This study describes meaning changes that have occurred in the native word stock of English. Since no existing studies are devoted solely to investigating semantic change in Old English words, this study tries to illustrate word histories through examples of usage in the past and by a discussion of causes for change.

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Embodied accounts contend that word meaning is grounded in sensory-motor representation. In support of this view, research has found rapid motor priming effects for words like eagle or shoe, which differ as to whether they are typically associated with an up or down spatial direction. These priming effects are held to be the result of motor representations evoked as an obligatory part of understanding the meaning of a word. In a series of experiments, we show that prime words associated with up or down spatial locations produce vertical perturbations in the horizontal movements of a computer mouse, but that these effects are contingent either on directing conscious attention to the spatial meaning of the word, or on the inclusion of the primed spatial direction in the response set, and that this is true even for strongly spatial words such as up and down. These results show that the motor representations associated with such words are not automatically evoked during reading. We discuss implications for claims that spatial representations reflect our embodied perception of the world. / Graduate

This thesis describes a novel methodology, grounded in the distributional semantic paradigm, for building context sensitive models of word meaning, affording an empirical exploration of the relationship between words and concepts. Anchored in theoretical linguistic insight regarding the contextually specified nature of lexical semantics, the work presented here explores a range of techniques for the selection of subspaces of word co-occurrence dimensions based on a statistical analysis of input terms as observed within large-scale textual corpora. The relationships between word-vectors that emerge in the projected subspaces can be analysed in terms of a mapping between their geometric features and their semantic properties. The power of this modelling technique is its ability to generate ad hoc semantic relationships in response to an extemporaneous linguistic or conceptual situation. The product of this approach is a generalisable computational linguistic methodology, capable of taking input in various forms, including word groupings and sentential context, and dynamically generating output from a broad base model of word co-occurrence data. To demonstrate the versatility of the method, this thesis will present competitive empirical results on a range of established natural language tasks including word similarity and relatedness rating, metaphor and metonymy detection, and analogy completion. A range of techniques will be applied in order to explore the ways in which different aspects of projected geometries can be mapped to different semantic relationships, allowing for the discovery of a range of lexical and conceptual properties for any given input and providing a basis for an empirical exploration of distinctions between the semantic phenomena under analysis. The case made here is that the flexibility of these models and their ability to extend output to evaluations of unattested linguistic relationships constitutes the groundwork for a method for the extrapolation of dynamic conceptual relationships from large-scale textual corpora. This method is presented as a complement and a counterpoint to established distributional methods for generating lexically productive word-vectors. Where contemporary vector space models of distributional semantics have almost universally involved either the factorisation of co-occurrence matrices or the incremental learning of abstract representations using neural networks, the approach described in this thesis preserves the connection between the individual dimensions of word-vectors and statistics pertaining to observations in a textual corpus. The hypothesis tested here is that the maintenance of actual, interpretable information about underlying linguistic data allows for the contextual selection of non-normalised subspaces with more nuanced geometric features. In addition to presenting competitive results for various computational linguistic targets, the thesis will suggest that the transparency of its representations indicates scope for the application of this model to various real-world problems where an interpretable relationship between data and output is highly desirable. This, finally, demonstrates a way towards the productive application of the theory and philosophy of language to computational linguistic practice.

<p>The aim of this study was to investigate if there is a connection between language and social identity in the perception of word meaning among second language learners in the same way as for native speakers, and if the sociolinguistic variable age is significant. This was done with an investigation of two generations of Swedish learners' perception of the meaning of the words 'respect', 'integrity' and 'communication'. The investigation showed that age is important to a certain extent regarding interpreting words and their meaning, but that it is not as important if the speaker has English as their mother tongue or as their second language.</p>

