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Våra första internationella insatser : ett tecken på beslutsvilja?

Målsättningen med uppsatsen har varit att åskådliggöra beslutsprocesserna på främst strategisk ochmilitärstrategisk nivå inför det svenska beslutet att delta i de militära FN-missionerna i Suez 1956,Kongo 1960 och på Cypern 1964. Men också att studera deployeringen vid den inledande insatsen.Uppsatsen har därmed syftat till att finna svar på varför det gick relativt fort att fatta beslut om insatssamt deployera förbanden – svar som kanske kan lära oss något inför framtida liknande beslut – tillexempel med EU Battle Group. Graham Allison’s teorier om Organizational Process ochGovernmental Politics har utgjort den vetenskapliga ramen för att hjälpa till att förklarabeslutsprocesserna. Metoden för att uppnå detta har varit att genomföra tre fallstudier över nämndainsatser med en kvalitativ granskning av olika av källor.Uppsatsen pekar på att det har funnits en stark politisk vilja att genomföra insatserna. I ett fall harregeringen förvisso varit mycket tveksam. Rent generellt har besluten fattats snabbt och effektivtinnan riksdagen gav sitt medgivande. Man kan därmed se regeringens ageranden som en syntes avbeslutsamma ledande politiker med ett tillhörande väl utvecklat regeringskansli med mycket godförmåga att koordinera sin vilja gentemot riksdagen och oppositionen i utrikesnämnden samt mot demilitära myndigheterna. I samtliga fall har delar av den militära ledningen var tveksam till insatsmed hänvisning till befälsbrist och att beredskapen skulle bli lidande. Krigsmakten har dock alltidvarit lojal och snabbt verkställt besluten.När det gäller deployeringen så pekar uppsatsen på att Sverige och FN varit beroende av främst USAnär det gäller strategiska flygtransporter. Allisons teorier har bidragit till ökad förståelse förbeslutsprocesserna / The aim of this study is to reveal the decision-making process at strategic andmilitary strategic level that led to the Swedish military UN engagement inSuez 1956, Congo 1960 and Cyprus 1964. Moreover, the aim is to study thedeployment phase. The purpose is therefore to find answers, which canexplain why these decisions and deployments were made quite rapidly andwhy there were differences between and within the two levels. The historymay help us to make fasts decisions in the near future – for example, when theSwedish / Nordic EU Battle Group will be used. Graham Allison’s theoriesabout Organizational Process and Governmental Politics constitute thescientific frame. These theories help us to understand the processes and thedifferences. The method to achieve this has been to make three case studieswhere the primary and secondary sources from archives, diaries and booksetcetera have been examined.The thesis shows that there has been a strong political will in two of the cases.In the last case however, the government has been doubtful whether to takepart in the mission or not. But generally, the decisions have been maderapidly and effectively before the consent of Parliament. One could thereforesee the government’s actions as a synthesis of resolute leading politicians witha well developed cabinet, which had good ability in coordinating their willagainst Parliament and the opposition in the advisory council on foreignaffairs, as well as against the military authorities. In every case there hashowever been some reluctance from leading military generals. The lack ofenthusiasm was due to their objective during the Cold War: to keep as manyofficers and non-commissioned officers as possible in Sweden at high militarypreparedness on purpose. However, the military authorities have shown greatloyalty to the political level – they have therefore quickly executed thepolitical decisions.Furthermore, the thesis shows that both UN and Sweden have been dependenton the United States’ Air Force when it comes to strategic airlifts. Thisdependence has also been shown earlier. The Swedish Supreme Commanderasked for better airlift capacity for the benefit of the UN as late as in thesixties. Graham Allison’s theories have helped to understand both the processand the differences that have been identified. However, the theories cannotexplain all the perspectives and varieties of the decision-making process. Forexample, the role and impact of Dag Hammarskjöld 1956 and 1960 and thepressure of ”the super powers” in 1964. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 03-05

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-1575
Date January 2005
CreatorsHansson, Johan
PublisherFörsvarshögskolan
Source SetsDiVA Archive at Upsalla University
LanguageSwedish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeStudent thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text
Formatapplication/pdf
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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