本文第一章介紹研究背景與問題意識與研究架構，從相關研究成果中爬梳政治腐敗的定義與其在社會主義國家中的特殊性。並探討兩個主軸：中國大陸市場轉型過程中所面臨的腐敗問題與政府、以及中共領導人如何看待之。 　　第二章從國家與政府的角度觀察中共的貪腐問題，變化中的產權、中央與地方關係。第三、四代領導人如何面對市場經濟帶來的變化，憲法賦予全國人大、政協的監督權有所不足之處，但通常未能充分發揮。並分析中共第三、四兩代領導人所進行的機構改革與法制建設。 　　第三章從黨的組織結構切入。紀委是黨內主要的監督機制，但黨紀處分最高只能開除黨籍，由於市場化使官商不分，意識型態的約束鬆弛，使得黨紀的約束能力下降。「三個代表」號召企業家入黨使得黨員身分不再是最可靠的的資本政治。第三、四兩代領導人都曾發起政治運動宣揚理想的幹部形象，例如江澤民的「三講」、胡錦濤的「保持黨員先進性」。 　　第四章引入非正式制度的層面探討貪腐問題，包括傳媒、文化與市民社會等層面。首先，中共缺乏開放的輿論監督，使人民與政府都無法獲得充分的訊息，雖然可以暫時掩蓋真相，但長遠而言是不利的。其次中國傳統文化講究人際關係的經營，計畫經濟時期的單位制都造成對關係網絡的重視，破壞公平性。最後作者分析是否能寄望藉由成熟的市民社會來促使非正式制度的監督發揮功能。 　　第五章歸納指出中國政治未來可能的發展與改革侷限，包含民主化與多元防腐機制的建構。並未來貪腐問題是否繼續困擾中共提出幾個思考方向。 / In chapter 1, I introduce the background of this study and review correlative research. I want to discriminate the character of political corruption in post-communism states, especially based on China’s market transformation. What situation the leaders faced and how they consider dealing with are two main viewpoints. Next, I analyze this issue from the government structure in chapter 2, such as the relation between central and local bureaucrats. In view of monitor institution setting is not sufficient, I want to explain the institution reform of PRC’s government and the regularization in law. Although the constitution gives the National People Congress and the Political Consultative Conference the authority to supervise, but the power is usually not elaborated well. In chapter 3, I want to observe this issue from the party-state perspective. The discipline committee is the main system in party organization each level. But as the marketization arises, the role of an official and an entrepreneur is often blurred. The leaders of the third and the fourth generation have taken some propagandas or political mobilizations to describe their desirable cadres. Such as Jiang Zemin’s “Three Emphasis” and Hu Jingtao’s “Keep the Party Members’ Advancement”. Then, I lead into the cause of informal institution to discuss the corruptive phenomenon in China. First, there are multiple restrictions on media to reveal the truth, so not only people, but also the government can’t get sufficient information. Second, there are some customs from Chinese culture tradition that make people rely on interpersonal network and guanxi. Third, I analyze whether a mature civil society could constraint these behaviors. Finally, I will indicate that there are still some restrictions on China’s political reform in my conclusion, and provide some directions for more thinking.

本論文把論述重心放在「比較」上，試圖去認識三位國家領導人對於政治改革理念以及改革實踐的不同之處，也希望透過這樣的比較，釐清三位領導人的改革各自爲俄羅斯政治體制帶來什麼不一樣的影響，以及他們各自的政治選擇又是帶領俄羅斯朝哪個方向前進。其次，我們還要釐清國家領導人的性格和意志等因素是如何影響制度運行。俄羅斯的超級總統制(Super-Presidentialism)將領導人的個人因素突出，這樣的體制對俄羅斯的民主有什麼影響。最後，本論文將探討俄羅斯獨有的政治文化是如何影響三位領導人的政治選擇和發展。 / This article’s main purpose is comparison, it tries to tell the different side of political innovation and the way it practices of 3 Russian leaders. It also clarifies the 3 leader’s reformation has been done to Russian political system separately and which direction their political decision has brought Russia into. Moreover, we will point out how the leaders’ will and personality effect the system. Super- Presidentialism of Russia highlight leader’s individual factor, what kind of effect the Super- Presidentialism does to Russian democracy. Finally, the essay will discuss how do the 3 leader’s political decision and development has been effected by Russian unique political culture.