It is well-known that the meaning of a word often changes depending on the context in which the word is used. Determining the appropriate interpretation for a word occurrence requires a knowledge of the range of possible meanings for that word, and consideration of those possibilities given available contextual evidence. However, there is still much to be learned about the nature of our lexical knowledge, as well as how we make use of that knowledge in the course of language comprehension. I report on a series of three experiments that explore these issues. I begin with the question of how precise our perceptions of word meaning in context really are. In Experiment 1, I present a Magnitude Estimation study in which I obtain judgments of meaning-in-context similarity over pairs of intransitive verb occur- rences, such as The kid runs / The cat runs, or The cat runs / The lane runs. I find that participants supply a large range of very specific similarity judgments, that judgments are quite consistent across participants, and that these judgments can be at least partially predicted even by simple measures of contextual properties, such as subject noun animacy and human similarity ratings over pairs of subject nouns. However, I also find that while some participants supply a great variety of ratings, many participants supply only a few unique values during the task. This suggests that some individuals are making more fine-grained judgments than others. These differences in response granularity could stem from a variety of sources. However, the offline nature of Experiment 1 does not enable direct examination of the comprehension process, but rather focuses on its end result. In Experiment 2, I present a Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff study that explores the earliest stages of meaning-in-context resolution to better understand the dynamics of the comprehension process itself. In particular, I focus on the timecourse of meaning resolution and the question of whether verbs carry context-independent default interpretations that are activated prior to semantic integration. I find, consistent with what has previously been shown for nouns, that verbs do in fact carry such a default meaning, as can be seen in early false alarms to stimuli such as The dawn broke -- Something shattered. These default meanings appear to reflect the most frequent interpretation of the verb. While these default meanings are likely an emergent effect of repeated exposure to frequent interpretations of a verb, I hypothesize that they additionally support a shallow semantic processing strategy. Recently, a growing body of work has begun to demonstrate that our language comprehension is often less than exhaustive and less than maximally accurate -- people often vary the depth of their processing. In Experiment 3, I explore changes in depth of semantic processing by making an explicit connection to research on human decision making, particularly as regards questions of strategy selection and effort- accuracy tradeoffs. I present a semantic judgment task similar to that used in Experiment 2, but incorporating design principles common in studies on decision making, such as response-contingent financial payoffs and trial-by-trial feedback on response accuracy. I show that participants' preferences for deep and shallow semantic processing strategies are predictably influenced by factors known to affect decision making in other non-linguistic domains. In lower-risk situations, participants are more likely to accept default meanings even when they are not contextually supported, such as responding "True" to stimuli such as The dawn broke -- Something shattered, even without the presence of time pressure. In Experiment 3, I additionally show that participants can adjust not only their processing strategies but also their stimulus acceptance thresholds. Stimuli were normed for truthfulness, i.e. how strongly implied (or entailed) a probe sentence was given its context sentence. Some stimuli in the task posessed an intermediate degree of truthfulness, akin to implicature, as in The log burned -- Something was dangerous (truthfulness 4.55/7). Across 3 conditions, the threshold separating "true" from "false" stimuli was moved such that stimuli such as the example just given would be evaluated differently in different conditions. Participants rapidly learned these threshold placements via feedback, indicating that their perceptions of meaning-in-context, as expressed via the range of possible conclusions that could be drawn from the verb, could vary dynamically in response to situational constraints. This learning was additionally found to occur both faster and more accurately under increased levels of risk. This thesis makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, I present evidence that our knowledge of verb meanings is at least two-layered -- we have access to a very information-rich base of event knowledge, but we also have a more schematic level of representation that is easier to access. Second, I show that these different sources of information enable different semantic processing strategies, and that moreover the choice between these strategies is dependent upon situational characteristics. I additionally argue for the more general relevance of the decision making literature to the study of language processing, and suggest future applications of this approach for work in experimental semantics and pragmatics. / text

The aim of this study was to investigate if there is a connection between language and social identity in the perception of word meaning among second language learners in the same way as for native speakers, and if the sociolinguistic variable age is significant. This was done with an investigation of two generations of Swedish learners' perception of the meaning of the words 'respect', 'integrity' and 'communication'. The investigation showed that age is important to a certain extent regarding interpreting words and their meaning, but that it is not as important if the speaker has English as their mother tongue or as their second language.

