Sveriges Försvarsmakt har innan 2000-talet inte haft något formellt fastställt dokument som beskriver hur verksamheten skall utövas såväl i krig som i fred. I och med 2002-års utgåva av militärstrategisk doktrin fastställdes att grunden för Försvarsmaktens agerande skall vara manövertänkande. 2004 drabbades Kosovo av upplopp runt om i provinsen, varav den svenska bataljonen SWEBAT, var inblandade i strider kring byn Caglavica. Vid tillfället var flera svenska chefer upp till brigadnivå, involverade i beslutsprocesserna som skedde under incidenten. Huvudsyftet med denna uppsats är att söka svar på huruvida den svenska officerskåren faktiskt tillämpar våra doktriner under insats. Frågeställningen är framtagen att utröna i hur stor utsträckning manövertänkande existerade och nyttjades på de olika ledningsnivåerna vid kravallerna i Caglavica 2004, likväl i hur stor grad det inte nyttjades. Med utgångspunkt i militärstrategisk doktrin har ett antal indikatorer på manövertänkande valts ut för att appliceras på framtagen fallstudie, vilken grundas på FHS rapport Caglavica 17 mars 2004. Resultatet av uppsatsen visar på ett assimilerat manövertänkande inom den svenska officerskåren under insats i Kosovo. / Before the 21th century the Swedish Armed Forces has been without any formally established document that describes how its activities should be practiced in peace as well as in war. In 2002 the Military Strategic Doctrine was published and it stated that all activity by the Armed Forces was to be based by the concept of maneuver thinking. In 2004 Kosovo was hit by riots all over the province, in which the Swedish battalion SWEBAT, was mixed up in combat around the village of Caglvica. At the moment several Swedish commanders, up to brigade level, were involved in the decision-making process that took place during the incident. The main object with this essay is to find out whether the Swedish officers actually put the doctrine into practice during their mission. The question at issue is to answer in how great extent maneuver thinking existed and was practiced by the different levels of command, during the riots of Caglavica 2004, but also in how great extent it was not applied. With starting-point in the Military Strategic Doctrine, several indicators representing the concept of maneuver thinking, has been chosen to be applied to a case study, which is based on a rapport by FHS; Caglavica 17 mars 2004. The results of the essay shows upon a assimilated maneuver thinking within the Swedish officer corps during mission in Kosovo.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-153 |
| Date | January 2009 |
| Creators | Olson, Emil |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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