Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007. / Thesis Advisor(s): Feroz Khan, Robert Looney. "March 2007." Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-63). Also available in print.

The lawful use of nuclear weapons in self-defence sits in a precarious and fraught position amongst lawyers, states and scholars, primarily due to their indiscriminate destructive nature. The use of nuclear weapons is the biggest threat to peace and security yet they exist under obscurity in International Law. The purpose of this paper is to examine at what point, and under what circumstances, a State is lawfully permitted to use nuclear weapons in self-defence. The right to self-defence is a basic normative right codified in the United Nations Charter (UN Charter). The inherent right to self-defence is the primary justification for the use of nuclear weapons according to the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion). Even so, nuclear weapons would still have to meet the threshold of self-defence and the cardinal principals of ‘imminence’, ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ which regulate the lawfulness of a state’s actions in self-defence. Since there has only been two situations where nuclear weapons have been used- in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945- it is necessary to examine three hypothetical situations in which nuclear weapons are used in self-defence to determine if, under any, exceptional circumstances such action could be lawful.

Thesis advisor: Jennifer Erickson / What explains the changing strength and weakness of the “anti-strategic bombing norm” (ASB) during conflicts in the 20th century and beyond? The ASB norm encourages states to avoid the use of strategic bombing (targeting civilians to destroy enemy morale) in conflict. Yet these periods of conflict have had an inconsistent effect on the strength/weakness of the ASB norm. What explains this variation? I use qualitative historical cases of “key” conflicts in the 20th and 21st century to assess the strength/weakness of the ASB norm using the Ben-Josef Hirsch and Dixon (2021) “Indicators of Norm Strength” scale (see Table 1.1). Once I determined norm strength in each case, I then analyzed the norm strength in each case using four hypotheses derived from IR theory and previous ASB research. These hypotheses include (1) high enforcement, strong norm, (2) high enforcement, weak norm, (3) hegemonic leadership, and (4) technology used by states. I find that the “high enforcement, strong norm” hypothesis best explains the rise and fall of the ASB norm- but that sources of enforcement other than the hegemon itself are key. Indeed, contrary to some theories, the hegemon often weakens rather than strengthens the norm in this case. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: International Studies.

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The A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network constitutes the most severe loss of control over nuclear technology ever. For the first time in history all of the keys to a nuclear weapon*the supplier networks, the material, the enrichment technology, and the warhead designs--were outside of state oversight and control. This thesis demonstrates that Khan's nuclear enterprise evolved out of a portion of the Pakistani procurement network of the 1970s and 1980s. It presents new information on how the Pakistani state organized, managed, and oversaw its nuclear weapons laboratories. This thesis provides extensive documentation of command and control challenges faced by Pakistan and argues that Khan was largely a rogue actor outside of state oversight. The A. Q. Khan affair refutes more optimistic theories about the effects of nuclear proliferation. This case study indicates that states have a difficult time balancing an abstract notion of safety against pressing needs for organizational speed and flexibility. This thesis enumerates enabling institutional factors in Pakistan, which allowed Khan's enterprise to continue and flourish, and which might also be generalizable to other states of proliferation concern.

adversary efforts in a direction desired by Washington. Several things become clear during this investigation. First, very little scholarly work exists discussing the concept of dissuasion and the mechanisms used to formulate, implement, and execute it as a defense policy. Second, that while an admirable attempt to lessen the need for more costly policy options such as deterrence and defeat, dissuasion will not prevent China from developing counter space weapons, especially since ground-based jammers that target satellite links have already proven effective. Third, the best chance of dissuading China's efforts to acquire space-based OCS systems is through international treaties and laws.

This thesis analyzes Libya's historic 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. In the 2 years following the decision, several theories have emerged to explain why the Libyan regime renounced these dangerous weapons. The author uses current literature and relevant sources to analyze the three most probable external causal factors: sanctions and diplomacy, intelligence, and coercive diplomacy. He finds that sanctions, diplomacy, and intelligence were significant in altering the Libyan cost-benefit analysis in favor of the West. These findings have political and theoretical implications. Lessons learned from the Libyan case will not be effective against Iran and North Korea due to differences between these countries' proliferation motivation levels and the Libyan case. However, the influence strategies that were effective against Libya are likely to be applicable in other situations. The author finds that more research is still needed to identify the conditions when different strategies are most likely to be effective.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the issue of political violence expressed via mass destruction has raised security concerns to an unprecedented degree not seen since the end of the Cold War. As a principal adversary, the Soviet Union has been replaced by terror networks applying asymmetric warfare to achieve politically charged or ideologically driven objectives. A scenario whereby non-state actors would acquire a nuclear capability not only threatens the security of the United States, but would destabilize the Westphalian notion of the primacy of nation-states within the international system. Despite U.S. expenditures of over $86 million to help nearly 30 countries worldwide in preventing the smuggling of weapons-useable radiological materials, over 20 known cases of such activity were reported between 1992 and 2001. Previous research has concentrated on a singularly defined threat: The Rogue State. Today's challenges are characterized by more defused, decentralized networks, to include transnational actors with the potential to proliferate and supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade radiological material. This thesis examines the applicability of traditional Cold War strategies such as deterrence, pre-emption, prevention, and coercive diplomacy in the present context, to deny extremist groups and associated networks the means to buy, steal, or make nuclear and radiological weapons. This thesis proposes a multi-dimensional approach in support of mixed-strategies for winning the race against nuclear terror. The author contends that terrorist groups cannot acquire nuclear or radiological technology without the witting or unwitting support of state actors.