中國大陸在改革開放的過程中，意識型態一直是理論與實踐的辯證過程。簡言之，中共意識型態是無法以「共產主義」一語概括，它隨著組黨、革命、建政、領導人的更替，在不同的歷史階段各有其不同的發展與名詞意涵，從「共產主義」開始，歷經「馬克思主義」、「馬克思列寧主義」、「毛澤東思想」、「中國特色社會主義」到「鄧小平理論」，均在其所屬年代中各領風騷。作為後鄧時期中共領導人的江澤民面對新世紀的新條件和新考驗，提出「三個代表」論述，除透過電視、報紙等輿論媒體向社會各界宣傳灌輸之外，並由理論界針對馬克思理論中的各項要素進行辯護，逐漸完成中共意識型態重構工程，成為指導中共綱領的「實踐意識型態」。 檢證中共黨史發展，自鄧小平要求解放思想，從而解放社會生產力，並且在1992年初，十四大前夕，以「三個有利於」的生產力標準解決了「姓社」與「姓資」的爭議。後鄧時期，1997年中共召開十五大，江澤民繼續扛著「鄧小平理論」的旗幟，也初步解決了「姓公」與「姓私」的爭議。然而，已經獲得承認的「姓私」的那一塊，將如何進一步安頓，卻仍然是江澤民在跨世紀征途上難以解決的問題。因此，當「三個代表」思想被譽為馬克思主義黨建學說重大突破之際，相對的，這也意味著傳統的馬克思主義理論，以及在馬克思主義思想武裝下的中國共產黨，都必須面對新世紀、新情勢的重大挑戰。 江澤民在「六四事件」後上台，不遺餘力進行中共意識型態「重構」工程，在「純粹」與「實踐」二重結構內涵上推動相應的重置與調整，一方面高舉「鄧小平理論」旗幟掌握意識型態解釋權，將「鄧小平理論」定義為：「是馬克思主義同當代中國實踐和時代特徵相結合的產物，是對毛澤東思想的繼承和發展，是當代中國的馬克思主義，是馬克思主義在中國發展的新階段」，將之供奉於「十五大」黨章中，移除其對實際政策的指導能力，成為中共意識型態「核心」的「純粹意識型態」，藉以鞏固其權力與地位；另方面採取批評與自我批評，開展黨內思想鬥爭，陸續推動「講政治」、「精神文明建設」、「三講」、「三個代表」等運動，透過政策制定與輿論灌輸，強調理論創新，在信仰體系中重新安排、接受、建立新內涵， 發揮「外圍」的「實踐意識型態」所具有的政權統治指導功能。 審視中共意識型態的重構，可以看到意識型態「純粹」與「實踐」二重結構的變化，前者表現在對馬列主義基本理論的重新界定，再次強化歷史唯物主義與辯證唯物主義的必然性與世界觀，並透過「四項基本原則」將社會主義道路、人民民主專政、黨的領導以及馬列毛思想加以確定，以鞏固中共意識型態發展的基本框架；而後者則表現在要求實事求是、結合中國具體實際、理論創新等方面，並以「三個代表」作為「當代的中國馬克思主義」的詮釋、辯護與發展主軸，從而在此框架下繼續不斷發展中共意識型態的生命力。 江澤民所建構的中共意識型態較諸毛澤東及鄧小平時代，其變遷的方向顯然在遠離社會主義，主要功能在於論證現行政策的合理性，為現行政策辯護。若以這樣的變遷方向，依目前的生產關係預測，未來中共意識型態較為可能的發展方向有二：（一）在「四個堅持」原則下，繼續在意識型態領域尋求為「一黨專政」辯護的正當性基礎，強化成為國家意識型態，作為中共政治經濟發展的政策指導；（二）隨著脫離社會主義這股不可抗拒的潮流，繼續採行漸進主義式的政治經濟體制改革，亦即在江澤民承認「黨已經從一個領導人民為奪取全國政權而奮鬥的黨，成為一個領導人民掌握著全國政權並長期執政的黨」的基礎上，持續社會階層的分化，形成更為穩定的社會結構，意識型態則相對的逐漸弱化其實踐指導功能。 關鍵詞：中共意識型態、鄧小平理論、江澤民、三個代表 / In the reform and opening-up of Mainland China, the ideology development has always been a dialectical process of theory and practice. In other words, the word “communism” does not fully convey the ideology of Communist China, which has developed various meanings with the establishment of the Communist Party, revolution, political establishment and leadership succession in the different periods of the history: from “communism” to “Marxism”, “Marxism-Leninism”, “Mao Zedong Thought”, “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, and “Deng Siaoping Theory”, all of which dominated the eras they were in. Jiang Zemin, the Chinese Communist leader in the Post-Deng period, proposed the thought of “Three-Represents” in facing the new conditions and challenges of the new era. The thought was propagandized to the public through mass media such as TV and newspapers, and theoretically argued against the essential factors of Marxist Theory to gradually complete the reconstruction of the ideology of Communist China and become the “practical ideology” that works as the guiding principle of Communist China. In review of the historical development of the Chinese Communist Party, Deng Siaoping first proposed to emancipate the mind and social productive forces. Before the 14th Party Congress in early1992, he also proposed the criterion of productive forces, “three favorables”, which solved the dispute of “socialist” or “capitalist”. In the Post-Deng period, the 15th Party Congress was held in 1997. Jiang Zemin continued to hold high the banner of Deng Siaoping Theory and also solved the dispute of “state-owned” or “privately-owned”. However, how to further consolidate the “privately-owned” sector, which had been acknowledged, was yet a tough issue for Jiang Zemin on the cross-century journey. Therefore, when the thought of “Three-Represents” was recognized as the key breakthrough of Marxism about the party-construction theory, it also indicated that the traditional Marxist Theory and the Chinese Communist Party, armed with Marxism, had to face the great challenges of the new era and prospects. Jiang Zemin came into power after the June 4 