The criminal law has been critiqued as an unsuitable system to regulate adverse medical events (AME) because the unintentional nature of AME renders it incompatible with the penal objectives of the criminal law. This project uses an interpretivist approach to examine how blameworthiness is constructed in criminal cases involving AME. Situated within a contextual constructionist paradigm, and utilizing a theoretical framework that draws on legal pragmatism, symbolic interactionism, Habermasian thought, and Goffmanian frame analysis, this project employs a case study approach to explore how appellate courts construct AME as a product of fate or agency. The British case of Bawa-Garba v. R. (2016) and the Canadian case of R. v. Javanmardi (2019) are analysed using thematic analysis. It is concluded that the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Javanmardi constructed the AME within the realm of fate, contrasting the minority in Javanmardi and full panel of the England and Wales Court of Appeal in Bawa-Garba which constructed the AME within the realm of agency. It is also concluded that the majority in Javanmardi utilised pragmatic adjudication to determine blameworthiness. It is suggested that these findings could reduce fear of criminal liability among Canadian health care professionals. Future research is suggested to examine the legal cultures underlying this variation, critically explore the intersection of race and criminal prosecution of AME, and apply structural violence as a theoretical frame to further interrogate AME as a systemic failure.

<p>Within legal positivism, the theory which holds that there is no necessary connection between legal validity and morality, there is dissensus about whether there can be a contingent connection. Inclusive legal positivists suggest that it is possible for morality to play a role in determining a norm’s legal validity while exclusive legal positivists argue for the opposite. This dissertation examines this debate between inclusive legal positivism and exclusive legal positivism focusing on how paying attention to all of the fundamental secondary rules in a legal system can affect arguments about the coherence of either theory. The fundamental secondary rules being the rules which identify other rules, identify authority and authorize changes. I will be demonstrating that three exclusive legal positivist arguments against inclusive legal positivism are unconvincing because of the role that fundamental secondary rules play in our legal systems. Shapiro and Raz offer arguments against inclusive legal positivism based on different important features that they believe the law possesses. However, given their commitment to a particular type of fundamental secondary rule, specifically a directed power, exclusive legal positivism is unable to better capture these important features. Himma suggests that inclusive legal positivism cannot explain how a court can have final authority to determine constitutional cases involving moral criteria. Again, however, we examine what fundamental rules an inclusive legal positivist could employ to explain the phenomenon, we find that exclusive legal positivism is in no better position. At the end of the dissertation, I will suggest why I think continuing with these types of arguments will continue to be fruitless and briefly examine how similar inclusive and exclusive legal positivism are through investigating how one might determine whether a given legal system had an inclusive rule of recognition or exclusive one.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Moral concerns should be relevant to the choice of the best legal theory on both theoretical and moral grounds because social practices such as law can change due to the theorizing activity. Hart's concept of law provides grounds for claiming that rules of social morality can constrain law in more ways than he admits in his minimum content of natural law. The belief that social morality constrains valid law allows one to treat the question of civil disobedience as sensitively as a legal positivist and leads to neither anarchism nor passivism. At the other extreme, Dworkin's law as integrity interpretation, which claims law is concerned with political morality through and through, leads to morally regrettable consequences when adopted as a normative theory of adjudication. Theoretical difficulties also flow from Dworkin's identification of the role of judge and legal theorist: that a legal theorist must be a participant in any legal system she interprets does not mean she should adopt or exclusively focus on a judge's perspective on that system. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

In a democracy it is the citizens who choose their leaders. Through elections, the people constitute government to preside over public affairs. However, in several African countries the quality of the elections has been vitiated by fraud, incompetence, unequal playing field and violence. Part of the problem is historical. Within the first decade of attaining independence in the 1950s and 1960s, many African regimes rapidly descended into autocracy and many countries formally recognised one-party regimes. Despite many one-party regimes having been abolished after the democratisation wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s, challenges of holding free and fair elections persist. Several elections held since this democratic wave were generally not considered by independent observers as free and fair. Indeed Africa has become well known for flawed elections, such as was the case in the 2007 elections in Kenya, the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe and the 2010 elections in Ivory Coast. Due to the stifled democratic climate, where even elections had a predetermined outcome, coups became a common and regular method of showing discontent or removing government. While the phenomenon of problematic elections is going on, at the continental level, Africa seems to be making renewed commitment towards democratic governance. With the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) through the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2000, the AU, inter alia, committed to promoting “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance” and seems determined to depart from the legacy of poor governance. It is in view of the foregoing background that this research sought to investigate the challenges the judiciary in Africa has faced in adjudicating presidential election disputes. And, in light of the growing trend towards establishing common African democratic standards and seeking collective solutions, the research also sought to explore the viability of establishing a continental supranational mechanism for resolving disputed presidential elections through adjudication. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LLD

