Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Davis, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [107]-114).

by Mak Kwai-ming, Simon [and] Lam Hing-wai, Johnny. / Bibliography: leaves 79-80 / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1984

published_or_final_version / Law / Master / Master of Philosophy

This thesis first examines the role of banks in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy by focusing on the eight European new member States of Central and Eastern Europe over the 2004-2013 period. We specifically investigate the influence of monetary policy changes on bank lending activity and if this potential influence is contingent on bank characteristics, such as banks' size, capital, liquidity, risk factor and market power. Moreover, we focus on the prospective role of banks in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in order to reveal any clear trends in banks' lending behaviour during the 2008-2011 financial crisis. Secondly, we investigate the impact of a protracted period of low monetary policy rates on loosening of banks' credit standards regarding enterprises, households and consumer loans through concentrating on the nine Eurozone countries involved since the initiation of the Euro area Bank Lending Survey in the three distinct time frames of pre- (2002Q4-2008Q3), mid- (2008Q4-2010Q4) and post- (2011Q1-2014:Q4) financial crisis. Furthermore, we test the fundamental concept of the risk taking channel by examining excessive risk-taking behaviour by banks in stressed vs. non-stressed countries of the Eurozone. In an additional analysis, the efficacy of the European Central Bank's 3 year Long-Term Refinancing Operations is evaluated in great depth in order to determine whether banks' credit standards have been softened and the degree to which demand for loans has increased. Thirdly, we explore the financing structure of bank lending constrained Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in the eleven Eurozone countries by utilising firm-level data over the period of 2009 to 2014. We estimate if bank lending constrained firms demonstrate relatively more usage or requests for alternative financing. Additionally, a comprehensive investigation is presented by unveiling the impact and determinants of various financing constraints including credit lines, bank loans, trade credit and other lending on Eurozone firms. Furthermore, the notion of discouraged borrowers originally formulated by Kon and Storey (2003) is empirically evaluated. Finally, we present the conclusion of our research by further outlining its limitations and prospective scope for future studies.

As evidenced by its market size, credit default swaps (CDSs) has been the cornerstone product of the credit derivatives market. The central question that I attempt to answer in this thesis is: why and how does the introduction of CDS market affect bank loan financing? Theoretical works predict some potential effects from CDS market, but empirical evidence is still rare. This dissertation empirically examines the effects of CDS trading on bank loan financing. In chapter one, I find that banks increase average loan amount and charge higher loan spread after the onset of CDS trading on the borrower’s debt. Also, credit quality of the borrower deteriorates for those with active CDS trading. These findings suggest that banks tend to take on more credit risk by issuing larger loans and by lending to riskier firms that could not obtain bank loan in the absence of CDS. The risk-taking by banks ultimately transmitted to higher bank-level risk profile. The second chapter is the first empirical study of CDS’ role in determining loan syndicate structure. I find larger lead bank share when CDS is in place. Moreover, participation of credit derivatives trading by lead banks is much larger than by the participants, suggesting that lead banks have better chance to use CDS to their own advantage. Further analysis shows that lead banks retain an even larger share when it is more experienced dealing with the borrower and when information asymmetry between the lender and the borrower is less severe. Different from conventional wisdom about moral hazard in syndicated lending, our findings suggest that the lead bank likely takes on more credit risk voluntarily due to its increased financing capacity. The third chapter focuses on the effects of CDS on debt contracting. Given that current evidence does not show CDS reduces average cost of debt, we conjecture that the diversification benefit is reflected by relaxation of restrictions imposed on borrowers. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find the marginal effect from CDS trading on covenant strictness measure is 16.8% on average. One standard deviation increase in the number of outstanding CDS contracts loosens net worth covenants by approximately 8.9%. Using various endogeneity controls, we are able to show the loosening of covenants is due to the reduced level of debtholder-shareholder conflict. Furthermore, the loosening effect is stronger when the expected renegotiation cost is larger, consistent with the view that CDS mitigates contracting friction and improves contracting efficiency. Overall, this dissertation attempts to provide first empirical evidence on how CDS affects bank loan financing. We focus the analysis on loan issuance, syndicate structure and contracting. The findings suggest that banks lend to riskier borrowers in the presence of CDS. On a positive note, banks tend to impose less restrictive covenants on its borrower, which may mitigate frictions in lending market in terms of ex ante bargaining and ex post renegotiation cost. / published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

No description available.

