A opção pela forma federativa de governo importa em compromisso com a existência de mais de um ente responsável, em territórios sobrepostos, pela realização das tarefas de arrecadação e gasto público, além de suas inerentes atividades políticas. O exercício dessas tarefas pode ser definido com rigor, em um regime dual, ou com possibilidade de auxílios mútuos, em um regime de cooperação. O Brasil adotou, como cláusula pétrea em sua Constituição, a forma de federação cooperativa, estruturada em três níveis de governo, tendo como consequência a divisão de competências materiais entre os componentes dessa federação. Apesar disso, os Tribunais brasileiros têm insistido em sustentar a tese de solidariedade obrigacional entre todos os entes federados em processo que tenham por objeto o controle de políticas públicas sociais. A imposição dessa obrigação solidária, além de desrespeitar a estrutura federativa e afrontar os princípios da efetividade e economicidade da administração com sobreposições e sobrecargas que facilitam o desperdício de verbas e a corrupção ainda não atenta para a regra de ouro da imposição de solidariedade obrigacional, que é a menção expressa em dispositivo legal ou constitucional. Conforme será demonstrado, as decisões proferidas pelos Tribunais nacionais em sede de controle jurisdicional de políticas públicas vem ignorando todo o arcabouço jurídico acerca do tema, além de impor aos entes federados desnecessária dificuldade de gestão de suas competências e de seus recursos financeiros. A defesa de responsabilidades divididas, porém, poderia gerar efeitos nefastos. É que, em sede processual, a demanda ajuizada em face do ente não diretamente responsável pela execução da política pública questionada poderia ser extinta sem resolução do mérito, impondo atrasos à efetivação de direitos sociais decorrentes de óbices processuais. Como os direitos fundamentais categoria na qual estão inseridos os direitos sociais exigem efetivação imediata e são sindicáveis judicialmente a partir dos comandos genéricos dados pela Constituição, foi preciso recorrer a uma técnica antiga já prevista no Brasil, porém mal compreendida de integração subjetiva da demanda por ordem do juiz, a intervenção iussu iudicis. Para evitar a repetição de erros, será refeito o caminho histórico de surgimento e desenvolvimento dessa técnica para melhor compreensão de seus escopos. / The option for the federal form of government matter commitment to the existence of more than one entity responsible, in overlapping territories, for performing the tasks of public collection and spending beyond their inherent political activities. The exercise of these tasks can be defined rigorously, in a dual system, or with the possibility of mutual aid, in a regime of cooperation. Brazil has adopted as entrenchment clause in its Constitution, a cooperative federation, structured in three levels of government, resulting in the division of powers between the material components of this federation. Nevertheless, the Brazilian Courts insisted on supporting the thesis of a mandatory solidarity among all federal entities in the suits whose purpose is the control of public policies. The imposition of such solidarity, besides disregarding the federal structure and defy the principles of effectiveness and economy of administration - with overlays and overloads that facilitate waste of money and corruption - not attentive to the golden rule imposing mandatory solidarity, which is the expressly stated in law or constitutional provision. As will be shown, the decisions handed down by national courts in the seat of judicial control of public policies has ignored the whole legal structure of the topic, and impose to federal entities an unnecessary difficulty in managing their skills and their financial resources. The defense of divided responsibilities, however, could generate adverse effects. Is that in procedural field, a suit filed in the face of an entity not being directly responsible for the execution of the questioned public policy demand could be terminated without resolution, imposing delays to the realization of social rights under procedural obstacles. As fundamental rights - the category in which they belong social rights - require effective immediately be investigated and are chargeable from generic commands given by the Constitution, it was necessary to resort to an old technique - already foreseen in Brazil, but poorly understood - a subjective integration demand by the judge\'s order, the intervention iussu iudicis. To avoid repeating mistakes, will be redone historical path emergence and development of this technique to better understand their scopes.

