Objetivamos analisar a construção do conceito de inimigo representado nos discursos de Osama bin Laden, durante o período de 1996 a 2004. Estes inimigos são constituídos a partir da edificação de uma realidade que apresenta Estados Unidos, Israel e seus aliados, como opressores dos muçulmanos. A fim de melhor compreender esta construção simbólica, buscaremos estudá-la com base na dinâmica de dois eixos fundamentais para a constituição do pensamento político-religioso de bin Laden: a herança teórica do islamismo radical, conjugada com a sua percepção acerca dos principais eventos geopolíticos contemporâneos envolvendo o mundo muçulmano. Dentro desta perspectiva, empregaremos o construtivismo em sua corrente linguística dos autores Nicholas Onuf e François Debrix como arcabouço teórico. Nos guiaremos pela prerrogativa de que a compreensão do mundo e da realidade ocorre de acordo com o modo como nós nos referimos a eles a partir de nossa linguagem. Como referencial metodológico que orientará nosso exame da construção do conceito de inimigo nos discursos de bin Laden, utilizaremos as categorias de operação da ideologia propostas por John Thompson na obra “Ideologia e Cultura Moderna – Teoria Social Crítica na Era dos Meios de Comunicação”. / We aimed to analyze the construction of the concept of enemy represented in Osama bin Laden‟s speeches, during the period 1996 to 2004. These enemies are making from the building of a reality that presents U.S., Israel and its allies, as oppressors of muslims. To better understand this symbolic construction, we will seek to study it based on the dynamics of two pillars for the constitution of bin Laden's politico-religious thought: the theoretical heritage of radical islam, combined with the author's perception about the main events contemporary geopolitical involving the muslim world. From this perspective, we will employ the Linguistic Constructivism of the authors Nicholas Onuf and François Debrix, as theoretical framework. We will be guided by the prerogative of the understanding of the world and reality occurs according to the way we refer to them from our language. As a methodological framework that will guide our examination of the construction of the concept of enemy in bin Laden's speeches, we will use the categories of operation of ideology proposed by John Thompson in his work "Ideology and Modern Culture - Critical Social Theory in the Era of the Media."

Al Qaeda s’est fait connaître grâce à quelques attentats pionniers symboliques dont le plus spectaculaire a eu lieu le 11 septembre 2001. L’étude du profil complexe d’Al Qaeda, avec ses racines profondes ancrées dans l’histoire, la politique et la société du monde islamique, puis de son évolution, permet de comprendre que la véritable menace ne vient pas d’un seul homme ni même d’un groupe, mais d’une idéologie plus large dédiée au djihad défensif, l’Al Qaedisme. Cette idéologie construite sur des piliers solides et cohérents, prône une guerre sainte planétaire contre l’Occident. Des réseaux fondamentalistes ad hoc et des groupes terroristes locaux se sont greffés autour des objectifs et stratégies d’un Al Qaedisme codifié commun diffusé dans le cyberespace et ont amplifié la menace en touchant toutes les sphères de la communauté internationale. L’approche politique conservatrice dominante a tenté de mettre un frein aux attentats en instituant toute une série de mesures exceptionnelles plus répressives les unes que les autres. Pourtant, le phénomène croissant de radicalisation et la multiplication des attentats terroristes depuis 2001, démontrent que les modèles occidentaux appliqués par des Occidentaux à des sociétés établies sur d’autres fondamentaux n’ont pas permis de trouver de solution durable contre l’Al Qaedisme et même aggravé la menace. Des réponses adaptées à la véritable menace renforcées par le respect des droits de l’homme, sont à mettre en œuvre au travers de nouvelles stratégies multidisciplinaires et synchronisées de déradicalisation qui passent par la guerre des idées pour dépolariser les relations entre les musulmans et non-musulmans. L’adoption de mesures préventives, proactives et réactives qui trouvent un équilibre entre les besoins de la lutte contre le terrorisme et les valeurs démocratiques fondamentales devra en tout premier lieu viser à gagner les cœurs et les esprits de toutes les parties et à former une alliance des civilisations. / Al Qaeda has become renowned thanks to a few symbolic pioneering terrorist attacks among which the most spectacular ones took place on 11 September 2001. The study of Al Qaeda’s complex profile with deep roots in history, politics and the society of the Islamic world, and of its evolution, helps to understand that the real menace comes not from one man, nor from a group, but from an overarching ideology dedicated to a defensive jihad, Al Qaedism. This radical ideology, built upon strong and coherent pillars, preaches a holy global war against the West. Radical fundamentalist ad hoc networks and local terrorist groups have amalgamated around the objectives and strategies of a common, codified Al Qaedism disseminated in cyberspace and have magnified the menace by reaching all the spheres of the international community. The dominating conservative political approach attempted in vain to prevent further terrorist attacks by putting in place a series of exceptional measures more repressive one than another. However, the growing radicalization and the unprecedented multiplication of terrorist attacks since 2001 demonstrate that the western models applied as such by Westerners to societies established on other fundamentals have not allowed to find a longstanding solution against Al Qaedism and rather increased the menace. Responses adjusted to the real menace, reinforced by the respect to human rights, have to be introduced by new multidisciplinary and synchronized strategies of deradicalization that take into account the war on ideas in order to depolarize the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the world. The adoption of preventive, proactive and reactive measures that find a balance between the needs of the fight against terrorism and the fundamental democratic values will have to aim first at gaining the hearts and minds of all the parties involved and to foster an alliance of civilizations.

