published_or_final_version / Psychology / Master / Master of Philosophy

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One of the purposes of this thesis is to try to examine the concepts of mental sickness and responsibility (and some other related concepts) and see whether or not they can be defended against some of the criticisms that have been made against them. It has, for instance, been argued that the concept mental sickness is culture relative in a bad sense. If this criticism is valid, then we cannot be justified in saying that mental sickness has impaired a person's responsibility. Another criticism that has been made is that arguments that use mental sickness to explain and excuse criminal behaviour are circular. Most of the criticisms that I have discussed are intended to be general, i.e. they are criticisms of the concept of mental disorder im general, not just of a particular kind of mental disorder. Thus though Lady Wootton says that arguments that try to explain the psychopath's anti-social behaviour are circular, she thinks (at least in her more radical moments) that the circular process prevails in other mental disorders as well (e.g. with mental defectives. See <u>Social Science and Social Pathology</u>, page 256 ff.). Similarly, the argument that different standards of mental defect prevail in different cultures, and that therefore there is something wrong with the concept of mental defect, is intended to be (at least in her more radical moments) a general one, i.e. it is intended to apply, <u>mutatis mutandis</u> against other kinds of mental disorders also.

This dissertation proposes that a necessary connection exists between a progressive model of sanctification and a compatibilist model of human freedom. Chapter 1 presents the thesis, background, and methodology for the dissertation, giving special interest to the way that compatibilism is uniquely qualified to accommodate the necessary link between one's character and conduct intrinsic to a progressive model of sanctification. Chapter 2 defines and examines the two most widely held models of human freedom: libertarianism and compatibilism. Compatibilism is shown to comport more closely with Scripture and to solve many of the nagging philosophical problems associated with a libertarian model of freedom. Chapter 3 continues to build a foundation for the remaining chapters by defining the three most widely held models of sanctification: Wesleyan perfectionism, Keswick, and Augustinian or progressive sanctification. Here it is argued that Wesleyan perfectionism and Keswick require a concomitant libertarian freedom, whereas an Augustinian model of sanctification requires compatibilism. Chapter 4 offers scriptural support for the connection between progressive sanctification and compatibilist freedom. The central focus is on determining the biblical author's intent and on laying the exegetical groundwork for the final chapter. Chapter 5 argues for the necessary connection between progressive sanctification and compatibilist freedom by questioning libertarian interpretations of the texts examined in the previous chapter. Since it potentially bifurcates the scriptural connection between one's character and conduct, libertarian freedom is shown to be a poor candidate for the type of freedom necessitated by a progressive model of sanctification. I close, in Chapter 6, by calling Evangelicals to return to a common sense understanding of the bounds of logic, scriptural fidelity to both God's gracious sovereignty and man's genuine freedom, and a greater sense of mystery concerning the nature of God.

This thesis comprises an introduction and six papers on causation, freedom and responsibility. Though mostly self-standing, the papers are unified by two common goals - to recognise and analyse the role of context in the semantics of causal claims and ascriptions of freedom; and to put metaphysical approaches to causation into closer contact with actual causal reasoning in science and the law. Chapter One defends a contextualist semantics of causal language that combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer's semantics of modality. Chapter Two extends this approach to ascriptions of freedom, by combining Kratzer's account with the principle that an agent acts freely only if she could have acted otherwise. Chapter Three explores a neglected view which combines David Lewis's counterfactual account of causation with his counterpart-theoretic approach to de re modality. Chapter Four proposes an amendment to the interventionist account of causation in response to a worry raised by John Campbell about causation in psychology. Chapter Five motivates the idea that causation is a relation to which multiple events can contribute to different degrees, and defends a novel account of an event's degree of contribution to a causing of an effect. Chapter Six then argues, from a conception of tort law as a system of corrective justice, that a defendant should be held liable for a claimant's losses only to the degree to which the defendant's wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the claimant's harm.

