This diploma thesis focuses on the legitimization methods in case of George W. Bush's war on terror and Osama bin Laden's terrorist attacks. It takes into consideration the time period from the 9th of September 2001 (the date of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C.) until the 20th of March 2003 (the beginning of the USA's invasion in Iraq). Using the discourse analysis methodology, the thesis presents the different legitimization approaches, which were used frequently, or not at all. The analysis itself is based on a database of the official statements of the two leaders or their close fellows. The interpretation of these approaches and the analysis of the societal, political, cultural or religious context, highlight the common and different features of these two cases. The aim of this thesis is to argue that despite very different political roles George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden played, their legitimization approaches were, in fact, very similar.

No description available.

In early 2001, as I began exploring the role of religion in conflict, I came across a declaration by a then little-known leader, Osama bin Laden, and his fellows. That declaration was of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.1 Many analysts now see it as one of the founding documents of al Qaeda, the amorphous terrorist umbrella group. The purpose of the declaration was to issue a fatwa that, because United States troops were stationed in the holy Arabian peninsula and threatened Muslims, particularly in Iraq, it was every Muslim¿s duty ¿to kill the Americans and their allies ¿ civilians and military ¿ ... in any country in which it is possible to do it.¿ Of course, the first thing that struck me, as an American, was that here was a group that wished to kill me solely because of my birthplace. They did not seem to care that I might not support specific actions of my government, even if I supported that government generally. Nor was there any discussion of whether methods other than violence might be more useful in persuading my fellow citizens as to the justice of their cause. I wondered, as a student of peace studies, what I could do in the face of such seemingly implacable hatred. The second thing that struck me about the declaration was its language. I noticed, in particular, a certain flourish that one does not often find in political analysis. The image that ¿nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food¿ has always stayed in my mind because the simple image has such rhetorical power. I also noticed, in accordance with my research interests, the use of religious teachings as a justification for violence. Yet poetic rhetoric and religious dogma were not the only contents of that declaration. Bin Laden and his fellows made coherent political points. They cited as 1 bin Laden, Osama; al-Zawahiri, Ayman; Taha, Abu-Yasir Rifa¿i Ahmad; Hamzah, Mir; Rahman, Fazlul, 1998, ¿Nass Bayan al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Alamiyah li-Jihad al-Yahud wa-al-Salibiyin¿ (¿Declaraton of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders¿), al-Quds al-Arabi (UK) 9(2732), 23 Feb.: 3, <data.alquds.co.uk/Alquds/1998/02Feb/23%2520Feb% 2520Mon/QudsPage03.pdf>. Cornell University Library hosts an English translation and a photocopy of the original at <www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/wif.htm> and <./fatw2.htm>, respectively (all web addresses as at 27 Jan. 2005). examples of the harm caused by the United States: the post-Gulf War presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, ¿dictating to its rulers [and] humiliating its people;¿ the continued bombing of Iraq ¿even though all [Saudi] rulers are against their territories being used to that end;¿ and, finally, the way that these actions contributed to the security of Israel by weakening Arab nations. Thus, beneath its religious expression the declaration contained political points with which I could engage. Now, as I categorically oppose the use of violence, I unreservedly reject the conclusion of the fatwa. Moreover, I do not assume that a single statement is evidence of this group¿s true intent. It may very well be the case, as analysts more versed in their politics than I have argued, that al Qaeda¿s real goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Its affiliation with Afghanistan¿s Taliban certainly supports this argument. In spite of these things, though, their use of political arguments meant they were trying to reach an audience that cared about such things. I could address that audience as well, and try to propose different courses of action that would address the same concerns. Thus, I could step outside of my original framework, in which I envisioned implacable hatred, and argue for nonviolent ways of addressing the issues. Yet the religious idiom of the declaration was also an important factor. Given that the declaration addressed Muslims as Muslims, by only trying to argue political points with them I might alienate people for whom the religious language meant a great deal. Already in my research I had come to the conclusion, drawing on R. Scott Appleby¿s The Ambivalence of the Sacred,2 that the people best placed to show the peaceful potential of a religion are believers in that religion. I am not, however, religious. Thus, this conclusion left me with no recourse in the face of the religious aspects of conflict. I began to wonder what role a nonreligious ¿ or, as I came to think of myself, a secular ¿ person could play in peacemaking when religion is an