Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / A U.S.-led naval operation in October 2003 interdicted a shipment of uranium-enrichment components on-board a German cargo ship traveling from Dubai to Libya. In December 2003, Libya announced it would halt its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and eliminate its existing stockpiles under international verification and supervision. The George W. Bush Administration proclaimed the interdiction a triumph for the newly created Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an activity which was announced five months earlier to interdict, through the threat or actual use of force, land, sea, and air trafficking of WMD at the earliest possible point. Despite increasing international support, numerous joint exercises, and the successful Libyan intercept, the PSI faces serious legal, intelligence, and operational challenges to sustained effectiveness. This thesis takes a close look at these challenges and considers how they can be overcome. I conclude that overcoming these challenges will require a multilateral trusted information network to augment secretive bilateral intelligence sharing, a PSI-specific legal umbrella to replace current reliance on only partially applicable international laws and resolutions, and an interoperable, team approach to operations that takes advantage of industry's technological improvements in detection technology and is conscious of air-intercept restrictions. / Major, United States Air Force

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / Throughout twenty-five years of strained relations, U.S. policy efforts have delayed but not thwarted Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program, largely because Washington has failed to influence Iran's motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons. There are three main motivations behind Iran's nuclear program. First, at the systemic level, external threats drive Iran's perceived need for a nuclear deterrent. Second, at the individual level, well placed governmental elites propel the nuclear security myth to spur nationalistic support for nuclear weapons. Third, at the state level, institutional bureaucracies, created to build Iran's nuclear infrastructure, now compete against other organizations for their own self interests, which are closely associated with the continued development of nuclear weapons. The thesis recommends three policy tracks, addressing causal factors at each level. First, the United States should try to create a new Gulf Security organization, including Iran and the new Iraqi government, to build a collective security environment without nuclear weapons. Second, Washington should build a multilateral coalition to contain Iranian proliferation activities while offering economic incentives for Iranian disarmament. Third, the United States should work to discredit Iran's nuclear security myth by fostering a public debate within Iran on the costs of nuclear weapons, using U.S.-run media. / Major, United States Air Force

Yuma Test Center (YTC) is a primary testing and evaluation facility for the United States Army's 30mm M230 automatic gun. The current program used by YTC to evaluate 30mm rounds is an old, complex, FORTRAN package called Accuracy Scoring Program (ASCORE). Due to the age and complexity of ASCORE, questions about its reliability in ballistic calculations have been raised. These reliability questions are important, because ASCORE is used by YTC to evaluate whether all such weapons systems meet Department of Defense specifications. Currently, the Army has no plans to replace ASCORE. The Navy has expressed interest in using ASCORE for fire control We evaluate ASCORE using a modern ballistic simulator named Projectile Design and Analysis System (PRODAS) to simulate trajectories of live fire rounds. This thesis demonstrates how PRODAS can be used to evaluate ASCORE. Preliminary results indicate that ASCORE's accuracy decreases the greater a round's impact distance is from the target.

In the face of Tehran's vitriolic rhetoric and outright refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, why do Russia, China and India refuse to support the United States and the EU-3 in their efforts to curtail Iran's pursuit of a complete and indigenous nuclear fuel cycle? Russia's motivations stem from its desire to establish itself as a counter to American hegemony and also to maximize its significant financial relationship with Iran. China's booming economy is dependant on its vast manufacturing infrastructure, which is increasingly dependant on Middle Eastern oil for its energy needs. Thus, China is unlikely to take a hard stand on Iran. India's energy demands are growing almost as quickly as those of China and Iran is a vital source of natural gas and oil for India. Also, Iran can be seen as a test case in India's desire to maintain an independent foreign policy. Containing Iran to the detriment of relations with these countries is not a path the United States should follow. U. S. foreign policy should support a verifiably peaceful nuclear program in Iran, with defined and unambiguous penalties should it come to light that the technology is diverted towards a military application. / US Navy (USN) author.

Recent case studies suggest that states highly motivated to obtain nuclear weapons will eventually succeed. If Iran manages to go nuclear, as Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have done, what will the Arabian Gulf region look like after Tehran acquires these weapons? This thesis investigates the likely responses of Israel, the Arab Gulf States, and Pakistan to an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. A detailed examination of regional statements and media analysis shows that the region will likely not be further unbalanced. Instead, these states will pursue rational responses to diminish any Iranian threats. This thesis argues that Israel will develop a mutually deterring relationship with Tehran. The Arab Gulf States will not yield to the temptation to develop domestic nuclear programs-instead they will continue to outsource state security needs. Pakistan, focused on India and lacking serious issues with Iran, will create an understanding to avoid conflict. Iranian nuclear weapon acquisition will be universally unwelcome, but the United States can mitigate the negative impact by extending security guarantees to states requiring protection against a potentially more aggressive nuclear Iran.

