Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Flavia Santos Arielo.pdf: 2225345 bytes, checksum: 99d70d569806b1db87e0fdc156e7b48e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12-05 / The investigation regarding the existence of evil in the world is confused by human existence. This investigation presents itself in a natural way to the theological world, practically referring to all religions-taking into consideration that the definition of good and evil are present in all of them. Also, in the philosophical field, from the Greek to the Contemporary, this is a theme that triggered many speeches and theories. The goal of this dissertation is to evaluate the evil from the cinematographic art, specifically using the film Antichrist, from the Danish director Lars Von Trier. For that reason, Philosophers and Theorists will be quoted from each religion that relates to the theme. With the unfolding of film plot, besides the evil, another two other references will be discussed: Theodicy and Gnosticism. Both the movie and the theme of evil allow for further reading and questioning of these tow concepts. It is indispensable to study those who try to justify God in respect to the evil in the world, hence the Theodicy theme, developed by the philosopher Leibniz, and that kept being debated for centuries. The Gnosticism starts the discussion from the cosmogenic and anthropogenic concepts. Viewed as one of the cults form primitive Christianity, Gnosticism spreads that the creation of the world and man was the act of an evil God. The analysis of the movie in question allows, through questioning in the characters dialogues and scenes, the relating of the problem of evil, Theodicy and Gnosticism in the world created by the Danish director / A investigação sobre a pertença do mal no mundo se confunde com a própria existência humana. Essa investigação se apresenta de forma natural ao mundo teológico, referente a praticamente todas as religiões - levando-se em consideração que as noções de bem e mal estão presentes em todas elas. Também no campo filosófico, dos gregos aos contemporâneos, é este um tema que incitou inúmeros discursos e teorias. O que se propõe nesta dissertação é avaliar o mal a partir da arte cinematográfica, especificamente tomando por objeto o filme Anticristo, do diretor dinamarquês Lars Von Trier. Para tanto, serão utilizados por princípios de pesquisa, filósofos e teóricos da religião que abarcaram o tema. Como desdobramento da história do filme, além do tema do mal e inserido nele, outros dois pontos referenciais serão sondados: a teodiceia e o gnosticismo. Tanto o filme quanto o tema do mal permitem leituras e indagações pertinentes a estes dois conceitos. É imprescindível estudar aqueles que tentaram justificar Deus perante a presença do mal no mundo, daí o termo Teodiceia, cunhado pelo filósofo Leibniz, e que continuou a ser debatido séculos adiante. O gnosticismo adentra a discussão a partir de suas concepções cosmogônica e antropogônica. Tido como uma das seitas do cristianismo primitivo, o gnosticismo difundia que a criação do mundo e do homem havia sido obra de um Deus maléfico. A análise do filme em questão permite, através dos questionamentos propostos nos diálogos, cenas e personagens, relacionar o problema do mal, da teodiceia e do gnosticismo ao mundo criado pelo diretor dinamarquês

