Is there a general moral duty to obey the law because it is the law? This is the question of political obligation. The issue of political obligation is allegedly a central topic of political philosophy, because political obligation is often assumed to be necessary for state legitimacy; that is to say, for a state to be legitimate, it must be capable of imposing political obligation on the governed. Nonetheless, the literature has indicated that it is enormously difficult, at least within the liberal doctrine that many find most attractive, to justify political obligation. Given that political obligation is viewed as an indispensable part of state legitimacy, skepticism about political obligation points to a seemingly inescapable yet disturbing conclusion: no existing liberal state is legitimate, no matter how just it is. This skeptical position is also known as philosophical anarchism. This study aims to show that philosophical anarchism is not as irresistible as it appears. But I do not take the traditional approach of refuting philosophical anarchism by defending or developing theories of political obligation. On the contrary, I devote the first part of my thesis to consolidating the skepticism about political obligation. The approach I favor is to argue that political obligation is not necessary for state legitimacy. If this point can be established, then even if political obligation is unjustified, it will not automatically lead to philosophical anarchism. This constitutes the second part of my thesis, where I develop a conception of “legitimacy without political obligation” and defend it against the objection that it is either conceptually or morally wrong to claim that a legitimate state need not impose political obligation on its subjects. / published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This is a study in the political ethics of liberalism. It uses political obligation theory to shed light on the neutrality-perfectionism debate. My thesis is that neutralism cannot provide a coherent foundation for liberal political morality because a viable account of general political obligation relies on background assumptions about persons and conduct that are reasonably contestable even though they are not illiberal. To make this case, Section I reviews the conceptual details of neutrality across two generations of thinking. Second-generation neutrality, under political liberalism, is the more plausible rendering because it acknowledges that liberalism must stake a middle-ground between non-moral instrumentalism and moral absolutism. Liberalism, in other words, needs a moral reason to be neutral. I question whether political liberalism remains sufficiently moral and sufficiently neutral by asking if it offers mutually sustaining legitimacy and obligation principles. Section II discusses perfectionist ethics and highlights a crucial kind of value, called inherent value, often invoked but rarely scrutinized in political theory. Inherent value marks the main ethical difference between liberal neutrality and illiberal perfectionism, showing how liberal-perfectionist positions on controversial matters can be taken without prescribing for the whole of life. Including this type of value, I then outline the precise neutralist and perfectionist conditions that liberals adopting either perspective would have to meet in justifying general political obligation. Section III then answers my main research question about whether political liberalism’s moral account of political obligation coheres with its neutralist position on legitimacy. My essential claim here is that our responsibility to comply with the moral and epistemological standards of civility is a position from inherent value. And since political liberalism cannot escape these inherent value assumptions while explaining and justifying its account of general political obligation, it is there that we can most clearly see political liberalism’s perfectionist leanings. My dissertation therefore shows a new way to understand that only liberal-perfectionist valuation can hang-together a coherent and viable liberalism for today’s pluralistic polities. / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2011-10-30 21:13:30.823

One of the core issues in contemporary political philosophy is concerned with `political obligation.' Stated in an overly simplified way, the question being asked when one investigates political obligation is, "What, if anything, do citizens owe to their government and how are these obligations generated if they do exist?" The majority of political philosophers investigating this issue agree that a political obligation is a moral requirement to act in certain ways concerning political matters (e.g. a moral requirement to obey the laws and support one's country). Despite this agreement about the general nature of what is being searched for, a broad division has arisen between political obligation theorists - there are some who take political obligations to actually exist ("defenders of political obligation") and there are some who take there to be no general political obligation ("philosophical anarchists"). While there is debate within the camp defending political obligation about what it is that generates the obligations, the common core of all "defender theories" is the fundamental idea that one has a moral requirement(s) to support and obey the political institutions of one's country. Despite utilitarianism's status as one of the major ethical theories, historically, it has largely been dismissed by theorists concerned with political obligation. Within the contemporary debate it is generally accepted that utilitarianism cannot adequately accommodate a robust theory of political obligation. The overarching objective of this dissertation is to challenge this general dismissal of a utilitarian account and to build upon the two accounts which have been developed (R.M. Hare's and Rolf Sartorius') in offering a robust utilitarian theory of political obligation which can be considered a competitor to the other contemporary theories (i.e., theories of consent, gratitude, fair play or fairness, membership or association, and natural duty). However, as this utilitarian account of political obligation develops, the possibility will also emerge for a non-antagonistic relationship between the utilitarian theory on offer and the contemporary political obligation debate. The moral reasons posited by the traditional theories of political obligation (i.e., consent, fair play, gratitude, associative, and natural duty) can be included in and accommodated by my utilitarian account. The utilitarian account of political obligation can accept that there are many types of reasons explaining why broad expectations concerning individual and group behavior are created, and each type of reason can be understood as supporting the utilitarian claim that there are moral reasons for following the laws and supporting legitimate political authorities. Taken all together, my arguments will take the form of a three tiered response to the prevailing opinion that any utilitarian attempt to account for political obligations is doomed. The first tier contends that the utilitarian can consistently claim that there are moral reasons to follow the law. This is not a particularly strong claim, but it is one which has been denied by the vast majority of political theorists. The second tier of my argument addresses this apparent issue by contending that even the traditional deontological accounts of political obligation are not offering more than this. Lastly, it is contended that, given the contingent features of humans (i.e., intellectual fallibility, selfish biases, and the way moral education is tied to rules), the strength of the utilitarian political obligations is comparable to other accounts' analyses of the obligations.

