Essay one. For banks, good governances can reduce both the abilities and incentives of insiders to expropriate bank resources and promote bank efficiency, and are supposed to have real economic effect on their customers and firms in that country. This study examines how banking sector's ownership structure is related to the firm-level investment efficiency on a sample of 88,764 firm-year observations across 36 developed and developing countries between 1995 and 2006. I find that, ceteris paribus, a country's banking sector with more cash flow rights by controlling owners improves firms' investment efficiency; whereas, a country's banking sector with larger divergence between cash flow rights and control rights by controlling owners reduces firms' investment efficiency. In addition, I find that the relation between a country's banking sector ownership structure and firms' investment efficiency is stronger for low growth firms, suggesting banks' stronger debt monitoring role on firms with free cash flow problem. Besides, banks have more influence on investment efficiency of firms, which rely on more external financing. Finally, the relation between banking sector's ownership structure and firms' investment efficiency is more pronounced in countries with stronger private monitoring for banks and better information environment of banks. On the whole, the results suggest that banking sector's ownership structure is an important instrument to govern banks' operation with regard to efficient lending and sound governances on firms' investment decision. / Essay two. In this study, we examine whether and how incentives in bank lending, in emerging market like China, influence firms' investment behaviors, the key determinant of firms' productivity. First, being connected with bureaucrats provides firms with a comparative non-economic advantage of access to debt in China. Our empirical results show that loans granting to political connected firms is less sensitive to those firms' profitability, which is consistent with "rent-seeking" hypothesis. Second, political connection is a violated factor in debt markets and politically connected lending is accompanied by less monitoring posted by banks. Consequently, we find that firms with political tie invest less efficiently than firms without political tie when they can access to abnormal debt through political tie. Moreover, the negative relation between politically connected lending and firms' investment efficiency is stronger for SOE firms and low growth firms. Finally, we find that region development with regard to financial development and government quality improvement reduces politically connected lending's negative impact on firms' investment efficiency. In sum, soft lending, like politically connected lending, destroy economic growth because of misallocation of scary resources among firms and also because of less incentive to monitor firms' project selection. / essay 1. Bank ownership structure, bank regulation, and firm investment: international evidence -- essay 2. Bank lending incentives and firm investment decisions in China. / Zheng, Ying. / Adviser: Joseph P.H. Fan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2173. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 88-90). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

The presented thesis is focused on the property valuation from a bank point of views for the purpose of providing loans. Its main objective is the analysis of particular secured bank loans pledged with real estate from contemporary bank practice. The secondary goal is to present the laws in force, explaining policies and procedures of the different methodologies.

Thesis (M.M. (Research))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, School of Governance, 2016. / Most economies today are calling upon their or rather are starting to rely on their Small and Medium business Enterprises to stimulate the economy and also help address issues of unemployment. However it is also believed that even though this maybe the case, most economies still don’t give SMEs enough funding. The underlying public assumption is that all that is needed for SMEs to thrive is access to funding, as such this study sought to investigate the role of financial access in the success of SMEs. The study had intended to use financial ratios as proxies for success, however, the record keeping of the SMEs or lack thereof impeded this intention, so the study measured the success of the enterprise as perceived by the owner. The study sampled SMEs from all for regions of Swaziland, and besides a descriptive analysis that were carried out to examine the utilization of credit by the SMEs. This study also used a statistical model known as the Logit model, to determine the effect that credit access had on the success of the SME and also assess the challenges/barriers that the SMEs faced when trying to access funding. The results of this study deviated from the underlying public assumption, as they showed that an SME owner that had access to funding had reduced odds of success, if anything the results showed that the success of an SME did not entirely depend on the availability of funding, and there were other potent factors that posed as barriers to financial access. / DM2016

In a 2004 study, Harvey, Lin and Roper argue that debt makers with a commitment to monitoring can create value for outside shareholders whenever information asymmetry and agency costs are pronounced. I investigate Harvey, Lin and Roper's claim for bank loans by empirically testing the effect of information asymmetry and direct agency costs on the abnormal returns of the borrowers' stock around the announcement of bank loans. I divide my study into two main sections. The first section tests whether three proxies of the direct agency costs of equity are equally significant in measuring the direct costs associated with outside equity agency problems. I find that the asset utilization ratio proxy is the most statistically significant proxy of the direct agency costs of equity using a Chow F-test statistic. The second main section of my dissertation includes and event study and a cross-sectional analysis. The event study results document significant and positive average abnormal returns of 1.01% for the borrowers' stock on the announcement day of bank loans. In the cross sectional analysis of the borrowers' average abnormal stock returns, I find that higher quality and more reputable banks/lenders provide a reliable certification to the capital market about the low level of the borrowers' direct agency costs of equity and information asymmetry. This certification hypothesis holds only for renewed bank loans. In other words, in renewing the borrowers' line of credit, the bank/lender is actually confirming that the borrower has a low level of information asymmetry and direct costs of equity. Given such a certificate from the banks/lenders, shareholders reward the company/borrower by bidding the share price up in the capital market.

