Thesis advisor: Christopher P. Wilson / Witnessing Empire is a cultural history of the American war correspondent. I trace the figure through various points of crisis in the making of U.S. sovereignty including the U.S.-Mexico War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War. Locating correspondents like Herman Melville, Richard Harding Davis, and Stephen Crane in what Mary Louise Pratt terms "contact zones"--areas of cross-cultural exchange and contest--I show in this interdisciplinary work how the figure emerged through confronting U.S. state power with "on the spot" visual and textual witness accounts of the violence entailed by that power in a period of territorial expansion across the hemisphere, mass media development, and renewed aesthetic challenges to representing war. Revising critical appraisals of U.S. empire, including those of Amy Kaplan, that argue that the war correspondent is simply an apologist for U.S. imperialism through a facile use of romance, realism, spectacle, and sensationalism, I argue that the figure carves out a unique vision via such familiar conventions to unveil the contradictions of U.S. imperialism--particularly, its reliance on a narrative of liberation and protection through conquest. The dissertation thus unveils the correspondent as ambivalent towards this narrative as his witnessed accounts reveal subjects less protected, than abandoned by the state. I argue that through exposing the violence of this abandonment, the correspondent develops a new literary convention that exposes the consequences of modern war. In Chapter 1, I historically situate war correspondence as an emergent form, comparing the writings of the New Orleans-based Picayune war correspondent George Wilkins Kendall, composed on the eve of the U.S.-Mexico War, with Herman Melville's Typee. An unorthodox travel narrative, Typee can be more effectively read as an inaugural work of war correspondence in its challenging of "race war" as a discourse employed to cement state power in the contact zone. Chapter 2 takes up the "on the spot" pencil line drawings of the Civil War "special artists." Comparing these artists' works with the published engravings in the newspapers at the time and the illustrated histories at the turn-of-the-century, I address the visual rhetoric by which war correspondents depicted the crisis of sovereignty entailed by the Civil War. The second half of the dissertation illustrates the emergence of war correspondence as a unique aesthetic form. Chapter 3 looks at how Richard Harding Davis crafts war correspondence as a critique of U.S. imperialism's spectacle-oriented "anti-imperialist" liberation narrative by opposing the production of an "imperial news apparatus" at the turn-of-the-century with the advent of the Spanish-American War. In Chapter 4, I show how Stephen Crane, like Davis, was inspired by the anti-statism and transnationalism of the antebellum filibuster. From his initial experiments in Red Badge of Courage, Crane was focused on the subjectivity of the witness in his correspondence and fiction, ultimately allegorizing the violence of U.S. imperial power and its abandonment of citizens and non-citizens alike in war zone. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: English.

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This dissertation is an ethnographic engagement with the social and political space of Afghanistan and how it has been shaped by the intensities of warfare in the last decade, with a focus on the realms of language, representation and economy. Taking Kabul as the panoramic ground of profound social and epistemological transformations, the dissertation traces a crucial shift beginning in 2011-2012, from a highly speculative war economy (a “green zone economy” that privileged the commodification of language and culture and the privatization of war, with crisis as an alibi for governmentality) to one based on equally speculative practices of prospecting for natural resources in the Afghan underground: where an estimated three trillion dollars’ worth of copper, gold, iron-ore, marble and oil & gas is presumed to lie in wait. I illustrate the nuanced epistemological concerns and political contestations that stem from an Afghan effort to distinguish between sources of violence and sources of economic value (especially in the aftermath of Kabul’s demilitarization) in a milieu where foreign militaries presuppose that civilians and insurgents cannot be distinguished, except through the medium of war-time translation and collaboration. The twin concern with generalized forms of death dealing and tragedy, on one hand, and the moral and political exigency for Afghans to distinguish between a world of appearances and one of essences (the Islamic and Quranic interpretation of zahir (exterior/surface) and batin (interior/ground), on the other, opens onto a set of epistemological concerns undergirded by several oppositions, which I argue, are central to American war making. I illustrate that the movement between these artificial binaries (Persian/Pashto and English, literacy and illiteracy, rationality and irrationality, repetition and transformation) inspires aspirational fantasy on an economic frontier and invests some Afghans (especially those who speak English and are literate) with the power of calculative reason (aql) and understanding (fahm and dânish), while condemning those who are illiterate (and sometimes those who only speak Persian and/or Pashto) to forms physical supplementarity and crisis--from literally being expendable prosthetic bodies (human body armor) to the breakdown of meaning in incestuous relations and the intensification of moral crisis. In this context, conventional writing and the felt lack of its absence illustrate for us the logic of war in more consequential ways. The belief that writing is the domain of what can be known (rationally understood) and universally applied invigorates the ideology of literate persons and war-time collaborators with shocking breadth and tenacity. It organizes antagonisms between persons and structures forms of death-dealing. I trace how the production of a binary around literacy and illiteracy produces, even in moments of technological acquisition, the retrospective fantasy that orality is not only the prior but also the locus of unfettered subversion and ignorance of the law. This misrecognition of linguistic diversity as lack comes to inform, in contexts of unprecedented transnational war-time activity, the charge that Afghans are beholden to an excessive localism that fuels the predicaments of the Afghan State and errors of judgement (such as incestuous transgressions, and suicide bombing) which would destroy society altogether. The issue of vulnerability to ideological suasion and excess emerges alongside these presuppositions. It informs the belief that the incapacity to exercise reason (due to illiteracy) renders Afghans vulnerable to diverse forms of propaganda and the inability to distinguish between the world of appearances (both technological media images and the Islamic notion of the zahir (surface manifestation)) and reality. I trace these complexities through a series of intense contact points where these oppositions come into play and determine forms of access and violence 1) in translational contexts during combat missions where linguistic transformation results in deadly misunderstanding 2) in familial contexts and contestations over property, where the failure of interpersonal and extrajudicial mediation results in mass murder 3) in courtrooms where failed suicide bombers (who did not detonate out of technological error or because they were attacked by members of the Afghan National Police) are subject to the limitations of oral testimony and to the belief that photographic evidence proves that they will repeat their crimes if released from prison 4) instances of incest that arise out of illiteracy and, when exposed, generate moral crisis 5) the production of zones of exteriority and interiority (especially in Kabul’s Green Zone) that rely on phamakological inclusion and reproduce the literal supplementarity of Afghan bodies 6) the attempt to find the “real” sources of economic value as part of a multi-national gold and mineral extraction endeavor—the continuation of an obsession with the Afghan ground that has a long imperial history from the 1800’s onwards (when it was assessed through botanical, railway and coal prospecting missions). Together, these sites and the consideration of the earthen terrain alongside the terrain of rationality and linguistic difference situate us in the midst of wartime catastrophe. They foreground the fantasy that rationalism is the sine qua non of modernism, and the belief that literacy is the basis for reflective and intellectual thought, and for being human. But what they also disclose for us is that in its absence you can (and sometimes must) die.

