This thesis explores Aristotle's theories of habituation and voluntariness and their impact on his ability to attribute moral responsibility to agents. Ultimately, I conclude that Aristotle should drop his assertions that we are morally responsible for our states of character in order to accommodate a compatibilist view that will still allow him to attribute moral responsibility for action to agents.

In evaluating Alcibiades' speech in Plato's Symposium, modern commentators often either conflate the historical figure and the fictive character, or else fail to make a distinction between Alcibiades the narrator and Alcibiades the eager young man whose adolescent encounters with Socrates which the more mature adult describes. The resulting scholarship tends to cast Alcibiades as a foil for Socrates and to reduce Plato's creation to a philosophic cautionary tale. Such reductions are misleadingly simplistic and require revision.By taking care to let neither history nor reputation supersede the textual evidence the Symposium provides, we can make a compelling case for a more moderate assessment of Alcibiades' philosophical progress. In doing so, we find that he is not lacking in understanding but rather that his understanding is incomplete. As such, Alcibiades occupies the vaguely defined space of intermediacy and intermediaries--the metaxu with which so much of the Symposium is concerned.

Neste trabalho argumento que o Teeteto é um diálogo sobre a relação entre o conceito de razão, entendido como uma potência específica da alma, e a sensação, compreendida como um processo inconsciente do corpo. No primeiro capítulo examino a análise platônica da epistemologia protagoreana. Tento mostrar que nesta seção Platão não está argumentando uma tese platônica sobre o mundo sensível. Ele está explicando e criticando os princípios fundamentais da epistemologia protagoreana. No final da seção Platão explica a distinção entre razão e sensação. Na análise da segunda parte defendo que a massa de argumentos dessa seção formula uma tese platônica sobre a essência do conhecimento. Por fim, no comentário da terceira definição examino o conceito de logos da teoria do sonho e o significado da tese de que os elementos são perceptíveis. / In this work I argue that the Theaetetus is a dialogue about the relation between the concept of reason, understood as a kind of power of the mind, and perception, viewed as an unconscious process of the body. In the first chapter I examine Platos analysis of Protagorean epistemology. I try to show that in this section Plato is not arguing his own view about the sensible world. He is, rather, explaining and criticizing the fundamental principles of the protagorean epistemology. At the end of this section Plato explains the distinction between reason and perception. In my analysis of the second part, I argue that the mass of arguments of this section formulates a platonic thesis about the essence of knowledge. Finally, in my commentary of the third definition, I examine Dreams concept of logos and the meaning of the thesis that the elements are perceivable.

In this thesis, I identify and engage an orthodox view in Aristotelian scholarship. Many scholars maintain that Aristotle, in the third book of his Nicomachean Ethics, claims that we should always blame people who act badly with ignorance of what is moral. This view, which I label the “common view” is widespread and unquestioned in the literature. I disagree with the orthodox view, and maintain that we can read Aristotle as not always holding people who act badly in ignorance of what is moral as blameworthy. There are three essential steps in my argument. First, I show that it is not certain that Aristotle commits himself to the common view in the passages usually cited as evidence for the view. I review the evidence in favor of the common view, and argue that other interpretations of Aristotle are equally compatible with his text. Second, I argue that there is textual evidence elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics which is contrary to the common view. Thirdly and finally, I suggest that an alternate reading – on which Aristotle allows for pardon in some cases where people act badly in ignorance of what is moral – chimes well with other portions of his ethics, and with scholarly literature: I take two such cases, moral education and ethical deliberation. Given the evidence against the common view, and the evidence in favor of an alternate reading, I suggest that the orthodox view should be abandoned by scholars. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In this thesis I identify and engage an orthodox view in Aristotelian scholarship. Many scholars maintain that Aristotle, in the third book of his Nicomachean Ethics, claims that we should always blame people who act badly with ignorance of what is moral. This view, which I label the “common view” is widespread and unquestioned by scholars. I disagree with this reading of Aristotle. I do not think that Aristotle commits himself to this view in his writings. Moreover, I argue that the common view is a bad fit with other passages from the Nicomachean Ethics. If the common view is false, as I claim, it is important for us to formulate an alternate reading of Aristotle’s comments. I proffer one such reading, a reading on which people are not always worthy of blame when they act badly in ignorance of what is moral.

