The study explored when, under what conditions, and to what extent did European integration, particularly the European Union’s requirement for democratic conditionality, contribute to democratic consolidation in Spain, Poland, and Turkey? On the basis of a four-part definition, the dissertation examined the democratizing impact of European integration process on each of the following four components of consolidation: (i) holding of fair, free and competitive elections, (ii) protection of fundamental rights, including human and minority rights, (iii) high prospects of regime survival and civilian control of the military, and (iv) legitimacy, elite consensus, and stateness. To assess the relative significance of EU’s democratizing leverage, the thesis also examined domestic and non-EU international dynamics of democratic consolidation in the three countries. By employing two qualitative methods (case study and process-tracing), the study focused on three specific time frames: 1977-1986 for Spain, 1994-2004 for Poland, and 1999-present for Turkey. In addition to official documents, newspapers, and secondary sources, face-to-face interviews made with politicians, academics, experts, bureaucrats, and journalists in the three countries were utilized. The thesis generated several conclusions. First of all, the EU’s democratizing impact is not uniform across different components of democratic consolidation. Moreover, the EU’s democratizing leverage in Spain, Poland, and Turkey involved variations over time for three major reasons: (i) the changing nature of EU’s democratic conditionality over time (ii) varying levels of the EU’s credible commitment to the candidate country’s prospect for membership, and (iii) domestic dynamics in the candidate countries. Furthermore, the European integration process favors democratic consolidation but its magnitude is shaped by the candidate country’s prospect for EU membership and domestic factors in the candidate country. Finally, the study involves a major policy implication for the European Union: unless the EU provides a clear prospect for membership, its democratizing leverage will be limited in the candidate countries.

El presente trabajo de investigación presenta un análisis acerca de Martín Vizcarra como actor político en el marco de las consecuencias políticas y judiciales en relación con el tema de corrupción que se le acusa, primero, como gobernador regional de Moquegua (2011-2014), luego, como Ministro de Transportes y Comunicaciones del Perú (2016-2017), y, posteriormente, como máxima autoridad del país (2018-2021). Metodológicamente, se emplea la información obtenida de la documentación periodística y la estadística. En el trabajo se señala que Vizcarra construye estratégicamente una identidad política con la que se opone a la corrupción y con la que contrarresta las acusaciones o denuncias de delitos durante sus distintas gestiones contra la administración pública peruana para favorecer su imagen como político. / This research presents an analysis of Martín Vizcarra as a political actor in the framework of the political and judicial consequences related to the corruption issue he is accused of, first, as regional governor of Moquegua (2011-2014), then as Minister of Transport and Communications of Peru (2016-2017), and, later, as the highest authority of the country (2018-2021). Methodologically, the information obtained from journalistic documentation and statistics is used. The work points out that Vizcarra strategically builds a political identity with which he opposes corruption and with which he counteracts accusations or denunciations of crimes during his different actions against the Peruvian public administration in order to favor his image as a politician. / Revisón por pares

Constitutional amendments in federal political systems have to be negotiated between national and sub-national actors. While theories of negotiation usually explain the outcome by looking at these actors, their preferences and bargaining powers, the theoretical model developed in this article also includes their interaction orientation. The article determines a typical sequence of bargaining and arguing and identifies favourable conditions for cooperation based on different interaction orientations. The article states that actors can reconcile the conflicting logics of intergovernmental or party competition and joint decision-making in constitutional politics through a sequence of bargaining and arguing. However, constitutional amendments negotiated in this way run the risk of undermining the legitimacy and functionality of constitutions.

本論文把論述重心放在「比較」上，試圖去認識三位國家領導人對於政治改革理念以及改革實踐的不同之處，也希望透過這樣的比較，釐清三位領導人的改革各自爲俄羅斯政治體制帶來什麼不一樣的影響，以及他們各自的政治選擇又是帶領俄羅斯朝哪個方向前進。其次，我們還要釐清國家領導人的性格和意志等因素是如何影響制度運行。俄羅斯的超級總統制(Super-Presidentialism)將領導人的個人因素突出，這樣的體制對俄羅斯的民主有什麼影響。最後，本論文將探討俄羅斯獨有的政治文化是如何影響三位領導人的政治選擇和發展。 / This article’s main purpose is comparison, it tries to tell the different side of political innovation and the way it practices of 3 Russian leaders. It also clarifies the 3 leader’s reformation has been done to Russian political system separately and which direction their political decision has brought Russia into. Moreover, we will point out how the leaders’ will and personality effect the system. Super- Presidentialism of Russia highlight leader’s individual factor, what kind of effect the Super- Presidentialism does to Russian democracy. Finally, the essay will discuss how do the 3 leader’s political decision and development has been effected by Russian unique political culture.

