The power to control Discourse is the power to maintain distinct discursive practices with particular ideological agendas prevailing others, including oppositional practices (Fairclough,1995a). Media discourse thus is a powerful tool in the creation and maintenance of the hegemony of a preferred Discourse. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) aspires to disclose discursive practices that involve unequal relations of power and aim to contribute to social change by creating more equal power relations (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). The present study, by using CDA, aims to understand the role of the media in the selling of the war on Iraq by looking at Time magazine articles prior to the war in contrast with President George W. Bush speeches during the same period. The major themes found were patriotism, the Discourse of fear, glorification of the army, polarization of us vs. them, the "if" Discourse and trivialization of war. The findings suggest that there is an influence from the presidential Discourse reflected in the Discourse presented by the magazine as well as some themes that are only present in the magazine and also serve to the same end of shaping the public support for the war.

This thesis examines British government policy towards Russian refugees in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War in Russia. As a consequence of these two events, approximately one million Russians opposing the Bolshevik rule escaped from Russia. The Russian refugee problem was one of the major political and humanitarian problems of inter-war Europe, affecting both individual countries of refuge, as well as the international community as a whole. The League of Nations had been formed in 1919 in order to promote international peace and security. The huge numbers of refugees from the former Russian Empire, on the other hand, were seen as a threat to the international stability. Consequently, the member states of the League for the first time recognised the need for international co-operative efforts to assist refugees, and the post of High Commissioner for Russian Refugees was established under the auspices of the League. Significantly, this action marked the beginning of the international refugee regime; the active co-operation of states in the field of refugee assistance. European countries, in addition to international co-operative efforts on behalf of Russian refugees, also took individual actions for their assistance by offering them asylum in their countries. However, there were big differences in the policies of various European countries. Britain had long enjoyed a reputation of being a country of liberal refuge, where political refugees and immigrants could find asylum. This liberalism, however, started to be undermined at the beginning of the 20th century, particularly since the First World War. Although a principle that political refugees should be considered separately remained, my thesis will argue that this rule was not followed in the case of Russian refugees. From the very beginning the British government took a rigid attitude against the admission of Russian refugees to Britain, and strict provisions were set for the entry of individual refugees. Because of this, the number of Russian refugees in Britain was much smaller than in many other European countries, for example France or Germany. The policy of the British government towards Russian refugees thus offers a good example of the general decline of liberalism in Britain.

ABSTRACT JUST NOT ENOUGH: REFRAMING JUST PEACE IN AN ERA OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT Derek M. Pottinger, ThM The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2016 Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Mark T. Coppenger Just peace is the proper end of an offensive just war. An ideally just peace is impossible must not be abandoned as a goal. This thesis argues peace is best viewed through a peace prism creating a six-level spectrum from war to ideally just peace. Levels 2 and 3 (marginally effective and substantially effective peace) do not qualify as jus post bella, while levels 4 and 5 (optimally effective and reasonably just peace) do because they address politics, economics, societal structure, international relations, and personal liberty postwar. Further the peace prism should be integrated into ad bellum decision-making as a precondition to meeting jus ad bellum criteria by using the maximum obtainable peace equation to estimate whether a just peace can be obtained at a reasonable expense in blood and treasure. Doing so will result in fewer decisions to go to war and a more ethically sound application of Just War Theory.