This thesis aims to provide a low-cost solution through integrating commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies to produce a prototype of a "Tactical Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle UCAV" system that can be utilized by the front-line ground units in the near future. The Tactical UCAV is designed to enhance the information collection and autonomous precision strike capability of the ground units. The Tactical UCAV can also be deployed as sensor nodes as part of a larger global information grid in a networkcentric warfare operation. The proposed Tactical UCAV system is comprised of a Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HUAV), which primarily carries high resolution sensors and communication devices and is used as a mother-ship for smaller "Killer UAVs (KUAV)." The KUAV carries a mission specific set of instruments; it can be a sensor or a warhead or both depending on the desired end results. After the target is acquired by the HUAV, the target information will be transferred to the KUAV. The KUAV can then be launched in close proximity of the target with the target position update from the HUAV. This thesis will focus on the development of a prototype KUAV and the integration of the prototype with the existing HUAV "Rascal" developed and operated by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The KUAV and the HUAV will form the Tactical UCAV system. / Singapore Army author.

The concept of Strategic Culture was developed during the Cold War years as a tool to analyse the nuclear policies of the Soviet Union and the United States, in an effort to assess the likelihood of their utilising their nuclear capabilities. Strategic Culture provides a useful lens through which we may understand the context, outlook and behaviour of states, shedding light on the way they perceive the international community and their role within it. As the Cold War came to an end, the focus of Strategic Culture literature shifted from the nuclear bipolarity that characterised U.S.-Soviet relations, to focus on other states and issue areas that dominated the international agenda within the New World Order. This thesis seeks to return to the original tenets of Strategic Culture, bringing attention back to the initial remits of this area of study, that is, the nuclear strategic cultures of the U.S.A. and Russia. Further to identifying the strategic cultures of the United States and Russia, this research questions whether these have been impacted by the change in international order brought on by the end of the Cold War. This work will also question whether nuclear weapons contorted their respective strategic cultures, or whether their strategic cultures were insulated from the impact of nuclear weapons. It will also assess whether the differences in strategic cultures have brought about differences in nuclear policy.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / Modern Test and Evaluation has long supported acquisition of warfighting systems in the United States Navy. As the complexity and long-term supportability of these systems has dramatically increased, the need to successfully, and incrementally test and evaluate families of systems, including their interfaces, has become even more critical. Long established techniques and methodologies for T&E may still apply, but new factors must be addressed. As the Navy continues to grapple with acquisition reform, and also looks to transform itself in the future, the Warfighters’ needs have essentially remained the same – delivery of the best, most effective weapons, delivered as soon as possible, and made easy to operate and maintain. Without an equally effective developmental and operational test and evaluation process, the United States Navy cannot satisfy this need. This thesis examines T&E today and where it must go in the future. It provides recommendations for T&E enhancements, and explores several areas where the Navy, and in many cases, Joint Services, are already looking towards future, integrated and collaborative test and evaluation. / Civilian, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division, United States Navy

CIVINS / Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The objective of this thesis is to determine whether the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) should apply the concepts of Performance-Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) to Strategic Weapons Systems (SWS) Technical Engineering Support (TES) Services. This thesis provides a Department of Defense (DoD), Department of the Navy (DON), and SSP SWS program acquisition and PBSA history background, reviews overarching PBSA policy and the DON PBSA implementation plan, defines a working PBSA model, defines Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), details the SWS program structure, defines target SWS TES services, and reviews and analyzes SWS TES service contracts and associated PBSA implementation attempts. The thesis concludes that the complete conversion of SWS TES services to PBSA is neither practicable nor desirable and recommends that SSP (1) establish a Government-only multi-functional PBSA team to perform a review of existing TES services statements of work to determine potential PBSA conversion tasking, (2) team with its business partners to develop a PBSA conversion business case, and (3) contract for selected SWS PBSA TES services through the use of a Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) completion contracting approach with an aggressive share line and targeted performance incentives. / Department of the Navy author (civilian).

Recent research literatures focused on the development and principles of using nuclear weapons in People Republic of China(PRC). For instance, the one-sidely withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the United States, the construction of ballistic missile defense system, the value of capability of hitting power for both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and persistence of outer space weapons development. Most of them studied the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and highlighted the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the principle of using nuclear weapons, and the deterrence strategy, rare did research focus on the integrative nuclear weapons strategy. The study aims to analyze PRC nuclear weapons strategy including nuclear weapons policies, the principles of use, approaches of deterrence, approaches and objects of hitting, methods of commend and control, and policies of controlling nuclear arms. Moreover, the study foresees the future of PRC nuclear weapons strategy based on the analysis of the similarity of the development of nuclear weapons strategy in main countries on the global, the influence of inner and outer factors to nuclear weapons strategy, the situation of PRC¡¦s abiding by international regimes about nuclear weapons, related research literatures with regard to the challenge of PRC nuclear weapons strategy, and the associations between both the development of outer space military and nuclear weapons strategy.