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Chan, Tze Wai. / "August 2011." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / List of Illustrations --- p.iv / Note on Abbreviation --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1: --- Prologue --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2: --- Homeric War and the Greek Military Culture --- p.12 / Homeric Age and the Study of Greek Warfare --- p.12 / Metallurgy --- p.18 / The Inception of the Greek Way of War --- p.30 / The Idea of Warfare --- p.44 / Chapter Chapter 3: --- The Emergence of the Greek Way --- p.52 / The Hoplite Warfare and the Greek Essences --- p.52 / Homeric Tradition and Hoplite Warfare --- p.59 / Encountering Foreigners --- p.73 / The Greek Way of War --- p.87 / Chapter Chapter 4: --- The Transformation of Greek Warfare --- p.92 / The Legacy of the Persian Wars --- p.92 / The Introduction of New Elements --- p.98 / Response of the Hoplite Tradition --- p.113 / Militarization of the Greek Way --- p.121 / Chapter Chapter 5: --- Epilogue --- p.130 / Bibliography --- p.133

In response to growing German propaganda during the First World War, the British Government formed a special Propaganda Department, which used visual art as a means of boosting up the morale of civilians and British soldiers on the Front. The War Artists‟ Scheme brought into being under the auspices of the Propaganda Department in 1914 allowed some of the most promising British artists to produce memorable paintings. The works documented the numerous sites of the Western and Eastern Front. In addition, the artists employed under the scheme presented the nation with portraits of notable military and political figures engaged in the war effort. This thesis investigates how William Orpen, an established society portraitist and A.R.A., fits into the War Artists‟ Scheme. His position was problematic: as a painter working in an early twentieth-century descriptive vein and older than other artists at the Front, how did he fare in this troubled context? Orpen‟s work on the Western Front (France and Flanders) has been so far neglected and considered to be of little relevance in comparison to what other avant-garde artists produced during the same time span. The thesis investigates how Orpen, although painting in an early twentieth-century representational style considered slightly passé, embedded in his works innovative means of expression, creating vivid, haunting imagery, adding to a body of work which was supposed to be documentary a depth reminiscent of ecclesiastic artistic practice. The thesis attempts to re-evaluate Orpen‟s war oeuvre, an aspect of the artist‟s rich imagery hitherto left to oblivion.