This dissertation addresses three topics on information economics. Generally, information is not perfect or costless as classical economics assumes. Thus, a consumer searches information at his cost or a seller provides information at his cost. First, chapter 2 presents a theoretical model where a consumer searches for local brand information. We show that a national brand providing information has a larger market share. Second, chapter 3 presents a theoretical model where a store randomizes prices and advertises the price changes. We show that at equilibrium the advertising intensity is negatively related to price and price density function is "U" shaped. As advertising costs decrease, average price decreases with more competition. Also as advertising costs decrease from the maximum to zero, price density function changes from monopoly price spike to nonprofit price spike. Thirdly, chapter 4 presents an example where information imperfection is not remedied so information asymmetry remains to cause moral hazard. The deposit insurance rate of a bank is set uniformly regardless of its loan quality because the government cannot discern the quality. Then, a failed bank has higher efficiency in good economic years by spending less on loan monitoring but lending aggressively, but has lower efficiency in difficult years because of its growing non-performing loan. The efficiency of Korean banks between 1990 and 1997 is measured by DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis), and the regression shows that the efficiency of the failed bank is affected by moral hazard. / Graduation date: 2003

In the first essay, "Why Won't You Forgive Me? Evidence of a Financial Misreporting Stigma in Bank Loan Pricing," we examine the relation between bank loan pricing and intentional financial misreporting. Firms that misreport financial information pay greater spreads on their bank loans for five years following their restatements, whether benchmarked against their pre-restatement loans or similar loans made to matched non-misreporting firms. Misreporting firms that promptly replace certain parties who are potentially related to the misreporting see their spreads fall to benchmark levels within three years following restatement. Large fractions of firms, however, do not promptly replace the potentially related parties and continue to pay premiums over benchmark spread levels for five years following restatement. The results suggest that misreporting creates a long-lasting and costly stigma, but that certain actions can reduce the duration of the stigma. In the second essay, "Can Shareholder-Creditor Conflicts Explain Weak Governance? Evidence from the Value of Cash Holdings," we look into whether shareholder-creditor conflicts generate costs large enough to prevent improvements in governance. If firms choose to remain weakly governed, some cost must prevent improvements. We address our research question by estimating the value of cash as a function of governance, leverage, and the interaction of the two. We find that governance increases the value of cash, but that leverage reduces the gain from strong governance. However, the magnitudes are far too small to explain why weak governance firms remain weakly governed. Our estimates suggest more than 80 percent of weakly governed firms would increase the value of their cash by improving governance. In fact, half of weakly governed firms would increase the value of their cash holdings by $0.35 or more per dollar held by improving governance. Our focus on cash holdings does not seem to drive our results, nor do endogenous governance choices or nonlinearities reverse our conclusions.

There are many different forms of financing for small businesses and two common financing options mentioned in the study, bank loans and Venture Capital.Venture Capital is a form of risk capital financing, investing in unlisted stock market. The feature of the arrangement is that those people are trying to find companies that can offer unique, attractive and in demand products on a strong growing market. Since VC-firms are taking a big risk in cooperation with the investment, the VC-company strong demands while assessments are made on the company will generate a return in the future. Bank loans are the most common form of financing for companies in the market. Requirements and assessment under the law is hard especially for small businesses because financing entails high risks. Banks require that the liquidity management in the enterprise should be stable because the bank's main objective is to repayment of debt and the interest payable on the capital. The purpose of this study is to examine the requirements and assessments VC-firms and banks make use of the financing of small businesses.

<p>There are many different forms of financing for small businesses and two common financing options mentioned in the study, bank loans and Venture Capital.Venture Capital is a form of risk capital financing, investing in unlisted stock market. The feature of the arrangement is that those people are trying to find companies that can offer unique, attractive and in demand products on a strong growing market. Since VC-firms are taking a big risk in cooperation<strong> </strong>with the investment, the VC-company strong demands while assessments are made on the company will generate a return in the future.</p><p>Bank loans are the most common form of financing for companies in the market. Requirements and assessment under the law is hard especially for small businesses because financing entails high risks. Banks require that the liquidity management in the enterprise should be stable because the bank's main objective is to repayment of debt and the interest payable on the capital.</p><p>The purpose of this study is to examine the requirements and assessments VC-firms and banks make use of the financing of small businesses.</p><p> </p>

