En afhandling om nuklear magtbalancebelyst gennem en neorealistisk analyse af Ruslands og Kinas perceptioner af USA'sintentioner om deployering af et ballistisk missilforsvarssystemmed henblik på at konkludere, hvilke konsekvenser disse intentioner og perceptionerkan få for stabiliteten af den nukleare magtbalance mellem USA-Rusland ogUSA-Kina. / The aim of this dissertation is to examine how the United States deployment of aNational Missile Defense will affect the stability of the nuclear balance-of-powerrelative to Russia and China. The theories used is, first, the balance-of-threat theoryby Stephen M. Walt, which rests on Kenneth N. Waltz’ neo-realism and balance-ofpowertheory and, secondly, Robert Jervis’ notable ”Four Worlds Under the SecurityDilemma” theory, which attempts to explore the power-security dilemma and theconsequences caused by the ambiguity between offensive and defensive militarypower. The method used is based on a qualitative empirical analysis of literature aswell as official statements from governments and governmental institutionsconcerned. First, the United States’ intentions of deploying a National MissileDefense will be examined. Secondly, the Russian and Chinese perceptions of threatas well as their possible options of balancing the National Missile Defense will beexplored. Finally, the affect of the National Missile Defense on strategic stability isexamined. My conclusions are:Russia and China perceive National Missile Defense as a threat:Russia’s nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the United States will be undermined in itspresent form towards 2015. Chinas current “minimal” nuclear deterrence will benullified instantly when the National Missile Defense is deployed. Furthermore,Chinas presently ongoing modernisation of its nuclear forces will be continuouslyundermined towards 2015. In addition to existing and potential areas of conflict withthe United States the deployment of the National Missile Defense might contribute toRussian and Chinese perceptions of malign American intentions.Russia and China will try to balance the perceived threat by increasing theoffensive capabilities of their strategic nuclear weapons:Russia will try to balance the threat from the National Missile Defense throughstrategic arms control agreements with the United States. Furthermore, Russia willprepare its nuclear infrastructure to be able to balance the National Missile Defense,if the system is deployed. The National Missile Defense will require a furtherexpansion of the Chinese nuclear force, perhaps significantly beyond its currentplans. The methods of balancing will be an increase of the number of missiles andwarheads and probably also deployment of sophisticated countermeasures.The deployment of the National Missile Defense can cause strategic instabilityand arms race:As the offensive nuclear weapons, i.e. ballistic missiles, have several obviousadvantages over the defensive nuclear weapons, i.e. the National Missile Defense,and as the offensive postures cannot be distinguished from the defensive ones thepower-security dilemma will operate unrestrained. All three states will be confrontedwith a very unstable situation and offensive strategic arms race will be likely. Thedeployment of a National Missile Defense will furthermore increase the difficultiesof achieving very low warhead levels in forthcoming START negotiations. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-1840 |
| Date | January 2002 |
| Creators | Dyvad, Peter |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Danish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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