element of a conflict. Moreover, 2 Appleby, R. Scott, 2000, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield). I saw that different seculars would have different reactions to bin Laden¿s arguments. Some would reject the message because of the religious medium. Some, like I first did, would perceive the sociopolitical elements but continue to ignore the religious language. Others, as I also briefly did, might consider the religious element but leave out the issue of their own secular nature. Yet no perspective provided a good model for what I, as a secular, might do. Thus, the goal of my thesis became to analyze the various models of secularity, find the most beneficial principles, and construct from these a model for secular best practice. That Osama bin Laden¿s words should catalyze this thesis brings me to two important points. First, this is not a thesis about Islam. If a disproportionate number of the examples that I use throughout the thesis focus on Islam, this should not indicate that Islam deserves special attention concerning conflict and violence. Rather, the focus here is always on secularity and secular responses to religion in situations of conflict. However, particularly after September 11th, the largely secular policy and scholarly establishments of Europe and North America have produced a great deal of material concerning Islam. Thus, while I sought out more diverse sources dealing with secularity, I often used the religion most commented on by secular sources as an exemplar. That leads to the second point, which is that this is not a thesis about terrorism. Given its scope and the place of religion in it, most obvious case study to use in this thesis is the ¿war on terror¿ ¿ which I call such for ease of use, as that is what the Western media generally call it, not because I think it is an adequate designation. I will cover this topic in the final chapter, but because the thesis is about peace and violence in conflict, and not about specific forms of violence, it will not figure elsewhere. Because this thesis is concerned with violence and, specifically, with the promotion of peace, it has an overt prescriptive element. This stems in large part from my Peace Studies background. Peace Studies entails a normative commitment to pursue peaceful situations through nonviolent means. Thus, at several points I actively enjoin readers to take or not take certain types of action because, by my analysis, that is the best way to promote peaceful relationships. More generally, by the title of this thesis, I ask readers to ¿rethink secular and sacred¿ ¿ both what these terms mean, and more importantly how they relate to one another. In particular, this goal leads me to avoid discussing the concept of tolerance. Tolerance is often held to be a virtue by those who seek to promote nonconfrontational religious interaction. However, as many other writers have pointed out, the word ¿tolerance¿ itself stems from physiological and biological studies, where it means the ability to withstand negative factors, such as poisons or drugs.3 Thus I find that its social meaning is essentially negative, denoting forbearance of what one finds repugnant. While in a very limited sense I feel that tolerance is necessary, it is only as a first step to actively engaging with what one might at first find off-putting. By itself, tolerance does not encourage one to rethink one¿s relationship with something, and thus a nonconfrontational situation is not necessarily a peaceful one. As I researched the thesis, although I was aware of academic work concerning tolerance, I found that none of it contributed to my goals. Thus, the thesis took shape in such a way that a treatment of tolerance was unnecessary. As a final note I would like to mention another topic that did not fit into this thesis, which I regard as something of a loss ¿ gender. During my research, I was also aware of work in this field, and, again, the structure of this thesis is such that it was not necessary to mention it explicitly. However, if there is one single issue that cuts across religious and secular groups, as well as the conflicts I analyze, it is the effect of gender roles and issues. Yet the very breadth of the topic put me in a bind ¿ either I could thoroughly treat it and produce a much different thesis, or I could cursorily treat it, perhaps in the chapter on theory and methodology. I chose to do neither, because the first option would have obscured the value that this thesis does have, and the second would have been a paltry treatment of such a weighty topic. However, the theoretical schools I use 3 See, for example, the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (1st 1933), Simpson, J.A., and Weiner, E.S.C., co-eds., in. al. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1989), v. 18, pp. 199-200. in this thesis are amenable to a gendered interpretation. This is particularly the case with integral theory, the chief proponent of which, Ken Wilber, has addressed gender issues in a number of his primary works. One can easily discern what I define in this thesis as a strong-open analysis in his analysis of feminisms. He notes both the strength of the radical feminist perspective that champions female distinctiveness as well as the desire of liberal feminists to open social and political spheres traditionally closed to women, and seeks to bring them together.4 Thus, I am confident that this thesis can bolster future research that specifically addresses gender issues as they arise in conflicts with a religious element.

No description available.

