A interpretação usual da obra de Rudolf Carnap, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (Aufbau),assentada sobretudo na sua leitura por parte de Goodman e de Quine na década de 50, toma-o como um projeto empirista de explicitação dos nexos lógicos entre os conceitos de diferentes domínios teóricos e \"o dado\". Essa interpretação minimiza o problema epistemológico, central no Aufbau, da legitimação (da justificação, da validade de jure) das pretensões de conhecimento das ciências factuais (Realwissenschaften, em contraposição às Formalwissenschaften). Ao examinar o projeto de Carnap como um projeto neotranscendental de justificação do conhecimento empírico, inverte-se a prioridade concedida ao esclarecimento conceitual entre as motivações do Aufbau. Na concepção de epistemologia que subjaz a esta abordagem do Aufbau, Hume e Kant, empirismo e racionalismo aparecem como representações estilizadas e simplificadas da polarização que se exerceu sobre Carnap frente a um tópico proposto pela tradição filosófica: o conhecimento empírico, as leis universais das ciências factuais, são ou não são passíveis de justificação racional (e de que modo)? Tal inversão permite entender as teses e os passos da teoria da constituição de Carnap de maneira a dar conta de forma coerente e sistemática de aspectos dessa obra que a maioria das análises trata de modo fragmentado e desconectado. Sob essa luz, são abordado temas como a escolha do instrumental formal da teoria da constituição, o papel da teoria das descrições definidas e do modelo das definições implícitas, a tese da extensionalidade, o estruturalismo, o formalismo, as pressuposições extrasistemáticas, a relação da ordem epistêmica com a ordem lógica, a distinção entre \"o sistema\" (na forma ideal em que o concebe a teoria da constituição) e o \"esboço provisório\" que Carnap propõe no Aufbau a título de exemplo. Quatro problemas principais que comprometem seriamente esse projeto de Carnap são examinados contra o pano de fundo da leitura epistemológica proposta. Os dois primeiros (suposições extra-sistemáticas e construção do tempo e do espaço) dizem respeito ao \"esboço provisório\", mas são dificuldades que não se devem ao estado provisório dos próprios conceitos científicos mas à incapacidade desse esboço de ater-se aos preceitos da teoria da constituição de que pretende ser uma aplicação. As duas dificuldades restantes (finitismo e decidibilidade, e caráter inteiramente formal do sistema) afetam a própria concepção do sistema ideal. Como desiderata da teoria da constituição, terminam por se revelar incompatíveis com traços fundamentais do conhecimento empírico de cuja preservação não é possível abrir mão sem descaracterizá-lo profundamente. O caráter original do projeto carnapiano de justificação racional completa e cabal de todo o conhecimento empírico termina portanto por conduzi-lo a posições incompatíveis com o próprio empirismo. Para preservar \"o caráter aberto e a inevitável incerteza de todo conhecimento empírico, Carnap abrirá mão do sistema único e total de conceitos científicos como garantia da objetividade e da possibilidade de comunicação, substituindoo, depois do Aufbau, pelo princípio de tolerância ou da convencionalidade das formas de linguagem / The usual interpretation of the work of Rudolf Carnap, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (Aufbau), rests on its reading by Goodman and Quine in the 50s, and takes it as an empiricist attempt to establish the logical connections between concepts of different theoretical domains and \"the given\". This interpretation minimizes the epistemological problem, central to the Aufbau, of the legitimation (justification, validity de jure) of the claims to knowledge of the factual sciences (Realwissenschaften, as opposed to Formalwissenschaften). By examining Carnap´s project as a project of neotranscendental justification of empirical knowledge, the priority given to conceptual clarification between the motivations of the Aufbau is reversed. In the conception of epistemology behind the new approach of the Aufbau, Hume and Kant, empiricism and rationalism appear as simplified and stylized representations of the polarization that is exerted on Carnap in his definition against a topic proposed by the philosophical tradition: the universal laws of empirical science are or are not capable of rational justification (and how)? This allows us to understand the arguments and the steps of Carnap\'s theory of constitution as coherent and systematic aspects of this work, often analysed in fragmented and disconnected ways. In this light, topics such as the choice of the formal instrumental of the theory of the constitution, the role of definite descriptions theory and of the use of implicit definitions, the thesis of extensionality, structuralism, formalism, extra- systematic