Le De natura hominis de Némésius d’Émèse a surtout été étudié pour ses sources (Galien, Porphyre, Philopator) et pour son anthropologie. Il constitue pourtant l’un des apports les plus importants de la pensée chrétienne antique sur la question du destin, de l’autodétermination et de la providence, auquel ont notamment puisé Maxime le confesseur, Jean Damascène et Thomas d’Aquin. Notre étude a pour but de dégager la position de Némésius et son originalité au sein de la pensée patristique et face aux débats de la philosophie antique sur ces questions majeures. La première partie présente une contextualisation de l’œuvre et un status questionis sur sa datation, son plan, sa nature et ses destinataires, afin d’en dégager l’unité et la cohérence apologétique. La deuxième partie se propose, à travers la traduction commentée des chapitres 1 et 3, de manifester la logique interne du traité en relevant les éléments qui introduisent et préparent le traitement de la providence (place de l’homme au sein de l’univers, union de l’âme et du corps, ses origines et eschatologie). La troisième et dernière partie offre une traduction commentée des chapitres 35 à 43 spécifiquement consacrés au destin, à l’autodétermination et à la providence. De ces analyses, se dégage le profil d’une œuvre apologétique qui se distingue par la qualité de son approche philosophique, par la transcription au moyen de notions techniquement élaborées de l’idée chrétienne de la providence divine et par un intéressant développement sur la permission du mal et son sens dans le plan divin. / The De natura hominis of Nemesius Emesa has principally been studied for its sources (Galen, Porphyry, Philopator) and its anthropology. However, it is one of the most important contributions of ancient Christian thought on the question of destiny, self-determination and Providence, inspiring Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene and Thomas Aquinas. Our study aims to identify Nemesius’ position and originality in patristic thought, and among the debates of ancient philosophy on these major issues. The first part presents a contextualization of the work and status questionis on the date it was written, its plan, its nature and recipients, in order to identify its unity and apologetical coherence. The second part proposes, through the translation and the Commentary of Chapters 1 and 3, to show the internal logic of the work, emphasizing the elements that introduce and prepare the treatment of Providence (the place of man in the universe, the union of soul and body, its origins and eschatology). The third and final part offers a translation and a Commentary of chapters 35 to 43, specifically devoted to fate, self-determination and Providence. From this analysis, there emerges the profile of an apologetic work that is distinguished by the quality of its philosophical approach, the transcription of the Christian idea of divine Providence through technically developed notions, and an interesting development on the permission of evil and its meaning in the divine plan.

This dissertation grows out of the collapse of traditional Christian justifications for evil in the wake of Enlightenment critiques of religion and the atrocities of the twentieth century. Skeptical of teleological narratives that sought to domesticate suffering as part of a necessary plan - whether God's plan, or some more secularized ideal of progress - a generation of Critical Theorists adopted the concept of contingency as their central tool for political critique. Defined as the realm of chance, change, and the unnecessary, contingency serves for most contemporary thinkers to remind us that even seemingly natural categories, such as sex, race, and religion could have been otherwise. Yet in using contingency to make sweeping statements about the nature of history, scholars often overlook how contingency is understood on the ground by those who feel their bodies and identities abruptly made unstable. This project seeks to reground contingency in the specificity of human experience by returning to a neglected Christian tradition that understood contingency as a state of finitude, defined in contrast to the necessary, impassive God. For such thinkers, contingency was experienced most acutely in the sense of touch as it renders the body vulnerable to the external world and the passions as they ambush the soul. Accordingly, this work picks up at one of the last junctures before questions of history swept away the tactile, affective understanding of contingency: the end of the eighteenth century with the influence of Pietism on the Early German Romantics. This work draws this particular moment into conversation with the history of science, literature, and the anthropology of the senses, asking questions about the influence of shifting medical theories on the cultural understanding of touch; the historical ties between this version of contingency and theories of psychological pathology; and the relationship between literature and theology within this intellectual tradition. To focus those conversations, each chapter centers on a different situation in which a given thinker experiences contingency through touch or the passions. The opening chapter looks at Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling's 1813 philosophical fable, Ages of the World, which locates contingency in the uncaused, unconditioned - and ultimately pathological - desire for companionship of an omnipotent will at the beginning of time. The chapter argues that Schelling's depiction of the contingency of desire offers a phenomenology of loneliness that grows out of a broader engagement with the problem of evil. The second chapter turns to the argument of the poet Novalis (1772-1801) that we experience contingency as a form of wonder that connects us to a divine whole we can only asymptotically approach. This wonder, he thinks, is experienced most clearly through our physical contact with books that impress on us our inability to ever do more than touch upon fragments of knowledge, given the proliferation of texts in the wake of the printing press. The third chapter reads together Eugène Minkowski's phenomenology of lived space for the mentally ill with Jean Améry's essay on torture during the Third Reich. This chapter pushes against the optimism and revelatory nature of contingency in Novalis by following cases where contingency is experienced as violation through unwanted touch. The final chapter asks whether contingency is solely disruptive, or if it can be incorporated into lasting social structures, by exploring the work of Michel Serres (1930-present). It argues a model of contingency as "common tangency" underlies his environmentalism, leading him to urge the creation of a "natural contract" where humans combat global warming from recognition that they are in co-implicated contact with nature, much like lovers during sex.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar como a literatura gótica pode ser atemporal, subvertendo as mentes e conceitos de seus leitores. Partindo do contexto histórico e cultural em que The Monk se inseriu, esse trabalho visa levantar as questões e elementos tão fortemente reprimidos em nossa sociedade desde o final do século XVIII, como as idéias de mal, abjeção e expressão do eu, em um diálogo permanente com a teoria de Michel Foucault, David Punter, Julia Kristeva, entre outros. Desta forma, a análise do romance se dá paralelamente a uma crítica social, visto que a obra gótica tem por um de seus fins denunciar e deslocar a realidade social. Em última instância, será feita a análise algumas personagens do romance e sua respectiva importância na obra / The objective of the present dissertation is to show how gothic literature can be atemporal, subverting the minds and concepts of the readers. Starting from the historical and cultural context The Monk is inserted, this piece of work attempts to raise the issues and elements so strongly repressed in our society since the end of the 18th century, such as the concepts of evil, abjection and expression of the self, in a continuous dialogue with the theory of Michel Foucault, David Punter, Julia Kristeva, among others. This way, the romance is analysed concomitantly with social criticism, considering that gothic literature aims at denouncing and displacing the social reality. Finally, some characters and their respective relevance in the novel will be analysed

