The purpose of this essay is to increase the understanding of the discussion of political obligation. This concern the questions if, how, and to what extent people are required to obey state commands. More specifically the purpose is to increase the understanding of one of the topics main theories, the natural duty of justice. This account states that people have a natural duty to comply with just institutions that apply to them, independent of any voluntary actions.  For this a discourse surrounding the theory has been examined and evaluated. It consists of Rawls argument for the theory, a criticism formulated by Simmons, and a defence formulated by Waldron. Rawls argues that for a just society to be stable, the natural duty of justice is necessary, and also sufficient for basing political obligations. Simmons criticises this account for dispensing of voluntary actions that he sees as necessary for political obligation. Without these, the application of just institutions is morally insignificant. Waldron then defends the account by adding additional requirements for institutions to apply, besides justice. Institutions also have to be effective, in the sense that they are able to enact justice, and legitimate in the sense that they are preferable to other alternatives.  I will argue that justice of institutions is necessary but insufficient for them to apply to people. Voluntary actions like consent will also be argued to be unnecessary for institutions application to be morally significant. If institutions are not only just but also effective and legitimate, in the sense that they are the most just and effective in relation to the viable alternatives, then their application and commands has moral significance. The conclusion of this essay then is that the natural duty of justice can account for political obligations, given high demands for institutions to apply.

Jeremy Waldron est un penseur d’origine néozélandaise s’intéressant aux rapports entre les législatures et les cours de justice. Tout au long de sa carrière, il a publié des articles critiquant la révision judiciaire et défendant la « dignité de la législation. » Ses travaux l’ont amené à s’opposer à H. L. A. Hart, à John Rawls ainsi qu’à Ronald Dworkin, et lui ont attiré de nombreuses critiques, entre autres celles de Richard Stacey et de Cécile Fabre. Sa thèse est qu’en vertu du droit de participation du peuple à la vie politique, ce dernier ne devrait pas être laissé hors de prises de décisions touchant à ses droits. Les cours de justice n’ayant pas de légitimité populaire, elles devraient s’effacer devant la volonté du peuple transmise par la législature. S’appuyant sur des penseurs classiques comme Aristote, Locke et Kant, Waldron démontre le surprenant soutien de ces derniers aux thèses de la sagesse populaire, de la primauté de la législation et de l’obéissance à la loi. Le présent mémoire a pour but d’explorer cette théorie originale et de la confronter à ses critiques. Après avoir, dans le premier chapitre, réuni les éléments nécessaires à une compréhension de l’argument participatif contre la révision judiciaire, nous nous intéresserons, dans le second, à un certain nombre d’arrêts des cours des États-Unis, du Canada et du Royaume-Uni, ce qui nous aidera à mieux saisir comment les juges perçoivent leurs rapports avec les législateurs. Le troisième chapitre sera celui où nous mettrons de l’avant les conséquences pratiques de l’application de la théorie de Waldron, mais aussi les critiques à son égard. Après avoir conclu que les précautions que notre auteur tente de mettre dans la présentation de sa théorie sont mises en échec par ses prémisses mêmes, nous tenterons de la modérer en montrant, grâce aux arguments de Leonid Sirota, comment elle pourrait être compatible avec la révision judiciaire en matière de fédéralisme. / Jeremy Waldron is a thinker of New Zealand origin interested by relations between the legislatures and courts. Throughout his career, he has published articles criticizing judicial review and defending the “dignity of legislation.” His work led him to oppose H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls as well as Ronald Dworkin, and have won him many critics, including those of Richard Stacey and Cécile Fabre. His thesis is that, by virtue of the right of popular participation in political life, it should not be left out of decisions affecting its right. The courts having no popular legitimacy, they should yield to the will of the people transmitted by the legislature. Drawing on classical thinkers like Aristotle, Locke and Kant, Waldron demonstrates the surprising support of these thinkers to the theses of popular wisdom, the primacy of the legislation and law’s obedience. This submission’s intention is to explore this original theory and confront it to its critics. Having, in the first chapter, put together the necessary elements for an understanding of the participatory argument against judicial review, we will consider, in the second chapter, a number of rulings from the USA, Canada and the United Kingdom courts, which will help us to understand how judges perceive their relationship with legislators. The third chapter will be where we will put forward the practical consequences of the application of Waldron’s theory, but also its critics. After concluding that the precautions that our author tries to put in the presentation of his theory are put in check by its very premises, we will try to moderate the resulting theory by showing, through Leonid Sirota’s arguments, how it could be compatible with federalism’ based judicial review.

The decision to adopt a formalized charter of rights is a momentous expression of a nations commitment to according and protection certain rights for its citizens. They usually contain complex and ambiguous moral concepts about which people have good faith disagreements. This thesis examines and ultimately rejects the belief put forward by Jeremy Waldron that judicial review is only democratically justifiable if the power of the last word in the interpretation of statutes and charter rights belongs to the democratically appointed legislature instead of the appointed judiciary. This thesis argues that a procedural conception of democracy is too limited and we would do better to base a justification of judicial review using a constitutional conception of democracy. It matters less which party has the authority of the final say with respects to rights-determining decisions and more on whether or not the democratic principle of equal concern for all is satisfied. This thesis introduces the concepts of deference, constitutional conventions, and principles and argues that these, among other things, will inform the constitutional theorists about which powers are actually present in a practice of judicial review. Once the contours of the practice are filled out one can then begin to deliberate about whether a particular conception of judicial review has democratic justification. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

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An instrumental defense of a right to do wrong is plausible because we cannot directly intervene in an individual's choices so as to effectively promote that individual's moral good, if her moral good is conceived as being some form of individual autonomy. An epistemic defense is also plausible if we reorient J.S. Mill's epistemological argument for his Harm Principle in "On Liberty" to center on the agent's knowledge, rather than on the interfering observer's knowledge. Restrictions on harmless acts that are imposed because the acts are wrong are only justifiable to that individual if she herself knows that her acts are wrong. Both approaches depend upon the limited subjectivity and fallibility of the agent or interfering observer. Moreover, both approaches make the justification for a right to knowingly do wrong problematic.

In this thesis, the concept of the procedural aspect of the Rule of Law will be distinguished from what I argue are conceptions that are falsely promulgated as concept. The different aspects of the Rule of Law—form, substance, and procedure— are helpful in making the distinction between concept and conception. Examining procedure within the Rule of Law is particularly important, and I define a broader set of requirements of the concept of the procedural aspect of the Rule of Law. This concept is applied to understand the Indian conception of the Rule of Law, a particularly interesting case that brings out questions about culture and economic capacity. Ultimately, I argue that this broader set of requirements is better suited to evaluate the realization of the Rule of Law in all contexts.

Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.

Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.

Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.