While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views
that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be
inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his
philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method
of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya
by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however,
assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because
śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of
substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that
phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis
grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting
arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that
if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on
its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty
make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is
established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his twotruths
formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive
truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguisticallybased,
conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an
explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the
Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths
as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based
on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena
point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding
of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be
cognitively grasped. / Religious Studies & Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:unisa/oai:umkn-dsp01.int.unisa.ac.za:10500/9936 |
| Date | 08 1900 |
| Creators | Mason, Garth |
| Contributors | Clasquin, M. (Michel) |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 1 online resource (v, 208 leaves) |
| Rights | University of South Africa |
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