從1987年兩岸開展民間交流及1991年兩岸進行事務性協商以來，兩岸的互動已累積了相當可觀的成績，但兩岸關係為何沒有進一步的開展？甚至還有倒退的現象發生？其關鍵點與中共當時領導人江澤民的對台政策有何關聯？ 本文探討江澤民對台政策，範圍以江澤民對台重要言論、作法為主，輔以中共對台決策過程、特徵及兩岸關係概述等，期能以歷史制度主義中「制度變遷」的概念，研析江澤民對台政策之路徑及轉折點。 1993年6月後，江澤民成為中共對台政策的決策核心。此一時期的對台最高戰略指導原則是統一，而對台政策方針是承續鄧小平時期的「和平統一、一國兩制」。以1993年及2000年發表的對台白皮書，與1995年江澤民發表的「江八點」，是這一既定方針的總體表現。而其主要策略在政治方面是「堅持一個中國原則」，在經濟方面是「以商圍政」、或「以商促政」，在軍事方面，不放棄武力犯台，在心理方面則是採取「文攻武嚇」的方式來嚇阻台灣走向獨立。 用歷史制度主義研析可得出：1993年發表之「台灣問題與中國統一」白皮書為對台政策路徑依賴而產生。1995年「江八點」應為江澤民正式主導對台政策後欲突破當時對台政策已顯現「內捲化」之結果。1995年「台海危機」可判斷中共以「革命化」方式修正對台政策，期改變當時之兩岸關係。2000年「一個中國的原則與台灣問題」白皮書應為對台政策重新「演化」的開始。2002年「十六大政治報告」可判定為江政權對台政策「內捲化」的結果。 本文研究發現為：一、中共對台政策具「路徑依賴」特徵。二、「台獨議題」使「對台政策」產生制度變遷。三、「武力」為對台政策路徑自我強化的手段之一。四、對台政策走向「內捲化」。五、制度形成是內生的論點具說服力。六、歷史制度研究途徑可掌握制度變遷方向而非制度變遷結果。 研究建議為：一、兩岸問題應以政治智慧解決。二、以國家生存與發展為最優先考量。三、強化早期預警機制。

中國大陸在改革開放的過程中，意識型態一直是理論與實踐的辯證過程。簡言之，中共意識型態是無法以「共產主義」一語概括，它隨著組黨、革命、建政、領導人的更替，在不同的歷史階段各有其不同的發展與名詞意涵，從「共產主義」開始，歷經「馬克思主義」、「馬克思列寧主義」、「毛澤東思想」、「中國特色社會主義」到「鄧小平理論」，均在其所屬年代中各領風騷。作為後鄧時期中共領導人的江澤民面對新世紀的新條件和新考驗，提出「三個代表」論述，除透過電視、報紙等輿論媒體向社會各界宣傳灌輸之外，並由理論界針對馬克思理論中的各項要素進行辯護，逐漸完成中共意識型態重構工程，成為指導中共綱領的「實踐意識型態」。 檢證中共黨史發展，自鄧小平要求解放思想，從而解放社會生產力，並且在1992年初，十四大前夕，以「三個有利於」的生產力標準解決了「姓社」與「姓資」的爭議。後鄧時期，1997年中共召開十五大，江澤民繼續扛著「鄧小平理論」的旗幟，也初步解決了「姓公」與「姓私」的爭議。然而，已經獲得承認的「姓私」的那一塊，將如何進一步安頓，卻仍然是江澤民在跨世紀征途上難以解決的問題。因此，當「三個代表」思想被譽為馬克思主義黨建學說重大突破之際，相對的，這也意味著傳統的馬克思主義理論，以及在馬克思主義思想武裝下的中國共產黨，都必須面對新世紀、新情勢的重大挑戰。 江澤民在「六四事件」後上台，不遺餘力進行中共意識型態「重構」工程，在「純粹」與「實踐」二重結構內涵上推動相應的重置與調整，一方面高舉「鄧小平理論」旗幟掌握意識型態解釋權，將「鄧小平理論」定義為：「是馬克思主義同當代中國實踐和時代特徵相結合的產物，是對毛澤東思想的繼承和發展，是當代中國的馬克思主義，是馬克思主義在中國發展的新階段」，將之供奉於「十五大」黨章中，移除其對實際政策的指導能力，成為中共意識型態「核心」的「純粹意識型態」，藉以鞏固其權力與地位；另方面採取批評與自我批評，開展黨內思想鬥爭，陸續推動「講政治」、「精神文明建設」、「三講」、「三個代表」等運動，透過政策制定與輿論灌輸，強調理論創新，在信仰體系中重新安排、接受、建立新內涵， 發揮「外圍」的「實踐意識型態」所具有的政權統治指導功能。 審視中共意識型態的重構，可以看到意識型態「純粹」與「實踐」二重結構的變化，前者表現在對馬列主義基本理論的重新界定，再次強化歷史唯物主義與辯證唯物主義的必然性與世界觀，並透過「四項基本原則」將社會主義道路、人民民主專政、黨的領導以及馬列毛思想加以確定，以鞏固中共意識型態發展的基本框架；而後者則表現在要求實事求是、結合中國具體實際、理論創新等方面，並以「三個代表」作為「當代的中國馬克思主義」的詮釋、辯護與發展主軸，從而在此框架下繼續不斷發展中共意識型態的生命力。 江澤民所建構的中共意識型態較諸毛澤東及鄧小平時代，其變遷的方向顯然在遠離社會主義，主要功能在於論證現行政策的合理性，為現行政策辯護。若以這樣的變遷方向，依目前的生產關係預測，未來中共意識型態較為可能的發展方向有二：（一）在「四個堅持」原則下，繼續在意識型態領域尋求為「一黨專政」辯護的正當性基礎，強化成為國家意識型態，作為中共政治經濟發展的政策指導；（二）隨著脫離社會主義這股不可抗拒的潮流，繼續採行漸進主義式的政治經濟體制改革，亦即在江澤民承認「黨已經從一個領導人民為奪取全國政權而奮鬥的黨，成為一個領導人民掌握著全國政權並長期執政的黨」的基礎上，持續社會階層的分化，形成更為穩定的社會結構，意識型態則相對的逐漸弱化其實踐指導功能。 關鍵詞：中共意識型態、鄧小平理論、江澤民、三個代表 / In the reform and opening-up of Mainland China, the ideology development has always been a dialectical process of theory and practice. In other words, the word “communism” does not fully convey the ideology of Communist China, which has developed various meanings with the establishment of the Communist Party, revolution, political establishment and leadership succession in the different periods of the history: from “communism” to “Marxism”, “Marxism-Leninism”, “Mao Zedong Thought”, “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, and “Deng Siaoping Theory”, all of which dominated the eras they were in. Jiang Zemin, the Chinese Communist