Nesta tese, desenvolve-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo fundamentada na noção de mônada, ou substância simples, como elemento ontológico estruturante de um enfoque contemporâneo da mencionada relação. Na primeira parte da tese, de natureza crítica, analisam-se as teorias fisicistas contemporâneas da mencionada relação, a saber, a teoria de superveniência da mente, da emergência e da causação mental, com vistas a justificar a proposta de assunção de uma premissa dualista que visa, principalmente, propor, em contraste com o cenário epifenomenalista do fisicismo contemporâneo, uma ontologia da mente que seja compatível com as intuições realistas do senso comum e da psicológica popular sobre a força causal da mente no universo físico. Na segunda parte, de natureza positiva, propõe-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo partindo-se, para tanto, de uma assunção e duas premissas. A assunção afirma que a mente tem o mesmo importe ontológico da matéria física, sendo estes considerados como elementos composicionais, afirmação a qual se denomina dualismo elementar. No que se refere às premissas, propõe-se duas, a saber, a tese composicional holística, que afirma que a mente e a matéria são partes constitutivas de um todo chamado substância simples, e a tese composicional mereológica, que afirma que as substâncias simples ou mônadas compõem mereologicamente, por superveniência, a relação mente-corpo. Examinam-se também algumas objeções ao argumento monadista proposto. / This thesis offers an explanatory argument concerning the mind-body relation, an argument that is grounded on the notion of monad, or the simple substance, as an ontological element for proposing a contemporary approach to the mind-body relation. In the first part, a critique of the current physicalist theories of mind is given, namely, supervenience, emergence and mental causation, in order to justify the proposal of a dualist premiss which aims at an ontology of mind which satisfies the realistic intuitions of common sense and of folk psychology on the causal efficacy and relevance of the mind amid the physical, in opposition to the epiphenomenalist view of contemporary physicalist theories. In the second part, the positive one, we propose an explanatory argument for monadism about mind-body relations, based on an assumption and two premises. The assumption says that the mind has the same ontological import of the physical matter, and they, mind and matter, are considered to be elements entering the composition of psychophysical relations, an assumption called elementary dualism. Regarding the premises, we propose two, namely, the holistic compositional thesis, which asserts that mind and matter are parts entering the composition of true wholes called substances, and the mereological compositional thesis, which says that such simple substances compose, via supervenience, the mind-body relations. Some objections to the proposed monadist argument are examined and rejoindered as well.

Nous nous intéresserons dans ce présent mémoire à l’« idiotie » du réel à partir de deux œuvres, celle du philosophe français Clément Rosset et celle du cinéaste sud-coréen, Hong Sangsoo. Nous poserons comme hypothèse que ces deux auteurs, à travers leurs théorie du réel, qu’elle soit philosophique ou esthétique, arrivent à un constat commun : le réel est « idiot », non pas au sens d’imbécile, mais en son sens premier c’est-à-dire « singulier, sans reflets ni doubles » (Rosset). Pour vérifier cette hypothèse nous procéderons d’abord par la construction d’un cadre théorique réalisé à partir de la définition rossetienne du réel. Ce cadre nous permettra de problématiser à la fois l’utilisation du zoom, la construction narrative, ainsi que les jeux temporels propres aux films de Hong, et ce, à partir de trois films du cinéaste : « Le pouvoir de la province de Kangwon » (1998), « Night and Day » (2007) et « Matins calmes à Séoul » (2011). Enfin il sera question, dans la dernière partie de ce mémoire, d’observer quelles peuvent être les conséquences engendrées par le fait de reconnaître ou non l’idiotie de toute réalité, à la fois dans des termes philosophiques mais également au plan de la prise d’images photographiques ou cinématographiques. / In this master’s thesis we will focus on the idiocy of reality in the work of two authors: Clément Rosset, a French philosopher, and Hong Sangsoo, a South-Korean filmmaker. As a hypothesis we will defend that both Rosset and Hong, through their theory of reality, come to the same conclusion: the reality is “idiot”, not in the sense of stupid, but in its primary meaning, in other words “singular, without any glare or double” (Rosset). To verify this assumption we will first build a theoretical framework based on Clément Rosset’s definition of the “réel”. This theoretical framework will allow us to problematize the use of the zoom, the narrative construction and the temporal games present in three Hong Sangsoo movies that we will analyze: “The Power of Kangwon Province” (1998), “Night and Day” (2007), “The Day He Arrived” (2011). Finally, in the last chapter we will discuss and observe what may be the consequences of recognizing or not the idiocy of any reality, in philosophical terms and for cinematographic creation.

