本研究係以中國大陸「水路運輸部門」的「航港體制改革」有關問題為研究對象，係屬一種針對某一特定「產業部門」（Industrial Sectors）的體制改革問題之研究取向。 　　由中共建政至「改革開放」路線實施前的三十年中，其「水路運輸部門」在實踐上也浮現了若干問題，而隨著經濟體制改革，如何尋求這些問題的解決，即為1980年代初期以來中共推動「航港體制改革」之目的。 　　有關「改革開放時期中共航港體制改革之研究」此一議題，基本上橫跨了做為「經濟基礎」的航運事業、港口事業兩大「產業部門」（Industrial Sectors），又涉及到其「上層建築」的「政府機構改革」（航港行政管理體制改革）；在屬性上是一個典型的「公共政策分析」議題。 　　本研究主要使用「公共政策分析」研究法的「過程論模式」（Process Model）做為分析模式（analytical models）。經由「政策環境分析」及一系列的「政策過程階段分析」，據以產出「政策主張」。 　　綜上，本研究之主要內容，乃在探討（1）「水路運輸部門」的「航港體制改革」之公共政策分析，以及其中一系列的政策過程階段分析，（2）跨入新世紀航港體制改革進一步深化發展之可能取向。 / The subject of the study is focus on the related public policy issues that were regarding the shipping and ports sectors regime reform on the Reform and Opening Era for the Mainland China. The shipping and ports sectors regime reform are a part of the integrated transportation sectors regime reform, especially in the water transportation sectors regime reform. This study orientation is against the regime reform issues on one specified industrial sectors. 　　During the 30 years form the regime found of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at 1949 to the beginning of the Reform and Opening Route at 1979, there were many problems existed on each developing process of the shipping and ports sectors. How to find the solutions against the problems, was the object to promote the shipping and ports regime reform from the beginning of 1980’s decade. 　　As regarding the issues of “A Study on the Shipping and Ports Sectors Regime Reform on the Reform and Opening Era for the Mainland China”, it is not only across both on the shipping industry and ports industry of the two important industrial sectors as the “Economic Base”, but also involved the government institutions reform (shipping and ports administration regime reform) as the “Upper Construction”, so that is a typical public policy analysis issues. The study will utilize the Public Policy Analysis Methodology, especially in Process Model to be the analytical models. Through the Policy Environment Analysis and the series Policy Process Stage Analysis, then it will output the Policy Advocacy. 　　As the above mentioned, the major contents of the study are including the （1）policy process stage analysis of the shipping and ports sectors regime reform, and （2）the possible upgrade orientation of the shipping and ports sectors regime reform during across to the new century.

本文利用介入模式分析中共改革開放所造成的經濟結構之轉變，並建構包含軍事、非軍事政府、及私人等三部門的生產函數，來探討其與經濟成長之間的關聯性。實證結果顯示，改革開放使得中國大陸由閉關自守的內向型經濟轉為高貿易依存度的外向型經濟，經濟體制由計劃經濟邁向多元經濟成分共同發展的市場經濟，整體投資環境獲得改善，而軍事支出雖持續增加，但相對於高經濟成長，其軍事支出規模卻是下降的。此外，中共的經濟成長主要來自於積累率的提昇、公部門支出的正面影響和外溢效果、及國際經濟關係的開放，而技術變遷和勞動投入之成長的影響並不顯著。 / This article proposes intervention model to analyze the structural change of China’s transitional economy. We identify the relationship between economic growth and structural change by using the production functions from military, nonmilitary, and private sectors. The results indicate a more market-oriented economy and changing relationship between private and public ownership will continue to drive China toward modernization. In contrast to high economic growth, although military expenditure is still increasing but its relative scale is declining. The main sources of China’s economic growth are from the increase of accumulation rate, the positive and spillover effects of public expenditures, and the liberalization of international economic relations. Especially, much of China’s growth has come from producing goods for foreign trade. While on the other hand, the impacts of technological change and increased labor inputs are not significant in this study.