本論文題為「中共政治改革之趨勢及其困難」, 旨在探討中共實施政治改革對其權力 、意識形態、和組織等三方面的困難點。 本論文全文約十九萬字, 分為六章, 主要內容如下: 第一章: 緒論。主要在闡明研究動機與目的、研究範圍與限制、以及研究方法。 第二章: 權力結構與改革路線。包括第一節, 概念厘清與說明; 第二節, 毛澤東死后 的中共權力斗爭; 第三節, 「十一大」到「十一屆六中全會」的權力結構與改革路線 ; 第四節, 「十二大」到「十二屆五中全會」的權力結構與改革路線; 第五節, 「十 三大」以后的權力結構與改革路線; 第六節, 小結。本章主旨在說明毛死后中共權力 階層變化的趨勢與路線變化的過程。 第三章: 意識形態與改革政策。包括第一節, 意識形態的概念與功能; 第二節, 中共 對「毛澤東思想」的評價; 第三節, 中共意識形態領導權的爭奪; 第四節, 小結。本 章主旨在探討意識形態轉變的內容與中共領導階層對意識形態的分歧, 以及其對改革 政策所產生的影響。 第四章: 建黨與整黨。包括第一節, 概念釐清與說明; 第二節, 政治改革的背景; 第 三節, 政治改革的作為; 第四節, 評估。本章旨在探討中共政治改革的構想與作為, 以及政治改革的性質。 第五章: 政治改革的困難。包括第一節, 政治衝突升高; 第二節, 官僚主義盛行; 第 三節, 意識形態紛雜。本章主旨在探討中共政治改革的重重困難, 主要自權力、官僚 體制的作風方面、和意識形態三方面分析。 第六章: 結論。試圖提出個人對中共政治改革的觀點。

蘇聯時期性質單一的「意識型菁英」在戈巴契夫的政經改革下開始分化成政治菁英與經濟菁英兩大類。到了葉爾欽時期，由於國家制度不彰、政府職能紊亂以及聯邦從屬關係被破壞，再加上總統本人執政後期健康情形不佳而導致大權旁落等緣故，造成各方菁英團體為了自身利益而彼此傾軋不已，也形成了以地方勢力、反對派政黨以及經濟寡頭為箭頭的「分散型菁英」。進入普丁時期，新執政者承繼了前朝唯一「正面」的遺緒 –「集權總統制」，再佐以個人的施政風格與高人氣支持，於第一任期內便大抵完成收編菁英的政治改革：於新設立的七大聯邦區派駐聯邦權力代理人 – 總統全權代表；改革聯邦委員會以削弱地方首長勢力；組建權力黨「統一俄羅斯黨」 並掌控國家杜馬。而在「共識型菁英」的氛圍下，作為普丁政權主要幹部甄補來源的「聖彼得堡幫」成員當中，又以所謂的「強力部門幹部」為大宗。其軍警情治背景與國家治理手法不僅為普丁治下的俄羅斯型塑了「軍事政體」的外觀，更讓後共俄羅斯或多或少出現了「蘇維埃化」的傾向。 / The single-natured “ideocratic elite” of the Soviet Union begins to differentiate into political and economic elite under the impact of Gorbachev’s reforms. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin’s elites jostled with each other for their interests and transformed into the “fragmented elite,” characterized by regional leaders, opposition parties and economic oligarchs. This occurred due to the malfunction of state institutions, disorder of government functions, destruction of central-peripheral relations and the regency by the President’s cronies during his illness in the second term. Later in Putin’s Russia, with the only “positive” legacy – “authoritarian presidential rule” that the new ruler inherits from his predecessor as well as his own personal ruling styles and high popularity, Putin achieves the approximate incorporation of Russian elites with the political reforms in his first term, including the delegation of Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoys as federal agents in the seven new federal districts, the weakening of regional elites by reforming the Federation Council, and the seizure of the State Duma with the party of power – “United Russia.” Under the atmosphere of the “consensual elite,” the “Petersburgers” – especially the so-called “siloviki” – constitute the main source of cadre recruitment in Putin’s Russia. The security-intelligence background and state governance tactics of these siloviki not only mold the façade of “militocracy” for Putin’s regime, but more or less contribute to the tendency of “sovietization” in post-communist Russia.

