In a time characterized by new libertarianism, where more and more critical infrastructure is in the hands of private ownership, it is important to secure vital flows of essential products and services. In Sweden the concept of total defense is supposed to embody the whole of society. But how do we understand incentives for trade and industry to engage in total defense and crisis preparedness? This study's aim is to add to the literature of private public partnerships and understand underlying dynamics. The theoretical framework this study usesis rational choice theory, rational choice institutionalism and logic of appropriateness. By examining public documents from government agencies and applying the framework, conclusions can be made about incentives for the private sector to engage in crisis preparedness. Even though the private sector seems to have good incentives for good crisis preparedness onthe surface, there seems to be a discrepancy between objectives in crisis management and what can be reasonably expected from the private sector. In accordance with rational choicevinstitutionalism and logic of appropriateness the state establishes institutions to control business behavior. By using policy instruments the state can affect private actors' utilitycal culations, goals and preferences. According to government agencies it is essential to use economics, partnerships and laws to ensure a satisfactory level of preparedness by the privatesector.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:umu-227430 |
| Date | January 2024 |
| Creators | Eklund, Andreas |
| Publisher | Umeå universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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