Si la loi du conflit dicte la conduite des hommes, tant dans leurs relations individualisées qu'au regard des communautés, elle emporte la nécessité de la contenir. Le droit de la guerre et de la paix, suscité par les Pères de l'Église, puis repris par les jurisconsultes, tout en s'en émancipant, reste l'instrument privilégié de cette maîtrise. Néanmoins, devant un danger potentiel, par le discours de revanche devant la défaite, préparer la guerre vise à assurer une cohésion nationale forte. Les institutions républicaines, qui se veulent indépendantes de toutes Églises, et l'Église Catholique elle-même, notamment par son clergé français, y travailleront, fût-ce par des voies au départ opposées. A cet égard, la Troisième République reste le cadre politique privilégié. La France, terre d'exemplarité dit-on et écrit-on, devient le terreau de la guerre sublimée. De cette analyse s'évincent cependant deux problématiques. Existe-t-il une constante au sein de l'Église de Rome relativement au droit de la guerre, une guerre qu'il faut gérer« au moins pire» possible, à l'instar de ce prescrivent les conventions internationales? La guerre n'est-elle qu'un moyen de survivre face à la peur de la mort, autrement dit ne serait-elle qu'une fatalité nécessaire ? / If the law of conflict dictates human conduct, both in their individual and community relationships, it is necessary to contain it. The law of war and peace, dictated by the Church Fathers, and then by the jurisconsults, remains the privileged instrument of this control. However, in front of a potential danger and the revenge speech after the defeat, preparing for war aims to ensure a strong national cohesion... [...]

Why do third-party interventions in civil wars sometimes positively contribute to fast conflict resolutions and post-war development and sometimes backfire? To solve this puzzle, I present a conceptual framework that links the motives and methods of intervention to civil war outcomes and post-war development. Two contrasting motives, self-interest and humanitarian concerns, lead to different intervention types. Self-interest prompts states to undertake unilateral and biased intervention. Humanitarian concerns encourage states to engage in multilateral intervention through the UN with a biased position. Interveners are more prudent in the use of force. They resort to violent methods only when critical security interests are at stake or when extreme humanitarian disasters occur. The method of intervention reflects interveners' motives and significantly influences civil war processes and post-war development. The effects of intervention on civil war duration and outcome, however, tend to be inconsistent with interveners' intentions. I find no empirical evidence that external intervention is likely to make civil war shorter. Whether interveners are motivated by humanitarian concerns or self-interest, they tend to fail to achieve their best outcome: a faster victory for their protégé or a faster negotiated settlement. Instead, biased interveners succeed in retarding military victory by their protégé's rival. Neutral interveners play a role in delaying time until government victory, regardless of their intention. The effects of intervention on post-war development are somewhat consistent with interveners' intention. Multilateral intervention motivated by humanitarian concerns tends to promote post-war well-being by increasing resources available for post-war reconstruction. On the other hand, unilateral intervention tends to impede the improvement of post-war quality of life. The use of force also has negative impacts on post-war development. The reason is that those interventions pursing self-interest produce a less-respondent government and reduce available resources. Military victory is more likely to improve post-war quality of life than is a negotiated settlement. However, the positive effects of military victory are realized only when a group wins a victory without biased support from foreign powers. I find that multilateral intervention using nonviolent methods and having an unbiased stance may be the best way for the international community to help post-war development.

With the Second World War, the U.S. defense establishment attained a scale and permanence it never had before. The new strategic blueprint of the Cold War dictated constant readiness for military confrontation, but it was also clear that the country could not keep up wartime levels of total economic mobilization. Faced with the problem of managing this military behemoth, leaders in the defense bureaucracy looked to private industry for expertise to help them run the emerging national security state. The result was a remaking of defense administration in the image of the post-war corporation. This dissertation explains how and why reformers placed their faith in models of business enterprise, an approach that was neither self-evident nor readily accepted across the military leadership. In the decades after World War II, the reorganization of the defense bureaucracy around values of efficiency and productivity shaped U.S. military operations and affected millions of people around the world. In concrete terms, this dissertation tracks how managerial science changed the ways the military kept accounts, disciplined labor, trained officers, and handled government assets. Interest in improving military management exploded after 1950. In the realm of budgeting and finance, reformers set up transactions between units to imitate buyer-seller relationships, requiring officers to express their needs for supplies and labor in dollar terms. Drawing analogies between military and private industry, defense establishment reformers embraced methods like Taylorist work measurement, which they used to control work ranging from filing to the production of massive weapons systems. Borrowing directly from Harvard Business School’s Advanced Management Program, defense leaders established schools to train high-ranking military officers in the latest trends of business management. While these business-inspired reforms gained traction in many parts of the military bureaucracy, they were not accepted without controversy. After the Vietnam War, many military leaders questioned the dominance of “managerialism” and denounced it in favor of traditional concepts of command and leadership. By the 1970s, however, the language and values of management had become thoroughly embedded in the institutional structure of the military. I argue that the reorganization of the defense bureaucracy in the image of the profit-seeking firm changed the experience of work in the military, redefined what it meant to be an officer, and facilitated the privatization of many of the defense establishment’s functions. Further, I aim to show that understanding how the military governed and produced can reframe key historiographic debates about 20th century American political economy.

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