Incident. He made strenuous efforts to carry out the reconstruction of the ideology of Communist China and promote the corresponding replacement and adjustment related to the connotation of the “pure” and “practical” ideology. On one hand, he held high the banner of Deng Siaoping Theory to hold the power of interpretation of the ideology, defined Deng Siaoping Theory as: “an outcome of the integration of Marxism, the practice of present-day China and the features of the times, a continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought, and Marxism of present-day China, representing a new stage of development of Marxism in China”. This definition was included in the party constitution at the 15th Party Congress to eliminate its guiding power to the actual policies and allow it to become the “core pure ideology” of Communist China, which as a result, consolidated Jiang’s power and status. On the other hand, he adopted criticism and self-criticism, carried out the inner-party thought battle, continually promoted the movements including “Stressing Political Awareness”, “Socialist Ideological and Ethical Progress”, “Three Emphases” and “Three Represents”, stressed innovation of theory, rearranged, adopted and established new content of the belief system, and brought the political power governing and guiding functions of the “peripheral practical ideology” into full play through policy establishment and public propaganda. In review of the reconstruction of the ideology of Communist China, the changes of the dual-structure of the “pure” and “practical” ideology are observed. The former is reflected in the redefinition of the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism, reconsolidation of the inevitability and world outlook of historical materialism and dialectical materialism, and reemphasis on the socialism, people’s democratic dictatorship, leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought through the Four Cardinal Principles in order to consolidate the fundamental frame of the ideology of Communist China. The latter is reflected in seeking truth from facts, integrated with China’s reality, theory innovation, etc., based on the “Three-Represents” thought as the annotation, argument and development focus of modern Chinese Marxism, and thus allows sustainable development of the life-force of the ideology of Communist China under this frame. Compared to the era of Mao zedong and Deng Siaoping, the ideology constructed by Jiang Zemin apparently tends to move away from socialism. Its major functions are to demonstrate the rationality and argue in defense of the present policies. Suppose this changing direction will continue, based on the present production relations, the future ideology of Communist China will be likely to develop in the following directions: 1) under the principles of “Four Upholdings”, to proceed to seek legitimate basis for the argument for “one-party dictatorship” in the ideological field, and promote the “Four Upholdings” to be the national ideology and policy guidance for political and economic development of Communist China; 2) following the inexorable trend of departure from socialism, to proceed to conduct progressive political and economic reform, in other words, on the basis that “the Party has evolved from one that led the people in the fight for seizing the power nationwide to one that has led the people in exercising the State power and to a party in power for a long period of time”, as Jiang Zemin stated, to proceed with social stratification to form a more stable social structure and gradually weaken the practical guiding function of the ideology.

