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<p>This paper examines whether the American officer’s education at West Point and the Swedish officer’s education at the Military Academy Karlberg have adapted their history of the military art education in accordance to the new requirements of the Armed Forces and its focus on the operational defense. Sweden is evolving towards an operational defense and so is the United States. This in turn requires that training and education keep up with the changes. The National Defense College in Sweden do not focus the teaching of advanced history, which happened beforet he invention of the engine, in the officer’s training program, while the American education is rather advanced, with special focus on events taken place in the 19th century up to the Cold War. The Swedish history of the military art education is more of a philosophical and introductory character resulting in less military historical knowledge. The American education is more focused on dates, battles and events, making the West Point education both more profound and extensive in these dimensions in comparison with the Swedish education. However, it is very doubtful that 19th century military history is useful for a commanding officer during an operation, for example in Afghanistan. Having knowledge about the history of the military art’s development is important to be able to understand the evolution of the Armed Forces, but having knowledge of the number of battalions and name of the commander at the Battle of Austerlitz is of less importance. This paper compares the Swedish and the American history of the military art education in order to analyze the degree of adaption to the new operational defense.</p>

This paper examines whether the American officer’s education at West Point and the Swedish officer’s education at the Military Academy Karlberg have adapted their history of the military art education in accordance to the new requirements of the Armed Forces and its focus on the operational defense. Sweden is evolving towards an operational defense and so is the United States. This in turn requires that training and education keep up with the changes. The National Defense College in Sweden do not focus the teaching of advanced history, which happened beforet he invention of the engine, in the officer’s training program, while the American education is rather advanced, with special focus on events taken place in the 19th century up to the Cold War. The Swedish history of the military art education is more of a philosophical and introductory character resulting in less military historical knowledge. The American education is more focused on dates, battles and events, making the West Point education both more profound and extensive in these dimensions in comparison with the Swedish education. However, it is very doubtful that 19th century military history is useful for a commanding officer during an operation, for example in Afghanistan. Having knowledge about the history of the military art’s development is important to be able to understand the evolution of the Armed Forces, but having knowledge of the number of battalions and name of the commander at the Battle of Austerlitz is of less importance. This paper compares the Swedish and the American history of the military art education in order to analyze the degree of adaption to the new operational defense.

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Syftet med denna studie är att fastställa vad som motiverade de adliga officerarna i den svenska militären att delta i Gustav III:s revolution 1772. Denna undersökning kommer att använda material skrivet av deltagande adliga officerare mellan 1771 - 1773, med ursprung från Gustavianska eller Sprengtportenska samlingen, samt från biografierna av Johan Christopher Toll och Jakob Magnus Sprengtporten. För att uppfylla det etablerade syftet formuleras tre forskningsfrågor, en primär och två sekundära, som besvaras i separata kapitel. Dessutom kommer undersökningen att tillämpa en kvalitativ textanalytisk metod tillsammans med en deduktiv teoretisk ansats. Denna metod, tack vare dess hermeneutiska användbarhet, möjliggör en omfattande analys av de motiv som anges i materialet, och hur resultaten återspeglar militärens sociala och politiska kultur. Det valda teoretiska ramverket, som tillämpas deduktivt i analysen, är Samuel Finers teori om militär intervention. Mer specifikt används koncept från avsnitt i boken som täcker militära officerares motiv för att ingripa i politik. De slutliga slutsatserna i denna undersökning är att officerarna främst motiverades att gå med i kuppen för att driva det "nationella intresset". De adliga officerarna hade ett långvarigt hat mot landets politiska system, baserat på uppfattningen att det var oförmöget att på ett adekvat sätt skydda vad de såg som nationens intressen. Officerarna, som såg sig själva som fosterlandets beskyddare, anslöt sig till revolten för att installera ett politiskt system som de ansåg kunde skydda nationens fortsatta existens. Officerarna motiverades också på grundval av "ideologi", eftersom konspirationen gav en möjlighet att implementera rojalistiska dygder. Slutligen var ytterligare ett motiv strävan efter "sektionsintressen". Beskyddandet av "gruppintressen", i form av att skydda adelns politiska och ekonomiska privilegier, samt "individuella intressen", där ekonomiska belöningar och befordringar begärdes i utbyte mot lojalitet, fanns också med i bilden. / The purpose of this study is to determine what motivated the noble officers of the Swedish military to participate in Gustav III:s 1772 Revolution. This investigation will be utilizing material written by participating noble officers between 1771 - 1773, originating from Gustavianska or Sprengtportenska samlingen, or from the biographies of Johan Christopher Toll and Jakob Magnus Sprengtporten. In order to fulfill the stated purpose of this investigation, three questions, one primary and two secondary, are formulated and answered in separate chapters. In addition, the investigation will be applying a qualitative text analytical method along with an deductive theoretical approach. This method, thanks to its hermeneutic utility, allows a comprehensive analysis of the motives stated in the material, and how the findings reflect on the military’s societal and political culture. The chosen theoretical framework which is applied deductively in the analysis, is Samuel Finers ‘military intervention’ theory. More specifically concepts from the section that covers military officers' motivations for intervening in politics. The final conclusions made in this investigation is that the officers were primarily motivated to join the coup to pursue the ‘national interest’. The noble officers had a longstanding hatred for the country’s political system, based on the conception that it was unable to adequately protect what they viewed as the nation's interests. The officers, who viewed themselves as the fatherlands protectors, joined the revolt in order to install a political system that they felt could protect the nation's continued existence. The officers were also motivated on the basis of ‘ideology’, as the conspiracy provided a opportunity to enforce Royalist political doctrine. Lastly, a further motive was the pursuit of ‘sectional interests’. The protection of ‘group interests’, in the form of protecting the nobility's political and financial privileges, as well as ‘individual interests’, where financial rewards and promotions were requested in exchange for allegiance, were also present.