leader in the Post-Deng period, proposed the thought of “Three-Represents” in facing the new conditions and challenges of the new era. The thought was propagandized to the public through mass media such as TV and newspapers, and theoretically argued against the essential factors of Marxist Theory to gradually complete the reconstruction of the ideology of Communist China and become the “practical ideology” that works as the guiding principle of Communist China. In review of the historical development of the Chinese Communist Party, Deng Siaoping first proposed to emancipate the mind and social productive forces. Before the 14th Party Congress in early1992, he also proposed the criterion of productive forces, “three favorables”, which solved the dispute of “socialist” or “capitalist”. In the Post-Deng period, the 15th Party Congress was held in 1997. Jiang Zemin continued to hold high the banner of Deng Siaoping Theory and also solved the dispute of “state-owned” or “privately-owned”. However, how to further consolidate the “privately-owned” sector, which had been acknowledged, was yet a tough issue for Jiang Zemin on the cross-century journey. Therefore, when the thought of “Three-Represents” was recognized as the key breakthrough of Marxism about the party-construction theory, it also indicated that the traditional Marxist Theory and the Chinese Communist Party, armed with Marxism, had to face the great challenges of the new era and prospects. Jiang Zemin came into power after the June 4 Incident. He made strenuous efforts to carry out the reconstruction of the ideology of Communist China and promote the corresponding replacement and adjustment related to the connotation of the “pure” and “practical” ideology. On one hand, he held high the banner of Deng Siaoping Theory to hold the power of interpretation of the ideology, defined Deng Siaoping Theory as: “an outcome of the integration of Marxism, the practice of present-day China and the features of the times, a continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought, and Marxism of present-day China, representing a new stage of development of Marxism in China”. This definition was included in the party constitution at the 15th Party Congress to eliminate its guiding power to the actual policies and allow it to become the “core pure ideology” of Communist China, which as a result, consolidated Jiang’s power and status. On the other hand, he adopted criticism and self-criticism, carried out the inner-party thought battle, continually promoted the movements including “Stressing Political Awareness”, “Socialist Ideological and Ethical Progress”, “Three Emphases” and “Three Represents”, stressed innovation of theory, rearranged, adopted and established new content of the belief system, and brought the political power governing and guiding functions of the “peripheral practical ideology” into full play through policy