In this thesis, I argue that the ethical theory Plato develops in the Republic assigns critical importance to the role of one’s moral dispositions in their ability to make progress in philosophy. On this view, cultivating a good character, although not sufficient for pursuing philosophy, is necessary for success in philosophic endeavor. Conversely, having a vicious character precludes one from being able to acquire wisdom, which is the goal of philosophy. This is in contrast to Socratic intellectualism, which Plato is commonly seen to have adhered to in his earlier writings. The intellectualist view holds that knowledge is sufficient for virtue, and so one naturally becomes virtuous through the acquisition of wisdom. In other words, rather than virtuous character being necessary for philosophy, it is merely an effect of becoming wise. I argue that Plato moderates this kind of intellectualism in Republic in a way that makes the relationship between moral virtue and wisdom bidirectional. I demonstrate the plausibility of this thesis by examining an array of themes in the Republic, starting with the nature of philosophy and what it means to be a philosopher, and concluding with a look at the theory of education Plato advances throughout the dialogue. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA)

In this thesis I attempt to bring out some interesting implications of Plato’s political thought as it is presented in the Politicus. In particular, I will show how this dialogue provides a new picture of the relation between ruler and ruled; a picture that stresses the importance and responsibility of every citizen, not just of the statesman himself. This is achieved by an analysis of the notion of political craftsmanship envisaged by the main speaker of the dialogue, the Eleatic Stranger. However, before I turn to consider the Politicus itself, I provide a brief presentation of another Platonic craftsman, the demiurge of the Timaeus. As will be clear, the teleological structure, and the accompanying terminology, of his craftsmanship will mirror that of the true statesman and thus help us understand the latter’s political rule. My choice to focus on this aspect of the Politicus is motivated by the text itself. For the question of the kind of craftsmanship involved in political rule is picturesquely, yet effectively, brought to the fore by the myth in the early parts of the dialogue, which distinguishes between two rival conceptions and associates the statesman with one of them. I conclude by reflecting on the significance of my findings for Plato’s political thought as a whole.

Thesis advisor: Marina B. McCoy / This dissertation investigates the role that eros in general, and philosophical eros in particular, plays in the search for the eidos of the beautiful in Plato’s Hippias Major. It defends the claim that noesis of the eidos of the beautiful can only be accomplished within the life of philosophical eros, that is, within the life of eros which is directed toward the good. As such this dissertation aims both to provide an interpretive key to the Hippias Major, allowing us to read the dialogue in a rich and novel way, and also to make the claim that the Hippias Major presents us with a picture of the interrelation between eros, philosophy, and beauty, and about how these three elements manifest themselves in human life. As such, some continuities and parallels can be found between it and the other two dialogues which deal most explicitly with beauty and eros, the Phaedrus and Symposium. The first five chapters interpret a particular section of the Hippias Major according to role the eros plays within it, attempting to show that eros, both in general and in its unique manifestation as philosophical eros, is a crucial mediating term for any comprehensive understanding of any section of the dialogue, and therefore of the dialogue as a whole. In each of these five chapters, I will articulate the role that eros plays within the search for obtaining a noetic glance at the eidos of the beautiful. The first chapter demonstrates how Socrates’s philosophical eros gives birth to the question about the beautiful itself within the context of a discussion about sophistry and money. The second chapter shows how Socrates’s philosophical engagement with Hippias’s definitions of the eidos of the beautiful generates a dialectic of ascent, allowing Hippias to expand his understanding of what counts as beautiful in a trajectory that mirrors Diotima’s ascent in the Symposium. The third chapter articulates the erotic significance of Socrates’s claim that the eidos of the beautiful inheres in being and not appearances. The fourth chapter gauges the erotic significance of Socrates’s and Hippias’s claim that the beautiful is good, and the good beautiful. The fifth chapter interprets the comic and tragic aspects of the dialogue in terms of philosophical eros, its rejection and fulfillment. The sixth chapter will take stock of the overall interpretation of the Hippias Major developed in the first five chapters, and will present the overarching view about the relationship between the contemplation of beauty, on the one hand, and desire for possession of beauty and moral concern, on the other, which one can glean from the character and action of Socrates in Hippias Major. It will bring this view into a conversation with the notion of “liking devoid of interest” which is found in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. The conclusion of this dissertation will underscore the principle claim, that the philosophical search for the eidos of the beautiful can neither be separated from the eros which beauty inspires in a human being, nor can it be accomplished without one’s eros benig directed toward the good, and that this philosophical search is marked by suffering and possible tragedy. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Esta dissertação tem dois objetivos principais: (i) apresentar um estudo introdutório e (ii) uma tradução integral do Eutífron de Platão. O Eutífron é um diálogo de definição. Nesta obra, Sócrates quer saber o que é o piedoso. Enquanto pergunta, examina e refuta as respostas de seu interlocutor, o filósofo também fornece um conjunto de instruções sobre como entender e responder a sua pergunta. Essas instruções podem ser entendidas como exigências ou requerimentos socráticos. O nosso estudo tentará identificar, prioritariamente, (i) o conjunto de exigências que acompanham a pergunta o que é o piedoso? e (ii) algum procedimento socrático específico que visa definir o piedoso. Quanto à tradução, utilizaremos a edição recente de E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson e J. C. G. Strachan (Oxford Classical Texts, 1995), que substitui a edição canônica de John Burnet na mesma coleção (Oxford Classical Texts, 1903). / This dissertation has two main objectives: (i) present an introductory study and (ii) an integral translation of Platos Eutífron. The Eutífron is a dialogue of definition. In this work, Socrates wants to know what the pious is. While asks, examines and refutes the answers of his interlocutor, the philosopher also provides a set of instructions about how to understand and to answer his question. These instructions may be understood as socratic exigencies or requirements. Our study aims to try to identify, prioritarily, (i) the set of exigencies that follows the question what is the pious? and (ii) any specific socratic procedure that intends to define the pious. Concerning the translation, we will use the recent edition of E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson e J. C. G. Strachan (Oxford Classical Texts, 1995), that replaces the canonic edition of John Burnet of the same collection (Oxford Classical Texts, 1903).