assumptions, the relationship of epistemic and logic order, the distinction between \"the system\" (in the ideal way in which the theory of the constitution conceives it) and the \"tentative outline\" Carnap proposed in the Aufbau as an example are addressed. Four main problems which seriously undermine Carnap´s project are examined against the backdrop of the epistemological reading proposed. The first two (extrasystematic assumptions and construction of time and space) concern the \"tentative outline\", but they are not due to the provisional state of scientific concepts themselves but to the inability of this sketch to stick to the precepts of the theory of the constitution of which it aims to be an application. The two remaining difficulties (finitism and decidability, and the entirely formal character of the system) affect the conception of the ideal system. Being desiderata of the theory of the constitution, they will eventually prove incompatible with fundamental features of empirical knowledge of whose preservation one can not give up without deeply disfiguring it. The original character of the Carnapian project of a complete and full rational justification of all empirical knowledge thus ends by leading to a position incompatible with empiricism itself. To preserve the \"open character and the unavoidable uncertainty\" of all empirical knowledge, Carnap will then relinquish the unique and full system of scientific concepts as a guarantee of objectivity and of the possibility of communication, replacing it, after the Aufbau, by the principle of tolerance or conventionality of language forms

Orientador: Luiz Roberto Monzani / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-08T09:48:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MendonA§a_MariaMagdalenaCunhade_D.pdf: 1195890 bytes, checksum: 85621e781ac4392de410372167192caf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / Resumo: Este trabalho investiga a relevância da crítica humeana ao pensamento teleológico, a partir da análise crítica do argumento do desígnio exposta no texto dos Diálogos da Religião Natural e sua articulação com o projeto filosófico do autor. Objetiva-se mostrar que a reflexão de Hume a respeito da religião natural, não se reduz a uma espécie de querela entre teísmo e ateísmo, deixando claro o entrelaçamento existente entre a recusa do raciocínio finalista e a crítica ao determinismo teológico e científico, a fim de deixar evidente o distanciamento do filósofo escocês da metafísica, sobretudo, das filosofias das ciências e epistemologia. No texto dos Diálogos da Religião investiga-se também a estrutura argumentativa filosófica do autor no intuito de precisar o sentido dialético e referencial cético presentes na sua compreensão e uso singular do estilo dos diálogos e sua ruptura com o discurso filosófico da tradição, precisamente platÃ'nico-aristotélica. Em um segundo momento deste trabalho, precisamente no terceiro capítulo, a motivação maior consiste em reafirmar o tom radical da crítica humeana ao argumento do desígnio em que se investiga a articulação entre os textos dos Diálogos da Religião natural e o da História da Religião natural, procurando tornar clara a manutenção do padrão da contrariedade dialética no contraponto que Hume apresenta entre politeísmo e teísmo, bem como, a compatibilidade entre a postura de Hume na obra da História da Religião natural e a do expositor do ceticismo e crítico maior do argumento teológico no texto dos Diálogos, a saber, Philo. Além disso, ainda nesta parte do trabalho, busca-se localizar no conceito de contingências a expressão da crítica de Hume ao raciocínio teleológico da filosofia experimental da sua época, que pretende apoiar-se no postulado da análise observacional objetiva, da necessidade física da esfera natural e do agir humano. No quarto capítulo o intuito é o de analisar o duplo papel que desempenha o conceito de circunstancia no pensamento de Hume: elemento fundamental da sua visão de um cosmo antifinalista e linha mestra da sua ruptura com o pensamento teleológico presente nas reflexões tradicionais e moderna sobre os problemas morais. Detendo-se na análise da noção de valor , particularmente nas reflexões sobre o problema filosófico da felicidade, busca-se tornar clara a recusa de Hume à visão teleológica religiosa e científica em suas pretensões de padronização dos comportamentos humanos, ou â?