International terrorism is a relevant and acute issue to deal with for most states across the globe. The horrors and fear of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 in New York and Washington left governments with new priorities and challenges to cooperate and coordinate efforts to combat terrorism. Governments in Southeast Asia have been faced with the threat of terrorism for several decades, although it has increased during the last decade. This case study sets out to trace and analyze terrorism in Southeast Asia from a neo-realist perspective. The first research question deals with the fact that the region is being referred to as the “second front” on the war on terror, or as a “terrorist haven”. Further, by using a neo-realist framework, an analysis of the situation and the actions of governments in the region will be provided. Finally, according to neo-realist theory, regional cooperation is only peripheral to the actual struggles of power and balancing that states are involved in. Yet the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is arguably an actor in combating terrorism in the region. Therefore, one of the objectives is to analyze these initiatives and to provide reflections for further action.

The Durand Line, the western border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was delineated in 1893 as the boundary between then British India and Afghanistan. The international community recognizes the Durand line as the Pak-Afghan border since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, but successive Afghan rulers have repudiated its legitimacy. This dispute has caused turbulence in relations between these countries and instigates greater problems with regard to the Pashtun nationalism. The Durand Line has remained porous due to the nature of tribal cultures and the socio-economic compulsions of the people living along the Durand line. The Durand Line was exploited to launch the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s. The GWOT in Afghanistan has once again brought misperceptions regarding alignment, and the porous nature of the Durand Line to the lime light. This thesis demonstrates that existing combat operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and the exploitation of the Durand Line by the U.S.-led coalition forces, had a destabilizing effect on Pakistan, due to the autonomous nature of tribal areas and Pakistan's necessity to extend its authority in tribal areas while supporting the GWOT. This thesis recommends that a clear understanding of the Durand Line as an international border by all concerned states will enhance the coordination of operations at all tiers, and thereby prevent this border from becoming South Asia's next trouble spot.

2001年9月11日發生在美國本土的自殺式恐怖襲擊事件之後，當時的小布希總統堅決宣示展開全面性「全球反恐怖主義戰爭」（Global War on Terrorism）。美國不僅以其強大的軍事力量，對付支持及庇護蓋達組織及其分支的國家，也與各國合作共同打擊恐怖主義。由於這是一場與傳統戰爭迥然不同的鬥爭，因此美國反恐的策略不但依賴軍事武力，還必須透過政治、外交、情報、金融與教育等多元途徑，並靈活運用國際的力量，徹底打擊恐怖主義。其中情報工作在反恐戰爭中扮演著非常重要的角色，因為恐怖分子在發動任何攻擊之前，可能會有些徵兆，若在事先能獲得蛛絲馬跡的情報，就能夠防患未然並且將危機消弭於無形。 在國際方面，9/11反而促成各國的合作，美國情報單位在這場反恐戰爭中也被賦予重要的任務，將反恐情報合作的觸角伸向全世界各個角落。由於美國與各國的合作程度影響全球打擊恐怖主義的成效，故有必要對美國主導的國際情報合作進行研究。美國在國際間致力反恐情報合作之際，同時也對其國內情報機制進行改革與重整。因為9/11的發生，很多人歸咎於國內情報單位的失職，美國政府於是開始對其情報圈，展開自杜魯門總統於1947年7月26日簽署《國家安全法案》以來，最重大的改革。因此也有必要對美國在9/11後的情報改革進行探討，以瞭解美國在此事件後所進行的國內情報改革情形及成效。 / In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001, the U.S. President George W. Bush launched the “Global War on Terrorism”. The U.S. has fight against countries that support Al-Qaeda and its affiliate with powerful military strength and cooperated with various countries on combat terrorism. This is a disparately untraditional war and consequently America’s counterterrorism strategy is multi-faceted that includes not only military but also diplomacy, financial action, intelligence, education, etc. Intelligence, in particular, plays a pivotal role in this war. Signs of terrorist threat may be discovered and attacks can possibly be prevented if intelligence agencies received information about the plots in advance. The September 11 attacks have facilitated bilateral and multilateral cooperation between countries in the globe. The U.S. especially undertakes great responsibilities in fighting against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and attaches strings to its counter terrorism cooperation around the world. Since the strength of the cooperative movement between the U.S. and other countries may affect the outcome of the global cooperation, conducting a study on the U.S.-led international intelligence cooperation is critical. While endeavoring to enhance international intelligence cooperation on anti-terrorism, the U.S. has conducted reform and adjustment of the domestic intelligence community. Owing to its intelligence failure on the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government initiated the greatest reform on intelligence mechanism since the former President Truman had signed the National Security Act of 1947. Therefore, study on and analysis of the results and achievement of the U.S. intelligence reform after the September 11 attacks is a must-do.

