本論文之研究範圍，主要係以一九四九年十月中共政權成立後，至一九九 五年底為止的反腐敗鬥爭為主，整個論文的章節安排如下： 第一章為緒論。第二章主要介紹改革開放以前的反腐敗鬥爭，包括：中 共政權成立前的反腐敗運動、「三反、五反」運動、四清運動。第三章介 紹改革開放以後至一九八九年間的反腐敗鬥爭，包括：一九八二年起的打 擊經濟領域犯罪運動、一九八三年起的整黨整風運動、一九八五年起的反 官倒運動。第四章係以介紹現階段中共之反腐敗鬥爭為主，從一九八九年 天安門事件起至一九九五年底為止，其中又以一九九三年八月中共中央紀 律檢查委員會第二次全體會議的召開作為一個分界點。第五章，則從理論 面來探討中國大陸的腐敗問題，包括：腐敗產生之因素、表現之形式、造 成之影響及其解決之道。第六章為中共領導人歷年來所發表的重要反腐敗 言論總集成，其間並有中共中央、國務院相關之反腐敗決議案。第七章為 結論，文中筆者提出個人對於中共反腐敗鬥爭之看法以及筆者造訪中國大 陸部分見聞，最後則為吾人對中國大陸之期許及建議。

本文第一章介紹研究背景與問題意識與研究架構，從相關研究成果中爬梳政治腐敗的定義與其在社會主義國家中的特殊性。並探討兩個主軸：中國大陸市場轉型過程中所面臨的腐敗問題與政府、以及中共領導人如何看待之。 　　第二章從國家與政府的角度觀察中共的貪腐問題，變化中的產權、中央與地方關係。第三、四代領導人如何面對市場經濟帶來的變化，憲法賦予全國人大、政協的監督權有所不足之處，但通常未能充分發揮。並分析中共第三、四兩代領導人所進行的機構改革與法制建設。 　　第三章從黨的組織結構切入。紀委是黨內主要的監督機制，但黨紀處分最高只能開除黨籍，由於市場化使官商不分，意識型態的約束鬆弛，使得黨紀的約束能力下降。「三個代表」號召企業家入黨使得黨員身分不再是最可靠的的資本政治。第三、四兩代領導人都曾發起政治運動宣揚理想的幹部形象，例如江澤民的「三講」、胡錦濤的「保持黨員先進性」。 　　第四章引入非正式制度的層面探討貪腐問題，包括傳媒、文化與市民社會等層面。首先，中共缺乏開放的輿論監督，使人民與政府都無法獲得充分的訊息，雖然可以暫時掩蓋真相，但長遠而言是不利的。其次中國傳統文化講究人際關係的經營，計畫經濟時期的單位制都造成對關係網絡的重視，破壞公平性。最後作者分析是否能寄望藉由成熟的市民社會來促使非正式制度的監督發揮功能。 　　第五章歸納指出中國政治未來可能的發展與改革侷限，包含民主化與多元防腐機制的建構。並未來貪腐問題是否繼續困擾中共提出幾個思考方向。 / In chapter 1, I introduce the background of this study and review correlative research. I want to discriminate the character of political corruption in post-communism states, especially based on China’s market transformation. What situation the leaders faced and how they consider dealing with are two main viewpoints. Next, I analyze this issue from the government structure in chapter 2, such as the relation between central and local bureaucrats. In view of monitor institution setting is not sufficient, I want to explain the institution reform of PRC’s government and the regularization in law. Although the constitution gives the National People Congress and the Political Consultative Conference the authority to supervise, but the power is usually not elaborated well. In chapter 3, I want to observe this issue from the party-state perspective. The discipline committee is the main system in party organization each level. But as the marketization arises, the role of an official and an entrepreneur is often blurred. The leaders of the third and the fourth generation have taken some propagandas or political mobilizations to describe their desirable cadres. Such as Jiang Zemin’s “Three Emphasis” and Hu Jingtao’s “Keep the Party Members’ Advancement”. Then, I lead into the cause of informal institution to discuss the corruptive phenomenon in China. First, there are multiple restrictions on media to reveal the truth, so not only people, but also the government can’t get sufficient information. Second, there are some customs from Chinese culture tradition that make people rely on interpersonal network and guanxi. Third, I analyze whether a mature civil society could constraint these behaviors. Finally, I will indicate that there are still some restrictions on China’s political reform in my conclusion, and provide some directions for more thinking.