In this essay, two of the most lethal terrorist organizations in the world, al-Qaeda and Boko Haram are being examined and compared based on psychological, political, economical and religious theories. The essay was written with the aim to find out about cause, objectives as well as course of action within al-Qaeda and Boko Haram. One has found out that the cause of al-Qaeda is mainly based on religious and political indicators, while Boko Haram is primary caused by economical and political factors. The objectives for both of the cases are religious, but for Boko Haram, political as well. Both of the organizations use psychological factors as a way to go through with their course of action, but in the case of Boko Haram, the economical indicators are very convincing as well.

<p> </p><p>Denna uppsats är en jämförelse av hur terroristdåden den 11 september 2001 i USA och den 11 mars 2004 i Spanien framställdes i Dagens Nyheter. Syftet med uppsatsen är att åskådliggöra hur terroristdåd utförda av Al Qaeda framställs i Dagens Nyheter på två olika kontinenter. Uppsatsen bygger på material från litteratur om terrorism som begrepp och dess gestaltning i media, samt tidningsartiklar om dåden från Dagens Nyheter. En diskursanalys har vidare genomförts på tidningsartiklarna för att kunna se likheter och skillnader i framställningen av text kring dessa dåd. Kodningen och jämförelsen har skett genom en dimensionering av olika företeelser som återfunnits i artiklarna. På detta vis framkom en skillnad i framställningen på dessa olika kontinenter i media. Dådet den 11 september erhåller ett större utrymme i Dagens Nyheter och framställs genom en krigsdiskurs som angår alla demokratiska länder i världen. Amerikanerna framställs i sammanhanget som ett folk som aldrig tidigare upplevt terrorism. Detta medan den 11 mars framställs genom en nedtonad terroristdiskurs som gör händelsen beskedlig och till något alldagligt och en närmare beskrivning av händelseförloppet uteblir. Dådet på denna kontinent angår endast Europa och européerna framställs som ett folk med stor erfarenhet av terrorism och våld. I båda dåden förekommer en vi-och-dem-diskurs, men inriktad på olika företeelser. I dådet den 11 september gestaltas detta genom en motsättning mellan den demokratiska västvärlden och de islamistiska länderna. Detta medan dådet den 11 mars påvisar en motsättning mellan europeiska medborgare och de säkerhetstjänster som fått i uppgift att lösa problemet med terrorism, men som i sammanhanget framställs som opålitliga hemlighetsmakare.</p>

