摘要 一九九七年東亞金融風暴起因之一即為公司治理不佳，其影響所及至數年後仍餘波蕩漾，而根據2000年6月麥肯錫顧問公司所做的全球投資人意見調查發現，有高達80％的美國投資人願意多付18％的價格來買良好公司治理企業的股票；自2001年底以來，美國「恩隆」（Enron）與「世界通訊」（WorldCom）等弊案又陸續爆發，其中所暴露的公司治理問題，讓世人驚覺這已是全球企業刻不容緩的議題，並亟思未來如何防止類似事件之發生。 公司治理經緯萬端，但都與如何確保資金提供者的投資能夠獲得應有的報酬有關。據此，公司治理的重要議題之一即為如何使小股東的權益不受內部人（即大股東與管理者）的侵犯；尤其在當今大企業紛紛進行事業轉投資之際，大股東常身兼轉投資事業之經營者，如何確保外在投資人（小股東與債權人）應得的報酬，並兼顧其他利害關係人的利益，為公司治理中實際且有趣之課題。我國大股東往往基於營運效率、自身利益與控制權的考量，會做出許多便宜行事卻不利公司治理的行為，如轉投資事業與母公司之間的透明度不足、大股東交叉持股或持有間接股權、所有權與經營權不分、母公司與轉投資事業之間可能的利益衝突、乃至於大股東個人風格等，這些大股東在轉投資事業中的角色定位與公司治理間的相互關係是本論文論述之重點。同時，為了加強研究的深度與實證性，作者特別藉由個案公司的實際案例來驗證文獻上的觀點，結論所得與研究相符合，並更能增添對企業經營之變化多端與不易控制之親身體驗。 本文最後並討論世界銀行、OECD及我國所規範之公司治理架構，希望公司治理能實際有助於我國企業之轉投資行為。因為制度的設計與執行若能加強公司治理與監督管理者的行為，當能強化公司競爭力，此乃公司治理積極面的貢獻。 / Abstract One of the reasons for the East Asia 1997 financial crisis is because of the careless corporate governance. The impact of this financial crisis actually has had deep and board affection even afterward. According to one investigation by Mckinsey & Company in June 2000, there are about 80% of global investors who are willing to pay 18% extra money to buy those stocks belong to companies have better corporate governance. On the other hand, starting from the end of year 2001, the successive collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and other USA companies has exposed the serious and urgency about corporate governance. It makes people in worldwide enterprises realize how significant the corporate governance is and try to avoid similar events occurred. Although corporate governance has many aspects, it all related to how to secure the deserved return of the capital providers. Accordingly, one of the important topics of corporate governance is to protect the minority shareholder rights from being invaded by the insiders (controlling shareholders and top executives). This topic become even more important especially when controlling shareholders are also top executives of the equity-invested companies. Thus, how to secure the investors’ (minority shareholders and creditors) rights is an interesting and practical issue of corporate governance. Controlling shareholders in Taiwan are used to manage firms based on their own convenience such as the efficiency of operation, interest of themselves, and control rights, instead of considering corporate governance. This attitude, however, will easily result in some negative behaviors such as the lack of transparency between mother company and her equity investment, cross holding or private holding of controlling shareholders, indifferences between ownership and management, the potential interest impact between mother company and equity investment, and even the affection of firms’ performance by the characteristics of controlling shareholders. This thesis emphasize in the above correlation between corporate governance and equity investment. We also examine a real firm’s case to enhance its conviction. This thesis also discusses the corporate governance structure of World Bank, OECD, and Taiwan. It is the author’s hope that corporate governance can be practically useful for a firm’s performance as its aggressive contribution.

企業股東基於法律與契約對於所投資之公司，通常享有股利分配權、新股優先認購權、剩餘財產分配權、股東投票權等基本權利，本文以股東權利基礎來重新詮釋Ohlson模式與Easton模式。基於股東權利基礎，Ohlson模式（價格模式）可重新表示為盈餘、帳面價值、投票權價值之線性模式；Easton模式（報酬模式）可重新表示為盈餘水準、盈餘變動、投票權價值變動之線性模式。本文依上述理論基礎發展相關之研究假說，為彌補單用當期盈餘資訊之不足本文於實證模式中將再加入未來盈餘變數，並以臺灣市場之資料來驗證各項假說。首先，本文實證價格模式與報酬模式之各項變數，對於股價及報酬是否具有解釋力。其次，本文實證當經濟環境不同時，上述實證結果是否會受到影響。 價格模式之實證結果指出：（1）各項價格變數對於股價皆具有顯著的正向解釋力。（2）當公司盈餘為負數或者盈餘持續性低時，當期盈餘對於股價的解釋力會降低。（3）當產業前景較差時，當期盈餘、帳面價值等會計資訊較不被注意，故比較不會反應在股價；管理者可由公司獲取的私有利益也會較少，故投票權價值與股價之關聯也會較低。（4）當產業生命週期較短時，當期盈餘資訊較被注意，此與其較易取得與計算有關。（5）當總體經濟情況不同時，各項變數對股價的解釋力並無顯著差異，此現象可能與研究期間內總體經濟情況好壞的差異並不明顯所致。（6）當通貨膨脹率較高時，公司所傳達之會計資訊會有高估的現象，故當期盈餘與股價之關聯會較低。 報酬模式之實證結果指出：（1）各項報酬變數對於報酬皆具有顯著的正向解釋力。（2）當公司盈餘為負數或者盈餘持續性低時，盈餘水準對於報酬的解釋力會降低，盈餘變動對於報酬的解釋力則會提高。（3）當產業前景較差時，由於盈餘水準、未來盈餘價值指標等會計資訊較不被注意，故比較不會反應在股價報酬；管理者可獲取的私有利益也會減少，故其與股價之關聯會降低。（4）當產業生命週期不同時，各項變數對報酬的解釋力並無顯著差異。（5）當總體經濟情況較差時，盈餘變動的資訊性顯著較低，此現象應與總體經濟情況較差時盈餘通常為負數所致，投票權價值指標也有相同的現象。（6）當通貨膨脹率不同時，各項變數對報酬的解釋力並無顯著差異，此現象可能與研究期間內通貨膨脹率高低的差異並不明顯所致。 綜上所述，股東權利基礎評價模式之各項變數確實能解釋股價或報酬，而且在不同的經濟情境下，上述變數對股價或報酬之解釋力確實會有不同，因此未來從事股權價值或股價報酬評估時，研究者應再進行相關的情境分析。 