本文要旨在回答中國大陸的能源戰略是如何形成，並探討此一戰略如何影響中國大陸的石油安全。本文主從歷史制度主義的觀點主張中國能源體制是決定中國的石油戰略最重要的因素。解釋中國的能源部門在經濟改革與國際化的內、外部環境下，產生制度變遷，進而形成不同時期的石油戰略。在回答中國大陸日益龐大的石油需求與進口石油依賴，使得政府制訂出提升能源使用效率、節約能源、能源多元化與確保海外石油供應
但由於中國為保護國有石油企業的壟斷角色，對於「迎進來」的市場進入條件設下許多條件限制，對外又採取積極的石油外交，使得國際社會對中國產生重商主義與保護主義的疑慮。
中國的能源部門自1980年以來已經歷幾個階段的改革，第一階段是從1982年至1987年，強調要計畫經濟為主、市場力量為輔的能源制度改革；第二階段是從1988至1992年，重點在於國有企業的改革，鼓勵國有企業集團化；第三階段是從1993至1997年，重點在政企分離，並把配置資源的基礎性職能轉移給市場；第四階段是從1998至2002年，重點在加強國有資產的監管與國有企業經營，並初步建立宏觀能源調控體系；第五階段則是自2003年以降，主要的改革目標在建立跨部門的能源協調機制與對外的競爭力。
本文但由於「漸進主義」式的制度變遷使得能源部門體制改革仍存在許多問題，諸如能源部門分散、能源監管部門眾多、國家安全思維與既得利益等，使得政府部門考量其能源安全時，政府干預仍多於市場思維，即便自改革開放以來國家能力已不斷衰退。但在能源辦與發改委能源局的人力有限以及能源部門缺乏效率的情形下，擁有龐大資源的三大國有石油企業（中石油、中石化、中海油）無疑「挾持」政府的決策，例如理論上中央政府可完全控制與審核國有企業的海外投資，但實際國有企業通常是在海外投案案定局後才通知發改委與國務院。中國的能源決策中的缺乏效率常來自於既得利益者的把持，而不願在整體的政治與經濟政策上肩負起更多的政策責任，例如中央政府與國企對於戰備儲油到底由誰出資的內部爭論。
未來中國的能源戰略會持續採取「迎進來、走出去」的方向；近年來政府試圖改革其能源決策程序，透過建立跨部會的決策協調機制試圖重奪能源決策的主導性，因此於2005年5月正式成立「能源領導小組」，並積極透入政府能源白皮書與能源相關法案的草擬，政府的舉動等於是將能源政策的制訂再度「中央化」。未來中國能源戰略的最大挑戰仍來自於能源體制能否深化改革，並且制訂出對外、對內策略一致的能源戰略，以因應中國未來的石油需求以及消減國際社會的疑慮。 / The new facet of global oil politics and China’s surging oil demand have forced the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises to secure foreign oil supplies and to implement energy efficiency. However, systemic level or state-centered theories have provided limited theoretic orientation to explain China’s state behaviors and foreign behavior. It is essential to explore China’s energy institution and energy strategy behind its quest for oil security. That is, China’s foreign strategy should be put into broader context of China’s institutional evolution and domestic/foreign energy policy-making process. This research applies historical institutionalism to look at history evolution of China’s energy institution and energy strategy (especially oil strategy).
Chinese energy institution has experienced four main stages of institutional evolution since 1980s. The main themes of four stages have emphasized different administrative, institutional, and energy goals. Meanwhile, institutional critical junctures and feedbacks (formation and reproduction) also have existed in every stage. The first phrase (1980-1992) emphasized how to integrate market forces into China’s bureaucratic institution with socialist characteristics and the market oriented reforms faced several institutional challenges due to necessity of central planning; the second phrase (1993-1997) was characterized by slight and limited institutional restructuring within the energy sector because market force did not gain political support from the leadership. The Chinese government established both the State Energy Commission (SEC) (1980-82) and the Ministry of Energy (MOE) (1988-93) in the wake of acute energy shortages to re-centralize authority over the energy sector. However, neither institution could effectively coordinate and implement energy policy, partly because they could not overcome the vested interests in sectional industries. The third phrase (1998-2002) was characterized by radical institutional reforms on conglomerating SOEs and delimiting administrative power. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) along with the Energy Bureau within it have taken over full governmental regulatory and public sector responsibility from SOEs. However, NDRC functions not as powerful as SOEs do. Therefore, the fourth phrase (2003 until now) then put attention on the establishment of a super-ministerial interagency, revivification of administrative power, and emphasis of foreign competitiveness. The establishment of State Energy Leading Group (SELG) aims at regaining strong central authority and to correcting turbulent oil strategies made on a base of institutional constraints.
Above all, China’s institutional evolution is characteristic of state-regulated marketization, limited property right reforms, strategic preference, and departmentalism in China’s energy sector since 1980s. The institutional evolution has constrained China’s energy institution from planning a long-term national energy strategy. China’s energy sector continuously confirms institutional formation by the support of highest leadership and mainstream ideology, and confirms institutional reproduction between the directive and liberal forces, between the government and market forces.
Meanwhile, international responses to China’s hunting behaviors are to play either a conductive role in impelling China’s institutional reforms and in adjusting its foreign behaviors. To prevent serious energy competition and to enhance international cooperation, China has shown its willingness to communicate with other nations on oil issues. However, China also needs to show its determination to implement domestic demand-side measures and a market approach instead of implementing protectionist “welcome-in” and aggressive “going out” policies.
Ongoing institutional reforms still determines whether the China’s energy institution will ensure the country’s energy security. In the short term, the establishment of the central authority in the energy sector will improve departmental coordination and policy persistance. However, in the long term, China’s ongoing institional reforms need to integrate more market forces, proceed property right reforms, and reshape relationship between the government and market. Without deeper institutional reforms, energy bureaucrats and SOEs would be dragged into institutional process of formation and reproduction but gain limited results in meeting China’s oil security.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0912605041 |
| Creators | 姚源明, Yao, Yuanming Alvin |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 英文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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