With the global economy in a crisis, debt levels are at an all-time high. The United States of America’s national debt exceeds $14 trillion and the South African outstanding gross consumer credit book is at R1,39 trillion. This pattern of debt levels is seen worldwide, with various adverse effects on the debtors and the economy in general. Although debt is an important mechanism in the growth of an economy, the amount of debt must be managed. Unsecured debt is a higher risk loan offered to debtors who cannot support the debt through any form of security. Default on this type of debt leaves the creditor with only a few options to recover the debt. It is thus important to understand the reasons for these defaults in order to manage the debtor and the risk associated with these loans. This study investigates the default rate and demographics of unsecured debt defaulters. A large study population is analysed to determine the total default rate and demographics of the defaulting debtors. The aim is to get a better understanding of the risk involved in unsecured debt in order to manage the credit vetting process more efficiently. Factors including loan size, number of loans, geographic distribution, gender and the age of debtors are studied to determine the profile of a typical debt defaulter. This is then compared to the non-defaulting population. The research findings confirm that there are statistically significant correlations between loan size, number of loans, geographic distribution, gender and age and the number of defaults in the population. The practical significance is, however, weak. It further proves that the profile of a defaulting debtors’ book is the same as the initial debtors’ book. A further challenge will be to incorporate affordability and other relevant data to understand the defaulting population and the reasons for default better. / MBA, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Thesis (MBA) --University of Limpopo, 2010

Financial crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have caused some to wonder if there is something inherently unstable about financial markets that thwarts their ability to allocate capital appropriate^- and ultimately causes these crises. I build a multi-period, industry-level credit model in which debt-financed entrepreneurs develop homogeneous projects with long gestation periods, sequential investment requirements, and no intermediate cash flows. Entrepreneurs accumulate private signals about terminal demand, and if the signals are bad enough, may decide to halt project development before completion. The prevalence of project suspensions aggregates information and permits the industry size to adjust to the true state of terminal demand. Debt contracts depend upon the pricing power of the creditor; these contracts impact the size of the industry and the timing of the information aggregation. When demand realisations are poor, some investors will be disappointed ex post; aggregate disappointment will depend upon how long the investment behaviour has carried on before suspensions occur, and how large the industry is. I interpret situations of substantial aggregate disappointment as a 'crisis'. Principal results relate to the impact of debt finance on the timing and likelihood of project suspensions. With all equity (self) financing, suspensions will typically be observed, but they may occur relatively late in the game. In contrast, debt finance may lead to very rapid suspensions, depending upon the tools allocated to the creditor. When creditors exercise monopoly control over credit allocation and pricing, profit-maximising creditors can and will force suspensions. This may involve reducing the entrepreneurs' equity contribution and / or subsidizing credit in order to ensure entrepreneurial participation. When credit markets are competitive, creditors lack the pricing power that can be used to structure credit policies that force early suspensions. As debt accumulates and the entrepreneurs' share of liquidation proceeds dwindles, entrepreneurs may not voluntarily suspend operations as this will lead to loss of private benefits. Therefore, there may be no suspensions observed in equilibrium. This problem will be particularly acute when the entrepreneurs' initial equit)' stake is small.

With the global economy in a crisis, debt levels are at an all-time high. The United States of America’s national debt exceeds $14 trillion and the South African outstanding gross consumer credit book is at R1,39 trillion. This pattern of debt levels is seen worldwide, with various adverse effects on the debtors and the economy in general. Although debt is an important mechanism in the growth of an economy, the amount of debt must be managed. Unsecured debt is a higher risk loan offered to debtors who cannot support the debt through any form of security. Default on this type of debt leaves the creditor with only a few options to recover the debt. It is thus important to understand the reasons for these defaults in order to manage the debtor and the risk associated with these loans. This study investigates the default rate and demographics of unsecured debt defaulters. A large study population is analysed to determine the total default rate and demographics of the defaulting debtors. The aim is to get a better understanding of the risk involved in unsecured debt in order to manage the credit vetting process more efficiently. Factors including loan size, number of loans, geographic distribution, gender and the age of debtors are studied to determine the profile of a typical debt defaulter. This is then compared to the non-defaulting population. The research findings confirm that there are statistically significant correlations between loan size, number of loans, geographic distribution, gender and age and the number of defaults in the population. The practical significance is, however, weak. It further proves that the profile of a defaulting debtors’ book is the same as the initial debtors’ book. A further challenge will be to incorporate affordability and other relevant data to understand the defaulting population and the reasons for default better. / MBA, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed June 26, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-117).

