Yes / Nicholas Sims, Reader in International Relations, London School of Economics, 'Evaluation of Proposals: Resumed Session of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Fifth Review Conference', November 2002.

No description available.

Museums have always had and displayed weapons, including firearms. As museums have evolved, so too has exhibit design and practice. However, many weapons displays have not kept up with changing practices, and many of them are now irrelevant, have limited audiences, or are unhelpful to the broader public. Simply displaying weapons by type or as art is not enough anymore, and keeping them in storage does not take advantage of their potential. Also, many museums are increasingly trying to become places for public discourse about current issues. They often create exhibits meant to be relevant to today and promote discussions about controversial topics. Many museums are also trying to make their collections and objects more accessible to the public. Innovative displays of firearms could help them accomplish both these tasks. The battle over gun control and gun rights is often more of a shouting match than reasoned discourse. Museums could use historic firearms as an opportunity to help facilitate a more responsible conversation about the issue. These firearms are typically not as emotionally charged as modern guns, and could be used as a pathway into the gun debate if displayed creatively. Guns, historic or not, are often not very approachable objects for many people. This can be for a variety of reasons, including their associations with masculinity, power, and nationality. Museums should experiment with new ways to display firearms that can make them more approachable and accessible to broader audiences, and ideally to the entire public. / History

No / A comprehensive and timely analysis of strategic nuclear arms policy in the United States and Russia and examines the collaborative efforts to reduce nuclear weapons through arms control and render nuclear weapons and fissile materials in Russia secure. He concludes that the end of the Cold War has created new and unprecedented dangers and that these dangers require a greater political will and cooperation which have so far been lacking.

No / Set in the context of efforts to utilise chemicals as weapons of war, that have their origins in collaborative efforts between the UK and the US during World War I, this chapter examines the origins, the evolution, and the hostile misuse of chemical anti-crop agents and defoliants. Out of efforts between the two countries that endured throughout World War II, military interest in chemical anti-crop agents and defoliants emerged in-part as a consequence of a close association between civilian chemistry and military chemistry. It is shown by way of insights provided from official sources from the United Kingdom (UK) National Archive that UK use of such agents in Malaya resulted in the emergence of new techniques concerning the large-scale use of chemical anti-plant agents, as well as methods for their widespread dissemination. It is argued here that the above can be seen as a prelude to subsequent use in Vietnam, the latter having implications of relevance to human health and for the environment. It is shown that the role of science policy experts in bringing influence to bear on policy-makers during the latter part of the Vietnam War was significant in bringing about change in policy and an end to use in Vietnam. Also of significance is the issue of chemical weapons in the context of efforts to codify the norm of non-use under the Geneva Protocol, under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and under a range of related prohibition regimes. This chapter considers the implications of the scientific and technological developments in phytobiology of relevance, in particular, to auxins (work on endogenous growth regulators—auxins—would lead to the discovery of “the first systemic or hormone herbicides”). The findings are drawn together in a concluding section at the end of this chapter.

A survey of cost effectiveness methodologies used in the defense industry is presented and an application of cost effectiveness is developed. A breakdown in the level of the decisionmaking is made and follows the example of the Weapon System Effectiveness Industry Advisory Committee. Examples of cost effectiveness methodologies at each decisionmaking level are shown.

Thesis (M.A. in International Security and Civil-Military Relations)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2002. / AD-A411 188. Also available online. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-92).

In this thesis, the role of Legal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) in the German institutional-political landscape is examined. The effort guiding the thesis is to uncover and understand how LAWS have been constructed in the German institutional-political discourse from 2017-2021. The field of LAWS is comparatively under-researched due to their recent emergence and highly contested spread as a weapon of choice. By trying to answer how securitization is taking place in German political-institutional debates surrounding LAWS, the aim is to better understand the different discursive elements of securitization in the specific German context. Building on the elements of defining the securitizing actor and referent subject, evaluating which discourse elements contribute and limit a securitization of LAWS and how suggested policy measures are tied to other discourses allows for a multileveled understanding of the issue at hand. What is clear is the need to further expand research in this field with the goal of contributing to the larger body of literature within Peace and Conflict Studies, detangling present discourses and suggesting potential policy paths. Finally, the conclusion drawn in this thesis suggests that both a technological discourse and discourse of threat of other actors contribute toward securitization of LAWS while a liberal economic discourse limits the securitization of LAWS.

Yes

Yes / Professor Paul Rogers gives a brief overview of the present status of international legal prohibitions against both nuclear and chemical weapons. He then goes on to discuss the need to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.