This research was conducted in association with Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) requests to update Unmanned Vehicle Tactical Memorandum TM-3-22- 5-SW. The research identified and discussed significant USV manning considerations such as source ratings and manpower qualities to pilot, operate sensors, support USV electronics, and the manpower implications associated with various weapons systems alternatives. In addition, this research described several existing and notional USV tactics, as well as a discussion about the existing N75 and N76 primary and secondary mission areas USV operations may support. The methodology consisted of a literature review of USV test reports; USV Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration briefs; USV Concept of Operations; fleet lessons learned; the USV tactical memorandum; Naval manpower instructions, and manuals; Weapons Tactical, Field, and Training Manuals; Military Utility Assessments; search of books, magazines, and manpower theses. The research found that determining manpower qualities and standard operating procedures will remain a dynamic process until USV equipment is standardized. The research also showed USV launch and recovery is more manpower intensive than that of a standard RHIB. Gunners Mates (GM) and Aviation Ordnancemen (AO) are potential source ratings to support USV Hellfire and Javelin missile modules. The Navy should establish a GM Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) to support Hellfire and Javelin or add these weapons to existing GM NECs. Electronics Technicians (ET), Fire Controlmen (FC), and Fire Control Technicians (FT) are potential source ratings for USV electrical/electronic support. FC and FT are potential source ratings to support the Remote Operated Small Arms Mount. This research found additional warfighting capabilities can be gained by equipping surface warfare vessels with USV's without any negative effects to primary or secondary warfare missions. Overall, USVs enhanced designed capabilities of Naval warships and directly support a capabilities based Navy.

This thesis explores China’s engagement with global nuclear order since 1949. In particular, China’s engagement refers to the process of creating, consolidating and maintaining nuclear order by assessing the methods it adopts, as well as the motivations behind its policy and the implications of its actions for global nuclear order. Overall, it is argued that in the 1950s and 1960s, even before nuclear order existed, China had an inadvertent hand in its creation, contributing to American and Soviet thinking about how best to build an order, as well as offering its own ideas based on socialist proliferation. Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, China engaged in the process of consolidating nuclear order by developing alternative thinking on nuclear deterrence that challenged mainstream strategies such as mutual assured destruction; and by joining important institutions, for instance the Non Proliferation Treaty in 1992 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. In addition, during this period, China began to promote a new vision for nuclear order: that of a more representative order. China’s current engagement, at a time when global nuclear order is perceived by many to be under significant strain, is less clear: while China remains committed to key global nuclear institutions and a minimal nuclear strategy; Beijing is also wary of deeper commitments, in particular multilateral arms control processes that might unfairly constrain its nuclear force capabilities relative to other nuclear weapons states.

What is a nuclear umbrella alliance and how does it differ from other defensive alliances in international politics? Scholars and practitioners frequently refer to this type of pact, but no study has defined it or identified how a nuclear security guarantee, as an umbrella alliance is better-termed, is unique. This dissertation presents and tests a theory of nuclear security guarantee formation and management. In Chapter 1, I establish two factors that make nuclear security guarantees novel: their ambiguous treaty content and unilateral provision of military aid. I present my Theory of Absolute Alliances, positing that these alliance attributes can be explained by the fact that security guarantees aim to establish deterrence by punishment in addition to deterrence by denial. Security guarantees' vague content and one-sided provision of capabilities, however, means that they are also riddled with vexing information problems that patron and client must manage at all stages of their alliance relations. I derive three hypotheses on security guarantee formation, entrapment, and abandonment that are tested in this project. In Chapters 2 and 3 I present a hypothesis on nuclear security guarantee formation, positing that while the presence of shared adversaries among prospective allies may explain the formation of many defense pacts, nuclear security guarantees have more exacting conditions for formation. For security guarantees to form, prospective allies should have exclusive adversaries--that is, one or more shared adversaries and no unshared adversaries--between them. I test this proposition statistically and using case studies of the US decision to deny Israel a formal security guarantee and the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance, a non-security guarantee. In Chapter 4 I hypothesize that security guarantees' ambiguous and unilateral nature may create a heightened risk of crisis entrapment for patrons. These features serve the purposes of general deterrence, but once an ally is involved in a crisis, they also mean that the patron is inclined to intervene to clarify its commitment to a weaker ally that cannot credibly defend itself. I test this hypothesis using summary statistics and qualitative case studies of the US-Taiwan and Sino-Soviet alliances in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. I also examine US non-intervention in the Beagle Channel Crisis, a non-security guarantee case. In Chapters 5, I present a hypothesis on client state abandonment fears. Security guarantee clients are prone to particularly acute abandonment fears, and I posit that because of the a priori information deficits in these pacts, abandonment fears can be addressed through the unilateral provision of information on patron strategies and policies. I examine case studies of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and the Extended Deterrence Dialogues in the US-Japan alliance, and consultation in the US-Thailand alliance, a non-security guarantee. I find significant support for my three hypotheses and conclude this study with directions for future research and policy implications.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Richard Doyle, Raymond E. Franck, Jr. Includes bibliographical references (p. 47-50). Also available online.

Current revolutions in biotechnology and neuroscience are changing military technologies, necessitating dramatic re-evaluations in arms regulatory regimes. This study assesses how these new technologies can be used in weapons systems - by governments and terrorists alike - and whether this frightening development can be brought under effective international control. Malcolm Dando begins by surveying the existing (and arguably inadequate) control mechanisms for chemical and biological weapons. He then discusses how earlier generations of toxin and bioregulatory weapons have been used by such states as Iraq, the Soviet Union and the USA, and explains, in non-technical terms, the implications for new weapons technology. Considering how international law might be applied to constrain undesirable military developments without restricting technological developments for peaceful purposes, Dando concludes with a proposal for an integrated control regime that would link international agreements, national legislation, and trade regulations.

This thesis is a study of what is said to be at issue in the nuclear weapons debate and constitutes the beginning of an attempt to understand its nature and significance . The technique adopted has been to offer an initial presentation of rival rationales in order to introduce the main concepts and show something of the force of these developed, positions (Vol I pp 7-30) . The two rationales are then related point by point , to give the analytical framework used in the subsequent interviews (pp 31-9) . Each pair of points is expanded and commented upon , and detailed references are given to the books and articles from which the analysis was drawn (pp 40-214) . The next section relates all of this briefly to the main party platforms in Britain , as of June 1987 (pp Zt 1- zt ) Volume II is made up of complete sets of responses to the framework of questions generated in the earlier chapters . The advantages of this method are i that in each case the rationale is laid out verbatim 9 so that premises are explicitly stated and the dependence of subsequent upon prior arguments is clearly seen . This in itself is very rarely done which is why so many proposed policies are so often , and so widely misunderstood . that , because all those consulted have responded to the same set of questions , their alternative sets of answers can be compared with one another point by point . This is the crucial and unique advantage of the approach adopted here . It ensures that what is at issue can be precisely pinpointed. The results as recorded here are in themselves striking and illuminating More important still they open the door to detailed future investigation of a kind which can be done in no other way.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2008. / "May 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 87-96). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-96). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 224-268).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Georgia, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 125-134).