本論文之研究範圍，主要係以一九四九年十月中共政權成立後，至一九九 五年底為止的反腐敗鬥爭為主，整個論文的章節安排如下： 第一章為緒論。第二章主要介紹改革開放以前的反腐敗鬥爭，包括：中 共政權成立前的反腐敗運動、「三反、五反」運動、四清運動。第三章介 紹改革開放以後至一九八九年間的反腐敗鬥爭，包括：一九八二年起的打 擊經濟領域犯罪運動、一九八三年起的整黨整風運動、一九八五年起的反 官倒運動。第四章係以介紹現階段中共之反腐敗鬥爭為主，從一九八九年 天安門事件起至一九九五年底為止，其中又以一九九三年八月中共中央紀 律檢查委員會第二次全體會議的召開作為一個分界點。第五章，則從理論 面來探討中國大陸的腐敗問題，包括：腐敗產生之因素、表現之形式、造 成之影響及其解決之道。第六章為中共領導人歷年來所發表的重要反腐敗 言論總集成，其間並有中共中央、國務院相關之反腐敗決議案。第七章為 結論，文中筆者提出個人對於中共反腐敗鬥爭之看法以及筆者造訪中國大 陸部分見聞，最後則為吾人對中國大陸之期許及建議。

本文第一章介紹研究背景與問題意識與研究架構，從相關研究成果中爬梳政治腐敗的定義與其在社會主義國家中的特殊性。並探討兩個主軸：中國大陸市場轉型過程中所面臨的腐敗問題與政府、以及中共領導人如何看待之。 　　第二章從國家與政府的角度觀察中共的貪腐問題，變化中的產權、中央與地方關係。第三、四代領導人如何面對市場經濟帶來的變化，憲法賦予全國人大、政協的監督權有所不足之處，但通常未能充分發揮。並分析中共第三、四兩代領導人所進行的機構改革與法制建設。 　　第三章從黨的組織結構切入。紀委是黨內主要的監督機制，但黨紀處分最高只能開除黨籍，由於市場化使官商不分，意識型態的約束鬆弛，使得黨紀的約束能力下降。「三個代表」號召企業家入黨使得黨員身分不再是最可靠的的資本政治。第三、四兩代領導人都曾發起政治運動宣揚理想的幹部形象，例如江澤民的「三講」、胡錦濤的「保持黨員先進性」。 　　第四章引入非正式制度的層面探討貪腐問題，包括傳媒、文化與市民社會等層面。首先，中共缺乏開放的輿論監督，使人民與政府都無法獲得充分的訊息，雖然可以暫時掩蓋真相，但長遠而言是不利的。其次中國傳統文化講究人際關係的經營，計畫經濟時期的單位制都造成對關係網絡的重視，破壞公平性。最後作者分析是否能寄望藉由成熟的市民社會來促使非正式制度的監督發揮功能。 　　第五章歸納指出中國政治未來可能的發展與改革侷限，包含民主化與多元防腐機制的建構。並未來貪腐問題是否繼續困擾中共提出幾個思考方向。 / In chapter 1, I introduce the background of this study and review correlative research. I want to discriminate the character of political corruption in post-communism states, especially based on China’s market transformation. What situation the leaders faced and how they consider dealing with are two main viewpoints. Next, I analyze this issue from the government structure in chapter 2, such as the relation between central and local bureaucrats. In view of monitor institution setting is not sufficient, I want to explain the institution reform of PRC’s government and the regularization in law. Although the constitution gives the National People Congress and the Political Consultative Conference the authority to supervise, but the power is usually not elaborated well. In chapter 3, I want to observe this issue from the party-state perspective. The discipline committee is the main system in party organization each level. But as the marketization arises, the role of an official and an entrepreneur is often blurred. The leaders of the third and the fourth generation have taken some propagandas or political mobilizations to describe their desirable cadres. Such as Jiang Zemin’s “Three Emphasis” and Hu Jingtao’s “Keep the Party Members’ Advancement”. Then, I lead into the cause of informal institution to discuss the corruptive phenomenon in China. First, there are multiple restrictions on media to reveal the truth, so not only people, but also the government can’t get sufficient information. Second, there are some customs from Chinese culture tradition that make people rely on interpersonal network and guanxi. Third, I analyze whether a mature civil society could constraint these behaviors. Finally, I will indicate that there are still some restrictions on China’s political reform in my conclusion, and provide some directions for more thinking.

Is Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign genuinely fighting corruption, or does it serve to expand Xi’s power? This “hunt for tigers and flies” is second to none in the history of the Communist Party of China. In the first 29 months of Xi’s tenure, 104 “tigers” – corrupt cadres at or above vice-provincial/ministerial level – have been confirmed of being brought down in the campaign, including 4 national leaders. It is Xi’s first sweep of his new broom and tells a story more than anticorruption itself. This thesis studies the early stage of Xi’s campaign against corruption from November 2012 to March 2015 from quantitative and network perspectives and illustrates the political dynamics that drive anticorruption in a period when the new autocrat consolidates his power. First, the thesis examines the temporal and geographical/functional distribution of tigers and concludes that it is a thorough campaign fueled by the autocrat’s increase of power. The process of Xi Jinping’s consolidating power pushes through anticorruption. Second, analysis of the tiger succession shows that Xi Jinping does not often apply outsider succession to fill the vacancies by his own loyalists. It suggests that the anticorruption campaign does not directly expand his power by personnel appointment. Third, this thesis draws a colleague network of the fallen tigers and uses centrality measurement to identify factional structure in the sociogram. Network analysis helps find out whether Xi Jinping takes advantage of the tiger hunt to strike down his enemies and, if he does, who he targets at. It turns out that there are factional groups that Xi cracks down, and the purge creates a favorable climate for Xi’s transcendence from a first-among-equals leader in power-sharing arrangements to an unchallengeable autocrat.