本文初始，筆者提出一個要解答的困惑：為什麼中國大陸地方的政治改革，其模式與幅度都不是「全國一盤棋」？本文將「地方」設定在「省級」，並將「政治改革」設定為「基層首長選制」與「行政三分制」，去分析在為何少數的省份，出現較大規模的政治改革。筆者試圖建構「政績─派系」模式，去解釋省委書記是如何推動中國大陸的政改。 在「政績」的面向，由於各地「初始條件」的考量，使得省委書記相繼追求「和諧社會」或「小康社會」的「政績」。「基層首長選制」有助於前者的完成，「行政三分制」的推進和後者有關。這說明各地政改的形式，為何出現互異。另一個因素是「派系關係」。和「最高領導人」存在「派系關係」的省級領導，因為能降低「硬制度」改革的風險，因此更容易在全省推動「大規模」的政改。 以2002之後的四川，和2008年之後的廣東，分別是經濟發展不佳與良好之地，政治改革的兩個代表案例。四川省委書記張學忠、廣東省委書記汪洋，都是胡錦濤的嫡系，使得兩省的政改力度冠居全國。但由於兩省的經濟環境迥異，使得張學忠、汪洋，分別推動「基層首長選制」和「行政三分制」。但筆者也指出，於分離主義盛行的西部省份，在「穩定壓倒一切」的思量下，該省並不會推動過多政改。即便省委書記是「最高領導人」的派系，亦是如此。筆者相信，將解釋層級聚焦在省級領導，並結合「政績」與「派系」因素，最能解釋省級為何會發動大規模的激進政改。  此外，筆者納入江蘇的個案，其主因是該省的政改途徑過於殊異。江蘇的經濟發展在中國名列前茅，與廣東類似，但該省卻走向「基層首長選制」改革。筆者認為，胡錦濤有意在東部省份，豎立一個「和諧社會」的推行樣版，因此提高江蘇推動「和諧社會」政績的效用函數，以鼓勵省委書記李源潮繼續在江蘇改革「基層首長選制」。換言之，江蘇的案例完全不能說明經濟發展與民主化的聯繫，它反而再現了黨國體制的國家能力中央對省級的絕對控制。 / The beginning of this article, we offer a question: why the range and pattern of political reform in Mainland China are not the same? For replying the question, we focus on the provincial level, and discuss the two categories of reform—the elective reform of local leader and separation of the three administrative powers ─ the most important and sensitive institutions of all the political reform for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). We try to generate the “Faction-Performance” Model, and use it to explain the provincial reforms. The theory covers two main points. First, these province leaders depend on the initial condition of economic development, to choose the reform’s pattern. At the no richness provinces, leaders wish to push the personnel system reform; on the other hand, leaders tend to practice administrative reform on the affluent provinces. Second, all the province leaders that enforce the radical political reforms are the top leader’s faction. The reason is that the patron-clientship may decrease the risk of political reform. We give two examples Sichuan and Guangdong, to prove the aboving inferences. Sichuan is the late developmental area, existing the unstable society, and the provincial leaders want to reach for the performance of the harmonious society. Besides, the provincial secretary of the CCP Committee, Zhang Xuezhong, ever had the colleague relationship with Hu Jintao. Zhang would be regarded as the clique of Hu. In the condition, after Zhang assumed the official, he pushed the large scale of the elective reform of local leader in Sichuan. On the contrary, Guangdong has the good economical growth. The administrative reform has been the important issue for the province. When Wangyang took on the provincial secretary, he pushed the large scale of the separation of the three administrative powers. Checking his background, we find Wangyang is the Communist Youth League (CYL) cadre—the faction of Hu. For the two cases, Zhang Xuezhong and Wangyang are all the faction of Hu. So, the two examples can confirm my hypothesis. Besides, the dissertation focuses on the Giangsu as a deviant case, to discuss why the large scale of elective reform of local leaders occurring on the wealth province. There are enough evidences to show that Hu Jintao inspired Li Yuanchao to advance the reform. Hu adjusted the performance utility function of the Giangsu and made the provincial leaders to accomplish the “harmonious society” in the area. The case represents the ability of party-state system ─ central committee has the absolute power to adjust and control the political reforms in provinces.