This thesis uses the photographic portrait as an example of contemporary art practice to examine developments in aesthetic sensibility and constructions of meaning with particular address to ineffable qualities in both the subject and in the photograph. It examines the contribution of practice to a wider cultural debate, predominantly described as poststructural. Thomas Ruff's contention that it is impossible to photographically depict an individual, establishes a methodology that interrogates assumptions and directs examination toward reconfiguring issues of theory and practice. In the photographic portrait, what is `essential' equates with the expectation of visual statements that are definitive and what is 'ineffable' is that which transcends words. The persistent premise of capturing the 'essence' is dependant on the notion of 'presence', the certainty of pure perception or essential meaning, now undermined by poststructuralism in terms of conceptions of meaning and authorship. If essential depiction is problematic, how might a correlative adjustment to conceiving and validating photographic meaning be framed? How are essential or ineffable qualities displaced, formed and manifested? What constitutes the contemporary 'meaningful' portrait? Realigned as 'depictions of people', the 'portrait' serves a complex function, adjusted in the light of psychoanalysis and poststructuralism and visibly manifested as metaphor for contemporary consciousness. With particular reference to texts by Julia Kristeva, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida and Jean Baudrillard, this thesis demonstrates photographic practice as a form of discourse that visualises implicit truth-values, and participates in debate. It asserts figural interpretations to photographs over literary systems like narrative, and immanent property over aspirations to 'transcendence' or 'essence' and proposes reconfigurations of psychological, critical or poetic 'fiction' as alternatives. It repositions the ineffable as a conceptual domain of possibility that assimilates the dynamic of differance as its poststructural equivalent and proposes a conceptual aesthetic that celebrates aspects of poststructuralism and is rooted in what the photograph provokes rather than what it depicts.

The present essay concerns the Levinasian understanding of responsibility in relation to the two spheres that Levinas introduces in his second major work Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, namely the Saying and the Said. The essay investigates some of the different meanings that the concept responsibility takes on in regard to these two spheres, and thus also in regard to the separation between the ethical and the political that is apparent in the book. Is it possible to find a politically uttered responsibility in Levinas Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence? The essay wants to emphasize the continuous transition between the ethical or the Saying and the political or the Said, and vice versa, with the purpose of showing how the two spheres may be conceived simultaneously. By posing the relationship between the two as a reciprocal rather than a oppositional one, the essay aims to suggest that an understanding of responsibility at once must be ethical and political. In order to show this, the essay analyses responsibility as communication, sensibility and exposure. Thereafter, it turns to Judith Butler's Giving an Account of Oneself to offer an ethical/political reading of responsibility as the subjectivity of the subject. Levinas' concepts of the Trace, the Third Party and the question of Justice is discussed, using Jacques Derrida's Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, Bettina Bergo's Levinas Between the Ethical and the Political, and Howard Caygill's Levinas and the Political. The essay poses the question of how we are to discuss responsibility if its original, ethical meaning is undone at the very moment that we try to grasp it.  Therefore what Levinas calls the philosophical reduction of the Said is taken in consideration.

This thesis is based on two readings on death. The first one is Martin Heidegger&rsquo / s Being and Time chapter two, part one and the second one is Jacques Derrida&rsquo / s Aporias. The first reading is based on the phenomenological analysis of death. The line of argument of Heidegger is figured out. The second reading is based on Derrida&rsquo / s deconstruction of Heidegger&rsquo / s account of death in Being and Time. The thesis and the conclusion part is based on the idea that, on death, these philosophers are fundamentally similar and radically different. This is shown by the comparison of these philosophers.