Nesta tese, desenvolve-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo fundamentada na noção de mônada, ou substância simples, como elemento ontológico estruturante de um enfoque contemporâneo da mencionada relação. Na primeira parte da tese, de natureza crítica, analisam-se as teorias fisicistas contemporâneas da mencionada relação, a saber, a teoria de superveniência da mente, da emergência e da causação mental, com vistas a justificar a proposta de assunção de uma premissa dualista que visa, principalmente, propor, em contraste com o cenário epifenomenalista do fisicismo contemporâneo, uma ontologia da mente que seja compatível com as intuições realistas do senso comum e da psicológica popular sobre a força causal da mente no universo físico. Na segunda parte, de natureza positiva, propõe-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo partindo-se, para tanto, de uma assunção e duas premissas. A assunção afirma que a mente tem o mesmo importe ontológico da matéria física, sendo estes considerados como elementos composicionais, afirmação a qual se denomina dualismo elementar. No que se refere às premissas, propõe-se duas, a saber, a tese composicional holística, que afirma que a mente e a matéria são partes constitutivas de um todo chamado substância simples, e a tese composicional mereológica, que afirma que as substâncias simples ou mônadas compõem mereologicamente, por superveniência, a relação mente-corpo. Examinam-se também algumas objeções ao argumento monadista proposto. / This thesis offers an explanatory argument concerning the mind-body relation, an argument that is grounded on the notion of monad, or the simple substance, as an ontological element for proposing a contemporary approach to the mind-body relation. In the first part, a critique of the current physicalist theories of mind is given, namely, supervenience, emergence and mental causation, in order to justify the proposal of a dualist premiss which aims at an ontology of mind which satisfies the realistic intuitions of common sense and of folk psychology on the causal efficacy and relevance of the mind amid the physical, in opposition to the epiphenomenalist view of contemporary physicalist theories. In the second part, the positive one, we propose an explanatory argument for monadism about mind-body relations, based on an assumption and two premises. The assumption says that the mind has the same ontological import of the physical matter, and they, mind and matter, are considered to be elements entering the composition of psychophysical relations, an assumption called elementary dualism. Regarding the premises, we propose two, namely, the holistic compositional thesis, which asserts that mind and matter are parts entering the composition of true wholes called substances, and the mereological compositional thesis, which says that such simple substances compose, via supervenience, the mind-body relations. Some objections to the proposed monadist argument are examined and rejoindered as well.

La bioéthique a émergé aux États-Unis à la fin des années 1960. Peu de recherches ont porté sur son institutionnalisation dans d'autres pays ;les cas du Québec et de la Belgique sont ici étudiés. <p>Son émergence dans ces régions est, comme aux États-Unis, influencée par les questions suscitées par l'expérimentation chez l'humain à partir de la fin des années 1970. Dans ces trois régions, les premières formes d'institutionnalisation ont été celles de comités dont le mandat est de réviser les protocoles de recherches impliquant des sujets humains. <p>Peu de temps après les États-Unis, des centres de recherche universitaires ont été mis en place au Québec à la fin des années 1970 et au début des années 1980. Ces mêmes institutions sont retrouvées en Belgique à la moitié des années 1980. Il apparaît que dans ces trois régions les acteurs alors impliqués sont majoritairement des théologiens. La philosophie de l'époque ne s'intéresse pas aux questions éthiques suscitées par les avancées technoscientifiques du domaine médical. <p>À la fin des années 1980, davantage d'instruments procéduraux ont été publiés par diverses institutions québécoises afin d'encadrer les pratiques. Parallèlement, des programmes d'étude en bioéthique amènent le domaine à se professionnaliser. La période est marquée en Belgique par le débat entourant l'interruption de grossesse. Il devient évident que d'autres questions éthiques devront être débattues et personne ne souhaite que perdure la tension entre catholiques et laïques. Le colloque la Bioéthique dans les années '90 a permis la rencontre des acteurs dans un climat plus serein.<p>En 1996, après six ans de discussions, a été mis en place un Comité consultatif de bioéthique en Belgique. Son fonctionnement et la nature de ses avis tiennent compte de la présence de quatre piliers dans la culture belge, soit les Flamands, les Wallons, les catholiques et les laïques. Ce comité est devenu l'institution phare de la bioéthique. Il influence depuis les débats politiques et plusieurs lois du domaine de la bioéthique ont été votées. On remarque que dans les deux régions à l'étude, le langage du droit est de plus en plus présent et rend la bioéthique davantage juridicisée. Ainsi, au départ réflexive, la bioéthique est devenue davantage normative. Tant au Québec qu'en Belgique, les institutions de bioéthique sont de moins en moins un lieu de discussions et de rencontres qui permettent les échanges et la réflexion commune dans la durée.<p><p>--------<p><p>Bioethics emerged in the United States in the late 60's. Little research has been done on the institutionalization of bioethics in other countries ;the cases of Quebec and Belgium have been studied in this work, through documentary studies and interviews with twenty players in the domain. <p>Its emergence in those regions was, like in the United States, influenced by questions raised in the late 70's about the use of human subjects in studies. In Quebec and Belgium, the first forms of institutionalization were ethics committees who were given the mandate to revise experimental protocols. <p>Following the United States, at the end of the 70's and the beginning of the 80's, research centers were put in place in Quebec. In Belgium, they were set up in the mid 80's. In those three regions, it appears that theologians were the first to be involved. Philosophy, in those days, was not interested with ethical questions raised by medical technoscience advances.<p>By the end of the 80's, more procedural instruments were published by institutions in Quebec to guide ethic practices. In a parallel direction, universities offered more programs in bioethics and brought the discipline to become professionalized. This period was marked in Belgium by the debate over abortion. It became apparent that other ethical issues would have to be discussed, but nobody wanted to endure the tension between Catholics and Seculars. The conference Bioethics in the 90's brought together the players of the field in a calmer setting.<p>In 1996, after six years of discussions, the Advisory Committee on Bioethics was set in place in Belgium. Its function and the nature of its views reflect the presence of the four pillars in the Belgian culture :the Flemish, the Walloons, the Catholics and the Seculars. This Committee has become the flagship institution of bioethics. It influences political debates and several laws in the field of bioethics have been passed since its inception. In Quebec and in Belgium, the language of law is becoming more present and makes bioethics more « juridicialized ». Thus, initially more reflexive, bioethics is becoming more normative. In both regions, bioethical institutions are less and less an arena of discourse where meetings permit long exchanges and philosophical reflection.<p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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