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I examine the relation between tax avoidance and firm investment by drawing on two capital market imperfections, adverse selection and moral hazard, to provide a link between tax avoidance and investment. Firms experiencing capital rationing because of adverse selection rely on internal resources to fund investment opportunities because of costly external financing. Tax avoidance can provide additional cash-flows that may alleviate capital rationing. Alternatively, tax avoidance can exacerbate problems of moral hazard by facilitating managerial rent extraction in the form of overinvestment. I find a positive relation between tax avoidance and investment suggesting effects of either capital rationing or overinvestment. To distinguish between these two effects, I examine how the relation between tax avoidance and investment varies in settings where capital rationing or overinvestment is more likely to occur. My findings suggest that firms rely on the cash savings from tax avoidance to alleviate capital rationing.

For more than a decade, to reduce the agency problem, various ways have been examined on how to align the interest of manager with shareholders. Evidence and empirical findings are conflicting on the agency problem. Recently, deferred compensation as one incentive compensation draws the attention as a means to incentivize CEOs to make them work for the firm. However, it is still not evident if deferred compensation has effect on aligning CEOs with the firm’s goal possibly due to the issue on data. Therefore, the first essay investigates if deferred compensation has the effect on the agency problem and on the firm performance improvement after dealing with the data issue. This paper mainly aims to investigate if there is the non-linear relationship between the investment choice problem and the deferred compensation as Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim. This paper concludes that deferred compensation from NQDC table has positive and significant effect on the firm performance and the investment choice problem. More importantly, following McConnell and Servaes (1990), this paper finds the curvilinear relationship between Tobin’s Q and the deferred compensation and can confirm Jensen and Meckling (1976) theoretical application. The second essay aims to clarify the understanding on the relationship between the firm’s cash holdings and its causes by introducing the more detailed relationship between cash holdings and macroeconomic uncertainty. While previous literature tries to explain the level of cash holdings mainly by the firm-level variables, this study considers the full impact of the macroeconomic uncertainty on the level of cash holdings by introducing the firm’s heterogeneous exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty to see if the heterogeneity can tell the difference in the change in the level of cash holdings. This paper finds that macroeconomic uncertainties measured by difference macroeconomic condition variables are significant and contribute to the change in cash holdings. Additionally, this paper shows that the firms’ different level of exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty can cause the different degree of cash holdings and that firms with the higher level of exposure have the higher level of cash holdings.

O propósito do presente estudo foi investigar a relação entre qualidade das informações contábeis, restrição financeira e decisões de investimentos na América Latina. Para isso analisou-se uma amostra com 10.318 observações de 958 empresas não financeiras de capital aberto, oriundas de sete diferentes países, entre os períodos de 1992 a 2009. Com o uso do modelo probabilístico Logit estimou-se o impacto da qualidade dos lucros na probabilidade das firmas apresentarem superinvestimentos, subinvestimentos ou restrição financeira. Em seguida, utilizando o método dos momentos generalizados (GMM) e uma adaptação do modelo acelerador de investimentos, estimaram-se os determinantes dos investimentos. Os resultados indicam que uma pior qualidade nos lucros possa reduzir a probabilidade de decisões eficientes de investimentos e aumentar a possibilidade de subinvestimentos. Verificou-se haver indícios de que a pior qualidade nos lucros possa exacerbar os problemas causados pelo conflito de interesses entre os tomadores de decisões e os investidores das firmas latino-americanas, pois a baixa qualidade nos lucros mostrou-se positivamente associada às taxas de investimentos das firmas com superinvestimentos e negativamente relacionada às taxas de investimentos das firmas com subinvestimentos. Por fim, os resultados indicam que a qualidade dos lucros afeta a sensibilidade dos investimentos ao caixa das firmas que estejam em situação de restrição financeira. Assim, conclui-se que a qualidade das informações financeiras, como ferramenta para redução de assimetria de informações, pode impactar as decisões de investimentos das empresas da América Latina. / The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship among accruals quality, financial constraint and investment decisions in Latin America. For this, it was analyzed a sample with 10,318 observations of 958 non-financial companies from seven different countries, between 1992 to 2009. Using the probabilistic model Logit it was estimated the impact of earnings quality on the probability of overinvestment, underinvestment and financial constraints. Then, using the generalized method of moments (GMM) and an adaptation of the accelerator model of investment, it was estimated the investment determinants. The results indicate that a poor accruals quality can reduce the probability of efficient investment decisions and increase the possibility of underinvestment. The results show that poor accruals quality could exacerbate the problems caused by the conflict of interest between decision-makers and investors from Latin American firms, because poor accruals quality was positively associated with investment rates for firms with overinvestment and negatively related to firms investment for firms with underinvestment. Finally, the results indicate that the accruals quality affects the investment-cash flow sensitivities for firms in financial constraint situation. Thus, we concluded that quality of financial information, as a tool to reduce information asymmetries, might affect the investment decisions in Latin America.

