110f. / Submitted by Suelen Reis (suziy.ellen@gmail.com) on 2013-04-15T14:51:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Carlos Coelho Netoseg.pdf: 368379 bytes, checksum: 2c9ad4cfd6bb8d760c541ac931d2a6be (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-04-18T13:20:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Carlos Coelho Netoseg.pdf: 368379 bytes, checksum: 2c9ad4cfd6bb8d760c541ac931d2a6be (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-04-18T13:20:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Carlos Coelho Netoseg.pdf: 368379 bytes, checksum: 2c9ad4cfd6bb8d760c541ac931d2a6be (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Esta Dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a noção de crença sob o ponto de vista da epistemologia contida nas obras: Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigações Sobre o Entendimento Humano. Visamos particularmente a ressaltar a questão da constituição da crença enquanto condição para que haja alguma “evidência” na esfera dos fatos. Tendo em vista a ruptura entre necessidade e contingência por sua crítica à noção de causalidade, seria preciso mais que os fundamentos consolidados pela razão para garantir alguma evidência acerca do mundo. A razão consegue conceber claramente o fato contrário àquele revelado constantemente pela experiência, não havendo contradição na esfera da experiência. Dessa forma, é preciso procurar outros caminhos que possam explicar o fato de ainda termos alguma convicção a respeito dos fatos, apesar de não podermos mais contar com bases semelhantes às oferecidas pelas ciências matemáticas. Desse modo, procuramos nesta Dissertação reconstruir a trilha teórica que permitiu a Hume estabelecer uma epistemologia pautada numa particular constituição da experiência, na qual a necessidade não tem lugar e a garantia de certeza e conhecimento se sustenta em princípios gerais (princípios associativos) próprios da natureza humana e em uma faculdade (o hábito), capaz de levar a mente de um estado imediato, vinculado aos dados do sentido e da memória, a projeções futuras. Vem daí a capacidade da mente de esperar que os acontecimentos se dêem de uma maneira; tal expectativa é o que Hume denominou crença. / Salvador

Although many historians assert the unity of the Enlightenment, their histories essentially belie this notion. Consequently, Enlightenment history is confused and meaningless, urging the reader to believe that diversity is similarity and faction is unity. Fundamental among the common denominators of these various interpretations, however, are the scientific method and empirical observation, as introduced by Newton. These, historians acclaim as the turning point when mankind escaped the ignorance of superstition and the oppression of the church, and embarked upon the modern secular age. The Enlightenment, however, founders immediately upon its own standards of empiricism and demonstrable philosophical tenets, with the exception of David Hume. As the most consistent and fearless empiricist of the era, Hume's is by far the most "legitimate" philosophy of the Enlightenment, but it starkly contrasts the rhetoric and ideology of the philosophe community, and, therefore, defies attempts by historians to incorporate it into the traditional Enlightenment picture. Hume, then, exposes the Enlightenment dilemma: either the Enlightenment is not empirical, but rather the new Age of Faith Carl Becker proclaimed it, or Enlightenment philosophy is that of Hume. This study presents the historical characterization of major Enlightenment themes, such as method, reason, religion, morality, and politics, then juxtaposes this picture with the particulars (data) that contradict or seriously qualify it. As a result, much superficial analysis, wishful thinking, even proselytizing is demonstrated in the traditional Enlightenment characterization, especially with regard to the widely heralded liberal and progressive legacy of the era. In contrast, Hume's conclusions, based on the method of Newton-the essence of "enlightened" philosophy, are presented, revealing the authoritarian character (and legacy) of the Enlightenment as well as the utility and relevance of its method when honestly and rigorously applied. Through David Hume, the twentieth century can truly acquire what the Enlightenment promised—an understanding of human nature and a genuinely secular society.