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The thesis is concerned with a specific example of misunderstanding as a factor in international crisis leading to war. The example is the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 and the thesis gives special importance to the mistranslation and misinterpretation of "Magic" (Magic, as the thesis explains, was the name given to the American decoding of the secret Japanese codes). The argument is that misunderstanding was a cumulative factor in relations between the United States and Japan, and that in the final negotiations mistranslation of Magic was a significant factor in the failure to reach an agreement. The thesis argues that as late as the last week in November 1941 the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been averted. The thesis opens with an introduction referring to the literature on the causes of war and misunderstanding in international politics. A brief comparison is made with crises which did not lead to war, such as the Cuban missile crisis. Part I is entitled "The Historical Legacy" and surveys briefly the period from the Spanish-American war to 1940. It does not claim to be a comprehensive account of U.S.-Japan relations. It is designed to show how successive crises increased misunderstanding. It emphasises the importance, for Japan, of the danger from Russia and demonstrates the lack of control in Japanese foreign policy. Part II opens with an examination of the way policy was formed and decisions made in the United States and Japan, discussing the role of Roosevelt, Hull and other influential members of the Administration in the United States, and the lack of a central core of decision-making in Japan. It then proceeds with a chronological study of negotiations from November 1940 to October 1941. Part III examines in detail the mistranslations from Magic, including the technical problems of coding and decoding and linguistic factors and problems of translation. Part IV studies chronologically the final negotiations, including Proposal B and the Hull Note, up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. It shows in detail the synchronisation and lack of synchronisation between the two sides and demonstrates the points at which accurate translation and clear understanding might have altered the course of events. The brief conclusion explains how the thesis adds to existing literature, notes the present state of archival material and speculates on the possible course of events had the attack on Pearl Harbor not occurred. There are five appendices: (i) Magic materials; (ii) List of Important Magic Misinterpretations; (iii) Historiographic Developments; (iv) Bibliography; (v) Maps.

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Since the end of the Cold War, traditional justifications for war have diminished in relevance and importance, while the use of Humanitarian Military Interventions (HMI) has proliferated, to the point that formerly traditional wars – e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq invasions – have become retroactively redefined as HMIs. While HMI suffers from a number of problems, from international law to historical track record, its proponents have managed to turn aside all arguments by claiming they represent either statistical outliers, improper implementation, or at best indicate a need for a certain degree of fine-tuning. Crucially, the validity of the HMI practice is never brought into question. In order to attempt to break this dialectic stalemate, this dissertation recasts HMI as a Kuhnian paradigm. Doing so provides for a better understanding of HMI as a holistic Weltanschauung, and allows the problems of HMI to be understood as anomalies. Unlike arguments, anomalies need not engage with every discrete position held by the paradigm. Instead, they serve as a direct demonstration of the untenability of a position, as evidenced by systemic failure to produce the desired results. Consequently, the paradigm approach allows for a binary resolution to the problems of HMI: either the anomalies can be explained by the paradigm, or the paradigm has failed. The present analysis begins with an examination of paradigms and their structures, and then follows the history and context of HMI is considered from a philosophical and historical perspectives. Then, the structure of HMI as a paradigm is unpacked, with the attendant ends, means, justifications, and implications. Finally, four categories of HMI anomalies are presented, leading to the conclusion that the HMI paradigm is a failed one.

The dissertation aims to explore the declared and the alleged undeclared reasons for the Second Gulf War (2003), against the background of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. To achieve the aim of the study, the research commenced with a conceptual framework of the causes, reasons and motives for war. The framework not only identifies the various type of wars, but also distinguishes between the general causes of, and specific reasons for war within the context of realist, liberal and conservative theories. To analyse the context of the 2003 US-led war with Iraq, the study explores the reasons why Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, and how this invasion ultimately resulted in the US participation in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. Following from this, the study identifies certain reasons/factors emanating from the 1991 Gulf War that may have influenced the US decision-making process in the lead up to the 2003 war against Iraq. Mainly, the study explores the three declared reasons for the war as well as the intelligence failures by the US and the UK intelligence agencies, especially the incorrect assessments of Iraq WMD capabilities and related programmes, which consequently resulted in the US-led campaign against Iraq. Although most of the declared US reasons of Iraq’s alleged WMD and its alleged links to Al Qaeda could not be substantiated, the study argues that these were important factors in building a case for the war. Lastly, the study explores the alleged undeclared reasons for the Iraq war, and suggests that oil seems to have been an important factor which led the US to war. Copyright / Dissertation (MSecurity Studies)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Political Sciences / unrestricted