本論文研究的目的是要解剖現階段中共進行的經濟管理體制改革之真相，進一步判斷 它將來的發展趨向。 第一章 緒論 第一節 研究目的 第二節 研究範圍與方法 第三節 資料的來源與研究的限制 第二章 社會主義經濟管理我基本理論 第一節 是否存在社會主義客觀經濟規律 第二節 關於生產資料所有制問題的基本理論 第三節 社會主義經濟中計劃經濟與市場調節的關係 第四節 分配理論─按勞分配 第三章 中共經濟管理體制的演變 第一節 時期的劃分 第二節 經濟管理制度的演變過程 第三節 現今經濟管理體制改革的時代背景 第四章 現階段經濟管理體制改革之內容 第一節 農業管理體制的改革 第二節 工業管理體制的改革 第三節 商業管理體制的改革 第四節 財政管理體制的改革 第五節 對外貿易管理體制的改革 第五章結論 第一節 現階段經濟管理體制改革之特性與局限 第二節 中共經濟管理體制改革之展望

本文撰寫動機，係以江澤民主政十三年為時間軸，探討中國共產黨在面臨轉變處境下，對於政權維繫的合法性挑戰做出了何種判斷與處置？對於黨的性質，做出了何種詮釋，且在黨建工作上，採取了什麼樣的變革措施？對於中共自身未來走向，做出了什麼樣的願景藍圖與評價？ 文中主要分析問題集中在：共產黨的政黨屬性；改革開放引發的社會變遷對中共政權合法性的衝擊；在政權穩定與一黨專政前提下，中共如何處理社會、國家和黨的關係；江澤民所主導的政黨改革，對於基本政黨屬性的「變」與「不變」為何。 附屬探討議題則包括：當前大陸市民社會、公共領域的發展狀況；中共是否已由極權體制向威權體制轉型；政治體制改革的進程與評估；中共所謂由革命黨轉向執政黨的論述作為；從嚴治黨、以德治國、依法治國的內容；三講運動的推展；中共在黨風、黨紀與反腐敗的實施作為；組織權力結構、幹部任用建制；三個代表重要思想的實際內涵。 本文結論為：中共在主軸堅持上有所「不變」：即思想建設、組織建設、黨風建設上都要服膺一黨專政的最高指導原則。在路線調整上展現出若干「變」的內容，包括以德治國；依法治國；社會主義政治文明；抵禦風險、拒腐防變；執政黨建設；三講；三個代表等。 中國雖仍是個超穩定結構；中共仍將堅持政治漸進主義，無法與經濟發展和社會結構分化的速度相適應；基層選舉、司法改革和治理能力將是其政策路線優先選項；黨內民主的實施可能性相對較低且落後。 / The motivation of this paper, under the evolution of Jiang Zemin’s thirteen years governance, aims to discuss what kind of judgment and reaction taken by the Chinese Communist Party, CCP under the transformation toward the challenges to the legitimacy of government, what kind of interpretations to the party nature, what kind of changes to the party construction, and what kind of vision and evaluation to the CCP future prospective. The major analysis in this paper focus on the party attribution of CCP, the impact of social transition inspired by open door policy toward the legitimacy of CCP government, how CCP handles the relations among society, state and party under the precondition of stability of power and one party dictatorship, and what are the variables and constants of fundamental party attribution under the party reform led by Jiang Zemin. The related issues include the civil society in China nowadays, the development of public field, the discussion whether PRC transit from totalitarian regime to authoritarian regime, the evolution and evaluation of the political regime reform, the CCP’s discourse and behavior of transition from revolutionary party to ruling party, the context of “run the party strictly”, “rule the state by morality” and “rule the state by law”, the promotion of three discourses movement, the concrete implementation of party style, party discipline, and anti-corruption, the power structure of organization, the regime of appointing cadre, the concrete context of the important "Three Representatives" thoughts. Although China is still a supra-stable structure, CCP shall still insists on the political gradualism. It cannot accommodate both economic development and diversification of social structure. The basic election, judicial reform and governing ability would be the priorities for its policy development. The implementation of democracy inside the party might be relatively low and lagging