establishment and public propaganda. In review of the reconstruction of the ideology of Communist China, the changes of the dual-structure of the “pure” and “practical” ideology are observed. The former is reflected in the redefinition of the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism, reconsolidation of the inevitability and world outlook of historical materialism and dialectical materialism, and reemphasis on the socialism, people’s democratic dictatorship, leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought through the Four Cardinal Principles in order to consolidate the fundamental frame of the ideology of Communist China. The latter is reflected in seeking truth from facts, integrated with China’s reality, theory innovation, etc., based on the “Three-Represents” thought as the annotation, argument and development focus of modern Chinese Marxism, and thus allows sustainable development of the life-force of the ideology of Communist China under this frame. Compared to the era of Mao zedong and Deng Siaoping, the ideology constructed by Jiang Zemin apparently tends to move away from socialism. Its major functions are to demonstrate the rationality and argue in defense of the present policies. Suppose this changing direction will continue, based on the present production relations, the future ideology of Communist China will be likely to develop in the following directions: 1) under the principles of “Four Upholdings”, to proceed to seek legitimate basis for the argument for “one-party dictatorship” in the ideological field, and promote the “Four Upholdings” to be the national ideology and policy guidance for political and economic development of Communist China; 2) following the inexorable trend of departure from socialism, to proceed to conduct progressive political and economic reform, in other words, on the basis that “the Party has evolved from one that led the people in the fight for seizing the power nationwide to one that has led the people in exercising the State power and to a party in power for a long period of time”, as Jiang Zemin stated, to proceed with social stratification to form a more stable social structure and gradually weaken the practical guiding function of the ideology.

自1993年鄧小平健康狀況惡化、漸失實權的同時，中國大陸亦開始積極投入各項公共外交布局。學界主要認為中國大陸基於以下三個理由而注重公共外交：對冷戰後新國際結構的反應、對「中國威脅論」的回應，以及領導人政治生存的考量。而在官方的聲明裡，中國大陸政府宣告其欲藉公共外交政策達成的主要目標：降低他國對中國大陸威脅的感受，以及促進中國大陸與其他國家的雙邊共同利益。本研究分析中國大陸公共外交政策中之「國是訪問」策略，探討其成因、模式與相關影響。實證資料顯示，在驅動因素方面，中國大陸「國是訪問」的行為與領導人政治生存考量的關聯度較高；而在目標達成方面，中國大陸的「國是訪問」與各項官方所宣稱的欲達成目標並未顯著關聯，反而是與「使受訪國的國家利益更趨近中國大陸、更疏遠美國」的這個事實有穩定的關聯性。本文的發現對於理解中國大陸外交政策的運作邏輯有著重要的理論意涵。

