Epistemic injustice is a relatively new philosophical term for a rather old phenomenon. A situation is said to be epistemically unjust when someone is wronged in his capacity to possess or convey knowledge. While anyone can be the victim of a testimonial injustice, the epistemic injustice that occurs in an exchange of testimony, people with marginalized identities systematically suffer from this kind of injustice. By relying on negative identity prejudices, a person in a position of power consciously or subconsciously undermines a marginalized individual’s capacity for knowledge.
In this paper, I argue that persistent testimonial injustice can inhibit the formation of one’s identity. Then I explore the role that communities may play in ameliorating this harm. I suggest that communities are conceptualized differently depending on their purpose (e.g. psychological melioration or political resistance). In the final part of this paper, I examine two conceptions of communities put forth by María Lugones and Iris Marion Young and determine whether they can provide both psychological and political resources for resistance.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-2950 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| Creators | Lipman, Alexia |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | 2018 Alexia C Lipman, default |
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