This study situates Ptolemy’s philosophy within the second-century milieu of Middle Platonism and the nascent Aristotelian commentary tradition. It focuses on Ptolemy’s adaptation and application of Aristotle’s tripartite division of theoretical philosophy into the physical, mathematical, and theological. In Almagest 1.1, Ptolemy defines these three sciences, describes their relations and objects of study, and addresses their epistemic success. According to Ptolemy, physics and theology are conjectural, and mathematics alone yields knowledge. This claim is unprecedented in the history of ancient Greek philosophy. Ptolemy substantiates this claim by constructing and employing a scientific method consistent with it. In Almagest 1.1, after defining the theoretical sciences, Ptolemy adds that, while theology and physics are conjectural, mathematics can make a good guess at the nature of theological objects and contribute significantly to the study of physics. He puts this claim into practice in the remainder of his corpus by applying mathematics to theology and physics in order to produce results in these fields. After the introductory chapter, I present Ptolemy’s philosophy and practice of the three theoretical sciences. In Chapter 2, I examine how and why Ptolemy defines the sciences in Almagest 1.1. In Chapter 3, I further analyze how Ptolemy defines mathematical objects, how he describes the relationships between the tools and branches of mathematics, and whether he demonstrates in the Harmonics and Almagest that he believed mathematics yields sure and incontrovertible knowledge, as he claims in Almagest 1.1. In Chapter 4, I present Ptolemy’s natural philosophy. While in Chapter 2 I discuss his element theory, in Chapter 4 I focus on his physics of composite bodies: astrology, psychology, and cosmology as conveyed in the Tetrabiblos, On the Kritêrion, Harmonics, and Planetary Hypotheses. I do not devote a chapter to theology, as Ptolemy refers to this science only once in his corpus. Therefore, I limit my analysis of his definition and practice of theology to Chapter 2. In the concluding chapter, I discuss Ptolemy’s ethical motivation for studying mathematics. What emerges from this dissertation is a portrait of Ptolemy’s philosophy of science and the scientific method he employs consistently in his texts.

This study situates Ptolemy’s philosophy within the second-century milieu of Middle Platonism and the nascent Aristotelian commentary tradition. It focuses on Ptolemy’s adaptation and application of Aristotle’s tripartite division of theoretical philosophy into the physical, mathematical, and theological. In Almagest 1.1, Ptolemy defines these three sciences, describes their relations and objects of study, and addresses their epistemic success. According to Ptolemy, physics and theology are conjectural, and mathematics alone yields knowledge. This claim is unprecedented in the history of ancient Greek philosophy. Ptolemy substantiates this claim by constructing and employing a scientific method consistent with it. In Almagest 1.1, after defining the theoretical sciences, Ptolemy adds that, while theology and physics are conjectural, mathematics can make a good guess at the nature of theological objects and contribute significantly to the study of physics. He puts this claim into practice in the remainder of his corpus by applying mathematics to theology and physics in order to produce results in these fields. After the introductory chapter, I present Ptolemy’s philosophy and practice of the three theoretical sciences. In Chapter 2, I examine how and why Ptolemy defines the sciences in Almagest 1.1. In Chapter 3, I further analyze how Ptolemy defines mathematical objects, how he describes the relationships between the tools and branches of mathematics, and whether he demonstrates in the Harmonics and Almagest that he believed mathematics yields sure and incontrovertible knowledge, as he claims in Almagest 1.1. In Chapter 4, I present Ptolemy’s natural philosophy. While in Chapter 2 I discuss his element theory, in Chapter 4 I focus on his physics of composite bodies: astrology, psychology, and cosmology as conveyed in the Tetrabiblos, On the Kritêrion, Harmonics, and Planetary Hypotheses. I do not devote a chapter to theology, as Ptolemy refers to this science only once in his corpus. Therefore, I limit my analysis of his definition and practice of theology to Chapter 2. In the concluding chapter, I discuss Ptolemy’s ethical motivation for studying mathematics. What emerges from this dissertation is a portrait of Ptolemy’s philosophy of science and the scientific method he employs consistently in his texts.