A presente tese aborda o tema da banalidade do mal e a vida do espírito em Hannah Arendt. Segue-se o fio condutor da reflexão da autora sobre o mal, cujo contexto político são os acontecimentos extremos do século XX. Com a expressão tempos sombrios evidencia-se o conceito de mal radical presente em Origens do Totalitarismo. Mostra-se que o mal radical, um conceito kantiano, para Hannah Arendt traduz o fato da redução de seres humanos a seres supérfluos que podem ser eliminados. Examina-se o conceito de banalidade do mal, suscitado por Arendt na obra Eichmann em Jerusalém. Apresenta-se, a partir do acusado Eichmann, o significado de banalidade do mal, com suas implicações para a ética. Seguem-se as reflexões de Arendt sobre o pensar, o querer e o julgar, faculdades da vida do espírito, para identificar os seus elementos definidores. O cuidado com o mundo trata especificamente do julgar e aponta que, para Arendt, o juízo de gosto kantiano fundamenta o juízo político que só pode ser exercido em comunidade. Por fim, considera-se que Eichmann é a metáfora do homem de massa contemporâneo e que Arendt, ao refletir sobre a banalidade do mal e colocá-lo como uma questão para a vida do espírito, nos convoca à responsabilidade para com o mundo que identificamos como uma ética do cuidado com o mundo / The present thesis treats the theme of the banality of evil and the life of the mind in Hannah Arendt. It follows the guiding principle of the authors reflection over evil, whose political context are the extreme events of the 20th century. The expression dark times shows the concept of radical evil present in the Origins of Totalitarianism. It is shown that the radical evil, a kantian concept, to Hannah Arendt translates the fact of reducing human beings to superfluous beings that can be eliminated. It examines the concept of the banality of evil, raised by Arendt in her Eichmann in Jerusalem. It presents, from the accused Eichmann, the meaning of the banality of evil, with its implications for ethics. It follows the reflections of Arendt on thinking, willing and judging, faculties of the life of the mind, to identify their defining elements. The care for the world leads specifically with the judging and points out that, for Arendt, the Kantian judgment of taste grounds the political judgment that can only be exercised in the community. Finally, it considers that Eichmann is the metaphor of the contemporary mass man and Arendt, reflecting on the banality of evil and putting it as a question for the life of the mind, summons us to responsibility for the world, that we have identified as an ethic of care for the world

<p><strong> </strong></p><p> </p><p>The concept of outsiders has been argued to be one of the main themes in childhood fairy tales in general and in J.K. Rowling's <em>Harry Potter</em> novels in particular. Severus Snape is one of the most evident outsider characters in the novels, described as an unpleasant, ugly man presented as a double agent with uncertain allegiances. When the truth is revealed, in the very last pages of the series, he is discovered to have been an undercover spy for the good side all along. This essay examines Snape as an outsider, and analyzes his effect on the novel, especially his relation to the three characters with whom he interacts most: Dumbledore, Voldemort and Harry. All three of these characters are main characters and are also outsiders themselves in different ways. Examining the relations between good and evil and showing that these concepts are closely tied to choices and reactions towards being an outsider, the essay argues that the analysis of Snape as an outsider helps distinguish between aspects of good and evil in the novel. By focusing on Snape and the concept of the outsider, different dimensions of the novels become visible. Snape is here an instrumental character on his own, and may well be seen as the main character. Although the series in some aspects has been described as a fairy tale, the complex character of Severus Snape gives the novels a further depth appealing not only to children, but to adults as well.</p>

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [56]-68).

