En komparativ studie som undersöker rekrytering av knektar till Värmlands regemente och Värmlands fältjägare under 1800-talet.

Den här uppsatsen handlar om soldaters upplevelser av bushkriget i Rhodesia. Bushkrigetstod mellan den statliga aktören Rhodesia och olika nationalistiska och kommunistiskagerillor, varför konflikten kom att präglas av COIN (Counter Insurgency), det vill säga militär upprorsbekämpning. Undersökningen utgörs av en kvalitativ textanalys av memoarer skrivna av rhodesiska veteraner efter krigets slut. Frågor som tas upp är hur soldaterna såg på sig själva och sina motståndare som aktörer samt hur de uppfattade kriget och metoderna de använde.

Militärstrategisk doktrin gavs ut 2002 och där kunde man för första gången läsa att Försvarsmaktens agerandeskall utgå från manövertänkande. Ett begrepp som varit känt sedan 1980-talet då bl.a. William S Lindetablerade det i samband med skrivandet av doktriner för amerikanska marinkåren. Här i Sverige har vi använtoch pratat om det sedan 1990-talet, men inte formellt uttryckt oss så i våra reglementen och styrandedokument.Med utgångspunkt från tiden efter andra världskriget och fram till millenniumskiftet gör denna undersökningennedslag vid tre tillfällen under perioden. Dessa nedslag markerar samtliga olika skiften för Försvarsmakten ochArmén. Det är 1950-talet som innebar en fortsatt kvantitativ utveckling av Armén på grund av efterdyningarnafrån upprustningen under andra världskriget. 1970-talet som utgjorde inledningen på den nedmontering avFörsvarsmakten som beslutades i och med FB 1968. 1990-talet som innebar en ökad mekanisering av Arménvilken möjliggjorde större rörlighet, eldkraft och skyddsförmåga i och med införskaffandet av Stridsvagn 122,Stridsfordon 90 och olika fordon från forna Warszawapakten.Med hjälp av utvalda indikatorer på manövertänkande och ett antal av de för tiden styrande dokumentenkommer undersökningen ta reda på i vilken mån det inom Armén existerade manövertänkande föreformuleringen av Försvarsmaktens doktriner. Denna litteratur utgörs av allt från den politiska ochmilitärstrategiska nivån med exempelvis Försvarsbesluten, ner till den enskilde soldaten och Svensk soldat.Resultatet visar att det förekommit ett manövertänkande inom Armén och att detta har uttryckts på olika sätt idet material främst reglementen som undersökningen bygger på. / The Military Strategic Doctrine was published in 2002 and it stated for the first time, that allactivity performed by the Swedish Armed Forces was to be influenced by the concept ofManeuver Thinking. A concept known since the 1980s and established, among others, byWilliam S. Lind in connection with his work concerning new doctrines for the U.S. MarineCorps. In Sweden we have talked about the concept since the 1990s, but we have not madeany formal expression of it in regulations and governing documents.Taking a starting point in the time after the Second World War and moving forward to the endof the 20th century this investigation will take a closer look at three occasions, which all markimportant events for the Swedish Armed Forces and the Army. First the 1950s, which meant acontinuing quantitative development as a consequence of the rearmament during the SecondWorld War. Second the 1970s, which was the beginning of the disarmament by the SwedishArmed Forces that is still in progress, as a result of the Defence Resolution in 1968. Finally,the 1990s, which meant an increased mechanization of the Army with the procurement of theLeopard 2 Improved, Combat Vehicle 90 and various vehicles from the former Eastern states.By using some specifically selected indicators representing the concept of Maneuver Thinkingand a number of governing documents and regulations from the three chosen periods, thisinvestigation will be able to find out to what degree the concept of Manoeuvre Thinkingexisted in the Army before it was formalized in The Military Doctrines. The literature anddocuments that are to be investigated consist of everything from the political and militarystrategic level and the Defence Resolutions down to the common soldier and his instructionsin the “Soldier’s Handbook” (Svensk soldat).The results prove that there has been a concept of Maneuver Thinking within the Army and ithas been expressed in different ways, especially in the investigated Army regulations. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 04-06