本文要旨在回答中國大陸的能源戰略是如何形成，並探討此一戰略如何影響中國大陸的石油安全。本文主從歷史制度主義的觀點主張中國能源體制是決定中國的石油戰略最重要的因素。解釋中國的能源部門在經濟改革與國際化的內、外部環境下，產生制度變遷，進而形成不同時期的石油戰略。在回答中國大陸日益龐大的石油需求與進口石油依賴，使得政府制訂出提升能源使用效率、節約能源、能源多元化與確保海外石油供應 但由於中國為保護國有石油企業的壟斷角色，對於「迎進來」的市場進入條件設下許多條件限制，對外又採取積極的石油外交，使得國際社會對中國產生重商主義與保護主義的疑慮。 中國的能源部門自1980年以來已經歷幾個階段的改革，第一階段是從1982年至1987年，強調要計畫經濟為主、市場力量為輔的能源制度改革；第二階段是從1988至1992年，重點在於國有企業的改革，鼓勵國有企業集團化；第三階段是從1993至1997年，重點在政企分離，並把配置資源的基礎性職能轉移給市場；第四階段是從1998至2002年，重點在加強國有資產的監管與國有企業經營，並初步建立宏觀能源調控體系；第五階段則是自2003年以降，主要的改革目標在建立跨部門的能源協調機制與對外的競爭力。 本文但由於「漸進主義」式的制度變遷使得能源部門體制改革仍存在許多問題，諸如能源部門分散、能源監管部門眾多、國家安全思維與既得利益等，使得政府部門考量其能源安全時，政府干預仍多於市場思維，即便自改革開放以來國家能力已不斷衰退。但在能源辦與發改委能源局的人力有限以及能源部門缺乏效率的情形下，擁有龐大資源的三大國有石油企業（中石油、中石化、中海油）無疑「挾持」政府的決策，例如理論上中央政府可完全控制與審核國有企業的海外投資，但實際國有企業通常是在海外投案案定局後才通知發改委與國務院。中國的能源決策中的缺乏效率常來自於既得利益者的把持，而不願在整體的政治與經濟政策上肩負起更多的政策責任，例如中央政府與國企對於戰備儲油到底由誰出資的內部爭論。 未來中國的能源戰略會持續採取「迎進來、走出去」的方向；近年來政府試圖改革其能源決策程序，透過建立跨部會的決策協調機制試圖重奪能源決策的主導性，因此於2005年5月正式成立「能源領導小組」，並積極透入政府能源白皮書與能源相關法案的草擬，政府的舉動等於是將能源政策的制訂再度「中央化」。未來中國能源戰略的最大挑戰仍來自於能源體制能否深化改革，並且制訂出對外、對內策略一致的能源戰略，以因應中國未來的石油需求以及消減國際社會的疑慮。 / The new facet of global oil politics and China’s surging oil demand have forced the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises to secure foreign oil supplies and to implement energy efficiency. However, systemic level or state-centered theories have provided limited theoretic orientation to explain China’s state behaviors and foreign behavior. It is essential to explore China’s energy institution and energy strategy behind its quest for oil security. That is, China’s foreign strategy should be put into broader context of China’s institutional evolution and domestic/foreign energy policy-making process. This research applies historical institutionalism to look at history evolution of China’s energy institution and energy strategy (especially oil strategy). Chinese energy institution has experienced four main stages of institutional evolution since 1980s. The main themes of four stages have emphasized different administrative, institutional, and energy goals. Meanwhile, institutional critical junctures and feedbacks (formation and reproduction) also have existed in every stage. The first phrase (1980-1992) emphasized how to integrate market forces into China’s bureaucratic institution with socialist characteristics and the market oriented reforms faced several institutional challenges due to necessity of central planning; the second phrase (1993-1997) was characterized by slight and limited institutional restructuring within the energy sector because market force did not gain political support from the leadership. The Chinese government established both the State Energy Commission (SEC) (1980-82) and the Ministry of Energy (MOE) (1988-93) in the wake of acute energy shortages to re-centralize authority over the energy sector. However, neither institution could effectively coordinate and implement energy policy, partly because they could not overcome the vested interests in sectional industries. The third phrase (1998-2002) was characterized by radical institutional reforms on conglomerating SOEs and delimiting administrative power. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) along with the Energy Bureau within it have taken over full governmental regulatory and public sector responsibility from SOEs. However, NDRC functions not as powerful as SOEs do. Therefore, the fourth phrase (2003 until now) then put attention on the establishment of a super-ministerial interagency, revivification of administrative power, and emphasis of foreign competitiveness. The establishment of State Energy Leading Group (SELG) aims at regaining strong central authority and to correcting turbulent oil strategies made on a base of institutional constraints. Above all, China’s institutional evolution is characteristic of state-regulated marketization, limited property right reforms, strategic preference, and departmentalism in China’s energy sector since 1980s. The institutional evolution has constrained China’s energy institution from planning a long-term national energy strategy. China’s energy sector continuously confirms institutional formation by the support of highest leadership and mainstream ideology, and confirms institutional reproduction between the directive and liberal forces, between the government and market forces. Meanwhile, international responses to China’s hunting behaviors are to play either a conductive role in impelling China’s institutional reforms and in adjusting its foreign behaviors. To prevent serious energy competition and to enhance international cooperation, China has shown its willingness to communicate with other nations on oil issues. However, China also needs to show its determination to implement domestic demand-side measures and a market approach instead of implementing protectionist “welcome-in” and aggressive “going out” policies. Ongoing institutional reforms still determines whether the China’s energy institution will ensure the country’s energy security. In the short term, the establishment of the central authority in the energy sector will improve departmental coordination and policy persistance. However, in the long term, China’s ongoing institional reforms need to integrate more market forces, proceed property right reforms, and reshape relationship between the government and market. Without deeper institutional reforms, energy bureaucrats and SOEs would be dragged into institutional process of formation and reproduction but gain limited results in meeting China’s oil security.

人類歷史上有著許多偉大的政治體制改革者。中國與俄國千年來，皆是帝王專制的政治體制，直到二十世紀初葉，兩國的帝王專制體制先後被推翻，蘇聯邁向共黨一黨專政的蘇維埃政治體制；中國則因連年戰亂，中華民國政府來台初期亦採取威權統治，直到八零年代蔣經國主政，全力推動政治體制改革，同一時間蘇聯亦在戈巴契夫的主政下，推動政治體制改革。而戈巴契夫與蔣經國兩人對當代兩國政治發展亦影響深遠。本文的研究重點在於探討蔣經國與戈巴契夫兩人在政治體制改革過程中，台蘇的政治體制；改革環境；以及改革者，戈巴契夫與蔣經國二人的人格特質、政治理念與改革實踐的比較。 / Look backward at the human history, there were many political institution reformers. In China and Russia, the regime had been always authoritarianism and controlled by emperors till the start of twentieth century. Both of the authoritarian regimes in these two countries were overthrown one after another. Russia went toward the road of Soviet institution; China (ROC) also adopted authoritarian regime since the successive insurrection in the initial years. This kind of regime did not end until the 1980s due to the political reform Chang Chin-Gwo initiated . At the same time, under the leadership of Gorbachev, the political institution reform has been started. This thesis puts emphasis on the comparison of the political institution reform of Chiang and Gorbachev in terms of political environments, characters of the leaders, political values, and the practices of the reforms.