Im Zuge der Diskussionen um den Irakkrieg 2003 oder den Einsatz des israelischen Militärs gegen die Hisbollah 2006 konnte beobachtet werden, dass sich die extreme Linke stärker denn je dem politischen Islam angenährt hat. Zwar gab es bereits in den 1970ern Kooperationen linker und palästinensischer Terroristen, jedoch lässt sich festhalten, dass sich der Diskurs in Teilen der Linken (vor allem im „antizionistischen“, „antiimperialistischen“ Spektrum) ebenso wie bei den vormals eher säkular ausgerichteten arabischen Extremisten „islamisiert“ hat. Auf der anderen Seite finden sich im „islamischen Widerstand“ verschiedene Vokabeln und Denkfiguren wieder, die aus der „antiimperialistischen“ Rhetorik der Linken bekannt sind. Trotz dieser Auffälligkeiten gab es bislang nur wenige Versuche, die extreme Linke (teilweise auch die extreme Rechte) in Verbindung mit dem salafistischen Islamismus zu bringen. Der Islamismus gilt hierbei dann oftmals als „dritter Totalitarismus“ oder „Islamofaschismus“, der die Riege totalitärer Ordnungsvorstellungen von Marxismus-Leninismus und Faschismus/Nationalsozialismus um eine weitere Spielart erweitert. In der Regel erfolgt diese Einordnung und Bewertung jedoch im Rahmen politischer Kommentare oder Essays und ohne tiefer gehende theoretische Betrachtung. Arbeiten, die sich – meist aus Perspektive des bundesdeutschen Verfassungsschutzes – mit möglichen Querfrontbestrebungen beschäftigen, gleichen das theoretische Manko zwar teilweise aus, gleichzeitig jedoch entbehren sie einer tiefer greifenden Analyse der ideologischen Basis der betrachteten Extremismen und verharren bei den oberflächlich zu erkennenden Feinbildern der jeweiligen Strömungen als Vergleichsmaßstab. Die Arbeit schließt diese Lücke, indem sie in vergleichender qualitativer Betrachtung ideologische Schnittstellen zwischen der extremen Linken und dem salafistischen Islamismus untersucht. Den ideologischen Konstrukten kommt dabei eine wesentliche Rolle zu. Weltanschauliche Grundannahmen beeinflussen die Wahrnehmung der Umwelt und der eigenen Rolle innerhalb derselben; erst ihre Bindungskraft schafft einen Ordnungsrahmen, anhand dessen sich Gleichgesinnte zu einer Gruppe zusammenschließen können, um gemeinsame Ziele zu verfolgen. Diese Erkenntnis hat sich auch in konstruktivistischen Erklärungsansätzen internationaler Politik niedergeschlagen und beschränkt sich nicht nur auf die klassischen Akteure im internationalen System – die Nationalstaaten. Auch nichtstaatliche Akteure wie eben die Protagonisten des internationalen Terrorismus lassen sich auf diese Weise erfassen. In der Untersuchung wird nach einleitenden Begriffserklärungen und Ausführungen zur angewandten Methodik zunächst eine idealtypische extreme Linke konstruiert, deren spezifische Ziele, Feindbilder etc. (Primärebene) und Vorstellungen über den Weg zum Erreichen dieser Ziele (Sekundärebene) die Analysekategorie für den nächsten Untersuchungsschritt bilden. In diesem werden Quellen des Salafismus inhaltsanalytisch untersucht und so ideologische Schnittstellen aufgezeigt. Hierbei werden Sayyid Qutbs „Milestones“, Ayman az-Zawahiris „Knights under the Prophet’s Banner“ sowie verschiedene Botschaften Usama Bin Ladins als Quellenmaterial herangezogen. Der Fokus der Untersuchung liegt auf dem „al-Qa’idaismus“ als derzeit offensichtlichste Ausprägung eines weltweiten islamistischen Terrorismus. Ausgehend von der idealtypischen Linken werden dabei nicht nur Schnittmengen auf der Sekundärebene oder hinsichtlich gemeinsamer Feindbilder (Antisemitismus, Antiamerikanismus, Antikapitalismus) festgestellt, wie dies bereits von anderen Autoren teilweise vorgenommen wurde. Vielmehr finden sich auch bei der positiven Zielbestimmung zumindest deklaratorische Gemeinsamkeiten, wenn etwa auch im Islamismus eine „herrschaftsfreie Gesellschaft“ verwirklicht werden soll und das Ziel der Gleichheit aller Menschen propagiert wird. Abschließend wird die Frage diskutiert, ob sich aus den Ergebnissen neue Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich einer möglichen „Querfrontbildung“ zwischen der extremen Linken und dem Islamismus ergeben. Insbesondere durch Bin Ladin gab es bereits mehrfach Versuche, auch nicht-islamistische Kräfte für seinen Kampf zu gewinnen. Auch bei der extremen Linken finden sich Stimmen, die im Islamismus und seiner Betonung des Religiösen lediglich ein Überbleibsel alter Strukturen erkennen, die nach erfolgreichem antiimperialistischem Kampf verschwinden werden. Dass positive Zielbestimmungen geteilt werden, lässt eine Querfrontbildung zumindest von Teilen des linksextremen und islamistischen Spektrums möglich erscheinen. In dem Maße, in dem sich der „al-Qa’idaismus“ im Sinne des Modells der „Leaderless Resistance“ entwickelt, können sich auch einzelne Linksextremisten zu Solidaritätsaktionen ermutigt fühlen. / While the ideological threat by al-Qa’ida and other Islamist groups has been compared to Fascism before, comparisons with the extreme Left have been made rather seldom, despite the fact, that within the extreme Left there are noticeable trends to express solidarity with Islamists and their “anti-imperialist” struggle. At the same time, the rhetoric of leading figures of “al-Qa’idaism” borrows heavily from the social revolutionary vocabulary of the Left. This work compares key ideological premises of the extreme Left with those of Islamic fundamentalism, exemplified by Usama Bin Ladins al-Qa’ida, and derived from a content analysis of various sources of Islamism (Sayyid Qutb’s “Milestones”, Ayman az-Zawahiri’s “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner” as well as various messages by Usama Bin Ladin). Both ideologies are considered to be “resistance identities” (Castells), directed at the perceived dominance of liberal capitalism and globalization. Both propagate a pre-modern model for the organization of society, they believe to be tainted by modernism. As the first step in this approach, an ideal model of the extreme Left is constructed, trying to incorporate its various shapes into a single model. The goals and enemies (primary characteristics) as well as the proposed ways and means in order to achieve these goals (secondary characteristics) are then used in a content analysis of the sources on Islamism. While previous authors have found various convergences on the secondary level as well as common enemies, so far common goals beyond the immediate victory over the United States, Israel or capitalism have been dismissed as unlikely. This is explained by obvious differences between Islamists and leftists concerning the role of women in society or the importance of religion. However, a more thorough comparison of the two ideologies shows that, despite these differences, Islamists as well as Leftists propagate a societal model based on cooperation, without recourse to man-made laws or any form of government. This positively defined utopia could serve as a rationale for cooperation between leftist extremists and Islamists stretching beyond the “common enemy”. Already, members of the extreme Left have explained the popularity of Islamism within the Islamic world with the Marxian term of “opiate for the masses”, thus expressing belief that as soon as “repression” and “exploitation” of the Third World have ended, the need for religion will vanish. In this point of view, differences about the role of religion could be defused. The more “al-Qa’idaism” is transforming into a form of leaderless resistance, individual terrorist acts committed by Leftist extremist in “solidarity” with the “Islamic masses” could occur.