Esse trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a sensibilidade do investimento ao fluxo de caixa de 356 firmas brasileiras de capital aberto no período de 1997-2010, considerando a estrutura de propriedade e controle. As firmas são classificadas a priori entre subinvestimento e superinvestimento, e reagrupadas conforme o nível de oportunidades de investimento do setor industrial. Com uma versão do modelo acelerador de investimento, estimado pelo método GMM System, o estudo mostra que essa sensibilidade poderia sinalizar oportunidades de investimento, problemas de agência do fluxo de caixa livre e problemas de assimetria de informação. Particularmente, discute-se que o superinvestimento pode ser oriundo tanto dos problemas de agência do fluxo de caixa livre quanto ser uma sinalização ao mercado do volume de oportunidades de investimento. Além disso, também é investigado se firmas com controle familiar, estruturadas como pirâmides e pirâmides controladas por família têm influência sobre o volume de recursos próprios aplicados para financiar os investimentos. As estimativas mostram que os investimentos das firmas consideradas com subinvestimento e grandes oportunidades de investimento podem não ser sensíveis ao fluxo de caixa quando o excesso de direito de voto sobre o direito de propriedade do maior acionista é baixo. Por outro lado, para as firmas consideradas com superinvestimento e poucas oportunidades de investimento, o controle familiar e a pirâmide controlada por família poderiam intensificar essa sensibilidade, caso o controlador detenha níveis extremos de excesso de controle. Esse estudo proporciona evidências de que a maior aplicação de recursos próprios nos investimentos das firmas com superinvestimento e grandes oportunidades de investimento seria, principalmente, uma característica de firmas familiares com o menor desvio entre o direito de voto e o direito de propriedade. Como uma análise adicional, o presente estudo investiga se a relação entre a sensibilidade do investimento ao fluxo de caixa e o excesso de controle do maior acionista é não linear. Os resultados estimados evidenciam a não linearidade dessa relação, exceto para as firmas piramidais familiares classificadas com superinvestimento e poucas oportunidades de investimento. / This study investigates the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a sample of 356 Brazilian listed firms on the period of 1997-2010, considering the ownership and control structure. Firms are grouped into underinvestment and overinvestment, and re-classified according to industrial investment opportunities. Using a version of the accelerator investment model, estimated by the System GMM, the results show that the investment-cash flow sensitivity may indicate asymmetric information, investment opportunities and agency problems of free cash flow. Specifically, it is discussed that the overinvestment may be signaling high investment opportunities or agency problems of free cash flow. The purpose of this study is also investigate whether family control, pyramidal ownership structure, and pyramidal controlled by families (pyramidal-family firms) can influence the level of internal capital used to finance investments. The results show that the investment of underinvestment firms with high industrial investment opportunities may be not sensitive to cash flow when the excess of control rights over cash flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder is lower. However, for overinvestment firms with low industrial investment opportunities, the family control and pyramidal-family may intensify the investment-cash flow sensitivity when the excess of control rights is high. For lower levels of excess of control rights, the results support that higher investment-cash flow sensitivity of overinvestment firms with high industrial investment opportunities may signal profitability potential of family firms. As an additional analysis, it is also investigated whether the relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and the excess of control rights is non-linear. The results confirm the non-linearity of this relationship, except to pyramidal-family firms into the overinvestment group with low industrial investment opportunities.

