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Abstract In the era of Jiang Zemin, the core leader of third generation has not be much more powerful than other leaders. Hence, he needs to build a coalition to gathering varied interests that supported his leadership. He had to bargain and compromise with other leading officials, to generate resources in order to reward and maintain the coalition which supporting him in power. Based on such ¡§give and take¡¨ relations, he had been relatively weak when bargain with military or other interest groups within Chinese political system. And that might be the major reason to explain why the People¡¦s Liberation Army (PLA) could get the unforeseeable political influence in the Jiang era. When discussing the Party-Army relations in the Jiang era, it would be useful to view the PLA as an interest group in the Chinese political system. Therefore, I posit two basic assumptions to analyzing such relations. The first is that army and Party are engaged in a chronic and multiform conflict stemming from their incompatible outlooks and interests. The second is that Party would insist in controlling the army and keep suppressing the expression of its group interests. Besides, several variables would be introduced to identify such conflict. These include the declination of ideological indoctrination, the power reduction of the political control system in the army, the absence of regularized procedures for the transfer of political power within the ruling Party elite, the acceptance of the principle of collective leadership, and the modernization of the economy. These factors would be used to explain the transformation of the Party-Army relations.

This research addresses the establishment of the 'Jiang Zemin Era' whereby Jiang Zemin, and the Chinese Communist Party, have attempted to relegitimise the Party and have attempted to make the Party meaningful to the Chinese populace. What is fundamental to this research is how Jiang Zemin, as the ‘core leader’ of the third generational leadership, incorporated the political thought of neo-conservatism (xin baoshouzhuyi) into the framework of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought (MLM) ideology in order to re-legitimise the CCP. The timeframe within the research is from Jiang’s appointment as the General Secretary of the CCP in 1989 until 1995. It is important that this was a time period whereby Jiang had to consolidate, and therefore legitimise, his ‘core leadership’, and provide a theoretical platform in order to bring forth his own ‘era’. The research is predominantly a historiographical narrative, utilising both primary and secondary sources, that examines the mechanisms Jiang utilised in order to create a strong government, with himself as the ‘core’, which pursued increased levels of marketisation. Indeed, after being appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 1989, Jiang Zemin had to achieve two goals in order to sustain and legitimate his position as ‘the core of the third generational leadership’. First, he had to secure his position as ‘the core’ through the creation of secured networks and alliances as well as legitimise of his ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ positions in the CCP hierarchy. In order to achieve this, Jiang had to first create a sustainable power base in order to retain, and therefore legitimise, his formalized positions as General Secretary of the CCP, Chairman of the Chinese Military Commission and the Presidency. In addition, he needed to be able to create alliances with both allies and protégés as well as differing power factions, be they conservative/elder or reformist, and with other leading figures like Li Peng and Zhu Rongji. Second, in order to further reinforce and legitimize his position as ‘the core’, Jiang had to develop his own ‘theoretical framework’ for governing the country – much as Mao and Deng had done previously. Therefore, the research also examines Jiang’s usage of the neoconservatism as a means of not only legitimising the CCP’s ideological framework but also as a means of providing his own ‘guiding thought’, thus enabling him to establish his own ‘era’. Indeed, after establishing himself as the ‘core’ through the aforementioned processes, Jiang had to develop such a theoretical framework that complimented Deng’s economic reforms, especially as he was designated by Deng, yet one that retained a smattering of Mao Zedong’s ‘Thoughts’ that could be applied pragmatically during the 1990s. It can be seen that Jiang Zemin successfully incorporated the political thought of ‘neo-conservatism’ within his platform in order to achieve these ends – including the establishment of a ‘Jiang Zemin Era’. This political thought, a successor to the political theory of ‘neo-authoritarianism’, already had several adherents within the higher echelons of the CCP. Indeed, it would be Jiang’s 1995 speech, entitled ‘Stressing Politics’, that would signify the incorporation of neo-conservatism within Jiang’s platform of (self) legitimation that would initiate the successful implementation of a ‘Jiang Zemin Era’.

共黨國家雖為一黨專政，但在最高領導層常形成具有二元領導的意涵的集體領導。二元領導體制是有兩位行政領導人的體制；由於二元領導體制符合許多政治狀況的需要，全世界有四分之一以上的國家採取二元領導體制，其中多為半總統制。本文認為東歐後共國家普遍形成半總統制的原因，在於共黨統治時期採取二元領導，以使統治菁英的集體領導得以鞏固。在此二元領導體制下，黨書記通常主管黨務、軍事，總理主管行政、經濟。 本文的重點在於第三章第二、三節的分析。第二節首先從黨內權力制衡的需要分析，指出共黨國家在初期的強人政治或單一領導之後，制度的要求與交易上的精英集體的利益極大化，共同促成一種展現為國家與黨的領導人和行政領導人的分立的二元領導體制。其後從權力繼承制度化與幹部年輕化的重要性進行分析，指出共黨國家二元領導體制要走向成熟，必須破除領導職務終身制。 在第三章第三節，本文引入國際政治學結構現實主義的觀點，強調權力結構的「二元」穩定性，同時分析共黨國家領導層的職務分配可能性，將之區分為單一領導、典型二元領導、非典型二元領導、多元領導等類型，並以蘇聯與中國大陸的政治菁英的職務分配作為範例加以介紹，說明典型二元領導是共黨國家領導體制的趨勢。 在此分析之後，本文在第四章分析蘇聯的領導體制變化，在第五章分析中共的職務分配趨勢。本文結論認為，中共幹部年輕化的制度壓力，使中共現任軍委主席江澤民必須盡快退休，而依據本文對典型二元領導體制的建構與利弊分析，中共政治菁英的共識將是讓胡錦濤接任中央軍委主席職務。倘若中共政局果真如此發展，則中共的典型二元領導將進一步強化。此種趨勢的進一步發展，將使中共民主化後傾向於採取半總統制。