Financial crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have caused some to wonder if there is something inherently unstable about financial markets that thwarts their ability to allocate capital appropriate^- and ultimately causes these crises. I build a multi-period, industry-level credit model in which debt-financed entrepreneurs develop homogeneous projects with long gestation periods, sequential investment requirements, and no intermediate cash flows. Entrepreneurs accumulate private signals about terminal demand, and if the signals are bad enough, may decide to halt project development before completion. The prevalence of project suspensions aggregates information and permits the industry size to adjust to the true state of terminal demand. Debt contracts depend upon the pricing power of the creditor; these contracts impact the size of the industry and the timing of the information aggregation. When demand realisations are poor, some investors will be disappointed ex post; aggregate disappointment will depend upon how long the investment behaviour has carried on before suspensions occur, and how large the industry is. I interpret situations of substantial aggregate disappointment as a 'crisis'. Principal results relate to the impact of debt finance on the timing and likelihood of project suspensions. With all equity (self) financing, suspensions will typically be observed, but they may occur relatively late in the game. In contrast, debt finance may lead to very rapid suspensions, depending upon the tools allocated to the creditor. When creditors exercise monopoly control over credit allocation and pricing, profit-maximising creditors can and will force suspensions. This may involve reducing the entrepreneurs' equity contribution and / or subsidizing credit in order to ensure entrepreneurial participation. When credit markets are competitive, creditors lack the pricing power that can be used to structure credit policies that force early suspensions. As debt accumulates and the entrepreneurs' share of liquidation proceeds dwindles, entrepreneurs may not voluntarily suspend operations as this will lead to loss of private benefits. Therefore, there may be no suspensions observed in equilibrium. This problem will be particularly acute when the entrepreneurs' initial equit)' stake is small. / Business, Sauder School of / Finance, Division of / Graduate

In the past decades, financial crises have recast the spotlight on sovereign debt restructuring (SoDR). Despite decades of discussion on how to reform SoDR, it still raises complex legal tensions. Among these tensions is the current lack of a mechanism to administer SoDR and the fact that the current SoDR regime is fragmented and leads to suboptimal and unfair results. This thesis critically assesses these tensions, with a focus on the international reform of the restructuring of privately held sovereign bonds. In making its contribution to the discourse on SoDR, this study seeks to bridge the gap between the legal and policy debates on SoDR. The novelty of the approach in this study is that it aims to add an African perspective to the international literature on the procedural, normative and conceptual reform of SoDR. Towards this end, the question of how to reform the SoDR landscape is addressed within the framework of a developmental and a human rights approach. This paradigm through which SoDR should also be viewed has only begun to feature in the literature recently and thus requires further evaluation. This study assesses the historical evolution of SoDR, the current challenges in the contemporary era of SoDR and evaluates the corresponding proposals for reform. While acknowledging the role that the contractual approach (the primary mechanism for SoDR) has already played in the current landscape, this study argues that this approach alone is not sufficient to ensure fair, transparent and prompt restructuring. The study consequently assesses the policy debate on viable options for reform. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2020. / Centre for Human Rights / LLD / Unrestricted

Previous researchers, especially on large enterprises, have revealed that debt financing structure influences enterprise performance. Though the issue has been extensively researched, micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) have traditionally been operating differently as compared to large enterprises in terms of their financial decisions, ownership and management style, and behaviour. Therefore, this study will explore the gaps encountered by all MSMEs to grow their businesses. These include forms and type of industry, firm size, asset tangibility, and a firm’s current assets in relation to its current liabilities and profitability level. The study examines the influence of financing structures on performance of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in South Africa. The ordinary least squares (OLS) technique of measurement is applied to examine the effects of financing structure on performance across various industrial sectors in the years 2013, 2014 and 2015. The findings in this study indicate an increase in the use of leverage to drive the influence of total debt on performance in all industrial sectors of MSMEs in South Africa. From the cross-sectional regression analysis, the results show that financing structure has a negative effect on the profitability of MSMEs, although not absolutely. The findings show that the size of the enterprise, asset tangibility, and the ratio of current assets to current liabilities are the most influential of borrowing decisions in total debt, short-term debt, and long-term debt. A significantly negative effect is observed for long-term debt, while short-term debt (STDR) exhibits a significantly positive effect. Thus the influence on MSMEs’ leverage on performance is driven by the usage of short-term debt. The variables of size of the firm, and ratio of current assets to current liabilities, do not have the same effect in all debt levels; the significance is substantially higher for long-term debt than for total debt and short-term debt. On the other hand, our empirical results suggested that transactional costs, and an asymmetric information problem in smaller firms, may lead to a mainly negative influence on size and total debt. The asset structure on profitability observed across the years showed mixed experiences. The ratio of current assets to current liabilities was found to be positive and significant on long-term debt and short-term debt leverage.