本文撰寫動機，係以江澤民主政十三年為時間軸，探討中國共產黨在面臨轉變處境下，對於政權維繫的合法性挑戰做出了何種判斷與處置？對於黨的性質，做出了何種詮釋，且在黨建工作上，採取了什麼樣的變革措施？對於中共自身未來走向，做出了什麼樣的願景藍圖與評價？ 文中主要分析問題集中在：共產黨的政黨屬性；改革開放引發的社會變遷對中共政權合法性的衝擊；在政權穩定與一黨專政前提下，中共如何處理社會、國家和黨的關係；江澤民所主導的政黨改革，對於基本政黨屬性的「變」與「不變」為何。 附屬探討議題則包括：當前大陸市民社會、公共領域的發展狀況；中共是否已由極權體制向威權體制轉型；政治體制改革的進程與評估；中共所謂由革命黨轉向執政黨的論述作為；從嚴治黨、以德治國、依法治國的內容；三講運動的推展；中共在黨風、黨紀與反腐敗的實施作為；組織權力結構、幹部任用建制；三個代表重要思想的實際內涵。 本文結論為：中共在主軸堅持上有所「不變」：即思想建設、組織建設、黨風建設上都要服膺一黨專政的最高指導原則。在路線調整上展現出若干「變」的內容，包括以德治國；依法治國；社會主義政治文明；抵禦風險、拒腐防變；執政黨建設；三講；三個代表等。 中國雖仍是個超穩定結構；中共仍將堅持政治漸進主義，無法與經濟發展和社會結構分化的速度相適應；基層選舉、司法改革和治理能力將是其政策路線優先選項；黨內民主的實施可能性相對較低且落後。 / The motivation of this paper, under the evolution of Jiang Zemin’s thirteen years governance, aims to discuss what kind of judgment and reaction taken by the Chinese Communist Party, CCP under the transformation toward the challenges to the legitimacy of government, what kind of interpretations to the party nature, what kind of changes to the party construction, and what kind of vision and evaluation to the CCP future prospective. The major analysis in this paper focus on the party attribution of CCP, the impact of social transition inspired by open door policy toward the legitimacy of CCP government, how CCP handles the relations among society, state and party under the precondition of stability of power and one party dictatorship, and what are the variables and constants of fundamental party attribution under the party reform led by Jiang Zemin. The related issues include the civil society in China nowadays, the development of public field, the discussion whether PRC transit from totalitarian regime to authoritarian regime, the evolution and evaluation of the political regime reform, the CCP’s discourse and behavior of transition from revolutionary party to ruling party, the context of “run the party strictly”, “rule the state by morality” and “rule the state by law”, the promotion of three discourses movement, the concrete implementation of party style, party discipline, and anti-corruption, the power structure of organization, the regime of appointing cadre, the concrete context of the important "Three Representatives" thoughts. Although China is still a supra-stable structure, CCP shall still insists on the political gradualism. It cannot accommodate both economic development and diversification of social structure. The basic election, judicial reform and governing ability would be the priorities for its policy development. The implementation of democracy inside the party might be relatively low and lagging

中文摘要 　　一九四九年成立的「中國人民政治協商會議」（以下簡稱「政協」），除了成為中共政權合法化的工具外，也提供了諸如參政議政、議事諮詢、統戰聯誼、政治宣傳等多種功能。綜觀五十餘年來政協的發展，研究其角色與功能之間的關係，大致可以分為兩個階段，前階段係指在改革開放政策提出之前的政協，當時的政協是扮演在中共授意下所定位的統戰角色，角色確定之後，其所能發揮的功能自然有限。至於改革開放政策提出之後的現階段政協，則是在原有的角色上賦予統戰功能外的其他多種不同功能，換言之，前階段的政協是先有定位，再根據定位發揮有限的功能，但現階段政協已不斷擴充其功能，我們必須從政協所發揮的功能來探求政協的定位變遷。 　　政協最明顯的改變首先在於不斷擴大其參與的範圍，增加不同階級的成員，其次則是試圖藉由提案、專題調研及考察等多種方式，提升政協在中共決策過程中的影響力。有了政協這樣的組織，可以減緩中國大陸非共黨人士對參政的要求，可以滿足日漸多元的社會主張，也提供了各階層、階級（或稱界別）對利益的要求，更重要的，這些要求都在政協掌控的範圍，它阻絕了界別、社團、人民再向上層突破的機會，政協就像是一塊防火牆或防護墊，做為民主黨派、社團與中共、政府之間的緩衝，維護了中國共產黨的領導。中共已提出「三個代表」來爭取更長久的政治領導地位，而政協勢必也將配合扮演鞏固領導、團結群眾的重要角色。 　　政協的未來發展可能有以下幾種可能：一是維持原來聯誼性質的統戰組織；二是走向類似西方「上議院」的權力機關；三是有可能在兩岸中發揮對話功能，扮演溝通的「窗口」角色；最後則是成為中共的政治宣傳組織。以作者的觀察，比較有創造性且令人期盼的，可能是政協在兩岸交流中能否加速催化的效果，增進兩岸的接觸與瞭解，特別是新任政協主席確定擔任中共對台工作小組中的重要職務，以政協特殊的發展歷程及與台灣的長期淵源，相信政協會比其他中共涉台事務機構更容易接觸台灣民眾，聽到台灣社會多元的聲音，可以扮演一個較為暢達的溝通管道。 / Abstract The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (hereinafter referred to as Consultative Conference) was founded in 1949. The Consultative Conference turned Chinese Communists into a legitimate power and served a number of political functions, such as participation in public affairs, political consultation, united front, and political propaganda. Reviewing the Consultative Conference’s development with emphasis on the relationship between the role and functions in the last 50 years, the history of the Consultative Conference is divided into two phases. In the first phase, no reform policy had been launched in Mainland China. At that time, the Consultative Conference undertook the tasks related to the united front as required by the PRC. With its designated role, the Consultative Conference was unable to play a constructive role. In the second phase, the PRC had launched its reform policy. As a result, the Consultative Conference had been delegated with several functions other than the united front. In the first phase, the Consultative Conference was assigned a certain mission and brought its capability to achieve its goal. In the second phase, the Consultative Conference had been delegated with more and more functions. Therefore, it is necessary to find out the Consultative Conference’s changes of position based upon its functions. Obviously, the Consultative Conference had participated in more and more areas and had accepted members from all walks of life. Secondly, the Consultative Conference had successfully promoted its position in the PRC’s decision-making process through motions, special topic researchstudies, and investigation tours. The Consultative Conference had successfully satisfied the political ambitions of the non-Communists and the plural Communists; and provided a channel for all walks of life to demand for interests. Most importantly, these demands are under the control of the Consultative Conference. As a result, the PRC’s governing body didn’t have to worry about the demands from all over Mainland China. In this connection, the Consultative Conference serves as a firewall or cushion between the democratic parties and PRC government; and had thus successfully safeguarded the PRC’s leadership. In an effort to maintain its leadership, the PRC has brought up the concept of “3 Representatives”. In this regard, the Consultative Conference is likely to play an active role so as to fortify the PRC’s leadership and unite the crowds together. The following are the possible developments for the Consultative Conference: 1, to remain a united front organization; 2, to become a power institution similar to the Western nations’ “Upper House”; 3, to serve as a “liaison” so as to enhance the dialogue between both sides of Taiwan Strait; and finally, to act as a political propaganda organization for the PRC. According to the author’s observation, the Consultative Conference is most likely to accelerate the contacts and understanding between both sides of Taiwan Strait in the future. The new Chairperson of Consultative Conference will assume the key position regarding the PRC’s Taiwan policy. In consideration of the Consultative Conference’s unique development and its existing relationship with Taiwan, the Consultative Conference is closer to the Taiwanese and is willing to hear the opinions from all walks of life in Taiwan; and thus serves as a effective channel for communication.