¿formas de vidaâ??, enfim, da singularidade e diversidade das múltiplas formas de pensar, crer e viver de cada homem / Abstract: This work examines the relevance of the humean critique regarding the critical analysis of the argument of design ( purpose) exposed in the text of the Dialogues of Natural Religion and its articulation with the authorÂ's philosophical project. The object is to demonstrate that HumeÂ's reflection in regards to the natural religion does not confine itself to a kind of quarrel between theism and atheism, making clear the present intertwining between the refusal of the finalist reasoning and the critique to the theological and scientific determinism, in order to prove this scotch philosopherÂ's detachment from methaphysics, especially, from the philosophies of the sciences and the epistemology. The text of Dialogues of the Religion examines also the argumentative philosophical structure of the author with the purpose of determining the dialectic meaning and skeptical referential present in his comprehension and his singular utilization of style of dialogues and its rupture with the philosophical discourse of tradition, precisely platonic-aristotelian. In a second moment of this work, precisely on the third chapter, the major motivation consists of reaffirming the radical tone of the humean critique of the design in which it examines the articulation between the texts of the Dialogues of Natural Religion and of the Natural Religion History, endeavoring to make clear the maintenance of the pattern of dialectic contrariness in the counterpoint that Hume presents between polytheism and theism, as well as, the compatibility between HumeÂ's posture in the work History of Natural Religion and that of the exposer of skepticism and principal critic of the theological argument in the text of the Dialogues, that is, Philo. Besides, still in this part of the work, one endeavors to locate in the concept of the contingences the critical expression of Hume to the teleological reasoning of the experimental philosophy of his period , which intents to base itself in the postulate of the objective observational analysis, the physical necessity of the natural sphere, and of human acting. In the fourth chapter the intention is to analyse the double role played by the concept of contingence in HumeÂ's thinking . : fundamental element of his vision of an antifinalist cosmos and main support of his rupture with the current teleological thought in the traditional and modern reflections regarding the moral problems. Lingering on the analysis of the notion of value, particularly in the reflections about the philosophical problem of happiness, it intends to make clear the refusal of Hume to the religious and scientific teleological visions in their pretensions of standardizing the human behaviors, or ¨forms of life¨ in which it becomes evident, once again, the dialectical tone of his sceptical philosophy. Accompanying the dialectic argumentative structure present in the humean texts it endeavors to stress the difficulties that HumeÂ's dialectic-sceptic argumentative structure presents to natural religion and science in their normative and moralizing pretensions regarding the acting of individuals starting from the none in the least fortuitous abstraction of the singularity and diversity of the multiple forms of thinking , believing and living of every human being / Doutorado / Filosofia Moderna / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Eneias Junior Forlin / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-25T20:52:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Beluzzi_EthelPanitsa_M.pdf: 1711262 bytes, checksum: 02a4b78ee578bbb3eebcec23a78ce104 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: O objetivo do presente projeto de pesquisa consiste em analisar aquele momento fundamental na Estética Transcendental da Crítica da Razão Pura, onde Kant, ao aceitar a tese empirista de que só temos intuição sensível, transforma o espaço e o tempo em princípios a priori da sensibilidade do espírito humano, e assim possibilita, contra o empirismo, a fundação de um conhecimento sintético independente da experiência. O conhecimento efetivamente se inicia com a experiência, segundo Kant. Mas isso não significa de modo algum que todo ele derive da experiência, como afirmam filósofos da tradição empirista como Hume. Embora alguns filósofos como Locke e Hume tenham mesmo estabelecidos princípios do entendimento pelos quais temos experiência, ainda assim todo conhecimento derivava da própria experiência. Kant, entretanto, vai além: a razão não apenas organiza a experiência, como de certa forma a produz; ao retirar o espaço e o tempo das coisas e coloca-los como organizador de nossa percepção, Kant defende a existência desses princípios puros da sensibilidade e do entendimento, onde os princípios puros da sensibilidade produzem efet ivamente a experiência sensível: nossa percepção não é apenas mediada, mas inteiramente produzida pela nossa forma de conhecer; uma tese considerada pelo seu autor "tão certa e indiscutível quanto se pode exigir de uma teoria que deva servir de organon" [CRP A46 B63]. Desse modo, a Estética kantiana é capaz de minar o conceito de intuição sensível tal como pretendido pelos empiristas e manter as prerrogativas da