Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Zürich, 1935. / No more published? Includes bibliographical references (p. [xix]-xxxvi).

[pt] Os grupos empresariais possuem diversas participações societárias. Essas sociedades constituem pessoas jurídicas próprias, contudo, coletivamente, são coordenadas e controladas por uma holding. A Governança de Participação Societária é o sistema pelo qual as participações são dirigidas e monitoradas. Esse sistema monitora, também, o relacionamento, a legitimidade e a interação entre a holding e demais partes envolvidas. Seu objetivo principal é garantir o compliance dos administradores das sociedades com os interesses do acionista, assim como mitigar o desalinhamento de interesses entre ambos. Diante disso, este trabalho buscou identificar os fatores críticos para a redução do conflito de agência entre holding e suas controladas. Para tanto, foi realizada uma pesquisa qualitativa, com base em estudo de caso em empresa brasileira de grande porte, com atuação nacional e internacional. Foram realizadas, em Novembro e Dezembro de 2011, no Rio de Janeiro, 10 entrevistas com especialistas (gestores da holding e administradores das participações), com objetivo de analisar os pressupostos formulados a partir do levantamento bibliográfico realizado. Assim, o trabalho fornece uma visão do sistema de relação envolvendo holding e participações. Além disso, ilustra; i) a existência de compartilhamento de papéis entre holding e suas controladas; ii) o alinhamento e a conformidade legal como princípios adicionais nessa relação; iii) o papel de patrocinador, orientador e estruturador da alta administração da holding neste processo e o alinhamento realizado por meio de pessoas, processos e mecanismos de controle; iv) a Assembleia, Conselho, Diretoria, Conselho Fiscal e Auditoria nesse contexto; e vi) a segregação de identidade como princípio. / [en] Modern business groups have dozen or even hundred companies. These companies are legal entities despite they are controlled and coordinated by a holding company. Subsidiary Governance is the management system by which these companies are driven and monitored. This system also monitors the relationship, legitimacy and iteration with the holding and other stakeholders involved in this system. Its main objectives are (i) to assure the compliance of Board of Director and Executive Committee decisions with shareholder’s concernments, and (ii) the misalignment of interests between the shareholder and the Board/Committee mitigation. This study aims to identify the critical factors for reducing the agency conflict between holding companies and its subsidiaries. It was developed a qualitative research based on case study supported by ten executive interviews in order to analyze the assumptions formulated from the bibliographical review. These executives work for a large Brazilian group with national and international subsidiaries and the interviews were realized in Rio de Janeiro during November and December 2011. Thus, this research provides an insight into the system involving holding and subsidiaries and the: i) existence of sharing of roles between holding company and its subsidiaries; ii) alignment and legal compliance as additional principles in this relation; iii) role of sponsor, advisor and structuring of the holding Board/Committee in this process and the aligning made by people, processes and control mechanisms; iv) the General Meeting, Board of Directors, Executive Committee and Audit in this context; and vi) segregation of identity as a principle.

3 pp. / Originally published: 2000

No description available.

Using the U.S. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act ("GLBA") as a model, I argue that this act of financial reform, promulgated in November 1999, is a result of "Re-regulation", rather than "Deregulation" as suggested by most scholars. I emphasize the linear development of the GLBA, from 'regulation' to 'deregulation' and then further to 're-regulation'. This linear direction denotes sequential regulatory development that concerns the gradual relaxation of permissible banking activities, which is correspondingly marked by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and the GLBA of 1999. The GLBA enabled the U.S. financial services industry to begin offering all round financial services under the single roof of the Financial Holding Company("FHC"). The GLBA's mandate is to provide the U.S. financial services industry with a level playing field and allow them to compete with their strongest rivals from th eEuropean Union. European Union banks already operate under a liberal regime, following the success of the Second Banking Directive of 1989 that embraces financial liberalization. Taiwan's Financial Holding Company Act ("FHCA"), promulgated in July 2001,owes much of its content to its U.S. counterpart, the GLBA. Taiwan's FHCA is basically modeled after the U.S. GLBA but selectively adopts parts of the E.U. model. The U.S. model is represented by the GLBA while the E.U. model is represented by the Second Banking Directive. Through cross-selling and cross-marketing, financial holding companies in the U.S. model and universal banks in the E.U. model, both can achieve economies of scale and scope. This dissertation is otherwise devoted to providing a comparative analysis on certain key elements of the U.S. GLBA and Taiwan's FHCA, although I sometimes refer to the E.U.'s Second Banking Directive. I conclude that while Taiwan's FHCs lack the economic scale of U.S. FHCs, the adoption of the U.S. model in the FHCA offers Taiwan's FHCs better fire wall protection than the E.U. model would. More generally speaking, there are pros and cons to Taiwan's adoption of the GLBA. The GLBA and by extension the FHCA require its domestically established FHCs be pure holding companies, as opposed to the E. U. model which requires the parent companies (universal banks) to also be operating holding companies.

