摘要
一九九七年東亞金融風暴起因之一即為公司治理不佳，其影響所及至數年後仍餘波蕩漾，而根據2000年6月麥肯錫顧問公司所做的全球投資人意見調查發現，有高達80％的美國投資人願意多付18％的價格來買良好公司治理企業的股票；自2001年底以來，美國「恩隆」（Enron）與「世界通訊」（WorldCom）等弊案又陸續爆發，其中所暴露的公司治理問題，讓世人驚覺這已是全球企業刻不容緩的議題，並亟思未來如何防止類似事件之發生。
公司治理經緯萬端，但都與如何確保資金提供者的投資能夠獲得應有的報酬有關。據此，公司治理的重要議題之一即為如何使小股東的權益不受內部人（即大股東與管理者）的侵犯；尤其在當今大企業紛紛進行事業轉投資之際，大股東常身兼轉投資事業之經營者，如何確保外在投資人（小股東與債權人）應得的報酬，並兼顧其他利害關係人的利益，為公司治理中實際且有趣之課題。我國大股東往往基於營運效率、自身利益與控制權的考量，會做出許多便宜行事卻不利公司治理的行為，如轉投資事業與母公司之間的透明度不足、大股東交叉持股或持有間接股權、所有權與經營權不分、母公司與轉投資事業之間可能的利益衝突、乃至於大股東個人風格等，這些大股東在轉投資事業中的角色定位與公司治理間的相互關係是本論文論述之重點。同時，為了加強研究的深度與實證性，作者特別藉由個案公司的實際案例來驗證文獻上的觀點，結論所得與研究相符合，並更能增添對企業經營之變化多端與不易控制之親身體驗。
本文最後並討論世界銀行、OECD及我國所規範之公司治理架構，希望公司治理能實際有助於我國企業之轉投資行為。因為制度的設計與執行若能加強公司治理與監督管理者的行為，當能強化公司競爭力，此乃公司治理積極面的貢獻。 / Abstract
One of the reasons for the East Asia 1997 financial crisis is because of the careless corporate governance. The impact of this financial crisis actually has had deep and board affection even afterward. According to one investigation by Mckinsey & Company in June 2000, there are about 80% of global investors who are willing to pay 18% extra money to buy those stocks belong to companies have better corporate governance. On the other hand, starting from the end of year 2001, the successive collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and other USA companies has exposed the serious and urgency about corporate governance. It makes people in worldwide enterprises realize how significant the corporate governance is and try to avoid similar events occurred.
Although corporate governance has many aspects, it all related to how to secure the deserved return of the capital providers. Accordingly, one of the important topics of corporate governance is to protect the minority shareholder rights from being invaded by the insiders (controlling shareholders and top executives). This topic become even more important especially when controlling shareholders are also top executives of the equity-invested companies. Thus, how to secure the investors’ (minority shareholders and creditors) rights is an interesting and practical issue of corporate governance.
Controlling shareholders in Taiwan are used to manage firms based on their own convenience such as the efficiency of operation, interest of themselves, and control rights, instead of considering corporate governance. This attitude, however, will easily result in some negative behaviors such as the lack of transparency between mother company and her equity investment, cross holding or private holding of controlling shareholders, indifferences between ownership and management, the potential interest impact between mother company and equity investment, and even the affection of firms’ performance by the characteristics of controlling shareholders. This thesis emphasize in the above correlation between corporate governance and equity investment. We also examine a real firm’s case to enhance its conviction.
This thesis also discusses the corporate governance structure of World Bank, OECD, and Taiwan. It is the author’s hope that corporate governance can be practically useful for a firm’s performance as its aggressive contribution.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0089932123 |
| Creators | 施銘賢, Shih, Albert Min-Hsien |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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