Augustine of Hippo argues that all suffering is the result of the punishment of sin. Misinterpretations of his meaning are common since isolated statements taken from his works do give misleading and contradictory impressions. This dissertation assembles a comprehensive account of Augustine’s understanding of the causes of suffering to show that these views are substantive and internally consistent. The argument of the dissertation proceeds by confronting and resolving the apparent problems with Augustine’s views on sin and punishment from within the broader framework of his anthropology and metaphysics. The chief difficulty is that Augustine gives two apparently irreconcilable accounts of suffering as punishment. In the first, suffering is viewed as self-inflicted because sin is inherently self-damaging. In the second, God inflicts suffering in response to sin. This dissertation argues that these views are united by Augustine’s concern with the theme of ‘order.’ The first account, it argues, is actually an expression of Augustine’s doctrine that evil is the privation of good; since good is for Augustine synonymous with order, we can then see why he views all affliction as the concrete experience of disorder brought about by sin. This context in turn allows us to see that, by invoking the notion of divinely inflicted punishment in both its retributive and remedial forms, Augustine wants to show that disorder itself is embraced by order, either because disorder itself must obey laws, or because what is disordered can be reordered. In either case, Augustine’s ideas of punishment may be seen as an expression of his conviction that order in the universe is unassailable. It is hoped that these observations contribute to a greater appreciation not only of Augustine’s theory of punishment, but also of the extent to which the theme of order is fundamental to his thought.

Augustine of Hippo argues that all suffering is the result of the punishment of sin. Misinterpretations of his meaning are common since isolated statements taken from his works do give misleading and contradictory impressions. This dissertation assembles a comprehensive account of Augustine’s understanding of the causes of suffering to show that these views are substantive and internally consistent. The argument of the dissertation proceeds by confronting and resolving the apparent problems with Augustine’s views on sin and punishment from within the broader framework of his anthropology and metaphysics. The chief difficulty is that Augustine gives two apparently irreconcilable accounts of suffering as punishment. In the first, suffering is viewed as self-inflicted because sin is inherently self-damaging. In the second, God inflicts suffering in response to sin. This dissertation argues that these views are united by Augustine’s concern with the theme of ‘order.’ The first account, it argues, is actually an expression of Augustine’s doctrine that evil is the privation of good; since good is for Augustine synonymous with order, we can then see why he views all affliction as the concrete experience of disorder brought about by sin. This context in turn allows us to see that, by invoking the notion of divinely inflicted punishment in both its retributive and remedial forms, Augustine wants to show that disorder itself is embraced by order, either because disorder itself must obey laws, or because what is disordered can be reordered. In either case, Augustine’s ideas of punishment may be seen as an expression of his conviction that order in the universe is unassailable. It is hoped that these observations contribute to a greater appreciation not only of Augustine’s theory of punishment, but also of the extent to which the theme of order is fundamental to his thought.

Kant denies that evil qua evil can be an incentive to human beings. Is this a fact about what sorts of reasons human beings find interesting? Or, is it rooted entirely in Kant’s notion of human freedom? I focus on key facets of Kant’s system: human freedom, immorality and incentives. With an understanding of these concepts based in Christine Korsgaard’s reading of Kant’s moral theory, I argue that the impossibility of acting solely from evil qua evil is not rooted in human incentives and that if we were able to represent an unconditioned principle of immorality, we would have as powerful an incentive to act in accordance with it as we do to act in accordance with the categorical imperative. Finally, I argue that the impossibility of human beings’ having evil qua evil as an incentive is grounded in the limited nature of our positive conception of freedom.