Many communities in Canada are experiencing high levels of unemployment, poverty, social breakdown and environmental degradation. In an effort to address these problems, individuals, community groups and all levels of government, are experimenting with an approach to development called community economic development (CED). CED is a grassroots, bottom-up process that focuses on the creation of stable, viable, and equitable local economies. In trying to implement CED strategies, communities and individuals face many obstacles, one of the most significant of which is a lack of capital. Credit unions are locally-owned and controlled co-operative financial institutions with access to significant pools of “local” capital and therefore logical places for communities to turn. This thesis explores ways these institutions can support community economic development in their communities. An examination of the literature and interviews with credit union leaders and CED practitioners, demonstrate that most credit unions are not involved in CED lending. Nor are they particularly committed to CED ideals. This being said, however, the research shows that there are a few credit unions, in both Canada and the United States, that do participate in CED. These credit unions--some with a holistic commitment to CED, others with a partial commitment--support CED in a variety of ways, only one of which is through financing. In addition to providing access to capital, these credit unions fulfil other support functions such as providing technical assistance, building “community” and supporting community infrastructure development. Credit unions that participate in CED are not typical of the credit union movement. Most credit unions do not play a role in supporting community economic development in their communities. The study found that there are significant barriers to their participation in CED, barriers such as a lack of vision, the nature of CED lending, and competition from private financial institutions. In order for credit unions to participate in CED, these barriers must be removed. Ways to reduce some of the barriers are explored in the thesis. The research shows that in order to be able to participate in CED, credit unions require: a committed leadership, staff with community development expertise, new deposits of capital, a means of subsidizing the costs of CED lending, and institutional mechanisms that reduce risk as well as government support. Ways for credit unions to fulfil these needs are outlined. Lastly, research findings are summarized and conclusions are drawn about the role individual credit unions can play in CED. The kinds of initiatives credit union centrals, governments and planners can adopt to support credit unions in this work also explored.

Bakgrund: De svenska företagens lånebaserade finansiering har historiskt sett mestadels utgjorts av banklån framför företagsobligationer. Efter finanskrisens start 2008, och fram till och med fjärde kvartalet år 2012, har den svenska företagsobligationsmarknaden vuxit med drygt 60 procent. I media framställs en bild där regelverket Basel III har gjort och kommer göra företagsobligationsmarknaden till en viktigare finansieringskälla för svenska företag. En studie om företagsobligationsmarknaden efterfrågas av Svenskt Näringsliv. Syfte: Syftet med studien är att kartlägga och utifrån institutionell teori analysera hur de ekonomiska förutsättningarna för den svenska företagsobligationsmarknaden har förändrats sedan år 2008. Genomförande: För att uppnå studiens syfte har ett kvalitativt tillvägagångssätt tillämpats. Empirin har samlats in genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med aktörer på företagsobligationsmarknaden. En intervjuguide utformades med grund i institutionell ekonomisk teori, med fokus på transaktionskostnader. Samma teoretiska referensram har sedan använts för att analysera den insamlade empirin. Slutsats: Tiden innan år 2008 kännetecknades av att företagen valde banklån. Detta för att bankerna kunde hantera banklån till låga transaktionskostnader. Institutionella förändringar sedan år 2008 har lett till att transaktionskostnaderna sänkts på företagsobligationsmarknaden. Företagsobligationer har således blivit ett bättre alternativ för många företag, även fast små företag fortfarande är utestängda från marknaden. / Background: Swedish corporates’ debt financing have historically mostly consisted of bank loans instead of corporate bonds. Since the beginning of the financial crisis of 2008, leading up to the fourth quarter of 2012, the Swedish corporate bond market has grown by over 60 per cent. Media coverage of the market presents a picture where the corporate bond market has become an important source of financing as a result of the legal framework Basel III. A study of the corporate bond market has been requested by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise. Aim: The purpose of the study is to identify and, by the use of institutional theory, analyse how the market conditions in the Swedish corporate bond market have changed since the year of 2008. Completion: To achieve the purpose of the study a qualitative research method has been applied. Empirical data have been collected through semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the Swedish corporate bond market. An interview guide was designed from an institutional theory perspective with a focus on transaction costs. The same theoretical framework has been used to analyze the empirical data. Conclusion: Before the year of 2008, debt financing was characterised by bank loans. This was the result of the banks’ ability to keep transaction costs low. Since the year of 2008, institutional changes have decreased transaction costs on the Swedish corporate bond market. Corporate bonds have become a more attractive alternative for many companies, even though small companies are still excluded from the market.