The dissertation lays the foundations for a naturalistic account of word meaning capable of addressing the conflicting intuitions that word meanings are both “out there”, world-involving and objective (the “objectivist” intuition) and in the heads of speakers, i.e. cognitive and perspectival (the “mentalist” intuition). The strong naturalization constraint endorsed in this project has it that the sought-after syncretic notion of word meaning must be nonmysterious and constitute a potential object for the natural sciences. The objectivist intuition is discussed within the framework of semantic externalism and the theory of semantic deference. Whereas the importance of the phenomenon of semantic deference (i.e. the fact that speakers defer to semantic standards for the fixation of the meaning of their words) is recognized, it is shown that taking the normativity of meaning evidenced by semantic deference at face value leads to embracing a form of meaning objectivism that is incompatible with naturalism. On the one hand, the objectivist/externalist commitment to independent meaning-determining realities could be stronger than the commitments actually undertaken by the natural sciences themselves. On the other hand, the degree of idealization inherent in the objectivist account makes it oddly disconnected from and ultimately irrelevant to actual linguistic practice. However, usage-based accounts – which have meanings determined by the way words are actually used rather than determined “from outside” – notoriously struggle to provide a satisfactory account of the normativity of meaning. The proposed move consists in biting the bullet and treating the inherent normativity of meaning as a form of cognitive illusion, albeit an unavoidable illusion and one which must be taken seriously in order to explain the properties of linguistic understanding. A strictly usage-based account is shown to be viable and even to be able to account for the objectivist explanandum, once it is coupled with biological functionalism. Word meanings “out there” turn out to be viable natural objects, yet quite unlike the apparent objects of our pre-theoretical intuitions. “Complete”, world-involving word meanings are complex functional kinds (like organs or artifacts) constituted (rather than determined) by speakers’ actual dispositions and relevant environmental factors. As such, complete meanings – whether at the communal level (conventional meanings) or at the level of the individual speaker (idiosyncratic patterns of use) – are essentially opaque to speakers and can only be identified from a theoretical point of view on the basis of functional considerations. Moreover, the environmental factors intuitively corresponding to the traditional notion of objective reference or extension cannot be considered independently of the other internal and relational meaning-constitutive factors. The view of meaning defended is thus supportive of a certain form of anti-realism, where reference and truth are relativized to evolved interests, yet it is not supportive of any global form of anti-realism, for the presuppositions of biological normativity still provide a realist anchor to natural-language meanings. From this theoretical perspective, the mentalist intuition is taken to concern the internal, cognitive sub-components of complete meanings. Internal meanings are the cognitive kinds associated with word types (lexical meanings) or word tokens (ways in which words are understood/interpreted on an occasion of use). It is argued that internal meanings – whether stable or occasion-specific – have an irreducible abstract dimension for which no naturalistically plausible worldly counterpart is to be found. The experience of aboutness of the concepts intuitively encoded and expressed by words is again to be treated as a cognitive illusion, on a par with the illusion of the inherent normativity of word meaning. However, the abstract nature of internal meanings explains some of the key properties of linguistic understanding – aboutness, compositionality, co-reference – without which productive thought and linguistic communication would be impossible. The proposed account thus makes room for compositional-extensional semantics and shared understanding, as long as these are fully internalized. The connection with the external components of complete meanings is indirect, mediated by procedures whose workings are to a large extent opaque to users. The main consequence of the proposed framework is the incommensurability of internal meaning and complete meaning, and therefore a rejection of the possibility of an articulation of internal meaning and complete meaning compatible with the commonsense view from which traditional accounts of semantic deference and semantic externalism are built.Cette thèse jette les bases d’une théorie naturaliste de la signification des mots à même de rendre compte de deux intuitions en apparence conflictuelles :d’une part, l’intuition selon laquelle les significations des mots ont une existence extérieure objective et impliquent le monde (l’intuition « objectiviste ») ;d’autre part, l’intuition selon laquelle les significations sont dans la tête des locuteurs, c’est-à-dire correspondent à des réalités cognitives et perspectivales (l’intuition « mentaliste »). La contrainte naturaliste assumée dans ce projet veut que la notion syncrétique de signification que l’on cherche à développer puisse constituer un objet potentiel d’investigation pour les sciences naturelles, c’est-à-dire qu’elle soit, au moins en principe, localisable dans le monde naturel. L’intuition objectiviste est débattue dans le cadre de l’externalisme sémantique et de la théorie de la déférence sémantique. Bien que l’importance du phénomène de la déférence sémantique (le fait que les locuteurs défèrent à des standards sémantiques pour la fixation de la signification des mots qu’ils emploient) soit pleinement reconnue, l’argument poursuivi mène à la conclusion que la normativité de la signification que semble imposer la déférence sémantique ne doit pas être prise pour argent comptant, sous peine d’épouser une forme d’objectivisme de la signification incompatible avec le projet de naturalisation stricte. D’une part, l’engagement ontologique objectiviste/externaliste vis-à-vis de réalités indépendantes déterminant les significations pourrait être plus fort que les engagements ontologiques implicites des sciences naturelles elles-mêmes. D’autre part, le degré d’idéalisation propre au point de vue objectiviste le rend étrangement détaché de la pratique linguistique effective, et en définitive sans pertinence pour rendre compte de celle-ci. Cela étant dit, les théories fondées sur l’usage – pour lesquelles les significations sont déterminées par la façon dont les mots sont effectivement employés plutôt que déterminées « de l’extérieur » – sont en général critiquées pour leur incapacité à rendre compte de la normativité de la signification. La proposition que fait la thèse consiste à assumer cette conséquence d’une théorie fondée sur l’usage et à considérer la normativité intrinsèque de la signification comme une forme d’illusion cognitive, bien qu’une illusion inévitable et devant être prise au sérieux s’il s’agit d’expliquer les propriétés remarquables de la compréhension linguistique. Une théorie strictement fondée sur l’usage est viable et même capable de rendre compte de l’intuition objectiviste, une fois que cette théorie est couplée avec un fonctionnalisme biologique. Les significations « extérieures » des mots sont bien des objets naturalisables, quoique fort différents des objets apparents de nos intuitions pré-théoriques. Les significations « complètes », c’est-à-dire impliquant le monde, correspondent à des espèces fonctionnelles complexes (à la manière des organes ou des artéfacts) qui sont constituées (plutôt que déterminées) par les dispositions effectives des locuteurs et les facteurs environnementaux pertinents. En tant que telles, les significations complètes – que ce soit au niveau de la communauté linguistique (significations conventionnelles) ou au niveau du locuteur individuel (usages idiosyncrasiques) – sont fondamentalement opaques pour les locuteurs et ne peuvent être identifiées qu’à partir d’un point de vue théorique externe et sur base de considérations fonctionnelles. En outre, les facteurs environnementaux correspondant intuitivement à la notion traditionnelle de référence ou d’extension objective ne peuvent être considérés indépendamment des autres facteurs internes et relationnels constitutifs de la signification. La théorie de la signification défendue suggère donc une certaine forme d’anti-réalisme, dans lequel la référence et la vérité sont relativisées à des intérêts spécifiques produits par l’évolution naturelle. Cette théorie ne sert pour autant guère d’appui à un quelconque anti-réalisme global, car les présupposés de la normativité biologique continuent à fournir un ancrage réaliste aux significations linguistiques. Une fois cette perspective théorique sur les significations impliquant le monde adoptée, on fait la supposition que l’intuition mentaliste concerne les sous-composantes internes et cognitives des significations complètes. Les significations internes sont les espèces cognitives associées avec les types lexicaux (significations lexicales) et avec les tokens lexicaux (façons dont les mots sont compris/interprétés lorsqu’ils sont employés). Il est avancé que les significations internes – qu’elles soient stables ou propres à une occasion d’usage – ont une composante abstraite irréductible à laquelle ne correspond aucune contrepartie mondaine acceptable d’un point de vue naturaliste. L’expérience de l’ « être-à-propos » (aboutness) des concepts intuitivement encodés et exprimés par les mots doit encore une fois être considérée comme une illusion cognitive, à l’instar de l’illusion de la normativité intrinsèque de la signification. Cependant, la nature abstraite des significations internes explique certaines des propriétés centrales de la compréhension linguistique – être-à-propos, compositionnalité, co-référence – sans lesquelles la pensée productive et la communication proprement linguistique seraient impossibles. La théorie proposée fait donc une place à la sémantique compositionnelle-extensionnelle et à la compréhension partagée, pour autant que celles-ci soient complètement internalisées. La connexion avec les composantes externes des significations complètes est indirecte, médiée par des procédures dont le fonctionnement est en grande partie opaque aux utilisateurs du langage. La conséquence principale du cadre proposé est l’incommensurabilité de la signification interne et de la signification complète et, partant, le rejet de la possibilité d’une articulation entre les deux types de signification qui soit compatible avec le point de vue de sens commun à partir duquel sont construites les théories traditionnelles de la déférence sémantique et de l’externalisme sémantique. / Doctorat en Langues et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