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This study examines the development of air defenses that evolved during World War 1, as a result of the birth of long-range strategic bombing missions able to reach far beyond the battlefield frontlines, primarily being directed at population centers and civilian targets. The dissertation tackles the research problem of what Sweden, as a neutral country, could learn regarding air defense systems from Great Britain, France and Germany; and if, and how, Sweden managed to benefit from and utilize these lessons. The purpose being to study the origin of air defenses in the combatting countries; as well as in Sweden. The study is based around organizational theories concerning military learning and lessons learned processes, that lists steps for learning, as well as factors that could affect the process. Using this theory, as well as a qualitative text analysis method, the study scrutinizes Sweden’s capability to 1: acquire, 2: manage, 3: disseminate and 4: finally transform the knowledge and experiences of the aforementioned countries, at the time around World War 1 and the inter-war years. The study finds that Sweden followed the first three learning steps satisfactorily, but stumbled with the fourth step, due to interference from external factors, which will be brought up and scrutinized, in accordance with the theory.

This doctoral thesis analyze the process whereby Sweden gained access to American guided missiles during the late 1950s and early 1960s. It also tracks the Swedish efforts to develop guided missiles domestically. The concept of hegemony is used to interpret these processes, the dynamic in the Swedish-American relationship, and its consequences for the Swedish policy of neutrality. Sweden’s domestic guided missile development program, begun in the end of World War Two, met with great difficulties already by the end of the 1940s, and had entered a cul de sac by the early 1950s. The reason for this was a contunuous lack of funding and personnel, as well as a lack of foreign hardware and know-how. By 1947 the United States had largely established its hegemony in Western Europe, and the U.S. government then sought to gain the consent of the Swedish government as well. The U.S. government used its preponderant position, and pressured Sweden to adapt its policies by withholding vital technology from the Swedes. The U.S. refusal to deliver arms to a neutral Scandinavian Defense Union was significant in this respect. Sweden gradually gave its concurrence through a series of steps, most importantly the participation in the Marshall Plan in 1948, and COCOM in the summer of 1951. The confirmation of the U.S. government’s acceptance of Sweden came in the summer of 1952 when was made eligible to buy armaments in the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA). However, Sweden was not granted access to American guided missiles. This was an experience shared with most of the NATO countries (with the limited exception of Britain and Canada). During the course of the 1950s the United States was forced to change its position, due to prodding from the nato allies. The annual nato meetings were used as a platform by the nato countries in this endevour. The U.S. government reversed its non-disclosure policy in 1957 because of worries that its hegemonic position was threatened if it did not provide these weapons to its allies. Guided missile deliveries to Europe was used as a means to keep the alliance together, and to preserve U.S. hegemony in Western Europe. Because of its consent to U.S. hegemony Sweden gained access to U.S. missiles at the same time, and many times even before the NATO countries. Sweden was the first Western European country to purchase Sidewinder (1959) and Hawk (1962), and license manufactured two versions of the Falcon missile. Because of these deliveries the development of Swedish surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles was halted. Sweden was dependent upon the U.S. for deliveries of additional missiles in wartime, and this could have become a problem for Sweden’s ability to defend its territory against Western intrusions, since Sweden’s defense was based on help arriving from the West if Sweden was attacked by the USSR. The Swedish government, using the Royal Air Force Board as a proxy, signed a memorandum of Understanding in 1961 which gave the U.S. government the rigth to any improvements to the Falcon missiles, as well as the right to use them anywhere in the world. Sweden had thus de facto become a part of the U.S. military’s supply line. / QC 20100811

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This study will investigate whether knights' and samurais’ practical skillsbuild on the same core beliefs and values.To do so, I will try to summarise the practical skills and equipment of knightsand samurai respectively with a focus on historical accuracy to establish ageneral picture of the methods of war for both.The essay will then use that picture as a springboard to compare the twowhile staying limited to the practical aspect. This comparison will then usemilitary history science principles to interpret the core of knight and samuraiwarfare respectively and should they be different, try to investigate if there isa plausible practical reason that explains the deviation from the values or if itis more likely to be a difference in beliefs between them.