This thesis examines the relation between two contrasting approaches to justice: the constructive and reconstructive projects of Rawls and Habermas on the one hand, and the deconstructive projects of Levinas and Derrida on the other. First, I identify the central difference between the two projects, reconstructing each account of justice as it develops in relation to Kant??s practical philosophy. I then argue that the two projects are complementary. [New Paragraph] Whilst Rawls and Habermas emphasise the possibility of objectively realising Kant??s idea of an impartial standpoint among autonomous persons, Levinas and Derrida defend the impossibility of determining the content of justice. Rawls and Habermas subscribe to the ??art of the possible??, rendering Kant??s impartial standpoint by means of the ??original position?? (Rawls) or the ??procedures of discourse ethics?? (Habermas). By contrast, Levinas argues for justice??s failure, discovering, in Kant??s moral law, a principle of responsibility for the particular other which conflicts with impartiality. Distinguishing himself from both the reconstructive tradition and Levinas, Derrida affirms, in part through his readings of Kant, the ??undecidability?? of the critical function of justice. Committed to the possibility of justice, Derrida also acknowledges its impossibility: no local determination can reconcile responsibility before the other with impartiality among all. [New Paragraph] Having identified the central difference between the two traditions, I then defend their complementarity. ??Reasonable faith?? in the possibility of justice must be supplemented by the acknowledgment of its impossibility. Conversely, attesting to justice??s failure is unsatisfactory without commitment to the possibility of constructing just social forms. Distancing myself from the liberal critique whereby deconstruction withdraws from the political (Fraser, McCarthy, Benhabib, Gutmann), I instead add my voice to a dissenting group (Young, Cornell, Mouffe, Honig, Honneth, Patton, Thomassen) which affirms that deconstruction can productively engage with the constructive tradition. Deconstruction is at home in Rawls?? view that ??the ideal of a just constitution is always something to be worked toward??.

In this thesis I will develop and test an interpretive framework for the Subject based on the understanding that an entity can be identified as a Subject if it is the necessary referent for an attribution. This understanding provides a template for approaching different Subjects, for considering the validity of their being identified as Subjects, and for reorienting the general discourse of the Subject away from an investigation of particular entities to one concerned with the contexts which support such identifications.

In this thesis I will develop and test an interpretive framework for the Subject based on the understanding that an entity can be identified as a Subject if it is the necessary referent for an attribution. This understanding provides a template for approaching different Subjects, for considering the validity of their being identified as Subjects, and for reorienting the general discourse of the Subject away from an investigation of particular entities to one concerned with the contexts which support such identifications.

In this thesis I will develop and test an interpretive framework for the Subject based on the understanding that an entity can be identified as a Subject if it is the necessary referent for an attribution. This understanding provides a template for approaching different Subjects, for considering the validity of their being identified as Subjects, and for reorienting the general discourse of the Subject away from an investigation of particular entities to one concerned with the contexts which support such identifications.

