The history of man is written in choice. Whether simple or complex, on a whim or after labored consideration, inflamed by passion or calculated coolly, the judgments that we form and the choices that we make define who we are and what we want for the future. Yet most of us have little or no conscious awareness of the inner workings of our own minds. We often choose without understanding or accounting for the perceptions, intuitions, and inferences that underlie our decisions. So how do people make decisions? How do we cope with the volume and complexity of information in our environment without being overwhelmed? How do we use our senses to select and process this information, and how do we organize, contextualize, and conceptualize it once it reaches our brains? How do we form judgments about the value of a specific piece of information or about the likelihood of a particular event or outcome? And what are the factors that lead us astray? The search for answers to these questions is more than academic; understanding the fundamentals of perception and cognition is critical to effective analysis and decision-making. For those involved in national security, and particularly for those involved in the collection and analysis of national intelligence, an appreciation of the intricacies of these processes has real-world implications. As evidenced by the dramatic intelligence failures of the last few years, and in particular by the mistaken assessment concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, understanding how we arrive at judgments and decisions can be quite literally a matter of life and death.

The changing nature of terrorist attacks in the previous decade has cast doubt on the commonly accepted constraints on terrorist violence. Claims that these constraints are eroding has led to an unstudied assumption that modern terrorist groups, and al-Qaeda in particular, are not subject to constituency constraints. Most alarming is the possibility that al-Qaeda, allegedly unconcerned with alienating supporters, will attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Yet no detailed study of al-Qaeda's constituency constraints has been undertaken, even though they devote considerable effort to win popular support among Muslims. This thesis reveals that al-Qaeda seeks the support of a constituency as the central pillar of their strategy. This constituency, contrary to Western portrayals, largely does not support indiscriminate killing and would not support a WMD attack. Al-Qaeda is aware of this sentiment, and as a pragmatic group is willing to alter their methods to gain supporters. Consequently, al-Qaeda is not likely to conduct such an attack for fear of alienating this constituency.

This thesis uses a capabilities-based methodology to determine what gaps exist in the military[alpha]s current ability to perform maritime homeland defense against unconventional and asymmetric opponents. This approach reveals that including joint air assets as part of the maritime defense force can significantly enhance protection of the homeland. In the short term, the military can use air power from each of the services for long-range maritime surveillance and interdiction. Additionally, using aircraft for maritime defense combat air patrol provides an effective and efficient last line of defense. Over the longer term, an investment in new technologies including non-lethal weapons and persistent surveillance platforms can make the joint force an even more effective guarantor of U.S. maritime security.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 to compel compliance with UN disarmament mandates. The invasion exposed the lack of a standing organization to conduct WMD elimination as a serious capability gap in the U.S. military force structure. This thesis demonstrates why it is necessary to establish such a capability. It argues that the United States cannot rely solely on multilateral, cooperative approaches to eliminate a determined adversaryâ s weapons program. While non-coercive tactics are preferred, the mixed results of twelve-years of UN verification in Iraq show that a viable threat of force must accompany these approaches in order to induce compliance with UN Security Council disarmament mandates. Additionally, the U.S. elimination effort in Iraq demonstrated that ad hoc approaches inadequately address this capability shortfall. The lack of integrated training, unsecured sites because of inadequate prioritization, and misaligned intelligence assets are just some of the problems that occurred during the ad hoc OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM elimination operation. When cooperative, nonproliferation measures fail to rollback aggressor statesâ WMD programs, DoD must have the capability to compel compliance if called upon. This thesis makes recommendations to facilitate the development of a viable and sustainable WMD elimination capability. / Outstanding Thesis

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The aim of the thesis is to analyze India's nuclear weapons command and control system as it has evolved since the nation's 1998 nuclear weapons tests. The small size of India's nuclear weapons arsenal does not imply that its command and control structure is simple. It requires the same infrastructure, capabilities, and operating systems possessed by countries with larger arsenals of nuclear weapons, though perhaps on a smaller scale. A small arsenal is easier to control than a large one, but it is still vulnerable to attack, and hence the issue of command and control becomes more complex. India's No-First-Use (NFU) policy states that its nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere. India's NFU policy makes the command and control of its nuclear weapons look simple, affordable, and easy to implement, but this policy must be examined through the prism of peacetime, crisis, and wartime situations. The smooth transition from peacetime to crisis and, if required, to wartime demands a robust command and control system. This thesis examines the requirements of such a system and provides recommendations for a command and control structure for Indian nuclear operations. The thesis investigates the U.S. command and control system and uses it as a model for a suitable option for India. While NFU has many challenges, it can be effective, provided that India adopts an operational capability of Launch After Attack (LAA), which would require a significant upgrade of command and control structure and procedures. In particular, the thesis demonstrates the role that civilians and military personnel can play to strengthen "minimum credible deterrence" within the established financial, political, and strategic parameters of India. / Outstanding Thesis

The United States is in the midst of an ambitious effort to build and deploy a wide range of ballistic missile defense systems. These ballistic missile defense systems will be effective against a host of current and postulated threats from ballistic missiles. In this thesis study, we explore the process of enhancing the effectiveness of weapon assignment for a system of systems. First, analysis of information is drawn from current proposed system of the ABM and its construction from the ground up. This research analyzes two ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), Aegis and Patriot respectively, their attributes, and their current and future roles in a Global Ballistic Defense Missile System. In addition, this thesis presents a software architecture for the ABM weapon assignment component module with object oriented design feasibility with integration as the key ingredient. This research contributed to highlighting some shortfalls in efforts to integrate capabilities and desired capabilities as the missile threat evolves and presents recommendations for follow-on research to improve ABM's weapon assignment capabilities.