La rencontre historique entre Abdul Aziz Ibn Saoud et le président américain Franklin D. Roosevelt à bord de l’U.S.S Quincy en mer rouge en février 1945, donna lieu à l’instauration des fondements d’une véritable alliance à long terme, basée sur des intérêts communs très forts entre l’Arabie Saoudite et les Etats-Unis. Le royaume a joué d’ailleurs un rôle important dans l’endiguement du nationalisme arabe et dans l’empêchement de toute pénétration soviétique au Moyen-Orient. Il a joué également un rôle central dans l’endiguement de la révolution islamique iranienne de Khomeiny. Cette alliance va mettre cependant du temps pour atteindre le degré au quelle elle est arrivée lors de la guerre du Golfe de 1990-1991, qui a eu comme résultat une présence militaire américaine permanente sur le sol saoudien et la radicalisation de l’opposition islamiste. Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, qui ont constitué un véritable choc pour les deux pays, provoquèrent un profond malaise dans les relations américano-saoudiennes. Riyad s’est trouvée dans une situation délicate, quinze des dix neuf pirates de l’air étaient Saoudiens ainsi que le chef d’al-Qaida, Oussama Ben Laden. On assista à une détérioration des relations entre les deux pays et une grande suspicion qui eut du mal à se dissiper, malgré les déclarations de bonne volonté des dirigeants des deux pays. Soumise à d’énormes pressions américaines, l’Arabie Saoudite lança une série de réformes en vue de rassurer Washington et faire face également à une situation très compliquée sur le plan interne (problèmes socio-économiques, le rôle de l’institution religieuse wahhabite, l’extrémisme religieux, droits de la minorité chiite, la question de succession…). Le réchauffement constaté dans les relations entre les deux pays à partir de 2003, qui culmina avec l’instauration du « dialogue stratégique » en 2005, laissa rapidement place à une graduelle prise de distance entre Riyad et Washington à propos de plusieurs dossiers régionaux (la situation en Irak, les ambitions régionales ainsi que le programme nucléaire et balistique de l’Iran, le processus de paix, la Syrie…). Cette prise de distance s’est confirmée avec l’éclatement du «printemps arabe » et le lancement par les Etats-Unis d’une nouvelle stratégie, axée sur un désengagement de la puissance américaine vers la zone du Pacifique. / The Historical meeting between Adul Aziz Ibn Saoud and the US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt on bord of U.S.S Quincy in the Red Sea at February, 1945, had set up a real long standing Alliance based on a strong common Interests between Saudi Arabia and the United States. It will take a time for this Alliance to be at the level it had during the Gulf War (1990-1991), Wich had as result a permanent US Military presence in the Kingdom and the radicalization of Islamist Opposition. The 9/11 Attacks, which was a real Choc for the two Countries and provocated an Embarassment in the US- Saudi relations. Riyad was in a delicate situation, Fifteen of the Nineteen Hijackers of September 9, 11 was Saudis such as head of Al-Qaeda Oussama Ben Laden. We assisted then to a deterioration of the relations between the two Countries and a great Suspicion although some declarations of good Intentions by leaders of two Countries. Subject of a tremendous US pressures, the Saudi Arabia has inaugurated a series of Reforms to reassure Washington and to face a complicated internal situation (Socio-economic problems, the role of the Wahhabi religious Institution, religious Extremism, rights of Chia minority, the problem of succession). The warming of the relations between the two Countries by 2003 wich culminated with the instauration of « Strategic Dialogue » in 2005, made rapidly room to a gradual taken distance between Riyad and Washington about some Regional matters (Iraqi situation, the regional ambitions just as the Nuclear and Balistic program of Ira ; Peace Process ; Syria…). This taken distance is confirmed by the events of « Arab Spring » and the New American Strategy of disengagement to the Pacific Zone.