In this study, an experiment was conducted to compare the three teaching methods: the inferring word-meaning method, the morpheme-based teaching method, and the word-based teaching method. The results showed that students taught by the inferring word-meaning method outperformed both the students taught by the morpheme-based method and the word-based method in terms of word retention. The possible reason is that the inferring word-meaning section enabled students to pay attention to and spend more time on each word. On the other hand, the disadvantage of the inferring word-meaning method is that it might not be an efficient way to teach a large amount of new vocabulary because it requires sufficient time for students to get involved with the context and the discussion of guessing words. Another drawback is that textbooks are seldom designed for the purpose of inferring word-meaning from context, which means that the teacher has to spend a substantial amount of time editing the dialogues or reading material from the textbook in order to give students more information to help them guess the meaning of each target word. For the morpheme-based teaching method and the word-based teaching method, there were no statistically significant differences observed. Students from both test groups achieved the same percentage of word retention.

本研究の目的は，機械が人間と自然な会話を行うために重要な能力である言語を理解する方法を実現することである．具体的には，基準となる言語資源に登録されていない単語（未定義語）の意味を提示するシステムの実現を目指す．未定義語の意味を推定するためには，ある単語から概念を想起し，さらに，その概念に関係のある様々な概念を連想できる能力が重要な役割を果たす．そこで，連想能力を表現するメカニズムである連想メカニズムを活用して，未定義語の意味を推定する方法を提案し，その有効性を評価する． / The purpose of this study is to realize a scheme to understand language, which is a significant ability for machines to have natural conversation with humans. Concretely speaking, we aim to achieve a system that can show meaning of words (undefined words) which are not registered in the reference language resource. In order to estimate the meaning of undefined words, two capability play an important role; one is recalling a concept from a word, and the other is associating various related concepts from the concept. Therefore, we propose a scheme for estimating the meaning of undefined words by using the association mechanism and evaluate its effectiveness. / 博士(工学) / Doctor of Philosophy in Engineering / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University