This thesis investigates the effects of resource strains on the United States Air Force Weapons School (USAFWS). Highly regarded as the Combat Air Force's (CAF) Center of Excellence, the USAFWS is responsible for producing a weapons officer who is finely tuned in the skills of communication, integration of joint forces, large force mission planning, training plan development, and tactical leadership. The CAF demands a weapons officer who is highly skilled and possesses traits and values above the norm. The USAFWS has translated these objectives into an exemplary standard that pervades the institution, its graduates, and thus the CAF itself. During this period of transformation and global war (circa 2005), the CAF is continually seeking ways to "do more with less." This thesis provides a framework for assessing whether this is continually possible without adversely affecting the USAFWSâ s training standard. The graduate can be seen as a product of objectives (ends) plus training concepts (ways) plus resources (means). All three components are rigorously examined. Everything under the USAFWS's control has been optimized, leaving the shrinking pool of resources as a contentious but unavoidable problem.

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Les armes et armures de la période médiévale ont depuis longtemps suscité un intérêt certain. Aux premiers auteurs ont succédé des érudits enthousiastes. puis des chercheurs qui ont mis en place les bases et proposé les problématiques. les approches et les dynamiques de l'étude. Mais l'arme, l'objet matériel, est à même de constituer une source : elle contient dans ses formes et sa matière les traces des phénomènes liés à sa création et son utilisation, liés aux savoir-faire qui leur correspondaient. Cette thèse étudie le mobilier présent dans un cadre géographique et institutionnel restreint, dans une démarche qui place le chercheur en outil de compréhension de l'objet : l’approche expérimentale a montré à de nombreuses reprises sa pertinence, mais peut être approfondie encore si l'observateur se tait détenteur des savoir-faire liés à la matière ; de plus une riche documentation existe qui permet de s'approprier physiquement ces savoir-faire spécifiques liés à l’arme et au combat, livrés par les écrits des maîtres d’armes de la fin du Moyen âge. Trois groupes d’objet sont considérées : les épées, lances et haches. Après un rappel ou parfois une exploration historique plus appuyée, le matériel .est étudié : les observations réalisées permettent d'entrevoir le détail des étapes et des modes de fabrication des objets, proposés alors de manière théorique. La combinaison des informations issues des sources secondaires. des objets et surtout de l'approche corporelle du chercheur permettent de comprendre l’arme dans ses aspects fonctionnels, vivants, appliqués. Mais également, d'entrevoir dans la matière des phénomènes au-delà de ces aspects de fabrication ou d'utilisation. / Mediaeval arms and armour have long been a subject of interest : the early authors were followed by enthusiastic scholars and finally scientists who set the base and offered the kevs, methods and dvnamics of the field. But the weapon. the phvsical object. is in itself a source of studv : its shapes and its very matter link to its making and its use, to the technical skills implied. In this thesis we study mediaeval arms on a restrained area and kept in specific institutions, within the scope of setting the researcher as an active tool for the understanding the object : experimental approach has proved its worth, but can be even furthered if the observer becomes holder of the skills related to matter : moreover, a rich documentation exists that allows to physically acquire the skills related to combat, provided by the writings left by the masters at arms of the late Middle Ages. Three categories of objects are considered : swords, spears/lances and axes. After an historical outline, or if needed a deeper exploration, the material then studied : observations open to an understanding of the steps and modes involved in the making, which is then schematicallv proposed, The association of informations given by secondary sources, by the objects themselves. and chiefly by the corporeal approach or the researcher allow to understand the weapon in its functional, live, applied aspects. And also to perceive in the very matter things reaching beyond the two sole aspects of making and use

Hugh Gaitskell was leader of the Labour Party between 1955-63. The Cold War was at a critical level and bi-partisanship in international affairs was expected. With Gaitskell's accession this appeared to end, marked in particular by the disputes over Suez, the independent nuclear deterrent and Britain's application to join the European Economic Community. Simultaneously, he was challenged by the Left over nearly every aspect of Labour's foreign and defence policy. Despite these major controversies, Gaitskell's influence over international affairs remains a neglected area of research, and he is remembered more for the domestic controversies over nationalisation, his ill-fated attempt to revise Clause IV and defeat at the 1960 Scarborough conference. This thesis addresses that imbalance by examining Gaitskell's contribution to foreign affairs and the following inter-related areas: bi-partisanship; policy formulation; internal divisions and the power struggle between Left and Right. In addition, it also considers how the structure of the Labour Party benefited the leadership during this turbulent period. The conclusions revise Gaitskell's reputation as a figure of unyielding principle, and demonstrates that his leadership was marked by a mixture of finesse and blunder. His responsibility for the end of bi-partisanship can be discounted, as Labour remained firmly committed to the policies laid down and followed since 1945. Yet, the personal control over policy that he exercised, allied to his determination to mould the Labour Party in his own image, needlessly accelerated the internal struggles for power. While the Scarborough defeat illustrates the limitations of his authority, Suez and Europe display his acute political awareness of the requirements needed to balance national interests, electoral prospects and maintain party unity.