Den här uppsatsen är en begreppshistorisk undersökning av fienden som idé och begrepp i förhållande till Vietnamkriget, med syfte att förstå begreppets roll och funktion i och under kriget. Med utgångspunkt i framför allt historikern Quentin Skinners begreppshistoria har jag i uppsatsen utvecklat metoden krigets begreppshistoria, vilket innebär en undersökning av begreppets breda användning. Uppsatsen utgår från ett amerikanskt perspektiv och bygger på ett brett källmaterial som bland annat inkluderar tal, broschyrer, intervjuer, event och böcker, från politiska och militära aktörer, försvarsdepartementet, fredsaktivister, soldater, veteraner och journalister. I Vietnamkriget användes fiendebegreppet på olika sätt i olika sammanhang med syftet att påverka, mobilisera, skapa konsensus, legitimera, avhumanisera, problematisera och destabilisera. En av uppsatsens utgångspunkter är att krig är något som påverkar alla dimensioner av ett samhälle, och att krig ytterst är en språklig och kollektiv aktivitet.

Målsättningen med uppsatsen har varit att åskådliggöra beslutsprocesserna på främst strategisk ochmilitärstrategisk nivå inför det svenska beslutet att delta i de militära FN-missionerna i Suez 1956,Kongo 1960 och på Cypern 1964. Men också att studera deployeringen vid den inledande insatsen.Uppsatsen har därmed syftat till att finna svar på varför det gick relativt fort att fatta beslut om insatssamt deployera förbanden – svar som kanske kan lära oss något inför framtida liknande beslut – tillexempel med EU Battle Group. Graham Allison’s teorier om Organizational Process ochGovernmental Politics har utgjort den vetenskapliga ramen för att hjälpa till att förklarabeslutsprocesserna. Metoden för att uppnå detta har varit att genomföra tre fallstudier över nämndainsatser med en kvalitativ granskning av olika av källor.Uppsatsen pekar på att det har funnits en stark politisk vilja att genomföra insatserna. I ett fall harregeringen förvisso varit mycket tveksam. Rent generellt har besluten fattats snabbt och effektivtinnan riksdagen gav sitt medgivande. Man kan därmed se regeringens ageranden som en syntes avbeslutsamma ledande politiker med ett tillhörande väl utvecklat regeringskansli med mycket godförmåga att koordinera sin vilja gentemot riksdagen och oppositionen i utrikesnämnden samt mot demilitära myndigheterna. I samtliga fall har delar av den militära ledningen var tveksam till insatsmed hänvisning till befälsbrist och att beredskapen skulle bli lidande. Krigsmakten har dock alltidvarit lojal och snabbt verkställt besluten.När det gäller deployeringen så pekar uppsatsen på att Sverige och FN varit beroende av främst USAnär det gäller strategiska flygtransporter. Allisons teorier har bidragit till ökad förståelse förbeslutsprocesserna / The aim of this study is to reveal the decision-making process at strategic andmilitary strategic level that led to the Swedish military UN engagement inSuez 1956, Congo 1960 and Cyprus 1964. Moreover, the aim is to study thedeployment phase. The purpose is therefore to find answers, which canexplain why these decisions and deployments were made quite rapidly andwhy there were differences between and within the two levels. The historymay help us to make fasts decisions in the near future – for example, when theSwedish / Nordic EU Battle Group will be used. Graham Allison’s theoriesabout Organizational Process and Governmental Politics constitute thescientific frame. These theories help us to understand the processes and thedifferences. The method to achieve this has been to make three case studieswhere the primary and secondary sources from archives, diaries and booksetcetera have been examined.The thesis shows that there has been a strong political will in two of the cases.In the last case however, the government has been doubtful whether to takepart in the mission or not. But generally, the decisions have been maderapidly and effectively before the consent of Parliament. One could thereforesee the government’s actions as a synthesis of resolute leading politicians witha well developed cabinet, which had good ability in coordinating their willagainst Parliament and the opposition in the advisory council on foreignaffairs, as well as against the military authorities. In every case there hashowever been some reluctance from leading military generals. The lack ofenthusiasm was due to their objective during the Cold War: to keep as manyofficers and non-commissioned officers as possible in Sweden at high militarypreparedness on purpose. However, the military authorities have shown greatloyalty to the political level – they have therefore quickly executed thepolitical decisions.Furthermore, the thesis shows that both UN and Sweden have been dependenton the United States’ Air Force when it comes to strategic airlifts. Thisdependence has also been shown earlier. The Swedish Supreme Commanderasked for better airlift capacity for the benefit of the UN as late as in thesixties. Graham Allison’s theories have helped to understand both the processand the differences that have been identified. However, the theories cannotexplain all the perspectives and varieties of the decision-making process. Forexample, the role and impact of Dag Hammarskjöld 1956 and 1960 and thepressure of ”the super powers” in 1964. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 03-05