In this thesis, I investigate economic and policy implications of corporate debt financing. In the first chapter, I examine whether or not leverage has a negative effect on corporate investment due to a debt overhang problem. Existing empirical studies face a challenging endogeneity problem inherent in the investment-leverage relationship, the source of which is the firm's anticipation of its growth opportunities. I develop a novel approach to control for this problem by using analysts' earnings forecasts as an anticipation measure. I show that anticipations influence the investment-leverage relationship in that firms that do anticipate future growth opportunities suffer less from debt overhang. In the second chapter, I extend Chapter One's analysis to a dynamic setting. I first establish that there is a stable long-term relationship between investment and leverage, and then disentangle the short-term dynamics of leverage and investment and find that the deviation of leverage from its benchmark path has a negative impact on the change in investment. I also employ dynamic panel models to estimate the causal dynamic effects of leverage on investment. The estimations show that the impact is negative for recent leverage, but positive for leverage in the more distant past. Also, the effects of leverage are attenuated when the investment uncertainties are further controlled. This suggests that the firm's response to investment uncertainties might explain dynamic effects of leverage on investment. In Chapter Three, I investigate the effects of the U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy-reorganization law on firm operating performance, and adopt matching methods to account for self-selection and heterogeneity in firms' pre-filing characteristics. Matching methods entail the selection of a control group of non-bankrupt firms that are comparable to Chapter 11 filing firms in a wide range of pre-filing characteristics that affect filing decisions. Comparing the operating performances of the two groups, I find that filing firms' net cash flows, but not operating incomes, improve significantly during bankruptcy. Furthermore, firms reduce their leverage levels and incur lower interest expenses after bankruptcy. The results suggest that the reduction in interest expenses contributes to the improvement in firms' net cash flows during bankruptcy.

In this thesis, I investigate economic and policy implications of corporate debt financing. In the first chapter, I examine whether or not leverage has a negative effect on corporate investment due to a debt overhang problem. Existing empirical studies face a challenging endogeneity problem inherent in the investment-leverage relationship, the source of which is the firm's anticipation of its growth opportunities. I develop a novel approach to control for this problem by using analysts' earnings forecasts as an anticipation measure. I show that anticipations influence the investment-leverage relationship in that firms that do anticipate future growth opportunities suffer less from debt overhang. In the second chapter, I extend Chapter One's analysis to a dynamic setting. I first establish that there is a stable long-term relationship between investment and leverage, and then disentangle the short-term dynamics of leverage and investment and find that the deviation of leverage from its benchmark path has a negative impact on the change in investment. I also employ dynamic panel models to estimate the causal dynamic effects of leverage on investment. The estimations show that the impact is negative for recent leverage, but positive for leverage in the more distant past. Also, the effects of leverage are attenuated when the investment uncertainties are further controlled. This suggests that the firm's response to investment uncertainties might explain dynamic effects of leverage on investment. In Chapter Three, I investigate the effects of the U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy-reorganization law on firm operating performance, and adopt matching methods to account for self-selection and heterogeneity in firms' pre-filing characteristics. Matching methods entail the selection of a control group of non-bankrupt firms that are comparable to Chapter 11 filing firms in a wide range of pre-filing characteristics that affect filing decisions. Comparing the operating performances of the two groups, I find that filing firms' net cash flows, but not operating incomes, improve significantly during bankruptcy. Furthermore, firms reduce their leverage levels and incur lower interest expenses after bankruptcy. The results suggest that the reduction in interest expenses contributes to the improvement in firms' net cash flows during bankruptcy.