本文研究主旨，在於透過一位變法思想家馬建忠的研究，了解中國近代知識分子在中 國近代化運動中的表現和其在中國近代史上的地位。 本論文所採取的文獻資料，就一手資料而言，除了馬建忠本身的文集『適可齋記言記 行』外，還包括清代檔案、奏摺、各家文集以及日記等。在二手資料方面，則利用與 本文有關的中、日、韓以及英文等各種資料。研究方法，則以史學方法來收集、考證 資料，經歸納、分析和綜合後，再組合敘述馬建忠整個維新主張的內容。 本文共計十萬餘字，分為五章。 第一章緒論，說明研究動機與目的，概述馬建忠所處的時代背景，介紹前人對馬建忠 的研究成果。 第二章敘述馬建忠的生平和經歷，以了解他的維新主張的形成背景和其實踐。 第三章根據馬建忠的著作分析馬建忠對於外交、教育文化方面的改革意見。 第四章對以「富民說」為主的經濟方面和以海軍建設為主的軍事方面等相關改革主張 ，加以探討。 第五章結論，探討馬建忠維新主張的特色，並評價其在中國近代史上的地位。 透過本研究，有助於了解在國家危亂中的知識分子的角色，進一步了解清末整個近代 化運動。

Le but de cette thèse est d'examiner les réformes politiques qui sont intervenues sous le règne de Charles III. La chronologie (1765-1787) se confond avec la visite générale de José de Gálvez en Nouvelle Espagne, puis avec sa nomination, en 1776, au secrétariat d’État des Indes. Au cours de cette période furent créées de nouvelles juridictions : une vice-royauté, deux capitaineries générales, trois audiencias et desintendances presque partout aux Indes. Ce moment est unique dans l'histoire de la monarchie espagnole par l'ampleur des réformes adoptées. Mais plus que les réformes elles-mêmes, c'est leur genèse et les moyens mis en œuvre pour les adopter qui ont attiré notre attention. À travers l'étude du réseau de José de Gálvez, nous avons pu observer une véritable politique de prise de contrôle du gouvernement des Indes. Le clientélisme du secrétaire d’État est alors mis au service de ses projets politiques. Ces réformes engagent une fragmentation du superior gobierno et un affaiblissement de l'autorité des vice-rois. Un nouveau système de gouvernement des Indes estalors expérimenté. / This dissertation examines the political reforms under the rule of Charles III and, especially, under José de Gálvez, first, as Visitador General of New Spain and, later, as Secretary of State of the Indies. Between 1765 and 1787, Gálvez undertook several profound changes in the Indies’ government, including the creation of new administrative territories: a viceroyalty, two capitanías generales, three audiencias, and numerous intendencias in almost all the Indies. This period was unique for the Spanish monarchy not only for the large-scale reforms, but also for the means to achieve them, which is the focus of our research. By studying the José de Gálvez’s network, we argued that it succeeded in taking control of the Indies’ government. In fact, the goal of the Secretary of State’s clientelism was to serve his political projects. Furthermore, Gálvez’s reforms caused the fragmentation of the Superior Gobierno and the weakness of viceroys’ authority, which resulted in a new government system in the Indies.

蘇聯時期性質單一的「意識型菁英」在戈巴契夫的政經改革下開始分化成政治菁英與經濟菁英兩大類。到了葉爾欽時期，由於國家制度不彰、政府職能紊亂以及聯邦從屬關係被破壞，再加上總統本人執政後期健康情形不佳而導致大權旁落等緣故，造成各方菁英團體為了自身利益而彼此傾軋不已，也形成了以地方勢力、反對派政黨以及經濟寡頭為箭頭的「分散型菁英」。進入普丁時期，新執政者承繼了前朝唯一「正面」的遺緒 –「集權總統制」，再佐以個人的施政風格與高人氣支持，於第一任期內便大抵完成收編菁英的政治改革：於新設立的七大聯邦區派駐聯邦權力代理人 – 總統全權代表；改革聯邦委員會以削弱地方首長勢力；組建權力黨「統一俄羅斯黨」 並掌控國家杜馬。而在「共識型菁英」的氛圍下，作為普丁政權主要幹部甄補來源的「聖彼得堡幫」成員當中，又以所謂的「強力部門幹部」為大宗。其軍警情治背景與國家治理手法不僅為普丁治下的俄羅斯型塑了「軍事政體」的外觀，更讓後共俄羅斯或多或少出現了「蘇維埃化」的傾向。 / The single-natured “ideocratic elite” of the Soviet Union begins to differentiate into political and economic elite under the impact of Gorbachev’s reforms. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin’s elites jostled with each other for their interests and transformed into the “fragmented elite,” characterized by regional leaders, opposition parties and economic oligarchs. This occurred due to the malfunction of state institutions, disorder of government functions, destruction of central-peripheral relations and the regency by the President’s cronies during his illness in the second term. Later in Putin’s Russia, with the only “positive” legacy – “authoritarian presidential rule” that the new ruler inherits from his predecessor as well as his own personal ruling styles and high popularity, Putin achieves the approximate incorporation of Russian elites with the political reforms in his first term, including the delegation of Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoys as federal agents in the seven new federal districts, the weakening of regional elites by reforming the Federation Council, and the seizure of the State Duma with the party of power – “United Russia.” Under the atmosphere of the “consensual elite,” the “Petersburgers” – especially the so-called “siloviki” – constitute the main source of cadre recruitment in Putin’s Russia. The security-intelligence background and state governance tactics of these siloviki not only mold the façade of “militocracy” for Putin’s regime, but more or less contribute to the tendency of “sovietization” in post-communist Russia.