Since the cognitive revolution during the last century the mind has been conceived of as being computer-like. Like a computer, the brain was assumed to be a physical structure (hardware) upon which a computational mind (software) was built. The mind was seen as a collection of independent programs which each have their own specific tasks, or modules. These modules took sensory input "data" and transduced it into language-like representations which were used in mental computations. Recently, a new conception of the mind has developed, grounded cognition. According to this model, sensory stimulus is saved in the original format in which it was received and recalled using association mechanisms. Rather than representations being language-like they are instead multimodal. The manipulation of these multimodal representations requires processing distributed throughout the brain. A new holistic model for mental architecture has developed in which the concerted activity of the brain's modal systems produces functional systems which are intimately codependent with one another. The purpose of this thesis is to explore both the modular and multimodal theories of mental architecture. Each will be described in detail along with their supporting paradigms, cognitivism and grounded cognition. After my expositions I will offer support for my own position regarding these two theories before suggesting avenues for future research.

School based administrators must often determine the use of potentially powerful computing resources for the school's instructional program. While site level administrators have allocated many kinds of resources within the schools, the allocation of this new technology has little precedent. A decision guide is proposed to assist site level administrators. This guide explores three major sources of information to assist the site level administrator in making computer-related allocations. First, the context of the school, such as the school profile, and the district plan for instructional use of microcomputers, forms a basis for investigating the allocation of computing resources. Second, because both access to and applications for instructional computing resources are critical issues, the moral dilemma of equity-excellence is examined. Finally, empirical information from the existing literature and from a possible school based research effort are analyzed. A procedure for using this information to make decisions is proposed. By weighing these three sources of information, it is contended that the administrator is better able to allocate potentially powerful computing resources. Woven into the decision guide are specific examples from one administrator's efforts to make decisions about word processing at an intermediate school. The context, equity-excellence issues, and empirical information are examined in this particular site to illustrate one application of the guide and to share findings about word processing as an instructional tool. / Ed. D.

William James denies consciousness as an entity and this rejection lies in the background of my thesis. I searched the main reasons for this rejection in his philosophy. Throughout this search, I perceived two modes of existence of consciousness, that is active and passive. As James improves his thoughts on consciousness over the main arguments of classical empiricists, I explained his radical empiricism and pragmatism in relation to them. It is difficult to answer whether we are completely active or passive in the ways of our thinking and behaving. However, although it includes some problems and inconsistencies, James&rsquo / s philosophy presents a more plausible explanation of our thinking than rationalism and empiricism, since it can appreciate the changes of our life in an unfinished world of pure experience. Therefore, my inquiry into the existence of consciousness in James depends on this plausibility of the main characteristics of radical empiricism in connection with the classical empiricists.

William James denies consciousness as an entity and this rejection lies in the background of my thesis. I searched the main reasons for this rejection in his philosophy. Throughout this search, I perceived two modes of existence of consciousness, that active and passive. As James improves his thoughts on consciousness over the main arguments of classical empiricists, I explained his radical empiricism and pragmatism in relation to them. It is difficult to answer whether we are completely active or passive in the ways of our thinking and behaving. However, although it includes some problems and inconsistencies, James&amp / #8217 / s philosophy presents a more plausible explanation of our thinking than rationalism and empiricism, since it can appreciate the changes of our life in an unfinished world of pure experience. Therefore, my inquiry into the existence of consciousness in James depends on this plausibility of the main characteristics of radical empiricism in connection with the classical empiricists.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Global human regionalization often depends heavily on conventions, especially the country model. Standardized “countries” are used as default regions, and influence other regionalizations as well. Proposed here is the preference for multiple independent systems of regions based on empirical criteria specific to each field of inquiry. These regions, defined by attributes of the landscape, would subsume formal and functional regions alike, as well as the very similar “trait geographies” and “process geographies”. Two specific inquiries are studied, politics and language; in both cases, existing data tend towards the conventional. A primary empirical regionalization for politics can be based on effective government control. A primary empirical regionalization for language can be based on mutual intelligibility of vernacular dialects. Examined in political geography are concepts of juridical and empirical statehood and the question of state territoriality; examined in linguistic geography are the question of language versus dialect and the standard reference ‘Ethnologue’.