本研究使用新制度主義和公共選擇學派之理論工具，來分析當前中國大陸國有企業中滋生蔓延之尋租性腐敗行為。研究之目的在於分析制度轉變和制度設計如何影響到個人之行為，以及由此所造成的社會損失和代價。 腐敗問題是世界各國政府和民眾普遍關心的社會熱門問題，由腐敗行為所帶來的政府形象受損、社會分配不公、資源配置扭曲等危害是不可估計的，因此，各國政府都在千方百計地進行反腐敗政策，以維護市場正常秩序，恢復公眾信心，促進經濟持續發展。隨著市場規則的不斷建立，法治環境的不斷完善，權力制衡機制不斷形成，似乎腐敗的產生越來越困難，然而腐敗行為仍然持續發生，任何國家、社會均存在腐敗行為，危害著社會和政府的透明度。 國有企業是中國大陸國民經濟的支柱，是中共引導、推動、調控經濟和社會發展的基本力量。在計畫經濟時期，中共當局逐漸遇到國有企業之效率不彰和生產率低落的問題，進而從激勵擴大面開始國有企業之改革。自1978年推動的改革開放必然導致了產業結構和市場運行機制的改變。中國大陸改革之特徵為分權式改革，亦稱「放權讓利」改革。改革以來，中央將大幅度的政策執行工作交給了地方政府、企業，同時希望給地方政府發展經濟、關注國有企業效率更大的誘因與激勵機制。自1987年承包制實行起，中共裝置代理關係使得國有企業和政府部門、地方政府等代理人具有代理人投機行為的傾向，就國有企業中委託─代理關係影響到國有企業經營者和一些利益追求的代理人之間的投機行為，造成國有企業盈利績效的損失。實際上國有企業虧損面日益增大的事實表明了代理關係形成的負作用。不過，以公有制為主的中共改革與從企業所有權改革著手的西方國家之公營事業民營化不同，只著重於對國有企業控制權方面，並不徹底執行產權改革，不足以解決產權問題，因而產生代理人的激勵問題。以分權化改革為核心的中共的改革過程，擴大了代理人的權限以及自主性，這些改革開放中形成的委託─代理關係受到改革中出現的大量租金的因素，造成代理人的「尋租性腐敗行為」。而中共所採取的漸進式改革、對國有企業的軟預算約束，以及國家的壟斷皆造成尋租行為出現的環境。 本研究追蹤國有企業改革過程中的尋租行為，從中國大陸整個國家結構中的「委託－代理關係」中的「資訊不對稱問題」和由此衍生的代理人的尋租性腐敗行為。本研究試圖研討資訊不對稱情形中，代理人如何採取經濟人的行為，經由什麼樣之博奕情境中採取自身最有利的行為。 文分七章，逐次深入探索相關議題，期對中共改革過程中凸顯出來的代理關係，能做全方位的辯證。

Is Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign genuinely fighting corruption, or does it serve to expand Xi’s power? This “hunt for tigers and flies” is second to none in the history of the Communist Party of China. In the first 29 months of Xi’s tenure, 104 “tigers” – corrupt cadres at or above vice-provincial/ministerial level – have been confirmed of being brought down in the campaign, including 4 national leaders. It is Xi’s first sweep of his new broom and tells a story more than anticorruption itself. This thesis studies the early stage of Xi’s campaign against corruption from November 2012 to March 2015 from quantitative and network perspectives and illustrates the political dynamics that drive anticorruption in a period when the new autocrat consolidates his power. First, the thesis examines the temporal and geographical/functional distribution of tigers and concludes that it is a thorough campaign fueled by the autocrat’s increase of power. The process of Xi Jinping’s consolidating power pushes through anticorruption. Second, analysis of the tiger succession shows that Xi Jinping does not often apply outsider succession to fill the vacancies by his own loyalists. It suggests that the anticorruption campaign does not directly expand his power by personnel appointment. Third, this thesis draws a colleague network of the fallen tigers and uses centrality measurement to identify factional structure in the sociogram. Network analysis helps find out whether Xi Jinping takes advantage of the tiger hunt to strike down his enemies and, if he does, who he targets at. It turns out that there are factional groups that Xi cracks down, and the purge creates a favorable climate for Xi’s transcendence from a first-among-equals leader in power-sharing arrangements to an unchallengeable autocrat.

「廉潔」、「效能」與「透明」乃當前全球先進政府的重要施政價值，亞洲各國為防制貪污之腐蝕，近年來均積極加強反貪廉政機構的建立與強化。反腐倡廉亦為兩岸政府當前施政重點，雙邊領導人均一再宣誓打擊貪腐之重要性並實際嚴打貪官污吏，中國大陸於1995年在最高人民檢察院成立反貪污賄賂總局，2005年又於國務院下設國家反腐敗局；我國則歷經兩次政黨輪替，在各界殷盼下終於2011年7月20日成立第一個廉政專責機構-法務部廉政署，但兩岸貪腐問題並未隨著廉政專責機構成立而減少，社會矚目之重大貪污弊案仍時有所聞，涉案層級也越來越高，其原因為何？是環境使然，抑或是兩岸現行廉政肅貪機制尚有缺漏，無法有效遏止貪污發生。 本研究重點係針對貪腐問題類型、成因及趨勢發展之學術理論進行回顧，並就兩岸貪腐問題發生成因、現況，以及在廉政法制、廉政組織等反腐敗機制上所採措施及成效，盡可能做一探討比較，以瞭解問題癥結。 本研究結果發現兩岸廉政機制不論在法制面、組織面及實際執行面均有待研究改進之處，建議執政當局應努力找出問題所在，積極調整改善，以健全各項廉政監督機制與完善廉政組織、法制等肅貪反貪措施，俾回應民眾對廉能政治之期待，進而提升國家整體清廉度及施政效能。

