本文第一章介紹研究背景與問題意識與研究架構，從相關研究成果中爬梳政治腐敗的定義與其在社會主義國家中的特殊性。並探討兩個主軸：中國大陸市場轉型過程中所面臨的腐敗問題與政府、以及中共領導人如何看待之。
第二章從國家與政府的角度觀察中共的貪腐問題，變化中的產權、中央與地方關係。第三、四代領導人如何面對市場經濟帶來的變化，憲法賦予全國人大、政協的監督權有所不足之處，但通常未能充分發揮。並分析中共第三、四兩代領導人所進行的機構改革與法制建設。
第三章從黨的組織結構切入。紀委是黨內主要的監督機制，但黨紀處分最高只能開除黨籍，由於市場化使官商不分，意識型態的約束鬆弛，使得黨紀的約束能力下降。「三個代表」號召企業家入黨使得黨員身分不再是最可靠的的資本政治。第三、四兩代領導人都曾發起政治運動宣揚理想的幹部形象，例如江澤民的「三講」、胡錦濤的「保持黨員先進性」。
第四章引入非正式制度的層面探討貪腐問題，包括傳媒、文化與市民社會等層面。首先，中共缺乏開放的輿論監督，使人民與政府都無法獲得充分的訊息，雖然可以暫時掩蓋真相，但長遠而言是不利的。其次中國傳統文化講究人際關係的經營，計畫經濟時期的單位制都造成對關係網絡的重視，破壞公平性。最後作者分析是否能寄望藉由成熟的市民社會來促使非正式制度的監督發揮功能。
第五章歸納指出中國政治未來可能的發展與改革侷限，包含民主化與多元防腐機制的建構。並未來貪腐問題是否繼續困擾中共提出幾個思考方向。 / In chapter 1, I introduce the background of this study and review correlative research. I want to discriminate the character of political corruption in post-communism states, especially based on China’s market transformation. What situation the leaders faced and how they consider dealing with are two main viewpoints.
Next, I analyze this issue from the government structure in chapter 2, such as the relation between central and local bureaucrats. In view of monitor institution setting is not sufficient, I want to explain the institution reform of PRC’s government and the regularization in law. Although the constitution gives the National People Congress and the Political Consultative Conference the authority to supervise, but the power is usually not elaborated well.
In chapter 3, I want to observe this issue from the party-state perspective. The discipline committee is the main system in party organization each level. But as the marketization arises, the role of an official and an entrepreneur is often blurred. The leaders of the third and the fourth generation have taken some propagandas or political mobilizations to describe their desirable cadres. Such as Jiang Zemin’s “Three Emphasis” and Hu Jingtao’s “Keep the Party Members’ Advancement”.
Then, I lead into the cause of informal institution to discuss the corruptive phenomenon in China. First, there are multiple restrictions on media to reveal the truth, so not only people, but also the government can’t get sufficient information. Second, there are some customs from Chinese culture tradition that make people rely on interpersonal network and guanxi. Third, I analyze whether a mature civil society could constraint these behaviors.
Finally, I will indicate that there are still some restrictions on China’s political reform in my conclusion, and provide some directions for more thinking.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0093260018 |
| Creators | 李景華, Lee,Chin hua |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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