here, the migration is of workers to jobs. Motivated by the distinction of public and private sector, we consider a spatial oligopsony model in which forms (two co-locating small firms with recruiting capacity constraints and a large firm without such limit) are competing for workers along a "strip" market. The capacity issue that is extensively discussed in the Chapter 2 again plays an important role in this model, though in a very different context. It is shown that the recruiting capacity affects the intra-group competition and hence the inter-group competition in wage- posting strategies. Additionally, we show that, as recruiting limits expand, the expected wages offered by the small firms increase while the wage offered by the big firm decreases, which helps to explain the recent trend of the wage disparity between public and private jobs. We also characterise the equilibrium wages and the size (direction) of the migration in the three-stage game (i.e. the workers decide whether to relocate in the first stage, then the big firm decides its wage offer, and lastly, the two co-locating firms simultaneous set wages), which helps us to understand better the inter-sector mobility in a changing environment of economy. We investigate the issues of interconnection and competition in three different markets. It is always of interest for a researcher of economics to have some ideas on the same issue from different perspectives. Remember that whilst this is a collection of essays on economic theory, it is nonetheless compared to empirical observation. And it will surely serve as a starting point for the author to further the research on market structure.
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The Value of Branding in Two-sided PlatformsSun, Yutec 13 August 2013 (has links)
This thesis studies the value of branding in the smartphone market. Measuring brand value with data available at product level potentially entails computational and econometric challenges due to data constraints. These issues motivate the three studies of the thesis. Chapter 2 studies the smartphone market to understand how operating system platform providers can grow one of the most important intangible assets, i.e., brand value, by leveraging the indirect network between two user groups in a two-sided platform. The main finding is that iPhone achieved the greatest brand value growth by opening its platform to the participation of third-party developers, thereby indirectly connecting the consumers and the developers via its app store effectively. Without the open app store, I find that iPhone would have lost its brand value by becoming a two-sided platform. Hence these findings provide an important lesson that open platform strategy is vital to the success of building platform brands. Chapter 3 solves a computational challenge in structural estimation of aggregate demand. I develop a computationally efficient MCMC algorithm for the GMM estimation framework developed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (forthcoming). I combine the MCMC method with the classical approach by transforming the GMM into a Laplace type estimation framework, therefore avoiding the need to formulate a likelihood model. The proposed algorithm solves the two fixed point problems, i.e., the market share inversion and the dynamic programming, incrementally with MCMC iteration. Hence the proposed approach achieves computational efficiency without compromising the advantages of the conventional GMM approach. Chapter 4 reviews recently developed econometric methods to control for endogeneity bias when the random slope coefficient is correlated with treatment variables. I examine how standard instrumental variables and control function approaches can solve the slope endogeneity problem under two general frameworks commonly used in the literature.
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The Value of Branding in Two-sided PlatformsSun, Yutec 13 August 2013 (has links)
This thesis studies the value of branding in the smartphone market. Measuring brand value with data available at product level potentially entails computational and econometric challenges due to data constraints. These issues motivate the three studies of the thesis. Chapter 2 studies the smartphone market to understand how operating system platform providers can grow one of the most important intangible assets, i.e., brand value, by leveraging the indirect network between two user groups in a two-sided platform. The main finding is that iPhone achieved the greatest brand value growth by opening its platform to the participation of third-party developers, thereby indirectly connecting the consumers and the developers via its app store effectively. Without the open app store, I find that iPhone would have lost its brand value by becoming a two-sided platform. Hence these findings provide an important lesson that open platform strategy is vital to the success of building platform brands. Chapter 3 solves a computational challenge in structural estimation of aggregate demand. I develop a computationally efficient MCMC algorithm for the GMM estimation framework developed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (forthcoming). I combine the MCMC method with the classical approach by transforming the GMM into a Laplace type estimation framework, therefore avoiding the need to formulate a likelihood model. The proposed algorithm solves the two fixed point problems, i.e., the market share inversion and the dynamic programming, incrementally with MCMC iteration. Hence the proposed approach achieves computational efficiency without compromising the advantages of the conventional GMM approach. Chapter 4 reviews recently developed econometric methods to control for endogeneity bias when the random slope coefficient is correlated with treatment variables. I examine how standard instrumental variables and control function approaches can solve the slope endogeneity problem under two general frameworks commonly used in the literature.
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Essays in Market Design and Industrial OrganizationDimakopoulos, Philipp Dimitrios 27 April 2018 (has links)
Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei unabhängigen Kapiteln in den Bereichen Matching Market Design, Industrieökonomie und Wettbewerbspolitik.
Kapitel 1 behandelt den Matching-Markt für juristische Referendariatsstellen in Deutschland. Wegen übermäßiger Nachfrage müssen Anwälte oft warten, bevor sie zugewiesen werden. Der aktuell verwendete Algorithmus berücksichtigt nicht die Zeitpräferenzen der Anwälte. Daher werden viele wünschenswerte Eigenschaften nicht erfüllt. Basierend auf dem matching with contracts Modell schlage ich dann einen neuen Mechanismus vor, der die Wartezeit als Vertragsterm verwendet, so dass die Mängel des gegenwärtigen Mechanismus überwunden werden können.
