The aim of this study is to examine what current discourses within the expanding popular management culture carry to organizations in terms of worldview, knowledge view, ideologies, norms, and values, and how these discourses shape leader’s roles in modern organizations. A case study is conducted on a conflict management book by a popular management guru, Stephen R. Covey. The three main study questions concern: 1) ontology and epistemology found in the discourses, 2) how the ideas of ‘right’ vs. ‘wrong’ conflict management strategies are constructed by the author, and 3) how the ideas of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ leader are constructed. The study applies different discourse analytical and poststructuralistic tools combined in a bricolage, to analyze and deconstruct Stephen R. Covey’s (2011) managerial discourses in his book “The 3rd Alternative - solving life’s most difficult problems”. The study result shows that popular managerial discourses such as Covey’s lack solid scientific ground and carry institutional myths, ideology and normative religious beliefs to the learning organizations. The analyzed managerial discourses carry an underlying naive realistic worldview, and belief that there are some universally applicable correct principals concerning conflict resolution, and that there are also some principles and paradigms that are fundamentally wrong. Consequently, leaders who use the ‘right’ conflict management strategy are characterized as good and those who use the ‘wrong’ strategies are characterized as bad leaders. The conclusion of the study is that such non-scientific managerial discourses are given constituating power in organizations, generating a simplistic, ideological and normative view of organizational life, while creating myths about how the organizational reality should be perceived and how a leader should operate in it. It is furthermore argued that even a myth, or an ideal, can sometimes be useful to create a necessary change in an organization and move it in the desired direction.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

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Derrida Animal Ethics, is a study of “the animal question" in the works of French Philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and his relevance for the newly emerging and diverse field of Critical Animal Studies (CAS), Religious Studies, and the Social Sciences and Humanities more generally. Drawing on Derrida’s longstanding engagement with human-animal relations, in such texts as The Animal That Therefore I Am, “Violence Against Animals,” and his final seminars The Beast and the Sovereign, this thesis centers on his analyses of sovereignty, singularity, death, and responsibility, treating each of these concepts in a thesis chapter, and examining the potential of each for a rethinking of “animality” in discourses on ethics and human-animal relations.

This thesis brings together two important aspects of Feminist Theory, the problem of reconceptualising community in terms of difference, and the role of temporality and futurity within feminist visions of the political. I argue that rethinking community directly entails a rethinking of temporality. This is initially suggested in my examination of the work of anthropologists Carol Greenhouse and Johannes Fabian, who argue that conceptions of time play an important role in social methods of ??managing?? difference. I then turn to an analysis of a number of different feminist accounts of community in order to show that, in each case, the attempt to rethink community in terms of an openness to diversity is invariably accompanied by a contestation of dominant linear temporal concepts. I suggest that these accounts represent a shift to an understanding of time as fractured, dislocated or out of joint. While this shift is explicit in some of the work I examine, specifically in Linnell Secomb and Rosalyn Diprose??s work, for the most part, the problem of temporality is not explicitly thematised. I therefore seek to uncover an emerging critique of linear temporality within feminist accounts of community, while also arguing for a greater recognition of the way time systems shape the way we understand and relate to difference. In order to extend the contestation of linear temporality developed in the first section, I turn to the work of Jacques Derrida. I extend the gesture towards a dislocated time by examining Derrida??s deconstruction of Aristotle??s account of time and his quasi-concept, diff??rance. Both of these accounts challenge the self-presence of the now. What proves to be particularly important for the problem of community is the way this fundamental dislocation suggests a reworking of social understandings of the heritage, transformation and political action. This suggestion is developed through an analysis of two of Derrida??s later essays ??The Other Heading?? and ??Psyche: Inventions of the other??, where I draw out his claim that an openness to the coming of the other involves both the active disruption of convention and tradition as well as a passive relation to an open and incalculable future. I conclude this thesis by arguing that Derrida??s account of time, as a disruptive exposure to alterity, is a provocative candidate for a model of temporality congenial to feminist projects of reconceptualising community. Accordingly, this thesis makes a unique contribution to feminist theory by connecting two significant but often separate concerns, in the process providing new avenues for feminist theorisations of community.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, School of Social Sciences, Discipline of Gender, Work and Social Inquiry, 2007. / "December 2006" Bibliography: leaves [183-203]. Also available in print form.

Thesis (PhD) -- AUT University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Also held in print (xxii, 344 leaves ; 30 cm.) in the Archive at the City Campus (T 305.42 OCO)

Diss--Berlin--Freie Universität, 1991.

Texte remanié de: Ph.D. thesis--Biblical studies--Edinburgh, GB--University, 1993. / Bibliogr. p. 223-230. Index.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía / Durante largo tiempo, el “discurso de duelo” o “discurso fúnebre” ha permitido hablar del muerto, e incluso al muerto, allí donde se sabe que éste no podría ya responder ni oír palabra alguna. Estando aquel otro muerto, no existiendo en ninguna parte más que en nosotros –pues el otro está muerto salvo en nosotros-, entre quienes lo recordamos y mantenemos vivo “en nuestra memoria”, ese otro a quien se habla sólo podría guardar silencio. Sin embargo, por una ficción propia del discurso se podría hacer siempre como si el otro estuviese ahí presente para escuchar cada una de las palabras que se dicen en su nombre y en su memoria. Aunque esté muerto y no exista más que en nosotros, nos dirigimos a él como si verdaderamente estuviese allí para escucharnos, para así poder hablarle como hace falta, es decir, adecuadamente, tal como debemos. Como si en eso se fuera a decidir todo nuestro deber con el otro ausente; la única manera de hacerle justicia.