Esse trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a sensibilidade do investimento ao fluxo de caixa de 356 firmas brasileiras de capital aberto no período de 1997-2010, considerando a estrutura de propriedade e controle. As firmas são classificadas a priori entre subinvestimento e superinvestimento, e reagrupadas conforme o nível de oportunidades de investimento do setor industrial. Com uma versão do modelo acelerador de investimento, estimado pelo método GMM System, o estudo mostra que essa sensibilidade poderia sinalizar oportunidades de investimento, problemas de agência do fluxo de caixa livre e problemas de assimetria de informação. Particularmente, discute-se que o superinvestimento pode ser oriundo tanto dos problemas de agência do fluxo de caixa livre quanto ser uma sinalização ao mercado do volume de oportunidades de investimento. Além disso, também é investigado se firmas com controle familiar, estruturadas como pirâmides e pirâmides controladas por família têm influência sobre o volume de recursos próprios aplicados para financiar os investimentos. As estimativas mostram que os investimentos das firmas consideradas com subinvestimento e grandes oportunidades de investimento podem não ser sensíveis ao fluxo de caixa quando o excesso de direito de voto sobre o direito de propriedade do maior acionista é baixo. Por outro lado, para as firmas consideradas com superinvestimento e poucas oportunidades de investimento, o controle familiar e a pirâmide controlada por família poderiam intensificar essa sensibilidade, caso o controlador detenha níveis extremos de excesso de controle. Esse estudo proporciona evidências de que a maior aplicação de recursos próprios nos investimentos das firmas com superinvestimento e grandes oportunidades de investimento seria, principalmente, uma característica de firmas familiares com o menor desvio entre o direito de voto e o direito de propriedade. Como uma análise adicional, o presente estudo investiga se a relação entre a sensibilidade do investimento ao fluxo de caixa e o excesso de controle do maior acionista é não linear. Os resultados estimados evidenciam a não linearidade dessa relação, exceto para as firmas piramidais familiares classificadas com superinvestimento e poucas oportunidades de investimento. / This study investigates the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a sample of 356 Brazilian listed firms on the period of 1997-2010, considering the ownership and control structure. Firms are grouped into underinvestment and overinvestment, and re-classified according to industrial investment opportunities. Using a version of the accelerator investment model, estimated by the System GMM, the results show that the investment-cash flow sensitivity may indicate asymmetric information, investment opportunities and agency problems of free cash flow. Specifically, it is discussed that the overinvestment may be signaling high investment opportunities or agency problems of free cash flow. The purpose of this study is also investigate whether family control, pyramidal ownership structure, and pyramidal controlled by families (pyramidal-family firms) can influence the level of internal capital used to finance investments. The results show that the investment of underinvestment firms with high industrial investment opportunities may be not sensitive to cash flow when the excess of control rights over cash flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder is lower. However, for overinvestment firms with low industrial investment opportunities, the family control and pyramidal-family may intensify the investment-cash flow sensitivity when the excess of control rights is high. For lower levels of excess of control rights, the results support that higher investment-cash flow sensitivity of overinvestment firms with high industrial investment opportunities may signal profitability potential of family firms. As an additional analysis, it is also investigated whether the relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and the excess of control rights is non-linear. The results confirm the non-linearity of this relationship, except to pyramidal-family firms into the overinvestment group with low industrial investment opportunities.

O propósito do presente estudo foi investigar a relação entre qualidade das informações contábeis, restrição financeira e decisões de investimentos na América Latina. Para isso analisou-se uma amostra com 10.318 observações de 958 empresas não financeiras de capital aberto, oriundas de sete diferentes países, entre os períodos de 1992 a 2009. Com o uso do modelo probabilístico Logit estimou-se o impacto da qualidade dos lucros na probabilidade das firmas apresentarem superinvestimentos, subinvestimentos ou restrição financeira. Em seguida, utilizando o método dos momentos generalizados (GMM) e uma adaptação do modelo acelerador de investimentos, estimaram-se os determinantes dos investimentos. Os resultados indicam que uma pior qualidade nos lucros possa reduzir a probabilidade de decisões eficientes de investimentos e aumentar a possibilidade de subinvestimentos. Verificou-se haver indícios de que a pior qualidade nos lucros possa exacerbar os problemas causados pelo conflito de interesses entre os tomadores de decisões e os investidores das firmas latino-americanas, pois a baixa qualidade nos lucros mostrou-se positivamente associada às taxas de investimentos das firmas com superinvestimentos e negativamente relacionada às taxas de investimentos das firmas com subinvestimentos. Por fim, os resultados indicam que a qualidade dos lucros afeta a sensibilidade dos investimentos ao caixa das firmas que estejam em situação de restrição financeira. Assim, conclui-se que a qualidade das informações financeiras, como ferramenta para redução de assimetria de informações, pode impactar as decisões de investimentos das empresas da América Latina. / The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship among accruals quality, financial constraint and investment decisions in Latin America. For this, it was analyzed a sample with 10,318 observations of 958 non-financial companies from seven different countries, between 1992 to 2009. Using the probabilistic model Logit it was estimated the impact of earnings quality on the probability of overinvestment, underinvestment and financial constraints. Then, using the generalized method of moments (GMM) and an adaptation of the accelerator model of investment, it was estimated the investment determinants. The results indicate that a poor accruals quality can reduce the probability of efficient investment decisions and increase the possibility of underinvestment. The results show that poor accruals quality could exacerbate the problems caused by the conflict of interest between decision-makers and investors from Latin American firms, because poor accruals quality was positively associated with investment rates for firms with overinvestment and negatively related to firms investment for firms with underinvestment. Finally, the results indicate that the accruals quality affects the investment-cash flow sensitivities for firms in financial constraint situation. Thus, we concluded that quality of financial information, as a tool to reduce information asymmetries, might affect the investment decisions in Latin America.