In this project I outline the current discourse within feminist epistemology and elucidated its limitations of feminist epistemology particularly its lack of formal attention to the modes of theorization and, in complementarity, the generative potential of an analysis foregrounding materiality. The first chapter explores the theories that constitute the field of study and the relationships between both feminist empiricism and standpoint theory illuminate the conceptual concerns of feminist epistemology. Building from this, I present an analysis that examines the rhetorical and disciplinary structures that determine the kinds of arguments and methodologies that are possible within these frameworks. This argument simultaneously presents an analysis of theoretical formation as well as a critique of the lack of attention given to the rhetorical and formal scaffolds which render additional epistemic limitations perceivable. Lastly, I demonstrate a mode of knowledge production that centers materiality and body which exerts pressure on the very frameworks utilized in the analysis of materiality and embodiment. If materiality has the capacity to articulate relationships between knower and knowledges formed by the knower and formal elements of research has the capacity to render the limits of knowledges created from the research, then feminist epistemology should account for the formal and the material in its attempts to explicate the possibilities and limitations of epistemology.

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Le projet le plus général de Deleuze consiste en ceci : penser les conditions de l’expérience réelle, expérimenter les conditions de la pensée pure. Ce projet ne sera pleinement accompli qu’au début des années 1990, hors du cadre chronologique de notre étude (1953-1970). Nous soutenons la thèse que ce projet général non seulement repose sur un système philosophique précis, mais aussi qu’il se confond avec lui. Ce système se présente chez Deleuze sous différents noms : empirisme transcendantal, philosophie de l’expression, philosophie de la différence et de la répétition, logique du sens ou encore philosophie critique. Sous ces noms, nous croyons que c’est la philosophie comme système de l’expérience qui est en jeu. Deleuze n’oppose pas le système et l’expérience. Si la philosophie de Spinoza a longtemps été lue comme un système sans empirie, celle de Deleuze a surtout été interprétée comme un empirisme sans système. Certaines de ses déclarations nous invitent pourtant à penser autrement : le système n’est pas plus une construction logique abstraite que l’expérience n’est une réalité irréductible au système. La philosophie ne s’oppose donc pas à l’expérience chez Deleuze, elle en pense les conditions systématiques et elle est elle-même une expérience. C’est la genèse et la structure de cette philosophie que nous avons tenté de dégager dans cette recherche. Nous avons cru pouvoir montrer, non pas que le système et l’expérience sont une seule et même chose chez Deleuze, mais que la philosophie prétend atteindre au point où ils passent l’un dans l’autre. / The most general project of Deleuze consists in thinking the conditions of real experience, experimenting the conditions of pure thought. This project will only be eventually accomplished at the beginning of the nineties, that is to say after the period set for of our study (1953-1970). We defend the thesis that this general project is based upon a precise philosophical system, and above all, that it merges with it. This system, in Deleuze’s work, appears under different names: transcendental empiricism, philosophy of expression, philosophy of difference and repetition, logic of sense, or also critical philosophy. Under those names, we believe that philosophy as a system of experience is what is at stake. Indeed, Deleuze doesn’t oppose system and experience. If Spinoza’s philosophy has long been read as a system without an empiric dimension, that of Deleuze has mostly been interpreted as a non systematic empiricism. Yet some of his assertions lead us to think differently: the system is no more an abstract logical construction than experience is a reality irreducible to a system. Deleuze’s philosophy isn’t opposed to experience, it sets its systematic conditions and it is an experience in itself. It is the genesis and the structure of this philosophy that we have tried to expose in this research. Through this work, we believe we’ve managed to show that system and experience are not one and the same thing for Deleuze, but that philosophy claims it reaches the point where they become indiscernible.