目 錄 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景與動機 1 第二節 研究目的與方法 5 第三節 論文貢獻 7 第四節 論文架構 9 第二章 文獻探討 10 第一節 股利分配權價值之相關文獻 12 第二節 剩餘財產分配權價值之相關文獻 14 第三節 新股優先認購權價值之相關文獻 19 第四節 股東投票權價值之相關文獻 26 第五節 情境式分析研究法之相關文獻 31 第三章 研究方法 33 第一節 股東權利基礎評價模式之建構 34 第二節 研究假說與實證模式 38 第三節 變數定義 47 第四節 樣本與資料選取 55 第四章 實證結果分析 59 第一節 價格模式之實證結果 60 第二節 報酬模式之實證結果 63 第三節 價格模式之情境分析結果 66 第四節 報酬模式之情境分析結果 80 第五章 結論與建議 94 第一節 研究結論 95 第二節 研究建議 101 第三節 研究限制 102 參考文獻 103 / When investors buy stock, they acquire all common and specific rights granted by the laws and contracts. Shareholders usually have the right to receive dividends, the preemptive right, the right to claim the residuals assets, and the right to vote at shareholders’ meetings. The paper uses the base of shareholders’ rights to re-explain the empirical meanings of Ohlson model and Easton model. According to the base of shareholders’ rights, Ohlson model（price model）can be rewritten as the linear model of earnings, book valve, and voting right premium. In the same way, Easton model（return model）can be rewritten as the linear model of earnings level, earnings change, and voting right premium change. According to the theory base above, this paper develops related research hypotheses. Not only current earnings but also future earnings are included in empirical models, and I use Taiwanese data to test the hypotheses. First, the paper tests whether each variable in price model or return model can explain stock price or return. Second, the paper investigates whether the results mentioned above will be affected by different contexts. The empirical evidence of the price model can be summarized as follows. First, each price variable has significantly positive explanatory power with respect to stock price. Second, when earnings is negative or earnings persistence is low, the value-relevance of current earnings will decrease. Third, when industry prospect becomes worse, market pays little attention to current earnings and book value and manager gets less private benefits, thus the association between current earnings, book value, voting right premium and stock price is low. Fourth, when industry life cycle is shorter, more attention is paid to current earnings, which is related to availability of data. Fifth, when macroeconomic circumstance is different, the explanatory power of each variable is not significantly different, this phenomenon may be due to little significant difference among macroeconomic circumstance during research periods. Sixth, when inflation rate is high, accounting information signaled by firm is overstated, which reduces the association between current earnings and stock price. The empirical evidence of the return model can be summarized as follows. First, each return variable has significantly positive explanatory power with respect to stock return. Second, when earnings is negative or earnings persistence is low, the value-relevance of earnings level will decrease, while the value-relevance of earnings change will increase. Third, when industry prospect is not good, market pays little attention to earnings level and future earnings indicator and manager gets less private benefits, thus the association between earnings level, future earnings indicator, voting right premium indicator and stock return is low. Fourth, when industry life cycle is not the same, the explanatory power of each variable is not significantly different. Fifth, when macroeconomic circumstance becomes worse, the informativeness of earnings change is significantly low, this phenomenon may be due to positive correlation between macroeconomic circumstance and earnings. Voting right premium indicator also has the same phenomenon. Sixth, when inflation rate is different, the explanatory power of each variable is not significantly different, this phenomenon is likely due to little significant difference among inflation rate during research periods. In summary, the variables in shareholders’ rights-based valuation models can explain stock price or stock return. In the different contexts, the explanatory power of variables mentioned above with respected to stock price or stock return is significantly different. The results imply the importance of contextual analysis when researchers are engaged in the valuation of stock price or stock return.

公司治理的研究,其主要的目的是了解董事會組成,董事會規模,外部董事, 董事及CEO薪酬誘因,CEO改組,外部大股東,外國股東,機構投資人,控制權和股權集中性,併購,法律制度及執行,法源…等變數對以ROA,ROE,會計盈餘,Tobin’s Q和股市報酬率所代表的公司績效之影響。與公司治理有關的重要指標包括股份控制權,現金流量權,董監事席次的控制權,控制權與股權的偏離,次大股東,金字塔結構,交叉持股,優先投票權,外部董事比例等。 本論文共計8章40節,引述國外文獻約500篇並由國際公司治理的實證結果來探討我國五家金控：開發金、台新金、復華金、富邦金、兆豐金的公司治理,最後提出九點結論和建議。