本文撰寫動機，係以江澤民主政十三年為時間軸，探討中國共產黨在面臨轉變處境下，對於政權維繫的合法性挑戰做出了何種判斷與處置？對於黨的性質，做出了何種詮釋，且在黨建工作上，採取了什麼樣的變革措施？對於中共自身未來走向，做出了什麼樣的願景藍圖與評價？ 文中主要分析問題集中在：共產黨的政黨屬性；改革開放引發的社會變遷對中共政權合法性的衝擊；在政權穩定與一黨專政前提下，中共如何處理社會、國家和黨的關係；江澤民所主導的政黨改革，對於基本政黨屬性的「變」與「不變」為何。 附屬探討議題則包括：當前大陸市民社會、公共領域的發展狀況；中共是否已由極權體制向威權體制轉型；政治體制改革的進程與評估；中共所謂由革命黨轉向執政黨的論述作為；從嚴治黨、以德治國、依法治國的內容；三講運動的推展；中共在黨風、黨紀與反腐敗的實施作為；組織權力結構、幹部任用建制；三個代表重要思想的實際內涵。 本文結論為：中共在主軸堅持上有所「不變」：即思想建設、組織建設、黨風建設上都要服膺一黨專政的最高指導原則。在路線調整上展現出若干「變」的內容，包括以德治國；依法治國；社會主義政治文明；抵禦風險、拒腐防變；執政黨建設；三講；三個代表等。 中國雖仍是個超穩定結構；中共仍將堅持政治漸進主義，無法與經濟發展和社會結構分化的速度相適應；基層選舉、司法改革和治理能力將是其政策路線優先選項；黨內民主的實施可能性相對較低且落後。 / The motivation of this paper, under the evolution of Jiang Zemin’s thirteen years governance, aims to discuss what kind of judgment and reaction taken by the Chinese Communist Party, CCP under the transformation toward the challenges to the legitimacy of government, what kind of interpretations to the party nature, what kind of changes to the party construction, and what kind of vision and evaluation to the CCP future prospective. The major analysis in this paper focus on the party attribution of CCP, the impact of social transition inspired by open door policy toward the legitimacy of CCP government, how CCP handles the relations among society, state and party under the precondition of stability of power and one party dictatorship, and what are the variables and constants of fundamental party attribution under the party reform led by Jiang Zemin. The related issues include the civil society in China nowadays, the development of public field, the discussion whether PRC transit from totalitarian regime to authoritarian regime, the evolution and evaluation of the political regime reform, the CCP’s discourse and behavior of transition from revolutionary party to ruling party, the context of “run the party strictly”, “rule the state by morality” and “rule the state by law”, the promotion of three discourses movement, the concrete implementation of party style, party discipline, and anti-corruption, the power structure of organization, the regime of appointing cadre, the concrete context of the important "Three Representatives" thoughts. Although China is still a supra-stable structure, CCP shall still insists on the political gradualism. It cannot accommodate both economic development and diversification of social structure. The basic election, judicial reform and governing ability would be the priorities for its policy development. The implementation of democracy inside the party might be relatively low and lagging

共黨國家雖為一黨專政，但在最高領導層常形成具有二元領導的意涵的集體領導。二元領導體制是有兩位行政領導人的體制；由於二元領導體制符合許多政治狀況的需要，全世界有四分之一以上的國家採取二元領導體制，其中多為半總統制。本文認為東歐後共國家普遍形成半總統制的原因，在於共黨統治時期採取二元領導，以使統治菁英的集體領導得以鞏固。在此二元領導體制下，黨書記通常主管黨務、軍事，總理主管行政、經濟。 本文的重點在於第三章第二、三節的分析。第二節首先從黨內權力制衡的需要分析，指出共黨國家在初期的強人政治或單一領導之後，制度的要求與交易上的精英集體的利益極大化，共同促成一種展現為國家與黨的領導人和行政領導人的分立的二元領導體制。其後從權力繼承制度化與幹部年輕化的重要性進行分析，指出共黨國家二元領導體制要走向成熟，必須破除領導職務終身制。 在第三章第三節，本文引入國際政治學結構現實主義的觀點，強調權力結構的「二元」穩定性，同時分析共黨國家領導層的職務分配可能性，將之區分為單一領導、典型二元領導、非典型二元領導、多元領導等類型，並以蘇聯與中國大陸的政治菁英的職務分配作為範例加以介紹，說明典型二元領導是共黨國家領導體制的趨勢。 在此分析之後，本文在第四章分析蘇聯的領導體制變化，在第五章分析中共的職務分配趨勢。本文結論認為，中共幹部年輕化的制度壓力，使中共現任軍委主席江澤民必須盡快退休，而依據本文對典型二元領導體制的建構與利弊分析，中共政治菁英的共識將是讓胡錦濤接任中央軍委主席職務。倘若中共政局果真如此發展，則中共的典型二元領導將進一步強化。此種趨勢的進一步發展，將使中共民主化後傾向於採取半總統制。