The term “Fundamentalism” used as a comparative category within the academic study of religion has become problematic. Fundamentalism, is not one comprehensive movement but is, in fact, a phenomenon which encompasses a variety of beliefs, practices, and expectations. This thesis will explore the diversity of several different and distinct fundamentalist movements. I will discuss the natures of four Christian movements that have been labeled “fundamentalist” – Jehovah’s Witnesses, Christian Reconstructionists, Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson – on several key points, eschatology, political philosophy, as well as level of social involvement. I will then turn to fundamentalism as it is used as a category to describe a global phenomenon. I will discuss three different scholarly approaches by turning to the work of Bruce Lawrence, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Bruce Lincoln on the Islamic “fundamentalist” group al- Qaeda. Finally I will argue that the category “fundamentalism” can be best understood in terms of a family resemblance.

The contemporary Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon has emerged as one of the most significant threats to both regional and international peace, security, and stability. As the international community struggles to develop a comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon in its present context, the academic community should respond and discuss this subject from all relevant disciplinary backgrounds and perspectives. If effective and successful policies, strategies, and tactics are to be developed in order to adequately confront these transnational actors, all dimensions of the subject need to be explored. This thesis examines certain aspects of the under-theorized geographical dimension of Islamist extremist/terrorism. Focusing on Al Qaeda and other members of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, this thesis explores the geographical and spatial imagination of the Islamist terrorist subject and deconstructs the geographical and spatial imaginings of Islamist extremism/terrorism through critically analyzing the diffuse international structure of Islamist terrorism and its related groups, the cultural ?space? Islamist extremist/terrorist actors occupy, and the function of landscape in the identity and subjectivity of Islamist extremist/terrorism.

The contemporary Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon has emerged as one of the most significant threats to both regional and international peace, security, and stability. As the international community struggles to develop a comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon in its present context, the academic community should respond and discuss this subject from all relevant disciplinary backgrounds and perspectives. If effective and successful policies, strategies, and tactics are to be developed in order to adequately confront these transnational actors, all dimensions of the subject need to be explored. This thesis examines certain aspects of the under-theorized geographical dimension of Islamist extremist/terrorism. Focusing on Al Qaeda and other members of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, this thesis explores the geographical and spatial imagination of the Islamist terrorist subject and deconstructs the geographical and spatial imaginings of Islamist extremism/terrorism through critically analyzing the diffuse international structure of Islamist terrorism and its related groups, the cultural ?space? Islamist extremist/terrorist actors occupy, and the function of landscape in the identity and subjectivity of Islamist extremist/terrorism.

This thesis is concerned with political psychology as an academic field with regard to the explanatory power of political psychology accounts in understanding the al-Qaeda network. Understanding al-Qaeda as a network of cells dispersed worldwide and in cooperation with local militant Islamist groups requires analysis at individual and group level, a multidisciplinary and multimethod research and focus on context and process. In this sense, political psychology accounts appear to have explanatory power to understand the al-Qaeda network, utilizing the defining characteristics of the field. Analyzing al-Qaeda through the lenses of political psychology, it can be concluded that psychoanalytically based approaches may not be very relevant to approach al-Qaeda. In this regard, this thesis promotes the study of the al-Qaeda network by concentrating on the group level of analysis. In this context, sociological accounts, social psychological framework of moral disengagement mechanisms, developmental psychology approach of social learning theory and large group in its own right provide us with powerful frameworks to study the causes, process and effects of al-Qaeda&rsquo / s terrorist activities.

<p>Through the increase in globalization over the last twenty years the world has become ’smaller’. The many positive aspects of the phenomenon sometimes make us overlook the negative aspects of globalization. Just as economic markets and communication has moved beyond national borders one of the most negative aspects of society has also become global, namely terrorism. As terrorism has moved on to the global spectrum so has the prevention of terrorism. National governments that are trying to combat terrorism have begun to realize that problems that other nations are facing in another continent could eventually affect their national security. Other nation states that are experiencing state failure may become a national security risk. The aim of this thesis is to examine if global terrorist organizations take advantage of the many problems that a nation faces when it is subject to state failure. It has not been to examine the phenomenon of global terrorism itself or why certain nation states fail. It has rather been to see if there is a connection between the two and if so, how do global terrorist organizations take advantage of these opportunities?</p><p>The most famous, or infamous, global terrorist organization al Qaeda has on many occasions used the fact that a state is experiencing failure to their advantage. Many of the more common problems that a failed state will face (loss of territorial control, disastrous domestic economy, and bad leadership) have been exploited by al Qaeda who have been able to build an effective infrastructure, build training cams and religious schools, and gain public support in two of the most troubled nations in the world; Afghanistan and Sudan.</p><p>The conclusion that can be drawn from this examination of the connection between global terrorism and failed states is that terrorist organizations have on several occasions taken advantage of the problems associated with state failure in order to become stronger and build a working infrastructure. It is, however, important to note that terrorism is very rarely the reason fore state failure. Furthermore, the fact that a sate is experiencing state failure does not automatically mean that it will be a breathing ground for global terrorism.</p>