東南亞海域的海洋運輸在亞太地區經濟成長上扮演相當重要的角色。一旦海上環境遭受猛烈恐怖襲擊，全球的船運和貿易活動立即會受到嚴重的影響。尤其是麻六甲海峽的特殊地理環境，讓恐怖份子很容易在良好策劃下，完成海上恐怖攻擊活動。後續該地區的保險金額將會高得驚人，造成整個東南亞地區的海運、亞洲地區的貿易、全球經濟的成長都會受到波及。這也正是為何執恐怖世界牛耳的「蓋達」組織正在積極組建「海軍」，對海上恐怖攻擊展現高度興趣的主要原因。近幾年來東南亞海盜有漸趨暴力的傾向，加上「蓋達」組織的阿富汗基地受創，部分幹部落腳於東南亞，更加深人們對於手段殘暴的海盜與海上恐怖主義的聯想。「蓋達」業已投注許多心力發展海上攻擊能力，如果再與東南亞恐怖組織分享研究成果的話，情況勢必更加棘手。 本文特別針對印尼、馬來西亞、新加坡、菲律賓與泰國等五個國家作分析，檢視各國所發生的海上暴力事件以及處理的方式，並且研究各國主政者對於恐怖主義的態度。此外，對於與海上恐怖主義有關聯的東南亞恐怖組織包括「伊斯蘭教祈禱團」、「阿布薩耶夫」、「摩洛伊斯蘭解放陣線」與「摩洛民族解放陣線」等，分析其有無跨界發展的能量與發動海上恐怖攻擊的能力。文中也試著從「東協」及其相關組織以及「聯合國」、「國際海事局」、「國際海事組織」、「亞太經濟合作會議」等全球性的機構分析其面對新興海上恐怖主義活動的回應，進而整理出促進東南亞各國在海上安全維護上更進一步合作的措施。最後針對台灣的海上反恐作一檢視，希望可以從全球海上反恐的努力獲取經驗，與全球反恐接軌，提升國家海上安全的保障。 關鍵字：海上恐怖主義活動、「蓋達」組織、麻六甲海峽、九一一事件、東南亞、海盜。

Évènement exceptionnel, les attentats du 11 septembre ont marqué l'entrée de la politique mondiale dans l'ère de la crise du jihadisme international. Si l'apparition de la menace jihadiste est antérieure à 2001, l'attaque qaidiste perpétrée à l'encontre des États-Unis a en effet représenté un saut qualitatif d'envergure, en ce qu'elle a été synonyme d'agression commise par des acteurs privés aucœur de l'hyperpuissance d'après-Guerre froide, et en ce qu'elle a constitué le point de départ d'un essor considérable du péril jihadiste. De la destruction du World Trade Center aux attentats du 13 novembre, en passant par le rapt des lycéennes de Chibok ou l'érection de l'État islamique, le jihadisme en est ainsi arrivé à représenter un défi protéiforme et véritablement global. Ciblesprivilégiées des forces jihadistes, les démocraties libérales occidentales ont dès lors répondu à ce challenge en s'engageant dans une « guerre contre le terrorisme » aux facettes multiples (interventions armées, mesures antiterroristes, etc.). Si plusieurs intellectuels d'extrême gauche, inscrits dans une perspective de critique du libéralisme politique, ont considéré, en s'inspirant de la réflexion de Carl Schmitt, que les États occidentaux contemporains sont plongés dans un étatd'exception permanent, dont la lutte contre le jihadisme a constitué soit le déclencheur, soit le révélateur, nous estimons pour notre part, que cette thèse ne permet tout simplement pas de se faire une idée exacte des retombées juridico-politiques de l'anti-jihadisme post-11 septembre. D'où la nécessité de la discuter en procédant à l'étude approfondie des éléments contextuels et principiels auxquels elle renvoie. / Outstanding event, September 11 attacks marked the entrance of the world politics to the era of the threat of the international jihadism. If the appearance of this threat is previous in 2001, the qaidiste attack committed against the United States indeed represented a large-scale qualitative jump, in the fact that it was synonymic of aggression committed by private actors at the heart of the cold postwar hyperpower, and in the fact that it constitued the starting point of a considerable development of the jihadist danger. From the spectacular destruction of the World Trade Center to the attacks of November 13th, via the kidnapping of the high school students of Chibok or the erection of the Islamic State, the jihadism came to represent a really global challenge, in the forms as diverse asvaried. Privileged targets of the Jihadist strengths, the western liberal democracies have then answered this challenge by making a commitment in a multifaceted ''war against the terrorism'' (military interventions, antiterrorist measures, etc.). If several extreme left-wing intellectuals, registered in a perspective of critic of the political liberalism, considered, by being inspired by Carl Schmitt's reflection, that the contemporary western States are plunged into a permanent state of exception, which the fight against the jihadism constitued either the trigger, or the revelation, we consider for our part, that this thesis does not simply allow to be made an exact idea of the legal and political effects of the post-September 11's anti-jihadism. Where from the necessity of discussing it by proceeding to the in-depth study of the context and the principles to which refers.