I uppsatsen utreds Adjudication Bond, vilket i Sverige är en ny typ av bankgaranti. För att bedöma denna görs en jämförelse med hur bankgarantier som rättsligt institut förhåller sig till svensk rätt. Bankgarantier används både i Sverige och internationellt. De utgör säkerhet för ett underliggande avtals riktiga fullgörelse. Den ena parten (uppdragsgivaren) till det underliggande avtalet ger banken i uppdrag att ställa ut bankgarantin till förmån för dennes motpart (beneficienten) för det fall att uppdragsgivaren inte uppfyller sitt åtagande enligt det underliggande avtalet. Bankgarantier kan varieras på olika sätt och ställas ut för alla typer av underliggande avtal. Bankgarantier är antingen självständiga eller accessoriska. Vid den självständiga bankgarantin ska beneficientens rätt till ersättning endast bedömas enligt bankgarantins villkor, emedan vid accessoriska bankgarantier denna rätt ska bedömas också enligt det underliggande avtalet. I garantins s.k. betalningsmekanism uppställs de krav som beneficientens begäran måste uppfylla för att ersättning ska utbetalas. Således kan det endast krävas en begäran från beneficienten (on demand), men därutöver kan det krävas att beneficienten till sin begäran presenterar ytterligare dokument, bestående av ett expertintyg eller ett domslut, som bekräftar beneficientens rätt till ersättning. Adjudication är ett speciellt tvistelösningsförfarande där en tvist ska avgöras med tillämplig lag men där avgörandet inte är slutligt. Således faller Adjudication Bond mellan expertintyget och domslutet. I uppsatsen framgår det att Adjudication Bond ska presumeras vara en självständig bankgaranti, med mindre det tydligt framgår i garantivillkoren att den är accessorisk. Vidare fastslås att Adjudication Bond är en bankgaranti som kan bedömas både enligt remburs- och borgensreglerna. / The thesis examines Adjudication Bond, which is a new kind of bank guarantee in Sweden. The examination is conducted by a comparison of how bank guarantees, as legal institutes, relate to Swedish law. Bank guarantees are used in Sweden and in international trade. They guarantee the due performance of an underlying contract. A party (principal) to the underlying contract instructs the bank to issue the guarantee on behalf of the principal in favour of the other party to the underlying contract (beneficiary) for the due performance of the underlying contract. Bank guarantees can be altered in various ways and be issued for all kind of underlying contracts. Bank guarantees are either independent or accessory. Under the independent guarantee the beneficiary’s call on the guarantee shall be assessed only pursuant to the conditions in the guarantee, whereas under the accessory guarantee the call shall be assessed also pursuant to the underlying contract. The guarantee’s payment mechanism specifies what requirements the call must fulfil in order to trigger the payment. Thus, the call may be honoured on the beneficiary’s demand (on demand), or the beneficiary may have to submit any additional document, such as expert certificate or a court decision, that confirms the beneficiary’s right to payment. Adjudication is a special sort of dispute resolution; the dispute is settled in accordance with applicable law but the decision is not final. Hence, the Adjudication Bond encompasses partly the expert certificate and partly the court decision. In the thesis I argue that the Adjudication Bond shall be perceived as an independent bank guarantee, unless it is clear from the guarantee’s conditions that it is accessory. Further, I hold that Adjudication Bond is a bank guarantee on which the rules of letter of credit and suretyship can be applied.