archives@tulane.edu / The overarching argument in this study is that although sovereign distressed debt investors can create holdout problems during the debt restructuring of a defaulting sovereign, the reality is that they remain a linchpin for an efficient sovereign debt market that guarantees the flow of private credit for capital formation in the Global South. In other words, holdout creditors are a bit of a curate's egg, a necessary feature of the sovereign debt markets. They are not the “spawn of the devil”. The presence of distressed debt investors in the market contributes to the liquidity and efficiency of the market. They enable non-litigant investors who would like to sell their debt and exit the market on their own volition to do so. In addition, they tend to put pressure on recalcitrant sovereign debtors who might not be acting in good faith. They therefore possess “nuisance value” that could spur efficiency in the sovereign debt market. In this context, a universal framework for dealing with holdout problems during the debt restructuring of a defaulting sovereign is needed and that is what this study proposes. Such rules can be developed into a soft-law mechanism spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A global normative framework that has elements of nonmarket private standard setting and nonmarket public standard setting, is therefore proposed to address the disruptive and exploitative activities of these creditors in the sovereign debt market. This normative framework would strike the delicate balance between the rights of commercial creditors on the one hand, and interests of sovereign debtors on the other hand, and inject some measure of equity into the process. In summary, this study challenges the contemporary negative and dismissive narratives about holdout creditors, and the assumption and unshaken faith placed on “restructuring or workout of sovereign debt” as the only favored path to alleviating the perennial problem of sovereign default and the attendant debt crises in the developing world. / 1 / MARIA OLUYEJU

Technical debt is a metaphor that refers to the consequences of suboptimal software development. Developers will have to pay interest on this debt, in terms of costs of maintenance. The term helps developers communicate the importance of software quality. This thesis has studied technical debt in the context of Django web applications. In a survey conducted, the main causes of technical debt in Django applications were found to be architectural issues and lack of testing. This is in line with other studies of causes of technical debt. Tools and practices used in Django development were evaluated. From this evaluation several guidelines were formulated on how to best manage and limit technical debt. The results suggest that static code analyzers should be used to maintain code standards. Furthermore, the evaluation show that log aggregation tools like Sentry are helpful. Application monitoring should be used if there are performance issues, deprecation patterns can be used in refactorizations and the identification and removal of dead code is probably unnecessary. Finally, pre-commit tools help in preventing technical debt. / Teknisk skuld är en metafor som beskriver konsekvenserna utav suboptimal mjukvaruutveckling. Utvecklare måste betala ränta på denna skuld, i form utav kostnader för underhåll. Termen hjälper utvecklare att kommunicera vikten utav programvarukvalitet. Denna rapport har studerat teknisk skuld i kontexten utav Django webbapplikationer. En enkätundersökning gjordes och de främsta orsakerna till teknisk skuld i Django applikationer visade sig vara arkitektoniska problem och brist utav testning. Detta ligger i linje med andra studier utav orsakerna av teknisk skuld. Verktyg och metoder som används i Django utveckling utvärderades. Från denna utvärdering flera riktlinjer formulerades om hur man bäst hanterar och begränsar teknisk skuld. Resultaten visar på att statisk programanalys bör användas för att upprätthålla kod standarder. Dessutom visar utvärderingen att log aggregerings verktyg som Sentry är användbara. Applikations övervakning bör användas om det finns prestandaproblem, deprecation patterns kan användas i refaktoriseringar och identifiering av död kod är förmodligen onödigt. Slutligen visar sig pre-commit verktyg vara hjälpsamma i att förebygga teknisk skuld.