公司取得聯貸是否是一項特殊資訊？過去已經有許多文獻指出，銀行核定企業的聯合貸款對投資人來說是一項特殊資訊，因為當銀行借錢給公司之前，通常有實地查核的動作，一旦銀行核定該項貸款，則代表銀行認可借款公司的財務狀況，所以會對股市投資人產生認證效果，市場會將該訊息視為一項對公司股價有正面影響的訊息。但是晚近文獻出現不同的看法，有學者發現獲得銀行貸款的公司，除了長期經營績效並未表現較好之外，其短期宣告效果也有樣本選擇偏誤的問題。 本文嘗試利用較完整的公司獲得聯貸資金的樣本、以及較高頻率的股價資料，重新檢視公司取得聯貸是否是一項特殊資訊。在實證部份，採用較完整的公司獲得聯貸資金的樣本，此資料來自美國證券管理委員會EDGAR資料庫。本論文以該資料庫做為搜集聯貸宣告的樣本，可以避免樣本選擇偏誤的問題。實證結果發現聯貸宣告時，並沒有產生顯著正向的股價報酬，本論文也發現美國公司近年來有逐漸將聯貸訊息轉移到盤後再宣告的趨勢，因此本論文再將聯貸案宣告的資料，分成交易時間和非交易時間加以分析，而實證結果顯示，不論於交易時間或非交易時間出現的聯貸宣告，其公司股價均沒有顯著的異常報酬，而且很多公司甚至有負報酬的現象。最後，本論文進一步使用高頻率的日內資料來分析，公司取得聯貸是否是一項特殊資訊。而實證結果發現，雖然在銀行核定公司聯貸的前後，該公司股價的日內報酬率為正值，但是在統計上並不顯著。因此基於以上的實證結果，本論文的結論為：銀行核定企業聯合貸款並不具有認證效果，因此並不是一項特殊的資訊。

The common justification, in financial theory, for the existence of debt covenants is their use as contractual devices that reduce agency problems between borrowers and lenders. The thesis first examines the extent to which debt covenants alleviate these agency problems, and how they affect a borrower's debt financing decisions. Then, building on recent theories on the costs of bank financing, the dissertation suggests a new economic rationale for debt covenants as instruments that can reduce these costs. The thesis consists of three essays: / The first essay shows that, debt covenants create underinvestment incentives while reducing the overinvestment cost of debt It also finds that the borrower's choice between different contracts with, and without covenants, depends on the magnitude of the agency problems, and the quality of the lender's monitoring technology. / The second essay shows how debt covenants reduce the costs of banks information monopoly. In fact, contingent contracting with debt covenants can be used by banks to precommit against using their informational advantage to hold up borrowers and extract rents, thus giving borrowers incentives to exert greater effort. / The third essay shows that the renegotiation that debt covenants permit, can reduce liquidity risk defined as the risk that a solvent but illiquid borrower is unable to obtain refinancing. It also shows that a debt contract with covenants is similar to a mix of debt contracts with different maturities. / The thesis concludes with a review of the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure, and the literature on corporate reliance on bank financing and suggests future research in this area.

This dissertation consists of three essays: (I) Double Liability, Moral Hazard and Deposit Insurance Schemes, (II) Contract Costs, Lender Identity and Bank Loan Pricing, and (III) Bank Capital Structure and Differential Lending Behaviour. The first essay proposes to add double liability to a deposit insurance scheme to induce insurees (depository financial institutions) to reveal their true risk types. The second essay looks at the differential lending patterns of American banks versus Japanese banks. The third essay discusses the relationship between the characteristics of a lender and those of the borrower.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 126-129).