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

In a democracy it is the citizens who choose their leaders. Through elections, the people constitute government to preside over public affairs. However, in several African countries the quality of the elections has been vitiated by fraud, incompetence, unequal playing field and violence. Part of the problem is historical. Within the first decade of attaining independence in the 1950s and 1960s, many African regimes rapidly descended into autocracy and many countries formally recognised one-party regimes. Despite many one-party regimes having been abolished after the democratisation wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s, challenges of holding free and fair elections persist. Several elections held since this democratic wave were generally not considered by independent observers as free and fair. Indeed Africa has become well known for flawed elections, such as was the case in the 2007 elections in Kenya, the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe and the 2010 elections in Ivory Coast. Due to the stifled democratic climate, where even elections had a predetermined outcome, coups became a common and regular method of showing discontent or removing government. While the phenomenon of problematic elections is going on, at the continental level, Africa seems to be making renewed commitment towards democratic governance. With the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) through the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2000, the AU, inter alia, committed to promoting “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance” and seems determined to depart from the legacy of poor governance. It is in view of the foregoing background that this research sought to investigate the challenges the judiciary in Africa has faced in adjudicating presidential election disputes. And, in light of the growing trend towards establishing common African democratic standards and seeking collective solutions, the research also sought to explore the viability of establishing a continental supranational mechanism for resolving disputed presidential elections through adjudication. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. D.

A sound theory of adjudication and of judicial duty requires or presupposes a sound theory of law and of legal argument. Jurisprudential inquiry is properly grounded not in reflections on conceptual properties of law but in reflections on human goods and needs as understood in a morally articulated theory of practical reason and compactly expressed in the normative concept of the common good. Such reflections confirm that law exists, in its central case, as a means to various types of authoritative co-ordination solutions. The underdetermined nature of (a) the positive requirements of practical reasonableness and the common good and of (b) the appropriate means of enforcing compliance and remedying non-compliance with either these requirements or the determinate negative precepts of practical reasonableness entails that a practically necessary aspect of the positive law’s role is constituting the requirements of justice, i.e. of what is due to whom generally and in particular situations (including situations where an injustice has been or is alleged to have been done). As a distinct and practically necessary mode of legal co-ordination for the common good, adjudication, in its central case, answers litigated questions of justice by applying all relevant law in accordance with the legal system’s practice of legal argument. Thus adjudication is performed by authoritative law-applying institutions precisely because it is about answering questions of justice, and not despite that fact. Theories of law developed on the assumption that it is possible to understand the ‘what’ of law without reliance on any moral judgments deny any practically necessary connection between (a) the promotion of justice and the common good and (b) the nature of law, in its central case, and, hence, the adjudicative application of the law. In the absence of this connection a judicial duty to do justice according to law is unintelligible.

This dissertation examines the tension inherent in the relationship between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as Member States Parties of the GATT/WTO and the GATT/WTO regime. It focuses specifically on the tension triggered off by the requirements of Article I – the Most-Favoured-Nation principle (MFN) and Article III – the National Treatment principle (NT) GATT 1994. It shows that while the non-discrimination principles are meant to promote trade liberalisation and economic growth, they produce the opposite effect in developing and least developed countries like ECOWAS and aggravate the tension between those countries and the WTO. It argues that the MFN is used to deny market access to the developing countries by exposing them to stiff but unequal competitive conditions and the NT to deny national governments the policy space to protect and promote national industries, employment and economic growth. It challenges the general assumption that the MFN and the NT are good and in the interest of all the WTO Members and rather identifies them as lynch-pins of economic development in the ECOWAS region. It also shows, contrary to the assumption of non-participation, how the ECOWAS High Contracting Parties are adapting their trading systems and harmonising their laws to the key provisions of Articles I and III of the GATT. It shows that the principles of non-discrimination are the outcome of the standard-setting procedures legally formulated as the SPS and TBT Agreements which favour the developed countries and how the Dispute Settlement Body has rejected the ‘aims-and-effect’ approach, taken a literal approach, overly emphasising trade liberalisation to the neglect of market access and economic development. This dissertation concludes that it is pre-mature for ECOWAS to assume Articles I and III obligations and recommends using the provisions of Article XXIV to build up effective influence through regional organisations and incrementally uniting to transform the GATT.