Prior to the current constitutional dispensation, the development of South African administrative law was restricted by the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Even in that comparatively 'hostile' environment, review for unreasonableness developed as an aspect of judicial review, and was applied as a check on the exercise of administrative power in certain circumstances. The principle of proportionality as an aspect of review for unreasonableness also developed during this period. With the advent of the new Constitutional dispensation, the framework within which administrative law in South Africa operates became one governed by Constitutional Supremacy. The Rights to Just Administrative Action, including a right to reasonable administrative action, were entrenched in the Constitution. Review for unreasonableness is an important aspect of administrative law in the present Constitutional dispensation as the mechanism for protecting the Constitutional right to reasonable administrative action. Proportionality is an important principle underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole, and it is an important aspect of the right to reasonable administrative action, and of review for unreasonableness. In early 2000, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000 ("the PAJA"), was passed by Parliament in fulfillment of the Constitutional requirement to pass legislation to give effect to the constitutional rights to Just Administrative Action. This thesis examines whether or not review for unreasonableness, and proportionality as an aspect of review for unreasonableness, have been meaningfully incorporated in the PAJA, and if they have not been, what potential remedies there might be. This is done by examining the basis of judicial review both before and under the current constitutional dispensation; defining unreasonableness, and proportionality; examining the content of the right to administrative action which is "justifiable in relation to the reasons given" in section 24(d) of the Interim Constitution and the right to reasonable administrative action in terms of section 33(1) of the Final Constitution; examining the application of review for unreasonableness and proportionality by the Courts both before and under the current constitutional dispensation; examining the content of judicial review incorporated in the PAJA and the drafting history of section 6(2) of the PAJA which relates to review for unreasonableness; drawing conclusions regarding whether or not review for unreasonableness and proportionality were meaningfully incorporated in the PAJA; and finally making recommendations with regard to review for unreasonableness and proportionality in light of the provisions of the PAJA.

Grounding its approach in historical and discursive institutionalist frameworks, this thesis examines the process of judicial review through an evaluation of Hogg et al.’s Charter dialogue hypothesis as it pertains to judicial invalidation of sections of the Charter of the French Language (CFL) and the legislative sequels produced by the National Assembly of Quebec (i.e. Bills 178 and 86). When examined from an historical institutionalist perspective, the National Assembly of Quebec appears to have strategized its response through an assertion of parliamentary sovereignty, rather than the desire to engage in a “dialogue” with the Supreme Court of Canada. However, a closer examination of how the Bourassa government crafted Bill 178 reveals that the first ‘legislative response’ to the Supreme Court’s decision in Devine and Ford was crafted exclusively by the executive branch, in virtual secrecy among a handful of Bourassa’s cabinet members. Displeased with the outcome of Bill 178, Anglophone civil society actors challenged the legitimacy of the CFL, as well as the notwithstanding mechanism at an international level, with their submission of Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v. Canada to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC). In 1993, the UNHRC ruled that Bill 178 violated sections of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The UNHRC’s decision eventually pressured the National Assembly of Quebec to amend Bill 178 with the passage of Bill 86, and consequently brought the Supreme Court’s remedies into partial effect. However, Quebec’s subsequent amendment to the CFL, Bill 86, was not a “legislative sequel” in response to judicial nullification; rather it was primarily a response to comply to international human rights norms. Bill 86 amended sections 58 and 68 of the CFL, but contrary to the recommendations of linguistic equality set forth by the Supreme Court, the Bourassa government ensured that French remained the predominant language on signage. The evidence in this thesis suggests that Charter compliance was an almost secondary effect caused by the primary objective of Quebec’s adherence to international human rights norms for the purpose of continued participation in international affairs. In its rejection of the Charter dialogue model, this thesis uncouples the pairing of the notwithstanding clause with the notion of parliamentary sovereignty and, in doing so, raises critical questions regarding the roles of the provincial executive and legislative branches during the process of constitutional interpretation. This thesis concludes that in lieu of Charter dialogue, a modified version of Baker’s model of coordinate interpretation is a more appropriate model of judicial review for summarizing the interaction of actors within the case studies of Bills 178 and 86.

In the twentieth century, a dynamic expansion of its activities and powers has made government a major supplier of information on an enormous range of topics of concern to citizens. Unfortunately, the information which it provides is not always completely reliable: sometimes it is inaccurate, and government is powerless to protect the citizen from the consequences; at others, it proves misleading because government chooses later to disown it. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the legal remedies available to citizens misled by government information. The analysis has two principal areas of investigation. First, consideration is given to the means whereby the citizen may be able to hold government bound by information which it has provided to him. Separate treatment is given to the situations in which the misleading information deprives the citizen of a benefit or inflicts on him a loss, and in which it subjects him to the risk of criminal liability. Secondly, consideration is given to the possibility of holding government responsible in damages for the consequences of its information being misleading. Of central importance in this wide-ranging analysis is the issue of the proper role of the courts. This stems from the fact that complaints about misleading government information frequently involve challenges to government decisions. Thus the majority of attempts by citizens to hold government bound by its information are generated by the making by government itself of a decision inconsistent with that information. Again, attempts to hold government responsible in damages for the consequences of providing misleading information commonly involve an allegation that a particular government decision relating to the provision of that information was negligent. It is emphasized throughout this thesis that the courts should refuse assistance to a citizen whose complaint of misleading government information is directed essentially towards a government decision, where that decision involves a determination of the priority of competing interests and values represented in society. The provision of a remedy in such a case would enable the courts effectively to review the choices embodied in value-laden government decisions, and as such would facilitate an unwarranted extension of their constitutional role. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

The advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms signaled a new and vastly expanded role for the judiciary. By entrenching our civil liberties into the Canadian Constitution, the courts were given the express authority to override inconsistent statutes. Due to the inherent overlap between law and politics, election law is an area that is particularly sensitive to this recent enlargement of judicial power. Despite this, the courts have scrutinized many areas of election law and many federal and provincial statutes have been fundamentally altered. The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the courts have developed a uniform theory of judicial review where election law is concerned via four case studies: electoral boundary redistribution, prisoner voting rights, the publication of opinion polls during campaigns and third party spending limits. Through an extensive review of the relevant case law and literature, I conclude that the courts have failed to develop a coherent and consistent theory judicial review regarding the application of the Charter to election law. My analysis reveals that the inconsistencies stem largely from three main sources: first is the failure of the courts to adopt a single vision of what constitutes a fair electoral system; second is that the case studies are dealing with two different sections of the Charter (ss. 2(b) and 3); and third is the Oakes test which has expanded judicial discretion along with the potential for disparity. If consistency is ever going to be achieved, the courts need to adopt a single vision of democracy in Canada. Until then, we are left to guess when our political rights may be justifiably restricted under the Charter. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The Court of justice of the European Union as an Administrative Court The aim of this thesis is to analyse the role of the Court of Justice of the EU as an administrative court with respect to the defined characteristics of administrative justice. The issue of administrative justice at the EU level is defined in relation to individuals (natural or legal persons) as non-privileged applicants. The first introductory chapter defines theoretical concepts and specifications of administrative justice which are necessary for further analysis. After a short introduction, the second chapter is focused on the analysis of the historical development and ongoing reforms of the Court of Justice of the EU in relation to its function as administrative court (institutional aspect), while identifying the French administrative justice model as a key inspiration for the initial model of judicial review. The issues of the ongoing reforms are important not only to describe the development of the Court of Justice as an administrative court, but can also serve as an inspiration for solving current problems of national administrative courts. The third chapter deals with the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of EU with regard to proceedings initiated by individuals' actions (material aspect). Furthermore, actions for...

The decision to adopt a formalized charter of rights is a momentous expression of a nations commitment to according and protection certain rights for its citizens. They usually contain complex and ambiguous moral concepts about which people have good faith disagreements. This thesis examines and ultimately rejects the belief put forward by Jeremy Waldron that judicial review is only democratically justifiable if the power of the last word in the interpretation of statutes and charter rights belongs to the democratically appointed legislature instead of the appointed judiciary. This thesis argues that a procedural conception of democracy is too limited and we would do better to base a justification of judicial review using a constitutional conception of democracy. It matters less which party has the authority of the final say with respects to rights-determining decisions and more on whether or not the democratic principle of equal concern for all is satisfied. This thesis introduces the concepts of deference, constitutional conventions, and principles and argues that these, among other things, will inform the constitutional theorists about which powers are actually present in a practice of judicial review. Once the contours of the practice are filled out one can then begin to deliberate about whether a particular conception of judicial review has democratic justification. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

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In this thesis, I attempt to justify the use of foreign precedent in Supreme Court constitutional cases and respond to various criticisms that have been brought forth. There are many critics of this process, as it is typically thought that Supreme Court Justices ought to look to their own domestic constitution and history of precedent when deciding cases. One of the critiques that I highlight is that the process is undemocratic and I respond to this by showcasing a distinction between procedural and constitutional conceptions of democracy. As well, I attempt to justify the process by showing how the utilization of foreign precedent can actually help judges uphold important values that we cherish in a constitutional democracy. I also attempt to do this for those who do not endorse the constitutional conception of democracy, by distinguishing between a community’s moral opinions and true moral commitments. I also examine two landmark cases Roper v. Simmons and Lawrence v. Texas, in order to establish the reasons that judges utilize foreign precedent; namely, as a source of further legal information and not due to any binding requirement. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)