馬列主義揭示無產階級政黨必然會帶領群眾走向共產天堂，這樣的「目的論」賦予了共產黨作為無產階級先鋒隊統治上的合法性。1978年以來，中共為了發展經濟改革而多次進行意識型態的修正，2000年以前中共所修正的意識型態都謹守在社會主義框架中，自我定位為工農階級政黨，但「三個代表」允許資本家入黨，卻將合法性基礎轉向了其他社會階層。 為什麼中共要提出「三個代表」，以及為何提出的時間點會在2000年？本文認為要從經濟結構和領導互動兩個變數來解釋。市場化的改革造成中國大陸經濟和社會的變動，私營經濟發展迅速、公有制經濟的優勢地位受到挑戰、紅色資本家人數上升，這些變化使理想與現實嚴重脫節。由於延續市場化路線在1990年代後已成為領導人的既定政策，加上前蘇聯因為脫離群眾而崩潰的經驗，使中共面對經濟社會變動時，選擇調整意識型態以符合現實需求。 1998年以後，經濟社會的變動更形劇烈，私營經濟負擔稅收、產值與就業的功能顯著提升，學界發表大量調研報告，加重了領導人的壓力，調整意識型態已經勢在必行。合法性基礎轉變以後，中共必需以政績尋求支持，並解決民眾需求。然而當「由下而上」的民意日趨重要時，勢必在未來衝擊「由上而下」的一黨專政體制。 / Marxism-Leninism theory claims that proletariat party will inevitability lead the people to arrive the paradise of communism. Such the “teleology” gives the legitimacy on as proletariat vanguard for Communist Party. Since 1978, the CCP revised ideology for many times to develop the economic reform. Ideology revised by CCP before 2000 was kept in the frame of socialism; the CCP positioned oneself as the class parties of workers and peasants. However the “Three Represents” allows capitalists to join the party, and turns the foundation to other social strata. Why did the CCP propose the “Three Represents” in 2000? I think there are two factors: the economic structure and interactions between the senior level. The market-based reform causes the economical and social change; like the rapid development of private economy, the challenge in the advantage of public economy, and the red capitalist's number rises. Which changes make ideal and reality disconnect seriously. The leaders extend the market-based policy, and the experience of the Soviet Union collapse, make the CCP in the face of the change of economy and society, choose to adjust ideology in order to accord with the current demand. After 1998, the violent change in the economic society appears even more violently, became that tax from private economy, the functions of the growth of output value, employment improve apparently, a large number of research reports were delivered by educational circles, has been imperative for the leader's to adjust ideology. After the transition of the legitimacy foundation, the CCP has to seek the support from the people by achievement in politics, and needs the demands of people. From top-to-bottom dictatorship system of one party will certainly be assaulted, when the “bottom-to-top” opinions of people become more important in the future.