This thesis is a study on the theology of an Anglican bishop, John Davenant (1572-1641), in the context of the early modern era. In particular it focuses on his understanding of the extent and intent of the atoning death of Christ. Davenant played an important role in the development of early orthodox Reformed theology, especially on this controversial doctrine. Some scholars have claimed that Davenant's position was a forerunner of Amyraldianism in the seventeenth century. Others have argued that his view was different from Amyraldianism. However, no scholar has substantiated the latter argument based on Davenant's extensive writings as to how far Davenant's view on the extent of the atonement was distinct from the position of John Cameron, the Father of Amyraldianism. The contention of this thesis is that Davenant's views of predestination, the atonement and free-will were the main factors that affected his twofoldintention view, and they differed from the positions of John Cameron. The exposition of those doctrines by John Davenant both in his various writings and in his testimony at the Synod of Dort serve as the object of the investigation. Cameron's writings are also selectively investigated and his views on those doctrines are compared with Davenant's positions. The Canons of Dort are analysed in order to examine whether Davenant's doctrinal position is situated within the confessional orthodoxy in the early seventeenth century. Davenant's position on the universal aspect of the atonement was based on the universal proclamation of the Gospel. Davenant stressed the immutability of God's will for the elect. Cameron's view on the universal aspect of the atonement depended on the divine will for the salvation of every individual which could be frustrated due to human free choice. Since the decree of sending Christ preceded the decree of election according to Cameron's view on the order of the divine decrees, Cameron's view was different from Davenant's. Cameron held to a distinction between moral and physical ability and intellectual persuasion of the Holy Spirit upon the human mind. These things were not shared by Davenant. The conclusion arrived at is that Davenant's twofold-intention view was distinct from Cameron's hypothetical universalism. Thus this study substantiates the claim that Davenant was not a forerunner of Amyraldianism and his view was situated within the boundary of confessional orthodoxy codified in the Canons of Dort.

In this thesis, I ask whether reformed theology is compatible with guidance control. I conclude that they are compatible. The main areas of compatibility are fourfold. First, both deny the sourcehood condition. Second, both deny the alternative possibilities condition. Third, both are types of reasons-responsive theories. Finally, both have a similar subjectivist condition. This conclusion implies that the resources of guidance control can be constructively used, developed and applied by reformed theologians and philosophers. Guidance control can be applied to the debates on free will and moral responsibility as well as to ethics and other related fields.

Free will skepticism denies that humans possess the type of freedom required for moral responsibility (FMR). While not the most popular position in scientific, philosophical, or mainstream communities, I contend that this lack of acceptance is due not to flaws inherent in the position, but to misconceptions concerning its ethical and practical implications. In my dissertation, I endorse free will skepticism, beginning with a refutation of contrary positions, followed by a response to objections, and ending with a defense of social reforms necessitated by the denial of free will. Ultimately, I support Derk Pereboom's optimism that a global acceptance of free will skepticism would result in societies that are more moral, beneficial, and just than those which perpetuate the illusion of free will. Because of flaws in the alternative positions, I argue that free will skepticism is the most feasible view to hold regarding free will. Libertarianism, which denies causal determinism and purports that humans possess FMR, is not compatible with our current scientific understanding of the universe. On the other hand, while compatibilism accepts causal determinism, it retains free will only by relaxing the requirements for it. I explain why accepting a position contrary to science, or accepting weakened definitions of freedom, is both untenable and unnecessary. Some object to free will skepticism not because they found something inherently wrong with the logic of the position but because of practical concerns. Their arguments against free will skepticism assert that if such a view is accepted, society will unravel, interpersonal relationships will become compromised, personal identity will be undermined, and life would lose all meaning. However, largely inspired by Derk Pereboom's book "Living without Free Will," I will show why such misgivings are unfounded. Pereboom offers good reasons to believe that not only would society, relationships, identity, and meaning remain intact, but also that society would enjoy practical advantages by accepting free will skepticism. Furthermore, a society based on the belief in free will perpetrates grave injustices on its citizens, and beliefs in desert and blame fuel destructive reactive attitudes inimical to flourishing interpersonal relationships. The social advantages of accepting free will skepticism involve sweeping reforms necessitated by its acceptance. I discuss two such reforms pertaining to the institutions of punishment and parenthood. If those who commit immoral or illegal acts are not to blame for their transgressions, then our current system of punishment is unfair and unjust. There are alternative ways to cultivate a safe society without subjecting wrongdoers to desert-based penalties. Using an alternative model of justice, one that tailors a punitive response to the specific risks and needs of each perpetrator, would be far more effective than mere incarceration. Furthermore, since the root cause of criminality can, in many cases, be traced to childhood abuse or neglect, I argue that society should do more to ensure that incompetent parents are not raising children. Therefore, I advocate a licensing program for parents for the benefit of both future children, and for the safety of society. Building on the arguments of notable free will skeptics, I conclude that free will skepticism is the most scientifically defensible position, that the objections to it are unfounded, and that the benefits of accepting it surpass those of alternative positions. While a discussion of all ethical and practical implications would surpass the space allowed here, I hope that my limited discussion inspires more research and challenges the many misconceptions surrounding free will skepticism.

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