Although political dissent is an idea that perennially receives much public attention, its standing in the academic literature is relatively slight. Very few thinkers engage the idea of dissent outside of its manifestation as an illegal action, and ever fewer dedicate any time to understanding the idea conceptually. A substantial portion of my dissertation aims to address this conspicuous gap. In the remaining portion, I advance a normative claim. My claim is that the very same justificatory considerations that pertain to illegal acts of dissent pertain as well to those acts that ought to be legally protected by a citizen’s right to dissent. Put more simply, I argue that whether or not a dissenting action is done within, or outside of, the law is of no normative effect. The upshot of this argument is that it places the burden on agents to be responsible for all the dissenting actions they undertake. This is so regardless of whether or not those actions find institutional shelter. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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The problem that this thesis addresses is what was meant by politics based on consent in seventeenth-century England. It proceeds by examining several of the best-known English political writers, beginning with Richard Hooker and ending with John Locke. It attempts to offer an historical account of the meaning of consent, and its relationship to political obligation. The method used is both philosophical and historical. It examines the cogency and coherence of doctrines of consent that were articulated, beginning with Hooker, touches on several theories of consent that arose during the period of the English Civil War, and examines the relative importance of consent theories during the Restoration and Glorious Revolution. It considers consent, or contract theory in light of two models: a 'social contract theory' that argues from a state of nature, and 'constitutional contract theory' that understands consent as consent to law. The nature of political obligation is a function of both varieties of consent theory. The general conclusion is that, despite the arguments of the Levellers for a politics based on 'each man's consent', John Locke does not use this vocabulary of consent. He relies instead on a variant form of English constitutionalism, a variety of consent theory that has affinities with that of Richard Hooker's, that assumes that Parliament consents to law for all. It concludes by arguing that, in spite of recent readings of consent theories that have suggested that political obligation was simply understood as a duty to God, one's consent to particular laws was a necessary component of one's obligation and willingness to obey. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

The essays included in this dissertation develop a fair play account of state legitimacy. I argue for a modest revision to the traditional analysis of legitimacy. I then defend the principle of fair play against common objections. Next, I argue that the principle of fair play is capable of generating all the rights included in the new analysis of legitimacy defended earlier. Finally, I argue that the principle of fair play grounds the legitimacy of existing reasonably just states.

The purpose of this essay is to increase the understanding of the discussion of political obligation. This concern the questions if, how, and to what extent people are required to obey state commands. More specifically the purpose is to increase the understanding of one of the topics main theories, the natural duty of justice. This account states that people have a natural duty to comply with just institutions that apply to them, independent of any voluntary actions.  For this a discourse surrounding the theory has been examined and evaluated. It consists of Rawls argument for the theory, a criticism formulated by Simmons, and a defence formulated by Waldron. Rawls argues that for a just society to be stable, the natural duty of justice is necessary, and also sufficient for basing political obligations. Simmons criticises this account for dispensing of voluntary actions that he sees as necessary for political obligation. Without these, the application of just institutions is morally insignificant. Waldron then defends the account by adding additional requirements for institutions to apply, besides justice. Institutions also have to be effective, in the sense that they are able to enact justice, and legitimate in the sense that they are preferable to other alternatives.  I will argue that justice of institutions is necessary but insufficient for them to apply to people. Voluntary actions like consent will also be argued to be unnecessary for institutions application to be morally significant. If institutions are not only just but also effective and legitimate, in the sense that they are the most just and effective in relation to the viable alternatives, then their application and commands has moral significance. The conclusion of this essay then is that the natural duty of justice can account for political obligations, given high demands for institutions to apply.

A obrigação política é interpretada como um problema de cooperação. Inicialmente rejeita-se a idéia de que a cooperação sempre emerge do equilíbrio de ações autointeressadas. Discutindo alguns dos mais conhecidos princípios morais para a obrigação política são rejeitadas princípios verticais, como a gratidão e o consentimento, e alguns princípios horizontais, como dever natural e deveres associativos. Defende-se, por fim a equidade como um princípio moral capaz de dar sentido à obrigação política entendida como requisito de uma sociedade entendida como um empreendimento cooperativo. / Political obligation is treated as a cooperation problem. At first, an account that cooperation always emerges as equilibrium of self-interested actions is rejected. Discussing some of most popular moral principles of political obligations, we reject vertical principles, as gratitude and consent, and some horizontal principles, like associative and natural duty, that are not centered in the idea of society as cooperation. Finally, the principle of fairness is defended as the most adequate moral principle to make sense of political obligation as requisite of a society understood as a cooperative venture.

This thesis addresses the moral permissibility of illegal acts of animal liberation in the form of civil disobedience, acts of rescue, and acts of sabotage. Animal liberation movements have been the subject of much media and political attention, with particular focus on use liberationist strategies of intimidation, vandalism, and harassment. Governments have mobilised state apparatus in surveillance, infiltration, and investigation, and have characterising radical activism as 'terrorism'. The variety of illegal activities aimed at preventing harm to non-human animals, particularly those involving violence towards property or persons, have often been classified together under the term 'animal liberation' and assumed to be wrong. I argue that the assumption of wrongness is questionable because it fails to give significant weight to the justification for acts of animal liberation. I pose the question as to whether and what illegal practices of animal liberation are ethically justifiable. I begin by arguing that non-human animals are worthy of moral consideration for their own sake, because their sentience above a basic level, particularly their capacity to suffer, gives moral agents reasons to acknowledge and respect their goods. Following this, I defend the claim that liberal democratic states that fail to treat animals living within them with respect are unjust. This injustice provides a justification for civil disobedience on behalf of non-human animals. Following this, I argue that beings worthy of moral consideration are owed positive duties of aid and easy rescue and I extend third-party intervention theory to non-human animals under threat from humans. I explore the limits to the duties of aid and intervention, using principles drawn from those of humanitarian intervention to identify duty bearers, and I weigh those duties against duties to fellow citizens and the state.