In Kapitel 2 analysiere ich den Wettbewerb von zweiseitigen Online-Plattformen, wie sozialen Netzwerken oder Suchmaschinen. Werbetreibende zahlen Geld, um ihre Anzeigen zu platzieren, während Nutzer mit ihren privaten Daten "bezahlen", um Zugang zu der Plattform zu erhalten. Ich zeige, dass das Gleichgewichtsniveau der Datenerhebung verzerrt ist, abhängig von der Intensität des Wettbewerbs und den Targeting-Vorteilen. Weniger Wettbewerb auf jeder Marktseite führt zu mehr Datensammeln. Wenn jedoch Plattformen Geldzahlungen auf beiden Marktseiten verwenden, wird die effiziente Menge an Daten gesammelt.
Kapitel 3 untersucht die dynamische Preissetzung auf Märkten für Flug- oder Reisebuchungen, auf denen Wettbewerb während einer endlichen Verkaufszeit mit einer Frist stattfindet. Unter Berücksichtigung der intertemporalen Probleme von Firmen und vorausschauenden Konsumenten hängen die Gleichgewichtspreispfade von der Anzahl der nicht verkauften Kapazitäten und der verbleibenden Verkaufszeit ab. Ich ermittle, dass mehr Voraussicht der Konsumenten die Konsumentenrente erhöht, aber die Effizienz reduziert. Ferner ist Wettbewerbspolitik besonders wertvoll, wenn die Marktkapazitäten zu hoch sind. Des Weiteren kann die ex-ante Produktion von Kapazitäten ineffizient niedrig sein. / This thesis consists of three independent chapters in the fields of matching market design, industrial organization and competition policy.
Chapter 1 covers the matching market for lawyer trainee-ship positions in Germany. Because of excess demand lawyers often must wait before being allocated. The currently used algorithm does not take lawyers’ time-preferences into account. Hence, many desirable properties are not satisfied. Then, based on the matching with contacts model, I propose a new mechanism using waiting time as the contractual term, so that the shortcomings of the current mechanism can be overcome.
In Chapter 2 I analyze competition of two-sided online platforms, such as social networks or search engines. Advertisers pay money to place their ads, while users “pay” with their private data to gain access to the platform. I show that the equilibrium level of data collection is distorted, depending on the competition intensity and targeting benefits. Less competition on either market side leads to more data collection. However, if platforms use monetary payments on both market sides, data collection would be efficient.
Chapter 3 studies dynamic pricing as in markets for airline or travel bookings, where competition takes place throughout a finite selling time with a deadline. Considering the inter-temporal problems of firms and forward-looking consumers, the equilibrium price paths depend on the number of unsold capacities and remaining selling time. I find that more consumer foresight increases consumer surplus yet reduces efficiency. Further, competition policy is especially valuable when market capacities are excessive. Moreover, ex-ante capacity production can be inefficiently low.
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The Influence of Market Dynamics on Business-to-Business Platform Service Pricing : A Case Study in the Spirits IndustryNygren Ålander, Andreas, Simoni, Vilhelm January 2022 (has links)
Digitization of business has evolved business strategies and models. Companies have found new ways of value creation and consequently innovated monetization. A prominent area where this can be seen is within platform services, which lacks business-to-business research. Knowledge contribution in this area is therefore warranted. Aim – This study aims to investigate pricing strategies and contextual challenges and opportunities regarding platform services in the spirits industry. To enable this, the following research questions have been formulated: 1) What are important market dynamics to consider when developing a platform service in the spirits industry? 2) How will these market dynamics affect the pricing strategy of a business-to-business platform service? Method – Considering that theory testing and theory generation are both parts of this study, the methodological approach is abductive. Regarding the data collection, a literature review was paired with a case study. Semi-structured interviews with senior executives from the focal industry provides the source of primary data for this study. Thereafter, a thematical analysis method was applied to help answer the research questions. Findings – From the thematical analysis, this study identified five market dynamics affecting pricing strategies of business-to-business platform services in the spirits industry. Namely, adaptability, legislative barriers, locking effects, individualization of business relations, and digitization. Implications – This study contributes to the spirits industry and to business-to-business platform developers through the identification of market dynamics. Investigation into how pricing strategies of platform services are affected by the industry-specific market dynamics can contribute to strategic decision-making. In terms of theoretical significance, the aforementioned market dynamics add to the business-to-business discourse. Additionally, this study’s explorative nature is expected to pave the way for further research into business-to-business platforms, the spirits industry, market dynamics, and pricing strategy. Limitations – The work context is limited to digital platform services within the spirits industry. Moreover, albeit the literature review covers established theory regarding both business-to-consumer and business-to-business platform services, the empirical focus and consequently the ambition of the analysis is to generate new knowledge for the business-to-business environment specifically. Lastly, the interview respondents are limited to the case company’s network.
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