razão / Abstract: The main objective of this research project consists in analyzing that fundamental moment in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of The Pure Reason, when Kant, accepting the empiricist thesis that we only have sensible intuition, transforms space and time into a priori principles of the sensibility of human mind, and therefore allows, against empiricism, the foundation of a synthetic knowledge independent from experience. Knowledge actually begins with experience, according to Kant. But that does not mean in any way that all of it derives from experience, like philosophers of the empiricist tradition such as Hume claim. Although some philosophers such as Locke and Hume have even established the existence of principles of the understanding through which we have experience, yet they assert all knowledge is derived from experience itself. Kant, however, goes further: reason not only organizes experience, but in certain ways produces it; taking away the space and time from things and putting them as organizers of our perception, Kant defends the existence of these pure principles of sensibility and understanding, where the pure principles of sensibility actually produce the sensible experience: our perception isn't only mediated, but entirely produced by our form of knowing; a thesis considered by it's author as "possess[ing] as undoubted a character of certainty as can be demanded of any theory which is to serve for an organon" [CRP A46 B63]. Thereby, the Kantian Aesthetic is capable of: undermining the concept of sensible intuition as intended by the empiricists and holding the prerogatives of reason / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestra em Filosofia

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This dissertation aims to investigate the moral theory of David Hume from his empirical method. In order that it is necessary to analyze his critique of rationalism and metaphysics as a method to moral foundation, the presentation of the empirical method as a possible theoretical foundation of morality and expose his moral theory in the context of his philosophical system. It is intended, therefore, to show that in Hume the reason by itself is insufficient to justify the moral, whose realization is possible only within the sensitivity. Similarly, the objective is to demonstrate that, although Hume s philosophy is skeptical concerning the metaphysical precepts and usual rationalist traditions, his understanding about morality is positive and intends to be universal. / A presente dissertação tem como objetivo investigar a teoria moral de David Hume a partir de seu método empírico. Para isso, é necessária a análise de sua crítica ao racionalismo e à metafísica como métodos para a fundamentação moral, a apresentação do método empírico como possibilidade de fundamentação teórica da moral e a exposição de sua teoria moral no contexto de seu sistema filosófico. Pretende-se, portanto, demonstrar por que em Hume a razão por si só é insuficiente para fundamentar a moral, cuja realização somente é possível no âmbito da sensibilidade. De forma semelhante, objetiva-se demonstrar que, embora se encontre em Hume uma filosofia cética em relação aos preceitos metafísicos e à tradição racionalista em geral, sua compreensão da moral é positiva e pretende-se universal

En quel sens les livres que Deleuze a écrits sur le cinéma sont-ils des livres de philosophie ? Dans une démarche généalogique, notre travail montre comment Deleuze « capture » de façons différentes les œuvres de quatre philosophes – Kant, Bergson, Peirce, Spinoza – afin de lui permettre d’avancer dans sa propre philosophie. A partir d’une rencontre avec le cinéma dans son ensemble, Deleuze prolonge sa réflexion sur l’empirisme transcendantal, reconsidère la question de l’image et des signes, revisite secrètement l’éthique de Spinoza afin de nous proposer une nouvelle éthique, qui ne répond plus à la question « Que peut un corps ? » mais à sa généralisation « Que peut une image ? ». Suivant la figure d’un spinozisme post-kantien que nous identifions chez Deleuze, le temps comme affect de soi par soi chez Kant équivaut aux auto-affections du second genre de connaissance chez Spinoza : le temps devient le lieu où se déploie la vie spirituelle dans l’attribut de la pensée. A la fois genèse de la sensibilité, cosmogonie, sémiotique et éthique, L’Image-mouvement et L’Image-temps construisent une génétique des puissances de l’image dont les œuvres singulières des cinéastes sont à la fois les jalons et les pierres de touche : la rencontre avec ces œuvres permet à la philosophie de Deleuze de subir l’épreuve du réel et de la faire bifurquer au gré des rencontres avec les pensées des cinéastes. Deleuze se sert du cinéma, qui devient la vérification expérimentale de sa philosophie, cependant que le