Recent trend of globalization has lead financial industry to an increasingly competitive environment. In respond to intensify market competition, mergers and acquisition (M&A) amounts financial institutions to become the strategic choice for firms to increase their market power. The trend also adds pressure on local financial institutions of Taiwan to improve their competitiveness for their global position. The result of it was the establishment of financial holding companies (FHC) to utilizes the use of resources and to achieve the economic of scale through M&A between companies. Therefore the market will weight more heavily on FHC and a tendency of continues M&A is expected for the next several years. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the performance of fourteen FCFs of Taiwan by looking their financial profitability, operating efficiency and asset quality and strategic resource allocation performance; the results are summarized as followed: 1.When look at the financial profit performance, Cathay FHC has the best performance therefore it ranks top of the list, and Chine Development FHC has the worse result and ranked at bottom of the list. 2.If look at from operating efficiency and asset quality¡¦s prospective, Chine development FHC, Taishin FHC and Shin Kong FHC are the top three amounts fourteen FHC of Taiwan. 3.To performance better in strategic performance ranking were associated with more diversified in subsidiaries of FCFs or FCFs which has less market shares. 4.In combine of the three performance measurements, Cathay FCF, Chinatrust FCF and Taishin FCF are the top three FCFs amount the fourteen and Chine Development FCF, Jin Sun FCF and Waterland FCF are rank as bottom three for their poor performance.

Using the U.S. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act ("GLBA") as a model, I argue that this act of financial reform, promulgated in November 1999, is a result of "Re-regulation", rather than "Deregulation" as suggested by most scholars. I emphasize the linear development of the GLBA, from 'regulation' to 'deregulation' and then further to 're-regulation'. This linear direction denotes sequential regulatory development that concerns the gradual relaxation of permissible banking activities, which is correspondingly marked by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and the GLBA of 1999. The GLBA enabled the U.S. financial services industry to begin offering all round financial services under the single roof of the Financial Holding Company("FHC"). The GLBA's mandate is to provide the U.S. financial services industry with a level playing field and allow them to compete with their strongest rivals from th eEuropean Union. European Union banks already operate under a liberal regime, following the success of the Second Banking Directive of 1989 that embraces financial liberalization. Taiwan's Financial Holding Company Act ("FHCA"), promulgated in July 2001,owes much of its content to its U.S. counterpart, the GLBA. Taiwan's FHCA is basically modeled after the U.S. GLBA but selectively adopts parts of the E.U. model. The U.S. model is represented by the GLBA while the E.U. model is represented by the Second Banking Directive. Through cross-selling and cross-marketing, financial holding companies in the U.S. model and universal banks in the E.U. model, both can achieve economies of scale and scope. This dissertation is otherwise devoted to providing a comparative analysis on certain key elements of the U.S. GLBA and Taiwan's FHCA, although I sometimes refer to the E.U.'s Second Banking Directive. I conclude that while Taiwan's FHCs lack the economic scale of U.S. FHCs, the adoption of the U.S. model in the FHCA offers Taiwan's FHCs better fire wall protection than the E.U. model would. More generally speaking, there are pros and cons to Taiwan's adoption of the GLBA. The GLBA and by extension the FHCA require its domestically established FHCs be pure holding companies, as opposed to the E. U. model which requires the parent companies (universal banks) to also be operating holding companies.

No description available.

München, Jur. Diss. v. 24. Jan. 1941. (Nur in beschr. Anzahl f.d. Austausch.). / Bibliography: p. ]123]-125.

Thesis--University of Florida. / Description based on print version record. Typescript. Vita. Bibliography: leaves 139-143.