貪腐是先進國家檢視政府行政效率的重要指標，貪腐會影響國家整體形象，甚至左右外國直接投資與金融市場的評比。中國之國家預防腐敗局的機構定位突顯中國內部對貪腐問題與政治結構調整問題。因此，本研究針對中國大陸貪腐問題、貪腐機制之演變過程、國家預防腐敗局現階段工作成效與不足之處、國家預防腐敗局未來工作方向展望與挑戰等問題，以文獻分析方法進行探討與分析。 經過本研究的分析與討論，本研究歸納以下論點： 一、中國大陸貪腐問題可以用尋租理論解釋，當改革開放後，地方官員可以藉由經濟特區許可證或稅務等工作內容，進行利益勾結與建立政商貪腐集團。 二、貪腐機制可分為權權交易模式與權錢交易模式，其貪腐集團的交接與政權交接息息相關。改革開放前的貪腐模式為權權交易模式，改革開放後為權錢交易模式。 三、中共貪腐機制以政治運作角度分析其過程，可以視為政權交接期間的合作式賽局崩解與重新建立，其崩解原因在於內部利益分配不平均導致矛盾加深，藉著政權交接期間之權力洗牌模式，產生新的貪腐集團與經濟利益分配模式。 四、過去中共對於貪腐問題的處理模式屬於政權協商方式，例如屬於江澤明體系的陳良宇貪腐案歷經「陳良宇涉嫌貪污」至「陳良宇同志違紀問題」的兩種處理模式，透露出中共對於貪腐問題的防治處理屬於政權協商的模式。因此，國家預防腐敗局的設立過程背後潛伏著個政治派系的妥協。 五、就組織架構而言，國家預防腐敗局目前位於監察部之下，部門本身並無獨立監察權，僅被視為調研與幕僚單位，此與香港或新加坡之獨立性反貪腐機構的特性有所差異。 六、在中共維持黨政雙軌制下，中紀委與監察部將是反貪腐制度的主軸，所以短期而言，對內部角色定位，國家預防腐敗局的功能將定位於中紀委領導的執行單位，負責實際的反貪腐之協調運作；對外部角色定位，國家預防腐敗局將定位於接收國際組織的意見，國家預防腐敗局的角色將是整合國際反貪腐的科技運作。 七、就國家預防腐敗局之未來發展模式，國家預防腐敗局需要建立獨立監察權，且其成員任命方式必須擺脫派系協商的影子，但在中共目前政治角力過程下，國家預防腐敗局之未來發展將視內部政治利益與輿論壓力的角力結果而定。 / The extent of corruption is an important index to review the administrative efficiency of the governments among advanced countries. The corruption issue affects the image of a country, the foreign direct investment and the rating of financial market. The role of National Bureau of Corruption Prevention of China (thereafter as “NBCP”) stresses the problems of corruption in internal systems of China and political restructuring. Therefore, this study adopts the literature analysis method to explore and analyze the corruption problems in China, the development of corruption prevention scheme, the performance and deficiencies of NBCP, and the future prospects and challenges of NBCP. After the analysis and discussions in this study, the conclusions are as follows. First, the problems of corruption in China could be interpreted by the rent-seeking theory. After China’s reform, the local government officials could take advantage of the permission of economically-designated zone or taxation, etc. to collude with private enterprises based on interests, and form the corruption groups. Second, according to the past literatures, the patterns of corruption in China could be categorized as the exchange of privilege for privilege and the exchange of privilege for money, and the transition of both corruption groups and regimes is closely bound up. From the perspective of rent-seeking theory, the exchange of privilege for privilege is the pattern of corruption before China’s reform, with the exchange of privilege for money standing for the ones after China’s reform. Third, from the perspective of operation of political system in China, the transition of regimes could be interpreted as the process of collapse and rebuilding in the dynamics of cooperative games. The reasons of collapse could result from the disequilibrium in the allocation of internal interests and then conflicts from the disequilibrium. Therefore, by the reshuffle of political interests during the transition of regimes, the new corruption groups and new scheme for the allocation of economic interests appear. Fourth, China used to deal with corruption through regime consultation. For instance, the corruption case of Chen, Lian-yu in the administration of Jiang, Ze-ming ,which was shifted from original tone of “Chen, Lian-yu suspected in corruption” to “Chen, Lian-yu’s violating disciplines”, shows that the strategy for corruption in China could be categorized by the features of regime consultation. Hence, the setup of NBCP implies the compromises among different political groups. Fifth, in terms of organizational structure, NBCP is under the Ministry of Supervision, without independent supervision, and only works as the research and staff unit of independent supervision, which differs from the independence of the anti-corruption institute of Hong Kong and Singapore. Sixth, under the present dual-track system of China, the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the CPC and Ministry of Supervision play the main roles in the system of anti-corruption. In the short term, as to the internal role, NBCP is regarded as the execution unit of Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. As to the external role, NBCP is responsible for receiving the opinions from international organizations and integrating the technology of international anti-corruption. Seventh, the future model of NBCP should build up the independent supervision and appoint the members without the influence of the political groups. However, in the struggle of different political groups in Chinese Communist party, the future development of NBCP will depend on the outcome of the struggle between internal political interests and public stress.