cinéma « capture » Deleuze, et l’amène à tracer des cheminements de pensée inédits. Dans cette parade amoureuse, Deleuze est la guêpe, le cinéma l’orchidée. / To what extent are the books written by Deleuze about cinéma philosophy books ? Following a genealogical reasoning, our study shows how Deleuze “captures” in different ways the works of four philosophers – Kant, Bergson, Peirce, Spinoza – in order to get ahead in his own philosophy. From his encounter with cinema as a whole, Deleuze continues his reflection about transcendental empiricism, reconsidering the issue of image ands signs and secretly revisiting Spinoza’s ethics to offer a new system of ethics which no longer answers the question “What can a body live ?” but its generalization “what can an image live ?” Following the figure of a post-kantian spinozism that we have identified in Deleuze’s work, time as an affect of the self by the self in Kant’s philosophy can be equated with the self-affections of the second kind of knowledge in Spinoza’s work : time becomes the place where spiritual life can spread in the attribute of thought. Being at the same time a genesis of sensitivity, a cosmogony, semiotics and ethics, The Movement-image and The Time-image constitute a system of genetics of image powers of which film-makers singular creations are both the landmarks and the touchstones : Deleuze’s encounter with these movies allows his philosophy to undergo the test of the real and to make it change its course each time he meets a film-maker’s thinking. Deleuze uses cinema which becomes the experimental checking of his philosophy where as cinema “captures” Deleuze and leads him to open up new ways of thinking. In this mating display, Deleuze is the wasp and cinema is the orchid.

Brexit, a highly contested issue, sparked discussion on the future of not only the United Kingdom but also the European Union and its role as a political actor. The attempts to explain the phenomena have been plentiful, and within the discipline of political science, the discussion largely focuses on the political preferences of different identity groups. Brexit tends to be associated with European right-wing populism, Trump, and a cultural backlash towards liberal values. This study argues that this is far too strong of a simplification and that Brexit has deeper causes which cannot strictly be attributed to modern political trends. Britain has historically had great difficulties with its post-war role in Europe, and its reluctance to commit itself to Europe is far older than what current literature assumes. The study theorises that the preconditions for Brexit lie in the divergence of French and English liberalism and established that the UK is in far more agreement on the role of the EU in UK politics than at first glance. The Conflict lies between the UK and the EU, not within the UK itself, specifically how apolitical structure is made legitimate, and what it means to be a reluctant member of Europe.

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In December of 1896 William James (1842-1910) penned the preface to The Will to Believe & Other Essays in Philosophy, announcing his novel philosophy of radical empiricism. Nearly one hundred and twenty years later, the metaphysical themes of his mature radical empiricist writings (e.g., his 1904-05 writings posthumously published as Essays in Radical Empiricism) continue to dominate the interpretations of the secondary literature. “William James’s Early Radical Empiricism: Psychical Research, Religion, and the ‘Spirit of Inner Tolerance’” offers a revisionist reading that prioritizes the epistemic, moral, and social elements of James’s early radical empiricism in light of his concerns expressed in the 1896 preface. By focusing on a close textual analysis that aims to historically and thematically re-situate James’s radical empiricism within the context of his major and minor work in the 1880s through the late 1890s, I argue for a supplemental interpretation that emphasizes James’s epistemic sensitivity to the plight of the perceived “irrational” other. This project demonstrates that not only is James’s early radical empiricism concerned with epistemological matters of fact and perspective, but also their social and moral implications. It suggests that an alternative narrative is uncovered if we attend to particular historical, philosophical, and religious themes that reveal themselves as focal points of James’s work in the 1890s, particularly in the year 1896. By historicizing his 1890s defense of the epistemic underdog I develop the narrative that James’s early radical empiricism embraces all experience and that this is illustrated by his genuine interest in the point of view of the believer, the marginalized, and the “irrational” other. / Religion

Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)