Constitutional amendments in federal political systems have to be negotiated between national and sub-national actors. While theories of negotiation usually explain the outcome by looking at these actors, their preferences and bargaining powers, the theoretical model developed in this article also includes their interaction orientation. The article determines a typical sequence of bargaining and arguing and identifies favourable conditions for cooperation based on different interaction orientations. The article states that actors can reconcile the conflicting logics of intergovernmental or party competition and joint decision-making in constitutional politics through a sequence of bargaining and arguing. However, constitutional amendments negotiated in this way run the risk of undermining the legitimacy and functionality of constitutions.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo estudar o financiamento da política no Brasil por pessoas jurídicas, a fim de evocar os riscos que gera para o processo de escolha dos governantes e a fase governamental. A análise dessas questões dá-se por meio de quatro chaves. A primeira trata da capitalização dos partidos políticos e candidatos, a qual demanda fixação de limites por meio de ferramentas de regulação que buscam equilíbrio nas campanhas eleitorais e no financiamento das atividades dos partidos. A segunda versa sobre os dados de eleições nacionais e de pesquisas empíricas sobre o resultado da participação de pessoas jurídicas, correlacionando-o com os efeitos colaterais do financiamento, quais sejam, a corrupção e a influência do poder econômico. O exame de alguns escândalos tem relevância na atualidade, sobretudo diante da possibilidade de subsidiarem reformas que se apresentam necessárias. A terceira aborda soluções encontradas em outros países para equacionar os efeitos da participação das pessoas jurídicas, com destaque para o debate da questão atinente à liberdade de expressão. A pesquisa revela que a Justiça Eleitoral e a jurisdição constitucional brasileira tiveram papel decisivo na conformação do financiamento da política. A quarta consiste na análise crítica das regras do ordenamento brasileiro, inclusive as decorrentes da reforma política, que visam equacionar os problemas diagnosticados no estudo, e das decisões da jurisprudência que lidaram com o princípio da igualdade. Ao final, alinham-se vantagens e desvantagens do financiamento da política por pessoas jurídicas. / The present work aims to analyze the political financing by legal entities in Brazil in order to evoke the risks for the process of choosing the rulers and the period of governorship. The analysis of the issues considers four keys. The first is about the capitalization of the political parties and the candidates, which demands the fixing of limits through regulation tools to seek the balance in the electoral campaigns and in the financing of the parties activities. The second one concerns the data of the national elections and the empirical researches on the result of the participation of legal entities, correlating it with the side effects of financing, in other words corruption and the influence of the economic power. The exam of some scandals is relevant in the present time mainly considering the possibility of subsidizing reforms that are presented as necessary. The third point considers the other countries solutions to balance the effects of the legal entities contributions especially the discussion of the issue pertaining to freedom of expression. The research reveals that the Electoral Courts and the Brazilian constitutional jurisdiction had a decisive role shaping the political financing. The fourth key is the critical analyses of the Brazilian legal system, including the rules resulting from the political reform, which intended to solve the problems identified in the study, and the case law which dealt with principle of equality. In the end, there is an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of political financing by legal entities.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T14:57:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vitor Emanuel Marchetti Ferraz Junior.pdf: 1464846 bytes, checksum: abc9ddd4f195ca1e509e1272ee7fa81f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-27 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Since 2002, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and the Federal Supreme Court (STF) have been making decisions on electoral rules by adopting a more aggressive stance. This study is based on the fact that the judicialization of elections is already an ongoing process. Due to this process, three matters are analyzed: 1) which institutional framework let the judicialization become a reality? 2) why the judicialization occurs? 3) what is its objective? Firstly, in order to answer these questions, the electoral model in Brazil has been defined. Afterwards, five expressive debate cases are investigated: the uniformity of party coalitions at state and federal levels, the number of city councilmen, thresholds for party representation, party funding and loyalty. In conclusion, it is proven that the judicialization took place as a result of the adopted electoral governance model. This process occurred rather because of judicial branch s attitude than because of eventual short comings of the legislative branch. And the whole judicialization was guided by mostly republican principles than by democratic ones / Desde 2002, o Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) e o Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) vêm interpretando a legislação eleitoral com um perfil mais arrojado. Essas interpretações produziram alterações profundas nas regras da competição político-partidária. Este trabalho parte do pressuposto de que está em curso uma judicialização da competição político-partidária no Brasil. A partir desse ponto, o estudo avança sobre três questões: 1) o que a torna possível, 2) por que ela ocorre e 3) qual é o seu objetivo. Para avançar sobre essas questões, primeiramente definimos o modelo de governança eleitoral adotado no país. Feito isso, investigamos cinco casos emblemáticos para o debate: verticalização das coligações, número de vereadores, cláusula de desempenho, fundo partidário e fidelidade partidária. Ao final, comprovaremos que a judicialização da competição política foi possível devido ao modelo de governança eleitoral adotado, ocorreu mais por uma disposição do Judiciário do que por possíveis deficiências do Legislativo e foi orientada por princípios mais republicanos do que democráticos por parte dos ministros do TSE e do STF