This study of Alain Robbe-Grillet’s first four published novels seeks to examine the manifestations of four different philosophical concepts in these works. Each novel will be taken as a primary example of Robbe-Grillet’s interrogation of either time, space, difference or repetition. The title of this work, ‘Philosophical Conceptions of Time, Space, Difference and Repetition in the Early Novels of Alain Robbe-Grillet’, as apparently uncomplicated as it is, is useful not only for directly implicating the topics to be examined, but also for what it does not directly allude to. By making reference neither to Robbe-Grillet’s involvement in the movement of the Nouveau Roman nor the theoretical ideas he developed, the title demonstrates one of the main approaches employed here; for Robbe-Grillet’s novels will be examined first and foremost for the textual qualities they exhibit, and will not be tested against the author’s statements, as is most often the case in studies of Robbe-Grillet. When examining these novels, we will thus neither support our study with quotations from Robbe-Grillet’s many interviews and public statements, nor concern ourselves with the apparent objectivity or subjectivity of the novels’ narrators, nor will we base our examinations of the philosophical concepts found in the novels on questions of subjectivity or objectivity. It will become clear throughout our work that Robbe-Grillet’s novels, particularly the early novels that are the focus of this work, have been very well researched and from many different perspectives, yet in spite of the proliferation of texts dealing with these novels certain standard readings have evolved that impinge on the advancement of our understanding of Robbe-Grillet’s complex works. We will argue that this is precisely because these readings actually negate the multiple interpretations that the novels demand and that these standardised readings therefore work as fixed central points around which almost all analyses of the novels revolve. It is thus the aim of this work to complicate these dominant readings by engaging with the ways in which the novels both offer and deny different interpretations, a strategy that ultimately results in the impossibility of a sole fixed reading. In choosing this approach to study the novels, we wish to concentrate solely on the non-representative aspects of these novels. That is to say, the novels will not be treated here, as they are by many critics, for the way they present themselves on the surface as merely concerned with an interrogation of narrative strategies, characterisation or with an application of Robbe-Grillet’s theoretical modus operandi. Rather we will argue that the texts simultaneously invite a deeper reflection on philosophical concepts. The possibility the novels offer to consider the four philosophical concepts that are the focus of this study will be remarked by the novels’ continual engagement with these ideas so as to suggest finally the opportunity of conceiving of these concepts in a literary discourse. Thus, the philosophical concepts which will be deployed in examining Robbe-Grillet’s novels aim to elucidate not strict equivalences between a given concept and its expression in the novel, but rather the ways in which the novels themselves can be seen to propose their own conceptions of these philosophical notions. Thus, each of these chapters will ostensibly deal with a particular philosophical notion, yet they can be seen to work towards a similar shared goal; for each section of this study will propose that it is impossible to isolate a single unifying thesis or central controlling identity through which the texts can be examined. Instead, we will suggest that the novels are governed by a logic of difference in itself, a philosophical notion which, as we will see throughout this work, operates outside of the notion of identity and which favours fluid, unstable and continuously evolving relationships of its constituent parts.

This thesis is centrally concerned with the texts of Jacques Derrida that have addressed directly the theme of sexual difference. Yet to say the thesis is centrally concerned with a philosophy that positions itself clearly as one that deconstructs centrality and its trajectory of return, is to face the crisis or chiasmus of my concern. The thesis is not returned to Derrida. If the question of feminism for Derrida is a question from the margins, from interruptions, of the trace and of la cendre, ashes, the question of sexual difference is primordially and originarily that of the undecidability of the name, signatory, and textual border. She would not have appeared here. Therefore she cannot return. There are two frames to this research that can be recognized in the chapter sequence of the thesis. Initially I develop a preparatory engagement to a questioning of the ontology of sexual difference, with Chapters 2 and 3, with a questioning that broaches the metaphysics of the feminine with respect to the texts of Derrida, Heidegger and Cixous in particular and further engages with Écriture Féminine, Levinas and feminist responses to Heidegger and Levinas. However, this broader questioning is undertaken in order to develop a sharper focus on the writings of Derrida that address Heidegger’s ontological difference, Levinas’s ethics before being, and a more originary questioning of sexual difference. The second frame and predominant focus of the thesis is on Derrida’s approach to the metaphysics of the feminine with four pivotal texts by Derrida from the late 1970s and early 1980s examined in Chapters 4 to 7. Each addresses a questioning of difference and the metaphysical tradition, under difference’s many names: ontological difference, sexual difference, différance, and engages deconstruction’s encounters with Nietzsche & Heidegger (Spurs); the psychoanalysts Abraham & Torok (“Fors”); Levinas (“At This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am”) and Hegel (Glas). In bringing together these four texts, my aim is to emphasize the significance of a double deconstructive movement of transgression and restoration, as this research’s politico-ethical acts of writing and reading for an otherwise discourse on sexual difference. This otherwise discourse has always already been produced with phallogocentrism and remains critical for the inventing of thresholds across philosophy, literature and their others. The ashen Preface enkindles a paradigmatic figure as deconstructive trace of sexual difference in writing and reading practices. A Postscript questions the binding to institutional laws constitutive of disciplinary practice while the fiery trace in Derrida’s writing on Kafka’s law concludes on the ash-laden edges of Blanchot’s unavowable work.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toronto, 2007. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2858.